

| RICHARD C. HALL, EDITOR |

WAR in the BALKANS

*An Encyclopedic History from the Fall of the
Ottoman Empire to the Breakup of Yugoslavia*



War in the Balkans

This page intentionally left blank

War in the Balkans

AN ENCYCLOPEDIC HISTORY FROM THE FALL
OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO THE BREAKUP
OF YUGOSLAVIA

Richard C. Hall, Editor



Santa Barbara, California • Denver, Colorado • Oxford, England

Copyright © 2014 by ABC-CLIO, LLC

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

War in the Balkans : an encyclopedic history from the fall of the Ottoman Empire to the breakup of Yugoslavia / Richard C. Hall, editor.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-61069-030-0 (hard copy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-61069-031-7 (ebook)

1. Balkan Peninsula—History, Military—20th century—Encyclopedias. I. Hall, Richard C. (Richard Cooper), 1950– editor.

DR45.W37 2014

949.6'0403—dc23

2014014296

ISBN: 978-1-61069-030-0

EISBN: 978-1-61069-031-7

18 17 16 15 14 1 2 3 4 5

This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook.
Visit www.abc-clio.com for details.

ABC-CLIO, LLC

130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911
Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911

This book is printed on acid-free paper (∞)

Manufactured in the United States of America

As ever for
Audrey

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

List of Maps, xiii

Preface, xv

Introduction, xvii

REFERENCE ENTRIES

Abdulhamid II (1842–1918), 1

Adrianople, Siege of, 1912–1913, 2

Adrianople, Treaty of, 1829, 3

Albania, Italian Occupation of, 1939, 3

Albania in the Balkan Wars, 5

Albania in World War I, 7

Albania in World War II, 8

Albanian Uprisings, 1910–1911, 10

Alexander I, King of Yugoslavia
(1888–1934), 11

Alexander Obrenović, King of Serbia
(1876–1903), 12

Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria
(1857–1893), 13

Ali Pasha (1750?–1822), 14

Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946), 15

Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during
World War I, 16

Averescu, Alexandru (1859–1938), 18

Balkan Entente, 1934, 20

Balkan League, 20

Balkan Pact, 1954, 21

Balkan War, First, 1912–1913, 22

Balkan War, Second, 1913, 26

Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes, 28

Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Consequences, 31

Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Naval
Campaigns, 32

Balli Kombetar, 33

Berlin, Treaty of, 1878, 34

Bessarabia, 35

Bihać, 36

Black Hand, 36

Black Sea Campaign, 1941–1944, 37

Boris III, Czar of Bulgaria (1894–1943), 39

Bosnia, Austrian Occupation, 1878, 40

Bosnian Crisis, 1908–1909, 41

Bosnian Forces, 43

Bosnian Revolt, 1876, 44

Bosnian War, 1992–1995, 45

Brioni Agreement, 47

- Bucharest, Treaty of, 1913, 47
- Bucharest, Treaty of, 1918, 48
- Bukovina, 49
- Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars, 50
- Bulgaria in World War I, 53
- Bulgaria in World War II, 57
- Bulgarian “Fatherland War,” 1944–1945, 58
- Bulgarian Horrors, 1876, 59
- Bulgarian-Serb War, 1885, 60
- Carol I, King of Romania (1839–1914), 62
- Carol II, King of Romania (1893–1953), 63
- Ceausescu, Nicolae (1918–1989), 64
- Cer Mountain, Battle of, 1914, 66
- Četniks, 67
- Chataldzha, Battle of, 1912, 68
- Cherniaev, M. G. (1824–1898), 70
- Cold War in the Balkans, 70
- Constantine I, King of Greece (1868–1923), 73
- Constantinople, Treaty of, 1913, 75
- Contested Zone (Macedonia), 1912, 75
- Corfu Channel Incident, 1946, 76
- Corfu Declaration, 1917, 77
- Corfu Incident, 1923, 78
- Cretan Crisis, 1896, 79
- Crete, Battle of, 1941, 80
- Crimean War, Balkan Operations, 82
- Croat Forces, 1991–1995, 83
- Croat War, 1991–1995, 84
- Cypriot Civil War, 1963, 87
- Cyprus War, 1974, 88
- Dayton Peace Accords, 1995, 91
- Dimitriev, Radko (1859–1918), 92
- Dimitrijević, Dragutin (1876–1917), 93
- Djilas, Milovan (1911–1995), 94
- Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918, 95
- Dobrudja, 96
- Dodecanese Campaign, 1944, 97
- Doiran, Battles of, 1915–1918, 98
- EAM/ELAS, 100
- EDES, 101
- Enver Pasha (1882–1922), 102
- Epirus, 104
- Ferdinand I, Czar of Bulgaria (1861–1948), 106
- Fiume/Rijeka, 1919–1924, 106
- Gallipoli, 1915, 108
- Germany in the Balkans during World War I, 111
- Germany in the Balkans during World War II, 113
- Greco-Italian War, 1940–1941, 116
- Greco-Ottoman War, 1897, 118
- Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922, 119
- Greece, Invasion of, 1941, 120
- Greece in the Balkan Wars, 122
- Greece in World War I, 123
- Greece in World War II, 125
- Greek Civil War, 129
- Greek Military Coup, 1909, 132
- Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832, 133

- Greens (Montenegro), 134
- Handschar SS Division, 135
- Herzegovina Revolt, 1875, 136
- The Holocaust in the Balkans, 137
- Horseshoe, Operation, 1998, 141
- Hoxha, Enver (1908–1985), 142
- Ilinden Uprising, 1903, 144
- Iron Guard, 145
- Italy in the Balkans during World War I, 146
- Italy in the Balkans during World War II, 148
- Izetbegović, Alija (1925–2003), 150
- Janina, Siege of, 1912–1913, 153
- JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army), 154
- Kalimantsi, Battle of, 1913, 157
- Karadžić, Radovan (1945–), 157
- Karageorge (George Petrović; 1768–1818), 158
- Kemal, Mustafa (1881–1938), 160
- Kosovo, Battle of, 1915, 162
- Kosovo Liberation Army, 163
- Kosovo War, 1998–1999, 164
- Kumanovo, Battle of, 1912, 166
- Lake Prespa, Battle of, 1917, 168
- Lausanne, Treaty of, 1923, 169
- Levski, Vasil (1837–1873), 170
- Little Entente, 171
- London, Treaty of, 1913, 172
- Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, Battle of, 1912, 173
- Macedonia, 174
- Macedonian Front, 1915–1918, 176
- Macedonian War, 2001, 178
- Mahmud II, Ottoman Sultan (1785–1839), 180
- Mahmud Muhtar Pasha (1866–1935), 182
- Mărășești, Battle of, 1917, 184
- Mehmet Ali (1769–1849), 185
- Metaxas, Ioannis (1871–1941), 186
- Michael I, King of Romania (1921–), 187
- Mihailov, Ivan (1896–1990), 187
- Mihajlović, Dragoljub “Draža” (1893–1946), 188
- Military League (Bulgaria), 189
- Milošević, Slobodan (1941–2006), 190
- Mladić, Ratko (1943–), 192
- Montenegro in Balkan Events, 1876–1878, 193
- Montenegro in the Balkan Wars, 194
- Montenegro in World War I, 195
- National Schism (Greece), 1916–1917, 197
- NATO in the Balkans, 198
- Navarino, Battle of, 1827, 199
- Nedić, Milan (1877–1946), 201
- Neuilly, Treaty of, 1920, 203
- Nikola I, King of Montenegro (1841–1921), 204
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 205
- Novi Pazar, Sanjak of, 207
- Obrenović, Milan (1854–1901), 209
- Obrenović, Miloš (1780–1860), 210
- Odessa, Siege of, 1941, 210

- Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations in the Balkans and Crete, 212
- Ottoman Empire, 214
- Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars, 215
- Ottoman Empire in World War I, 220
- Papandreou, George (1888–1968), 223
- Partisans, Albania, 224
- Partisans, Bulgaria, 225
- Partisans, Yugoslavia, 226
- Pavličić, Ante (1889–1959), 227
- Pleven, Siege of, 1877, 228
- Ploeshti, Bombing of, 1943–1944, 229
- Princip, Gavrilo (1894–1918), 231
- Putnik, Radomir (1847–1917), 232
- Radomir Rebellion, 1918, 236
- Romania, Invasion of, 1916, 237
- Romania, Invasion of, 1944, 238
- Romania in the Balkan Wars, 240
- Romania in World War I, 242
- Romania in World War II, 245
- Romanian Campaign in Hungary, 1919, 248
- Romanian Campaign in Hungary, 1944–1945, 249
- Romanian Coup, August 1944, 250
- Romanian Peasant Uprising, 251
- Russo-Ottoman War, 1806–1812, 252
- Russo-Ottoman War, 1828–1829, 254
- Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878, 256
- Saint-Germain, Treaty of, 1919, 259
- Sakarya River, Battle of, 1921, 261
- Salonika, 262
- San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878, 264
- Sarajevo, Siege of, 1992–1995, 265
- Sarajevo Assassination, 1914, 266
- Sarkoy and Baloyir, Battles of, 1913, 267
- Savov, Mihail (1857–1928), 268
- Scutari, Siege of, 1912–1913, 269
- Selim III (1761–1808), 270
- Serbia, Invasions of, 1914, 271
- Serbia, Invasions of, 1915, 272
- Serbia and the Balkan Wars, 274
- Serbia in World War I, 277
- Serbian Retreat, 1915, 280
- Serbian War of Independence, 1804–1817, 281
- Serbo-Ottoman War, 1876, 283
- Sèvres, Treaty of, 1920, 284
- Shipka Pass, Battles of, 1877–1878, 286
- Skanderbeg SS Division, 287
- Slivnitsa, Battle of, 1885, 288
- Slovene War, 1991, 289
- Smyrna, Destruction of, 1922, 291
- Srebrenica Massacre, 1995, 292
- Stalingrad, Battle of, 1942–1943, 293
- Stamboliski, Aleksandür (1879–1923), 297
- Stepanović, Stepa (1856–1929), 298
- Storm, Operation, 1995, 299
- Süleyman Hüsnü Pasha (1838–1892), 300
- Tepelene, Ali Pasha (1744–1822), 303
- Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980), 305
- Transnistrian War, 307
- Trianon, Treaty of, 1920, 308

Trieste Dispute, 310	Yugoslavia, 337
Truman Doctrine, 311	Yugoslavia, Axis Occupation Forces in World War II, 340
Tsolakoglou, Georgios (1886–1948), 313	Yugoslavia, Collaborationist Forces in World War II, 342
Tudjman, Franjo (1922–1999), 314	Yugoslavia, Invasion of, 1941, 345
UNPROFOR, 316	Yugoslavia in World War II, 347
Ustaša, 317	Yugoslav Military Coup, 351
Vance-Owen Plan, 1993, 319	Yugoslav Overflight Incidents, 1946, 353
Vaphiadis, Markos (1906–1992), 320	Yugoslav-Soviet Split, 353
Venizélos, Eleuthérios (1864–1936), 321	Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, 355
Vienna Award, Second, 322	Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes, 358
Vladimirescu, Tudor (1780–1821), 324	Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences, 360
VMRO, 325	Zhekov, Nikola (1864–1949), 364
Vukovar, Siege of, 1991, 327	Zog, King of the Albanians (1895–1961), 365
Warsaw Pact, 328	
World War II Peace Settlement in the Balkans, 331	
Young Turks, 334	
Ypsilantis, Alexander (1792–1828), 336	

Chronology, 367

Bibliography, 371

Editor and Contributors, 375

Topical Index, 379

Categorical Index, 387

General Index, 393

About the Editor, 411

This page intentionally left blank

List of Maps

Contemporary Balkans, xxi
Bosnia and Herzegovina, xxii
Croatia, xxiii
Serbia, xxiv
The Balkans, 1878–1913, 29
Bosnian Genocide, 1992–1995, 46
Dardanelles/Gallipoli Campaign, 1915, 109
Ottoman Empire, 1877, 217
Balkan Front, 1914–1918, 278
Yugoslavia, 1945, 348

This page intentionally left blank

Preface

Southeastern Europe, also known as the Balkan Peninsula, has a distinct geography. It is bordered on the west, south, and east by significant bodies of water, the Adriatic Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the Black Sea, respectively. In general, the reverse “S” of the southern part of the Carpathian mountain system provides a northern border. The topography of much of the interior is irregular. The Danube River system provides a unifying route through much of the region.

The Balkan Peninsula has long maintained a political and cultural identity distinct from that of Western Europe. The major defining characteristics were established by the split in Christian ideology in the eleventh century and the Ottoman conquest in the fifteenth century. Afterward, the Balkan Peninsula was largely under the political control of the Ottoman Empire from its capital in the ancient imperial city of Constantinople, and under the cultural direction of the Orthodox Church, also based in Constantinople.

Any precise characterization of this region is very difficult. For purposes of this volume, the Balkan Peninsula is defined as that part of southeastern Europe that is largely Orthodox Christian or Muslim culturally south of the mountain divide. This includes the modern states of Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia,

Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey. Other areas that at the time were in political arrangements with Balkan partners, such as Croatia and Slovenia, are dealt with only in the context of those arrangements.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, western European ideas based upon Enlightenment principles had begun to intrude into southeastern Europe. The influx of concepts such as reason, rights of man, and nationalism caused major disruptions throughout the region. The peoples of the Balkans sought to emulate the perceived successes of the western European national states. Conflict and war marked the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the Balkans as the inhabitants adopted national identities and sought political arrangements to conform to those identities. Inevitably these national conflicts attracted the attention of the European Great Powers, who sought economic and political advantage from them. This process continued on into the twentieth century and the cataclysms of World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. This volume is intended as a guide to these conflicts in this region.

All dates in this volume are according to the Western or Gregorian calendar, even though it did not come into general usage in the region until the early twentieth century. Transliterations from Cyrillic are

based upon the Library of Congress system. Place names are generally given according to the most common usage, although I have made an effort to include alternative place names—i.e., Scutari (Shkodër). Other names are given according to their time

reference—i.e., Constantinople until 1923, and Istanbul afterward. I have attempted to be consistent throughout the locations and names of the peoples of the Balkans. I take full responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation that appear here.

Introduction

Ottoman domination of southeastern Europe, often referred to as the Balkans, began in the fourteenth century. Initial Ottoman rule provided relative peace and stability for the region for the next three centuries. This was the *pax ottomanica*, or the Ottoman Peace. The long Ottoman decline began after the Ottoman defeat outside the city of Vienna in 1683. Throughout the eighteenth century, Ottoman control of southeastern Europe receded. This permitted the intrusion of Enlightenment ideas from Western Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. The concept of nationalism, imported from Western Europe, in particular caused desires for political change throughout the Balkans. Its influence would provide the main basis for conflict in southeastern Europe, lasting throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At first the self-identified nationalities of the Balkans, first the Serbs, then the Greeks, Romanians, Bulgarians, and finally the Albanians all sought to obtain national states, mainly at the expense of Ottoman rule.

This process lasted throughout the nineteenth century. It began in 1804 with the Serbian revolt. Although initially the Serbs acted to redress local wrongs, their revolt soon assumed nationalist overtones. By 1818, Ottoman authorities in Constantinople acknowledged the autonomous status of a

small region around Belgrade. Gradually the Ottoman government granted additional privileges, which culminated in full independence at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

Next, the Greeks sought complete separation from Ottoman authority. Their revolt against Ottoman rule started in 1821. By 1827, the Greeks, with the help of the Great Powers, obtained an independent state. The borders of newly independent Greece did not conform to the distribution of Greek-speaking people in southeastern Europe. Accordingly, the government in Athens adopted a policy of irredentism.

The withdrawal of the Russians from the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1856 and the unification of the principalities under the same prince that same year marked the establishment of Romania. The formal end of Ottoman suzerainty at Berlin in 1878 established a fully independent Romania.

Due to their proximity to the Ottoman capital, the Bulgarians were slower to develop a national movement. A nationalist revolt against Ottoman rule in 1876 failed. This failure, however, attracted Russian sympathy and support. The Russians intervened against the Ottomans the next year, initiating the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. The Russian victory in that conflict

established a Bulgarian state that technically remained under Ottoman suzerainty. Through the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, the Great European Powers confirmed the borders of the Bulgarian principality as well as the independence of Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia.

The Treaty of Berlin satisfied none of the Balkan states. All sought unification with their co-nationals in the Ottoman Empire and, in the case of the Romanians and Serbs, also those living in Austria-Hungary. The Romanians additionally recognized a Romanian minority within the borders of the Russian Empire in Bessarabia. Sometimes, as in the case of Ottoman Macedonia, the aspirations of the Balkan states overlapped. After 1878, all of the Balkan states attempted to realize their national ambitions. National unification was perceived as the necessary basis for further economic and political development. National rivalries, however, precluded unified action by the Balkan states against the Ottomans.

The Young Turk Coup in Constantinople in 1908, with its stated goals of military and political reform, motivated the leaders of the Balkan states to begin diplomatic talks for a Balkan alliance. They recognized that they would be less likely to realize their nationalist agendas at the expense of a revitalized Ottoman Empire. The outbreak of the Italian-Ottoman war in 1911 provided further incentive for a Balkan Alliance. In the fall of 1912, a Balkan League was formed. It was really a loose series of bilateral agreements.

In October 1912, in the First Balkan War, the Balkan League overwhelmed the Ottoman Empire. By the spring of 1913, the Ottoman Empire was limited to a bit of territory in front of Constantinople and a part of the Gallipoli Peninsula. In December 1912, an independent Albania emerged

from the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire. This weak state soon became the object of contention from its Greek, Montenegrin, and Serbian neighbors.

The Balkan allies failed to find a formula for the division of the conquered Ottoman territories. Consequently, in the summer of 1913, Bulgaria confronted its erstwhile allies primarily because of disputes over Macedonia. The ensuing Second Balkan War was brief but bloody. While Bulgarian forces were deployed against the Greeks and Serbs, the Ottomans and Romanians seized the opportunity to invade Bulgaria from the southeast and northeast. After a month of fighting, the Bulgarians sued for peace. They surrendered territory to all of the surrounding states.

Even though Austro-Hungarian and Italian objections had barred Serbia from access to the Adriatic, Serbian troops continued to maintain a presence in the new state of Albania after the Balkan Wars. The antagonism between Austria-Hungary and Serbia continued through 1913 and into 1914. One consequence was the Sarajevo assassination on June 28, 1914.

For the Balkan peoples, World War I was a continuation of the fighting that had begun in the autumn of 1912. Three Austro-Hungarian invasions of Serbia in 1914 failed. When the Austro-Hungarians returned in 1915, they had assistance from the Bulgarians and the Germans. Bulgarians were eager to obtain Macedonia, which they had lost in the Balkan Wars. The Central Powers quickly overran Serbia and neighboring Montenegro. In an effort to help the beleaguered Serbs, British and French forces landed at Salonika. The Bulgarians, however, stopped and contained them at the Greek frontier. The war divided Greece into supporters of the Entente and advocates of neutrality. This lasted until the summer of

1917, when the interventionists, with British and French military assistance, ousted neutralist King Constantine. Afterward, Greek troops deployed on the Macedonian Front alongside the British, French, Italian, and Serbian forces.

The Romanians had joined the Entente in the summer of 1916. They quickly advanced into Austro-Hungarian territory. A rapid Central Powers counterattack thrust deeply into Romania. The Russian revolution left Romania isolated and forced the Romanian government to accede to terms with the Central Powers.

An Entente offensive undertaken on September 15, 1918, broke through the Bulgarian lines at Dobro Pole. The Bulgarians, exhausted after six years of intermittent war, collapsed and sued for peace. The Ottomans followed soon afterward. In November 1918, Serbian troops, advancing north from the Macedonian Front, finally returned to their homeland. At the same time, Romania rejoined the Entente.

The conclusion of World War I in southeastern Europe did not end conflict there. After a turbulent birth as a nation, Albania increasingly came under Italian control. Bulgaria, defeated for the second time in five years, remained committed to unification with Macedonia. Montenegro disappeared into the new South Slav state, officially called Yugoslavia after 1929. Yugoslavia, together with the other two Balkan victors in World War I, Greece and Romania, struggled to maintain the status quo in the face of foreign and domestic opposition. The former Ottoman Empire was revitalized as a secular Turkey under the leadership of the former Young Turk Mustapha Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938).

The rise of Nazi Germany and its demands for foodstuffs and raw materials brought unprecedented prosperity to the

Balkan states. By the mid-1930s, they all had strong economic ties with Germany. Bulgaria also was attracted to German revisionism. The failure of the British and French to protect Czechoslovakia at Munich also made clear to the Balkan states the fact of German continental domination. By the time of the outbreak of World War II in 1939, all of the Balkan states were in some position of subservience to Nazi Germany. The only possible exception was Albania, which Italy invaded and annexed in April 1939. The seizure of Romanian territory by Bulgaria, Hungary, and Soviet Russia in the summer of 1940 served to emphasize German domination of the region.

Actual fighting returned to the Balkans in the fall of 1940 when Italian dictator Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) sought to recreate the Roman Empire by invading Greece from Italian bases in Albania. Greek resistance soon pushed the invaders back into Albania. The British hastened to send aid to Greece. This attracted the attention of the Germans, who were then planning their invasion of Soviet Russia in the following spring, Operation Barbarossa. Hitler decided to eliminate this potential threat to the southern flank of Operation Barbarossa. A pro-British coup in Yugoslavia added urgency to the German plans. In Operation Marita, German troops swiftly overran Yugoslavia and Greece. On the eve of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, all of southeastern Europe was under the control of Nazi Germany or its Bulgarian, Hungarian, or Italian allies.

When the Germans invaded Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941, they received considerable aid in manpower and material from Romania. Meanwhile, strong resistance against the Germans and their collaborators began to emerge in Greece and Yugoslavia. In both places this developed into a three-sided

conflict among collaborators, pro-Communist resistance, and anti-Communist resistance. At the same time, deep in Soviet Russia, the Romanian army shared in the disaster at Stalingrad. By the summer of 1944, the Red Army was at the eastern approaches of the Balkans while the Communist resistance forces in Greece and Yugoslavia were winning the conflicts against both the collaborators and the anti-Communists. At the end of the summer, first Romania and then Bulgaria changed sides, and began to fight alongside the Red Army. The Germans undertook a long retreat out of Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia.

The victorious Red Army then imposed Soviet-style regimes in Bulgaria and Romania. The triumphant Partisans of Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) did the same thing in Yugoslavia and Albania. Tito, however, came to resent the Soviet presence in his country, and in 1948, he broke off his connections to them. The Albanians utilized this Yugoslav-Soviet break to rid themselves of the Yugoslavs. Meanwhile in Greece, the three-sided fighting of World War II had morphed into a civil war between pro- and anti-Communist forces. By 1950, the anti-Communist forces had prevailed in this conflict, due in part to the considerable quantities of aid from the United States and other Western countries.

The next three decades were relatively quiet in the Balkans. Greece and Turkey joined the Western military alliance NATO, while Bulgaria and Romania adhered to the Soviet-backed Warsaw Pact. Yugoslavia and, after 1961, Albania remained outside of the Cold War organizations. Ideology triumphed over nationalism, at least for the time being. The *pax sovietica* replicated the *pax ottomanica* that had prevailed in the region up until the nineteenth century.

The death of Tito on May 4, 1980, and the decline of Soviet power through the

subsequent decade allowed dormant Balkan nationalisms to revive. Communist regimes in Bulgaria and Romania quickly collapsed at the end of 1989. While the Bulgarian Communists conceded power with little resistance, the Communist regime in Romania fell with considerable violence. In 1992, the end of the isolated Communist government in Albania attracted little world notice. This was mainly because neighboring Yugoslavia was undergoing ideological and national collapse. The adhesive qualities of Titoism had eroded considerably over the 10 years after the Yugoslav dictator's death. A particularly virulent nationalism revived throughout Yugoslavia. A series of bloody wars tore the state apart. By 1996, Yugoslavia had dissolved into its national components, with Montenegro and Serbia still maintaining a loose confederation. By 2010, not only had the Montenegrin-Serbian arrangement ended, but Kosovo had declared its independence from Serbia. Out of the six federal states of Titoist Yugoslavia had emerged seven independent states.

In the aftermath of the nationalist revival in southeastern Europe, all of the new governments sought inclusion in wider European organizations. Greece and Turkey had been members of NATO since the Cold War, and Greece was one of the original members of the European Union. Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007. As of this writing, the other Balkan states are all in the process of joining both of these international organizations. After two tumultuous centuries of nationalist conflict in southeastern Europe, full admission and participation in international organizations offers at last some expectations of peace and prosperity for the region. These were exactly the same goals the Balkan peoples had anticipated gaining with the achievement of national unity.

CONTEMPORARY BALKANS



BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA



CROATIA



SERBIA



A

Abdulhamid II (1842–1918)

Ottoman sultan, the son of Sultan Abdulmejid, Abdulhamid was born on September 21, 1842. He succeeded to the throne on the deposition of his brother Murad on August 31, 1876, and ruled until April 27, 1909. Abdulhamid II enjoyed near absolutist rule. He attempted to carry out reforms, but these latter proved impossible. His reign came to be marked by war, internal violence, upheaval, and pressure on the empire from outside powers. A revolt occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875, and war with Serbia and Montenegro followed, leading to Russian intervention and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. The latter was a disaster for the empire, although the harsh effects of the Treaty of San Stefano were somewhat mitigated by the 1878 Congress of Berlin. In gratitude for London's assistance at that conference, Turkey ceded Cyprus to Britain in 1878. In 1881, the French seized Tunis in North Africa, and in 1882, British forces occupied Egypt. Despite the Ottoman wartime victory over Greece in 1897, the Great Powers insisted that Turkey yield Crete.

Abdulhamid pursued a surprisingly liberal policy toward the Jews. In 1876, he allowed Jews of the empire full equality before the law. Jews were elected to the Ottoman Parliament, and Abdulhamid named two Jews as senators. Another Jew was made an admiral in the Turkish navy. In Palestine, Abdulhamid introduced administrative reforms that improved the situation

for the people there, and during his reign the Hejaz Railroad was constructed to Medina and Mecca.

Abdulhamid strongly opposed Zionist aspirations for a state in Palestine, however. This was at least in part because he feared that resulting increased immigration from the European states, especially from Turkey's historic enemy Russia, would lead to expanded European influence in the empire. Following expanded Jewish emigration from Russia after the 1881 pogroms, in 1882 Abdulhamid prohibited Jewish immigration to Palestine. He rescinded the order in 1883 but reinstated it in 1891. Nonetheless, the regulations against immigration were not stringently enforced, and Jews were still able to settle in Palestine.

In June 1896 Abdulhamid awarded Zionist leader Theodor Herzl (1860–1904) the Commander's Cross of the Majidiyya Order. In May 1891 the sultan received Herzl in private audience, although this brought no tangible advantages to Zionism. Abdulhamid rejected Herzl's effort to secure a charter that would have established an autonomous Jewish settlement in Palestine in return for cash payments to help reduce the Turkish national debt. Abdulhamid suggested instead that Jewish immigrants settle in various parts of the Ottoman Empire.

Dissatisfaction with the continued deterioration of the Ottoman domestic situation coupled with crumbling frontiers brought the rise of the Young Turk movement and the Revolution of 1908. Suspected of sympathies with a counterrevolutionary coup

2 | Adrianople, Siege of, 1912–1913

attempt of April 23, 1909, Abdulhamid was deposed on April 27. Banished to Salonika, he was permitted to return to Istanbul in 1912 and passed his last years studying and working at his hobby of carpentry. Abdulhamid died in Istanbul on February 10, 1918.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Berlin, Treaty of, 1878; Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878; San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878; Young Turks

Further Reading

Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*. New York: Avon, 1989.

Kent, Marian, ed. *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*. London: Routledge, 1996.

Palmer, Alan. *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire*. London: John Murray, 1992.

Adrianople, Siege of, 1912–1913

The siege of Adrianople (Turkish: Edirne, Bulgarian: Odrin) was a protracted engagement during the First Balkan War that began in October 1912 when the Bulgarian Second Army blocked the Ottoman fortress city of Adrianople and ended on March 26, 1913, when the Bulgarian Second Army together with the allied Serbian Second Army succeeded in taking the city.

Adrianople was the city in Thrace. In 1912, it had a mixed largest population of around 76,000, of whom about half were Turkish and the other half Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and others. At the start of the war it was not initially a major Bulgarian objective. The Ottomans had fortified Adrianople as a forward defensive position to protect Constantinople. The fortifications at Adrianople

consisted of two lines of fortified positions surrounding the city. The garrison consisted of 52,597 men and officers, under the command of Ferik Mehmed Sukru Pasha (1857–1916). Initially the Bulgarians intended only to employ their Second Army under General Nikola Ivanov to screen Adrianople to prevent Ottoman forces from the garrison from attacking the flanks of the main Bulgarian force moving east of the city toward Constantinople. After the Bulgarian success at Lozengrad, the Bulgarians decided to initiate a siege. Soon afterward the Russians indicated that they would not object to a Bulgarian presence there.

At the time of the December armistice, the Bulgarians had surrounded the city and subjected it to regular artillery bombardments. They also had called upon their Serbian allies for help. By November 12 the Serbian Second Army under the command of General Stepa Stepanović had arrived to augment Bulgarian forces. The Balkan allies remained in place during the armistice. After the Ottomans denounced the armistice, the Bulgarians resumed their bombardments. Additional Serbian artillery arrived in February. On March 24 the Bulgarians and Serbs began an infantry assault on the Ottoman positions. By March 26 they had taken the center of the city and accepted the surrender of Sukru Pasha.

Victory came at a high cost. The Bulgarians lost 18,282 men in the siege. The Ottomans lost about 15,000 in siege operations and around 60,000 were taken prisoner. Civilian casualties in the city due to the bombardment as well as to disease and lack of food resources undoubtedly increased Ottoman losses. The Bulgarian success was short lived. Fighting in Macedonia against their erstwhile Greek and Serbian allies during the Second Balkan War forced them to transfer most of their troops to the west. The small Bulgarian

garrison remaining in Adrianople was unable to contest control of the city when Ottoman forces returned. The Ottomans reoccupied Adrianople on July 23 without firing a shot. The Bulgarian occupation of Adrianople had lasted about as long as the Bulgarian siege.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Balkan War, Second, 1913; Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Erickson, Edward J. *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Vachkov, Alexander. *The Balkan War, 1912–1913*. Sofia: Angela, 2005.

Adrianople, Treaty of, 1829

The treaty concluding the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828–1829 was signed on September 14, 1829, in Adrianople by Russia's Count Aleksey Orlov (1787–1862) and by the Ottoman Empire's Abdul Kadyr-Bey. Russia, whose forces had advanced as far as Adrianople during the war, abandoned most of its conquests beyond the Danube but gained territory at the mouth of the Danube and acquired substantial territories in the Caucasus and southern Georgia. The Porte recognized Russia's possession of western Georgia and of the Khanates of Yevivan and Nakhichevan, which had been ceded to Russia by Iran in the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828). The Ottomans recognized the autonomy of Serbia and agreed to the removal of their troops except for the frontier garrisons, and the end of Ottoman

collection of taxes in return for Serbian payment of a fixed annual tribute to the sultan. They also accepted the autonomy of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia under Russian protection and fixed the border between the Ottoman Empire and Wallachia on the thalweg of the Danube. The Porte also recognized the autonomy of Greece, which achieved full independence in 1830. Russia was granted the same capitulatory rights enjoyed by the subjects of other European states. The treaty opened the Dardanelles to all commercial vessels and Russia was granted the same capitulatory rights enjoyed by other European states.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832; Russo-Ottoman War, 1828–1829

Further Reading

Finkel, Caroline. *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1923*. New York: Basic Books, 2006.

Karsh, Inari. *Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789–1923*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Albania, Italian Occupation of, 1939

Fascist Italy occupied Albania in April 1939 after years of Italian political and economic domination. After Benito Mussolini came to power in Italy in 1922, he dreamed of establishing a new Roman Empire around the Mediterranean Sea (*Mare Nostrum*). Albania had been part of the Roman Empire, and several Italian states had influenced and controlled portions of Albania during part of the Middle Ages. Additionally, the Italian Fascists claimed that the Albanians were ethnically linked to the Italians, not to the

Slavs of the Balkans, since prehistoric times. In addition, direct control of Albania would give Italy an important beachhead in the Balkans for a possible invasion of Yugoslavia or Greece and provide Italy with complete control of the Strait of Otranto and the entrance to the Adriatic Sea. The Fascists used these tenuous cultural, historical, and “ethnic” claims to justify Italy’s right to dominate and eventually possess Albania.

By the mid-1930s, the Fascist regime dominated Albania politically and economically. It had granted Albania’s ruler, King Zog I, several loans, making Albania economically dependent on Italy. In exchange for Italy’s continued support of Albania, Mussolini demanded that Zog allow all new appointees to Albanian government positions to receive an “Italian education” and allow an “Italian expert” into all Albanian government ministries (1895–1961). Furthermore, Italy assumed control of Albania’s fortifications, and Italian officers replaced the British officers who were training Albania’s gendarmerie. In addition, Albania had to abrogate its existing commercial treaties with other countries, make no new agreements without the approval of the Italian government, and sign a treaty granting Italy “most favored country” status in trade.

By 1939, the Fascist regime decided to physically occupy Albania although Albania had been a de facto Italian protectorate since 1927. Mussolini wanted direct control to increase his own prestige and provide a response to Hitler’s annexation of Austria and occupation of Czechoslovakia. On March 25, Mussolini sent the Albanian government an ultimatum, demanding it to accede to Italy’s occupation of the country. King Zog refused, and, on April 7, 1939, Italian troops invaded Albania. They completed the occupation by April 10 after

a short and ineffective Albanian resistance. On April 9, King Zog with his family fled to Greece.

On April 12, the Albanian parliament voted to offer the Albanian crown to the Italian king, Victor Emmanuel III, who appointed Francesco Jacomoni di San Savino (1893–1973), a former ambassador to Albania, as his viceroy to govern Albania. The Fascist government also established a customs union between Italy and Albania, and Rome assumed control of Albania’s foreign policy. The Albanian armed forces became part of the Italian military, and Italian advisors were placed inside all levels of the Albanian government.

The Italian Fascist regime established an Albanian Fascist Party and subordinate organizations as a branch of the National Fascist Party of Italy, and its members took an oath to obey the orders of *Il Duce* (Mussolini). The Italian Fascist regime resettled Italians in Albania as colonists who, it hoped, would, in time, gradually transform it into Italian soil. Albania remained an autonomous part of the Italian Empire until September 1943, when Italy surrendered to the Allies. At that time, German forces occupied Albania until November 1944 when Albanian resistance fighters liberated their country.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Hoxha, Enver (1908–1985); Partisans, Albania; Zog, King of the Albanians (1895–1961).

Further Reading

Barclay, Glen St. John. *The Rise and Fall of the New Roman Empire: Italy’s Bid for World Power, 1890–1943*. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1973.

Fischer, Bernd J. *Albania at War, 1939–1945*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1999.

Hibbert, Reginald. *Albania's National Liberation Struggle: The Bitter Victory*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1991.

Villari, Luigi. *Italian Foreign Policy under Mussolini*. New York, Devin-Adair Co., 1956.

Albania in the Balkan Wars

Not long after the conclusion of the Albanian Rebellions of 1910–1912, the First Balkan War broke out. The Albanian territories of the Ottoman Empire became the objective of several campaigns of the Balkan League. Additionally, northern Albania was the first Ottoman territory attacked by the Balkan League. Montenegro launched an offensive and officially declared war on October 8, 1912. Previous to this there had been nearly constant cross-border raiding by both states ever since the Albanian Rebellions of 1910–1912. Serbia moved into the Kosova Vilayet, considered by Albanians in the period to a part of Albania, in the middle of October 1912. Greece moved against Albania on October 18, 1912.

The Balkan Wars, coming as they did in the aftermath of the Albanian Rebellions, placed many Albanians in a difficult position. Reactions to the incursions by the Balkan League from Albanians were mixed. Scars from the Albanian Rebellions had yet to heal and some Albanians welcomed the war, hoping it would bring about Albanian independence. Some of the Catholic tribes of the Shkodra region, who had been given refuge in 1910–1911 by Montenegro, cooperated with Montenegrin-Serbian forces. Other Albanians rallied to the Ottoman cause, often spurred on by accounts of real or perceived atrocities committed by the Balkan League. Isa Boletini (1864–1916),

who had vigorously opposed the Ottoman government months before, now organized Albanian military units in Kosova and opposed the Serbian offensive.

Opening Phases

In early October, Montenegrin units came in force across the border and encountered stiff Ottoman resistance. Ottoman border positions were flanked and isolated, and by the middle of October these border positions surrendered. As Montenegrin forces moved southward, they slowly pushed Ottoman forces out. These moves opened the way to Scutari, which was the Montenegrins' principal objective. Serbian forces concentrated their moves against the Kosova Vilayet. Serbian forces crashed into the ad hoc Ottoman forces defending the Kosova frontier. Not long thereafter, a Greek army moved toward the Yanya (Janina) Vilayet and opened hostilities there.

The Siege of Scutari (Shkodër)

One of the principal events in Albania during the Balkan Wars was the siege of Scutari, which occurred from October 28, 1912, to April 23, 1913—in essence the entire duration of the First Balkan War. In late October, a joint Serbian-Montenegrin force surrounded the city. Hasan Riza Pasha (1871–1913) and Essad Pasha Topanti (1863–1920) were the Ottoman commanders that directed the defense of Scutari. With this, Scutari was cut off from resupply and reinforcement. The initial Serbian-Montenegrin attacks did not break the resolve of Ottoman forces in the city. By early December, an armistice was proposed. This armistice was agreed to in principal by both parties, but it was almost immediately violated. Ottoman authorities in the city pressed the Great Powers for assistance in maintaining the armistice, but to no avail. The armistice officially collapsed on

February 3, 1913. Throughout the siege, Montenegrin and Serbian forces launched numerous offensives on Ottoman positions in and around Scutari. These engagements inflicted numerous casualties on both sides. Eventually, after the assassination of Hasan Riza Pasha, Essad Pasha Topanti negotiated surrender, and Montenegrin forces entered Scutari. Despite capturing the city, in May 1913, Montenegro was obliged by most of the Great Powers to evacuate Scutari. Meanwhile, Serbian forces pushed southward into central Albania.

Epirus

The Greek kingdom's principal goal in the Albanian territories was Epirus, specifically the city of Yanya. A series of three battles for Yanya began on December 14, 1912, and focused on the fortress on Mount Bijan (Bizani), which controlled the approach to the city of Yanya. Ottoman and Greek positions fluctuated back and forth. Eventually, Greek forces, bolstered by the arrival of reinforcements, made a final push, and on March 6, 1913, Yanya surrendered and Greek forces entered the city the same day. Throughout March 1913, Greek forces steadily pushed northward and faced fairly disorganized Ottoman resistance in central Albania.

Central Albania

After Serbian victory at the Battle of Manastir (Bitola) on November 20, 1912, the remainder of the Ottoman army in Macedonia, often known as the Vardar Army, was forced to retreat west into central Albania. As Ottoman forces entered the region, an independent Albania was proclaimed and the prospect of Albanian cooperation with the Balkan League became a concern. This joint action never materialized, and the remnants of the Vardar Army organized

themselves around the city of Berat. Serbian forces did press down on them from the north and east, but the armistice of December 1912 was observed by the Serbs, and this sector remained relatively quiet. This quiet was shattered in the spring of 1913. With the fall of Yanya, in early March 1913, what remained of the Ottoman forces from Yanya made their way northward into central Albania. This was followed by the movement of Serbian forces southward in the middle of March 1913. Small delaying actions kept Ottoman forces in the region from being totally encircled, but just barely. Meanwhile, Serbian forces again pushed down from the north. On April 6, 1913, Ottoman and Serbian forces fought the battle of Loşne. The beleaguered Ottomans were unable to keep the Serbs out of Loşne or Berat, which fell a few days later. Loşne was the final battle of the First Balkan War. The Vardar Army and the remaining Ottoman forces in central Albania were saved from a Greek-Serbian pincer movement by an armistice in mid-April 1913.

The Emergence of Albania

With the defeat of Ottoman forces, the possibility of remaining in the Ottoman Empire disappeared; Albanian nationalism became the only option. Albania's independence was declared by an assembly held at Vlorë on November 28, 1912. The Treaty of London confirmed Albania's independence on May 30, 1912. Albania's status was not altered by the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 or any other postwar treaties, although the new state's existence was contested by the Republic of Central Albania under Esad Pasha Topanti, the former Ottoman commander at Scutari. This republic asserted its own sovereignty during 1913–1914 but was later incorporated into the rest of Albania.

The Greek-backed Autonomous Republic of Northern Epirus also attempted to alter the boundaries of the new Albanian state. Later, after World War I, this state too was incorporated into the new Albania.

James Tallon

See also: Albanian Uprisings, 1910–1911; Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Janina, Siege of, 1912–1913; Scutari, Siege of, 1912–1913

Further Reading

Erickson, Edward. *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.

Király, Béla, and Dimitrije Djordjevic, eds. *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Hellenic Army General Staff. *A Concise History of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Athens: Army History Directorate, 1998.

Treadway, John D. *The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908–1914*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1983.

Albania in World War I

Located in the Balkans on the Adriatic Sea, Albania proclaimed its independence from the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) in November 1912, following the First Balkan War. This was confirmed by a conference of ambassadors in London that December. Turkey officially renounced all rights there in May 1913, and Albania was formally granted independence as a Muslim principality in July.

The Great Powers agreed to the installation of Austro-Hungarian aristocrat Prince

Wilhelm zu Wied (1876–1945) as Albanian ruler. He arrived in Albania in March 1914 but departed on September 3 after World War I erupted. He lacked confidence that he could maintain his government amidst the fighting on the Balkan Peninsula. He realized that with the distractions of the war, the Great Powers had little interest in maintaining him. During the war, he joined the German army. On Wied's departure, Albania reverted to anarchy. Throughout the war, Albania had no real functioning central government. The French established the so called "Republic of Korçë" in December 1916. The Italians and Austro-Hungarians also set up Albanian governments in conjunction with their occupations. The Italian and Austro-Hungarian occupying authorities also established local structures and supported local armed bands. These Albanian institutions, even though under the sponsorship of foreign occupations, maintained the concept of Albanian identity and even Albanian independence during the war.

Although Albania sought to avoid involvement in World War I, its neutrality and sovereignty were alternately threatened by Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Germany, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia. Greek troops occupied southern Albania beginning in October 1914. In June 1915, Montenegrin troops returned to Scutari (Shkodër), which they had taken during the First Balkan War, and Serbs reentered central Albania, where they had maintained an armed presence until the outbreak of World War I. Already in November 1914, Italy, although officially neutral, sent troops into the port of Vlorë. In the secret treaty of London of April 26, 1915, that secured Italy's entry into the war on their side, the Entente governments promised Italy Vlorë, the island of Sazan (Saseno), and a protectorate over much of

the rest of Albania. Serbia and Greece were to divide what remained.

In the fall of 1915, Serbian and Montenegrin forces, under pressure from Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian armies, withdrew across northern and central Albania. As they retreated toward the Adriatic, the Serbs and Montenegrins also came under attack by local Albanian forces. In the second half of 1916, Italian troops drove the Greeks from southern Albania and brought almost all Albanian territory under their control. Austrian forces invaded in June 1916. In 1918, there was fighting in Albania between Austro-Hungarian forces on the one side and Italian, French, and Greek forces on the other. Austro-Hungarian forces remained in Albania until the end of the war.

Italian troops stayed on in Albania after the war. Greek and Italian interests threatened the existence of Albania at the Paris Peace Conference. The Greeks also sent armed bands into southern Albanian territory, which they called “Northern Epirus.” Nevertheless, the Americans, British, and French all supported the reestablishment of Albanian independence. After the conferees at the Paris Peace Conference called on Italy to withdraw, they did so in August 1920, following an uprising in Albania and unrest in Italy. The Congress of Lushnja, which began to meet in January 1919 even before the final Italian withdrawal, established a new government. At the end of the Great War, Albania lay in ruins. There was chaos and great suffering, with 70,000 deaths from epidemics and fighting out of a population of only 800,000 people.

In December 1920, Albania was admitted to the League of Nations. It was declared a republic on January 21, 1925, and its borders were formally established in 1926 as

those proclaimed by the London Conference of 1913.

Gary Kerley

See also: Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I; Greece in World War I; Montenegro in World War I; Serbia in World War I; Serbian Retreat, 1915

Further Reading

Jacques, Edwin E. *The Albanians: An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1995.

Pollo, Stefanaq, and Arben Puto. *The History of Albania from Its Origin to the Present Day*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.

Vickers, Miranda. *The Albanians: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1999.

Albania in World War II

During World War II, Albania was the springboard for the Italian invasion of Greece and the scene of anti-Axis guerrilla warfare. Having dominated Albania politically and economically for some time, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini planned a formal annexation of Albania in the spring of 1939. Italian troops invaded the small mountainous country on April 7, 1939, and met only light resistance, although a small force led by Colonel Abas Kupi (1892–1976) held the Italians at Durrës (Durazzo) for 36 hours, sufficient time for Albanian King Zog (1895–1961), Queen Geraldine (1915–2002), and their days-old heir Prince Leka (1939–2011) to escape. They eventually arrived in Britain, where they spent the war. Like his predecessor William of Wied (1876–1945), Zog would never return to Albania once he left the country. On April 16, 1939, King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy accepted the Albanian crown, and a

pro-fascist government was installed. Britain, still hoping to prevent an alliance between Mussolini and Adolf Hitler, acceded to the annexation, but the Greeks prepared to resist an inevitable Italian invasion of their own country, which occurred on October 28, 1940. The invading Italian army contained some Albanian formations. The invasion of Greece presented Albanian nationalists with something of a quandary. They relished the opportunity to gain the parts of northwestern Greece containing an Albanian population. On the other hand, the Greek defeat of the Italian invasion and subsequent occupation of southern Albania presented Albanian nationalists with an opportunity to throw off Italian control. German intervention in the war on the Italian side the next year rendered the issue moot. The Germans and Italians soon overran Yugoslavia and Greece. The defeat of Greece and Yugoslavia brought additional territories to Albania. Kosovo, parts of western Macedonia, and northwestern Greece (Çamëra) were annexed. These annexations were not unpopular either in Albania proper or in the new territories.

Already, earlier in 1940, Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) had attempted to create a united-front movement under Abas Kupi and to stimulate a revolt against the Italians in northern Albania. The effort began well, but it faltered after the German conquest of Yugoslavia. However, as Axis fortunes waned in 1942, Albanian resistance revived. Italian control became limited to the major cities and the coastal regions.

In the mountains of southern Albania, the Communists, encouraged by Josip Broz Tito, leader of the Yugoslav Partisans, coalesced under Enver Hoxha (1908–1983). Liberal landowners and intellectuals mainly in the north formed the Balli Kombetar (National Front) resistance movement. In



Albanian troops under Italian command in Tirana, Albania, April 24, 1939. (Bettmann/Corbis)

central and northern Albania, Abas Kupi and various tribal leaders also formed resistance groups. SOE agents Colonel Neil McLean (1918–1986) and Major David Smiley (1916–2009) were sent into southern Albania, and they subsequently recommended that the British provide aid to both Hoxha's partisans and the Balli Kombetar.

The disintegration of the Italian forces in Albania following the overthrow of Mussolini in September 1943 provided the Albanian guerrillas with arms and other supplies captured from or abandoned by the Italians. The Germans quickly sent in troops to clear out the remaining Italian forces, savagely repressed the local population, and "restored Albanian independence." The Germans created a government under Mehdi Frashëri (1872–1963), but it was able to control only the main towns and

coastal plain. The rest of Albania descended into chaos as various guerrilla chieftains fought for power. The Germans' attempt to bolster their control by raising the 21st SS Mountain Division ("Skanderberg") among mainly the population of Kosovo met with little success.

The British Balkan Air Force headquarters at Bari controlled the support to anti-Axis guerrillas in the Balkans and was decidedly pro-Partisan in both Albania and Yugoslavia. The British hoped to use all of the Albanian resistance forces to harass the German withdrawal from Greece, which began in September 1944. But when Hoxha's Communists attacked the Balli Kombetar and Abas Kupa instead, the British cut off aid to the non-Communist resistance groups, thereby ensuring their defeat. This situation mirrored that in Yugoslavia, where the Partisans gained an advantage over the Četniks in their ongoing civil war. Kupa and the Balli Kombetar leaders were evacuated to Italy with the McLean SOE mission, and the Communists were left to take over Albania. German forces withdrew from Albania in the fall of 1944. With Yugoslav support, Hoxha seized power on November 29, 1944, and the People's Republic of Albania was recognized by the Allies. Hoxha maintained his ties to his Yugoslav patrons for only a brief time. When the Yugoslavs split from Soviet control in 1948, Hoxha used the opportunity to support the Soviets and rid Albania of Yugoslav domination. Albania subsequently developed anti-Western views and supported an isolated Stalinist regime for nearly half a century.

Charles R. Shrader

See also: Hoxha, Enver, 1908–1985; Germany in the Balkans during World War II; Greco-Italian War, 1940–1941; Italy in the Balkans during World War II; Partisans, Albania

Further Reading

Fischer, Bernd J. *Albania at War, 1939–45*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1999.

Swire, Joseph. *Albania: The Rise of the Kingdom*. New York: Arno Press, 1971.

Vickers, Miranda. *The Albanians: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1997.

Albanian Uprisings, 1910–1911

Following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, there was a strong reaction, especially by many of the highland tribes of northern Albania, to the imposition of new reforms by the Young Turk regime. This reaction eventually broke out into a full-scale rebellion. It was one of the largest rebellions in the Young Turk period (1908–1918).

The Ottoman army committed 50,000–60,000 soldiers to quell the rebellion. Fighting principally occurred in the areas around the Montenegrin border and Kosovo, although there were isolated incidents elsewhere in Albania. The rebellions of 1910–1911 began for two principal reasons: the anger of local agents of the deposed sultan Abdulhamid II against the removal of their subsidies; and the imposition of new taxes and regulations in the Albanian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Later, as the rebellion dragged on, nationalism also motivated rebellion.

In April 1910, Shevket Turgut Pasha (1857–1924) was dispatched by Istanbul and moved to crush the rebellion. By the end of June 1910, the rebellion was defeated. Many of the erstwhile rebels fled across the border with Montenegro. This led to the 1911 rebellion, also known as the Highlander's Rebellion. This rebellion began when the highland tribes near the city of Scutari (Shkodër), with the urging of Montenegro,

attacked Ottoman soldiers in May 1911. The rebels initially captured Ottoman positions along the border, threatening Scutari itself. However, Ottoman forces recovered, recaptured the lost positions, and scattered the remaining rebels. Many of the rebels fled again across the border into Montenegro. Several remained there and launched a third rebellion in 1912.

James Tallon

See also: Abdulhamid II (1842–1918); Albania in the Balkan Wars; Montenegro in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Blumi, Isa. *Reinstating the Ottomans: Alternative Balkan Modernities, 1800–1912*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Gawrych, George. *The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam, and the Albanians, 1874–1913*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2006.

Jäckh, Ernst. *Im türischen Kriegslager durch Albanien*. Heilbronn: Verlag von Eugen Salzer, 1911.

Skendi, Stavro. *The Albanian National Awakening, 1878–1912*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Treadway, John D. *The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908–1914*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1983.

Alexander I, King of Yugoslavia (1888–1934)

Alexander was born the second son of Peter Karadjordjević of Serbia and Princess Zorka of Montenegro on December 16, 1888, in Montenegro. Peter became king of Serbia in 1903 after the murder of Alexander Obrenović by conspirators including Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević (Apis). Educated in Geneva and St. Petersburg (1876–1917),

Alexander Karadjordjević returned to Serbia as crown prince in 1909 after his elder brother George disqualified himself for the throne by murdering his manservant. There, Alexander continued his education.

During the First Balkan War, Alexander commanded the Serbian First Army, which won battles at Kumanovo (October 1912) and Monastir (November 1912) against the Ottomans, allowing for Serbian control of a large part of Macedonia. During the Second Balkan War, Alexander helped to defeat the Bulgars at the Battle of Bregalnica (June–July 1913), thereby permitting Serbia to retain Macedonia. In June 1914, Alexander became regent of Serbia due to his father's age and ill health.

As supreme commander of Serbian forces, Alexander and his army withstood three Austro-Hungarian attacks after the outbreak of the First World War. In 1915 combined Austro-Hungarian, German, and Bulgarian attacks forced Alexander and the Serbian army to retreat across the Albanian mountains to the Adriatic coast. There Entente ships took the survivors to the Greek island of Corfu. After rest and recovery, they became part of the Entente Salonika Front in Greece. While in Salonika in 1917, a Serbian military tribunal convicted a group of army officers of plotting to assassinate Alexander. Among those executed was Colonel Dimitrijević, the leader of the Black Hand. Serbian forces were instrumental in the Battle of Dobro Pole in September 1918, which forced Bulgaria out of the war.

In late 1918, Serbia joined with the South Slav lands of the former Austria-Hungary and Montenegro to become the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with King Peter Karadjordjević as monarch. When Peter died on August 16, 1921, Regent Alexander succeeded his father as king. The kingdom

did not meld together, mainly because of conflict between the Serbs, who were the largest national group, and the Croats, the second-largest national group. Due to ethnic strife, Alexander proclaimed a royal dictatorship in January 1929, officially changing the name of the country to Yugoslavia. Under his leadership, Yugoslavia joined the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente. During a state visit to France, Alexander was assassinated on October 9, 1934, by a terrorist with connections to Croatian Ustaša and Macedonian VMRO. Both of these were separatist organizations.

Gregory C. Ference

See also: Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I; Black Hand; Dimitrijević, Dragutin (1876–1917); Kosovo, Battle of, 1915; Kumanovo, Battle of, 1912; Serbia in the Balkan Wars; Serbia in World War I; Serbia, Invasions of, 1914; Serbia, Invasions of, 1915; Serbian Retreat, 1915; Ustaša; VMRO

Further Reading

Graham, Stephen. *Alexander of Yugoslavia: Strongman of the Balkans*. London: Cassel, 1938.

Graham, Stephen. *Alexander of Yugoslavia: The Story of the King Who Was Murdered in Marseilles*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939.

Roberts, Allen. *The Turning Point: The Assassination of Louis Barthou and King Alexander I of Yugoslavia*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970.

Alexander Obrenović, King of Serbia (1876–1903)

Alexander Obrenović was born on August 14, 1876, to King Milan Obrenović (1854–1901) of Serbia and his wife Natalija Obrenović (1859–1941). On March 6, 1889, King Milan unexpectedly abdicated and proclaimed Alexander, then 13 years old, king

of Serbia, with Alexander's mother as regent until he turned 18 years old.

In 1893, Alexander, aged 16, staged a coup, dismissed the regents, and took royal authority into his own hands. In May 1894, he staged a second coup in which he abolished his father's liberal 1888 constitution and restored the conservative one of 1869. In 1894, Alexander brought his father, Milan, back to Serbia and, in 1898, appointed him commander in chief of the Serbian army.

In the summer of 1900, Alexander suddenly announced his engagement to the widowed Draga Mašin (1864–1903), a former lady-in-waiting to his mother. The projected union initially aroused great opposition from his father, Prime Minister Dr. Vladan Đorđević (1844–1930), and his mother. Milan and Đorđević resigned from their respective offices, and Alexander banished his mother from Serbia. Opposition to the marriage subsided somewhat after Russian czar Nicholas II published his congratulations to Alexander on his engagement and of his acceptance to act as the principal witness at the wedding, which took place on August 5, 1900.

On his own initiative, Alexander unveiled a liberal constitution, introducing a two-chamber legislature for the first time in Serbia's constitutional history. The army, already dissatisfied with the king's marriage, became more dissatisfied at the rumors that Alexander might proclaim one of the queen's two unpopular brothers as heir-presumptive to the throne. Then, in a third coup in March 1903, Alexander suspended the constitution for 30 minutes so he could dismiss the old senators and councilors of state and replace them with new ones, increasing dissatisfaction in the country.

In June 1903, a group of army officers with ties to the Serbian secret society the

Black Hand and several politicians conspired to assassinate the king and his wife and replace him with Peter I Karageorgević. The conspirators invaded the palace and brutally murdered the royal couple in the early morning of June 11, 1903. King Alexander and Queen Draga were buried in the crypt of St. Mark's Church, Belgrade.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Black Hand; Dimitrijević, Dragutin (1876–1917); Obrenović, Milan (1854–1901)

Further Reading

Cox, John K. *The History of Serbia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002.

Mackenzie, David. *Apis, the Congenial Conspirator: The Life of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijevic*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1989.

Pavlowitch, Stevan K. *Serbia: The History of an Idea*. New York: New York University Press, 2002.

Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria (1857–1893)

From 1879 to 1886, Alexander of Battenberg was the first elected prince of Bulgaria and had the unfortunate job of trying to create a nation-state without the support of the major European powers. In particular, the Russian czars worked for his removal from office throughout his short reign. Nevertheless, Alexander oversaw the union of Bulgaria with the province of Eastern Rumelia in 1885 and successfully led his army against the invading Serbs in the same year. By the time he abdicated in 1886, he was a symbol of national unity for the Bulgarian people.

Alexander was born on April 5, 1857, in Verona, Italy, a member of an aristocratic family that was related to much of European

royalty. His godfathers were his uncle, Czar Alexander II, and Count Josef Radetzky (1766–1858), the Austrian field marshal. His father was stationed with a garrison in Verona when Alexander was born, but in 1861, he retired and moved the family back to Darmstadt in Hesse (present-day Germany). When the Russo-Ottoman War broke out in 1877, Alexander was a lieutenant in the Hessian Dragoons and was eager to participate in the conflict. Over the next few years, he served in several military capacities, most notably with the Bulgarian cavalry and later as an aide to King Carol I (1839–1914) of Romania.

When the war ended, the Congress of Berlin established Bulgaria as an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire, with the restriction that Bulgaria's new monarch could not come from a ruling dynasty so as not to tip the balance of power in the Balkans in favor of one of the major European powers. The major European powers also retained a supervisory role over the newly independent nation, particularly Russia, which was the dominant power in the region. Alexander's name was put forward by the Russian minister of foreign affairs, who thought that the young man could easily be made an instrument of Russian policy. His candidacy had the backing of both Czar Alexander II and Britain's Queen Victoria.

On April 29, 1879, the Bulgarian National Assembly was given a slate of three candidates for the position of prince: Alexander, Prince Henry XXV of Reuss (1856–1911), and Prince Waldemar of Denmark (1858–1939). Alexander, the only serious candidate and the one who had fought recently on the side of the Bulgarians during the Russo-Ottoman War, was easily elected.

Alexander arrived in Varna, Bulgaria, on June 29, 1879, after a visit with the Ottoman

sultan Abdulhamid II in Constantinople. Immediately after he ascended the throne, Alexander attempted to institute some reforms. He felt the Bulgarian constitution was too liberal, but appeals to other monarchs to get it changed were unsuccessful. He also had to contend with a strong pro-Russian faction within Bulgaria and Russia's continual interference in Bulgarian affairs. Alexander had to walk a fine line with Russians. He resented their interference, but he needed Russia's support to maintain Bulgaria's independence from the aggression of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In 1880, finding it increasingly difficult to govern with the Russophiles in the legislature, Alexander dissolved the National Assembly (Sŭbranie). The following year, he suspended the constitution, concentrating almost all political power in Bulgaria in himself. He also attempted to purge the Bulgarian army of Russophile officers. His relations with Russia deteriorated even further after the ascension of his cousin, Czar Alexander III, in 1881. To build support for his regime among the Bulgarians, he reconstituted the constitution and convened the National Assembly, ruling with the help of a liberal-conservative coalition.

Alexander's next move was in violation of the Congress of Berlin and was sure to further harm Bulgaria's relations with Russia, but nationalist sentiment was growing increasingly strong in the Balkans. In September 1885, he annexed the province of Eastern Rumelia with the full backing of Prime Minister Stefan Stambolov (1854–1895). The Russians were furious but did not want to go to war over the issue. The Serbians, however, launched an attack against Bulgaria in protest of the annexation. Alexander led the Bulgarian army against the Serbs and had pushed them back into their own country by November

of that year. Austria then intervened and convinced Bulgaria to accept peace terms in the Treaty of Bucharest that confirmed the status quo in the region.

The pro-Russian factions within Bulgaria had had enough of Alexander, however. On August 21, 1886, just months after he finalized the Treaty of Bucharest, Alexander was forced to abdicate by a coup of pro-Russian army officers, who then escorted him out of Bulgaria to Bessarabia. Many referred to the episode as a kidnapping. He returned shortly thereafter in an attempt to reclaim his throne, but his efforts met with little success, despite the efforts of Stambolov to maintain a pro-Alexander faction in the country. He formally abdicated on September 7, 1886.

Alexander arrived back in Hesse on September 10. In 1889, he assumed the title count of Hartenau and married the actress Johanna Loisinger (1865–1951). He received a commission as a colonel of an infantry regiment stationed in Graz and died there of peritonitis on November 17, 1893.

Michael D. Johnson

See also: Abdulhamid II (1842–1918); Bucharest, Treaty of 1886; Bulgarian-Serb War, 1885

Further Reading

Corti, Egon Caesar Conte. *Alexander von Battenberg*. London: Cassell and Company, 1954.

Crampton, R. J. *Bulgaria 1878–1918: A History*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1983.

Stavrianos, L. S. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958.

Ali Pasha (1750?–1822)

Ali Pasha was born around 1750 in southern Albania near the village of Tepelene. A prominent clan, his family lost much of

its influence after Ali's father was murdered. His mother formed a brigand band where Ali learned the art of tribal politics, soon becoming its leader and recovering much of what the family had lost. The Turks appointed him to protect northern Epirus in 1778, and he helped put down a rebellion in Scutari (Shkodër). He became the lieutenant to the pasha of Rumelia, and received the pashalik of Trikala for his help in the Austro-Turkish War of 1787–1791. In 1788, he became pasha of Yannina, his power center until his death.

Dreaming of establishing a sea power to rival that of the dey of Algiers, in the late 1790s, Ali Pasha entered into an alliance with France in order to gain a seaport on the Adriatic. In 1807, he switched sides to the British before briefly renewing his alliance with the French, all of this with the approval of the sultan.

The weakness of the Ottoman government allowed Ali Pasha and his sons to expand their territory to include most of Albania, large sections of western Greece, and part of the Peloponnese peninsula. In 1820, the sultan, who wished to enact reforms to strengthen the empire, sent an army in an attempt to remove Ali from power. Ali worked with the Christian Greeks, who were fighting for their independence, against the Ottomans, but after a two-year siege of Yannina, Ali was killed in either January or February 1822, with his head being sent to the sultan.

Gregory C. Ference

See also: Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832

Further Reading

Baggally, John W. *Ali Pasha and Great Britain*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1938.

Fleming, K. E. *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha Greece*.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946)

Romanian marshal and dictator Ion Antonescu was born in Pitesti on June 14, 1882 to an aristocratic military family. Antonescu graduated from Romanian military schools in Craiova (1902) and Iași (1904). A cavalry lieutenant during the 1907 Peasant Revolt, he fought in the Second Balkan War and was an operations officer during World War I. From 1922 to 1927, he was military attaché in Paris, Brussels, and London. He was chief of the Army General Staff in 1933 and 1934.

As with most others among the nationalistic Romanian military elite, Antonescu favored British and French political influence. However, he closely monitored both the Third Reich's ascendancy and the looming Soviet Union in his vigilance regarding Romanian territorial integrity, pragmatically preparing for a German accommodation should such a choice become necessary. As minister of defense, Antonescu became embroiled in and frustrated by the corrupt governing vicissitudes of King Carol II (1893–1953), especially after 1937. Protesting Carol's February 1938 establishment of the Royal Dictatorship and his suppression of the fascistic Legion of Saint Michael (the Iron Guard), Antonescu defended the Iron Guard's leaders in court and was briefly jailed and outposted to Chisinau (Kishinev) near the Soviet border.

Following the Soviet Union's occupation of Bessarabia and the ceding of Transylvania to Hungary in summer 1940, in September, King Carol was coerced into naming Antonescu head of the troubled government before abdicating under pressure in favor of

his son Michael, age 19. Antonescu's title, *Conducator*, was the Romanian equivalent of Duce or Fuhrer, and he used his broad powers to oust the Iron Guard from government in January 1941. That June, he assigned 14 Romanian divisions to Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa. For reclaiming Romanian lands from the Soviets, Antonescu was proclaimed marshal by figurehead King Michael I on August 23, 1941. Antonescu continued to supply the German war effort with troops (ultimately, Romania lost substantially more men than Italy) in exchange for German military favor, but on the home front he sought to temper his ally's overbearing appetite for Romania's oil and agricultural bounty. Antonescu did not hesitate to assert Romanian interests in direct conversations with Hitler.

In coming to terms with Romania's "Jewish question," Antonescu—like Benito Mussolini in Italy—preferred his own solution to anything dictated by Berlin, employing policies that (officially) allowed Jews to emigrate in exchange for payment or to face deportation to Romanian-administered work camps in the Ukrainian region of Transnistria. Nonetheless, Antonescu's regime was responsible for the deaths of more than 250,000 Romanian and Ukrainian Jews and Gypsies as a result of its "romanization" policies during 1940–1944, despite its refusal to join Germany's "final solution" outright. After the catastrophe of Stalingrad made victory problematic, Antonescu began to moderate his policies toward the Romanian Jews.

Antonescu was deposed by coup-installed King Michael on August 23, 1944, and turned over to the occupying Soviet forces. His war crimes show trial, held in Bucharest on May 4–17, 1946, led to the death

sentence, and he was executed there on June 1, 1946.

Gordon E. Hogg

See also: Iron Guard; Michael I, King of Romania (1921–); Romania in World War II; Stalingrad, Battle of, 1942–1943

Further Reading

Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania: 1866–1947*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Temple, Mark. "The Politicization of History: Marshal Antonescu and Romania." *East European Politics and Societies* 10, no. 3 (1996): 457–503.

Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I

During World War I, there were three basic weaknesses of the Austro-Hungarian military. First, about one-quarter of all conscripted soldiers were illiterate, and most of the conscripts from the subject nationalities simply did not understand German or Hungarian. Communication within the Habsburg army was at best somewhat difficult. Second, for most of these same subject nationalities—Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Romanians, and southern Slavs—there were links and sympathies that crossed international borders, a sense of identity with the empire's various enemies. Third, Austria-Hungary, like Russia, lacked the industrial base needed to wage protracted war and was not well served in terms of railways and rolling stock so important in the timely movement of formations between fronts.

The latter point was but one factor of a division of the empire into two parts that basically fell apart during the war. The Austrian part was relatively industrialized, whereas Hungary was the empire's



Austro-Hungarian Army troops on their way to the Romanian Front in the Carpathian Mountains in March 1917. (National Archives)

breadbasket. But with the collapse of domestic industrial production and the rail transport system, Austria lacked the consumer goods to sell to Hungary, and Hungary would not sell grain to Austria. The latter development gave rise to the bitter Austrian comment that Hungary would rather give grain to the pigs than to Austria.

Austria-Hungary did not have an army; it had two armies, one for each of the two parts of the empire. In 1914, it was nominally able to put 32 infantry and 9 cavalry divisions into the field and had a reserve of 16 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions; but the fact was that the empire called up only 29 percent of its eligible manpower for service and the reserve divisions were decidedly third-rate and aging. The problem for the army was that the disastrous defeats of 1914 in Galicia really wrecked the Austrian part of the army, and the Brusilov Offensive completed the process. The Austrian army—or the Austrian part of the army—really ceased

to exist after that time. The adoption of field gray uniforms and the spiked helmet reflected an increased German influence throughout the Austrian formations. The Germans, in addition to providing chiefs of staff to the various commands within the Austro-Hungarian army, increasingly provided German formations to support Austro-Hungarian formations in the field. By 1917, the majority of Austrian troops regarded themselves as German rather than Habsburg, and this was manifest in the honoring of the German national anthem rather than the imperial one. For their part, the Germans were increasingly contemptuous of Austria-Hungary, its head of state, army, and military personnel. Allied—or handcuffed—to a corpse was the not inaccurate summary of this relationship.

Austro-Hungarian forces first invaded Serbia in August 1914. They were stopped at the battle of Cer Mountain. Two subsequent invasions that same year met with failure. In October 1915, the Austro-Hungarian Third

Army, this time accompanied by one German and two Bulgarian armies, again invaded Serbia. The Central Powers overran the exhausted Serbs. Austro-Hungarian forces occupied most of Serbia. At the beginning of 1916, they occupied Montenegro and established a front against the Italians in Albania roughly along a line north of Vlorë to Lake Ohrid.

In 1916, Austro-Hungarian reserve troops resisted Romanian attempts to break into Transylvania. The Austro-Hungarian First Army together with some German formations counterattacked across the Transylvanian Alps and swept into Wallachia. At the same time, a Bulgarian-German force attacked Romania in Dobruja. Through 1918, Austro-Hungarian forces maintained occupation duties in Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. The occupation regime in Serbia was especially rigorous.

Evidence of the progressive collapse of Austria-Hungary is provided in three matters. First, throughout 1917, there were a growing number of industrial incidents that escalated after the halving of the flour ration in January 1918. Strikes spread and workers' councils sprang up, and military censors noted throughout society and the armed forces an increased political edge to incidents, especially in the military disturbances of May 1918. Second, by war's end, the physical state of the army and its soldiers bordered on desperate. The average weight of ordinary rank-and-file soldiers with the Tenth Army was as little as 120 pounds, perhaps 30 to 40 pounds underweight. Most of the troops were without leather boots, full uniforms, adequate underwear, and protective clothing for mountain warfare and were reduced to eating their transport animals. Third, after May 1918, there were increasing problems of desertion from the army. An estimated 400,000 men deserted

between June and September 1918, and in the final defeat at Vittorio Veneto in Italy, 500,000 men surrendered or deserted. By this time the war was clearly over, and most troops were trying to go home. There is a certain poignancy in accounts of formations leaving the front en masse and trying to get home with railways working only intermittently. There is little evidence that units containing Balkan peoples, mainly Romanians and Serbs, were any more or less reliable than other Habsburg troops. Bosnian units were especially feared by their enemies on the Italian and Russian Fronts. But this was the final act in a story of an army that reached back over six centuries and that by war's end in November 1918, like the state itself, had ceased to exist.

Hedley P. Willmott

See also: Cer Mountain, Battle of, 1914; Romania, Invasion of, 1916; Serbia, Invasions of, 1914; Serbia, Invasions of, 1915

Further Reading

Gumz, Jonathan E. *The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Rothenberg, Gunther E. *The Army of Francis Joseph*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1976.

Scheer, Tamara. *Zwischen Front und Heimat, Österreich-Ungarns Militärverwaltungen im Ersten Weltkrieg*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009.

Averescu, Alexandru (1859–1938)

Romanian army general Alexandru Averescu was born on March 9, 1859, in Ismail, Bessarabia. Averescu enlisted in the Romanian army in 1876 and fought in the war against Turkey during 1877–1878.

After the war, Averescu remained in the army and was commissioned a lieutenant in 1891. Promoted to captain in 1896, he studied at the Military Staff College in Turin, Italy. During 1895–1898, Averescu was military attaché in Berlin. He was promoted to colonel in 1901 and to brigadier general in 1906. In 1907, Averescu accepted an appointment as minister of war. He oversaw the suppression of the great peasant uprising that year. Advanced to major general in 1912, he was Romanian army chief of staff in the Second Balkan War of 1913.

With the beginning of World War I, Averescu became a strong advocate of Romanian intervention on the Allied side, which occurred in August 1916. He then took field command of the Third Army and forces in Dobrudja to defend the southern border with Bulgaria. Averescu planned a daring strategy of striking across the Danube River and taking German General August von Mackensen's forces in the rear.

Averescu's (1849–1945) crossing of the Danube failed due to poor weather, the Central Powers' river flotillas, and the fortuitous presence of Bulgarian army units at the point of attack. Averescu then assumed command of the Second Army, restoring his military reputation in a series of defensive actions back toward the Sireth River. The Second Army became the only Romanian army still in the field. In July 1917, Averescu became a national military hero when his Second Army, supported by the Russian Fourth Army, broke through the Central Powers' defenses on a 20-mile-wide front at Marasti and advanced up to 12 miles. This offensive forced the Central Powers to transfer five infantry and two cavalry divisions to this area and to modify their own offensive plans. Later Averescu was responsible for

defensive actions in the Carpathians and the defense of Marasti. Although he held the Sireth line, Russian forces collapsed and Romania was forced to sue for peace.

In February 1918, following the defeat of Romania, Prime Minister Ionel Brătianu (1864–1927) resigned and King Ferdinand I appointed Averescu prime minister, with the task of negotiating a settlement with the Central Powers. Averescu knew von Mackensen and was strongly opposed to Bolshevism; Ferdinand hoped these factors might allow a more generous settlement, but the resulting Treaty of Bucharest was nonetheless extraordinarily harsh. Czar Ferdinand was sufficiently displeased with the treaty that he refused to sign it and forced Averescu from office.

After the war, Averescu established the People's League Party, which won the 1920 elections. He served twice as prime minister, from 1920 to 1921 and from 1926 to 1928. Promoted to field marshal in 1930, Averescu was appointed a member of the Crown Council by King Carol II in 1937. He died in Bucharest on October 2, 1938.

Brandon H. Turner and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Bucharest, Treaty of, 1918; Romania, Peasant Uprising, 1907; Romania in World War I

Further Reading

Alexandrescu, Vasile. *Romania in World War I: A Synopsis of Military History*. Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1985.

Seton-Watson, R. W. *A History of the Roumanians: From Roman Times to the Completion of Unity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934.

Torrey, Glenn. *Romania and World War I: A Collection of Studies*. Portland, OR: Center for Romanian Studies, 1998.

B

Balkan Entente, 1934

The Balkan Entente of 1934, or Four Power Pact, was an effort by Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia to promote better relations among the Balkan states. It grew out of a series of four conferences held in Athens in 1930, Istanbul in 1931, Bucharest in 1932, and Salonika in 1933. The Balkan Entente itself was signed by the four states in Athens on February 9, 1934, after preliminary talks in Belgrade. The pact guaranteed mutual security and pledged to maintain the territorial *status quo*. The pact mainly was directed against Bulgaria, which harbored revisionist claims against all of the signatories. Some effort was made to obtain the Sofia government's adherence to the pact. The Bulgarians, however, were not prepared to abandon their nationalist aspirations, especially those in regard to Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia. To a lesser degree, the pact was also intended to provide the Greeks and Yugoslavs with security against Albanian territorial claims. Albania itself provided little threat, but by the early 1930s, Italian influence had come to dominate the country. Benito Mussolini's (1883–1945) aggressive intentions throughout the Mediterranean region were well known. The signatories of the pact intended the Balkan Entente to be a southeastern European counterpart to the Little Entente. Romania and Yugoslavia were members of both.

Nevertheless, by 1938, the Balkan Entente was virtually defunct. The Munich Crisis indicated that Britain and France

were not interested in confronting Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe. Also by then, all members of the Balkan Entente were aligned economically with Nazi Germany. The Balkan Entente was basically a defensive arrangement. None of the signatories of the Balkan Entente ever implemented any of its provisions. In 1954, three of the members of the former Balkan Entente, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, revived the idea of a Balkan mutual assistance agreement. Like the Balkan Entente, the Balkan Pact of 1954 proved to be ephemeral.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan Pact, 1954; Little Entente

Further Reading

Hall, Richard C. *The Modern Balkans: A History*. London: Reaktion, 2011.

Jelavich, Barbara. *The History of the Balkans*. Vol. 2, *Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Kerner, Robert Joseph, and Harry Nicholas Howard. *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente, 1930–1935*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1970.

Balkan League

In 1912, the young, independent nations of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia formed a military alliance, named the Balkan League, for the purpose of attacking their former subjugator, Turkey. The military conflicts that ensued heightened nationalist tensions in the Balkans as well as

among Western European powers with interests in the region. Only two years later, the aspirations of the Balkan League countries and the heated international conflicts they engendered helped ignite the diplomatic crisis that started World War I.

At the turn of the century, the newly independent Balkan countries, after hundreds of years of domination by the Turkish Ottoman Empire, were hotbeds of nationalist sentiments. At the same time, the regional powers of Turkey and Austria were intent on exerting their influence on the smaller Balkan states, and moreover, the larger European powers—France, Britain, Germany, and Russia—all believed that they had vital national interests of their own in the Balkans.

The political instability in the region first led to military conflict in 1912. The First Balkan War was indirectly brought on by Italy's successful bid to assert its imperialist designs on Turkish territory along the Libyan coast. The Italian victory exposed Turkey's military weakness, a weakness that the Balkan countries were happy to exploit. To this end, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia formed the Balkan League in October 1912.

The league was quite successful in its initial military efforts. All four countries invaded simultaneously, and though both sides had about equal forces, the league's tactics proved superior. The four armies quickly pushed the Ottoman forces back and forced Turkey to surrender all of its European possessions, with the exception of Constantinople (Istanbul). The Balkan League's victory, however, was short-lived. Its members, joined by Romania, soon went to war with one another over the conquered territory, and the league disintegrated. A second round of battles followed

in 1913; in this Second Balkan War, Turkey won back a portion of its territory.

Overall, the Balkan Wars did little to satisfy nationalist aspirations in the region. At the end of the Second Balkan War, Great Britain intervened in hopes of ending conflict between the Balkan nations. The London Conference, as it was called, was not particularly successful. Rather than abating tensions, the conference aggravated the situation by granting Austria the land between Serbia and the Adriatic Sea, effectively cutting Serbia off from the sea and dashing any hopes of Serbian expansion. In June 1914, it was an angry Serbian nationalist who took revenge on Austria by assassinating the Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand, an event that helped spark the outbreak of World War I.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Greece in the Balkan Wars; Montenegro in the Balkan Wars; Serbia in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Geshov, Ivan. *The Balkan League*. Translated by Constantin C. Mincoff. London: J. Murray, 1915.

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Helmreich, E. C. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938.

Balkan Pact, 1954

The Balkan Pact of 1954 was a security arrangement among Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. NATO members Greece and Turkey were geographically separated from

the other NATO allies by the strong Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. Since its 1948 break with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was isolated and vulnerable between both Cold War factions. It had NATO allies Greece and Italy on its southern and northern borders. Soviet allies Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria threatened on the eastern borders.

The Yugoslav dictator Josip Broz Tito attempted to end this isolation by reaching an accommodation with Greece and Turkey. On February 28, 1953, Yugoslavia signed a Treaty of Friendship with Greece and Turkey in Ankara. A more detailed agreement ensued the next year. On August 9, 1954, in Bled, Yugoslavia, representatives from Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia signed a Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. This agreement provided for mutual military assistance in the event of an attack against any of the signees. It was to remain in force for 20 years and could be renewed. The agreement also provided for the establishment of a Balkan Consultative Assembly to establish the basis for increased economic cooperation. This provision had the potential to facilitate economic development in a region sorely in need of it. The Balkan Pact of 1954 replicated to a degree the Balkan Entente of 1934, although Romania did not affiliate this time.

Unfortunately, the Balkan Pact did not endure. Disagreement over the future of Cyprus undermined the pact. Also, by 1955, the foreign policy of Soviet Russia and its allies in regard to Yugoslavia had moderated. The new Soviet dictator, Nikita S. Khrushchev (1894–1971), visited Belgrade in May 1955. Tito began to pursue a policy of nonalignment. Although the signatories never formally repudiated the Balkan Pact, in 1960, both Greece and Yugoslavia indicated that they considered it defunct.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslav-Soviet Split

Further Reading

- Hall, Richard C. *The Modern Balkans: A History*. London: Reaktion, 2011.
- Junkovic, Banimir M. *The Balkans in International Relations*. London: Palgrave, 1988.

Balkan War, First, 1912–1913

Fighting in the First Balkan War began on October 8, 1912, between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire. On October 18, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia entered the war, all siding with Montenegro. In many ways the armies of the Balkan League were similar. They all followed European models for staff work, training, logistics, communication, and sanitation. Many officers had received education at Great Powers military schools. They all depended upon conscripted peasants to fill their ranks. They all had a variety of equipment from European sources.

The Bulgarians had the largest army among the Balkan allies, with around 350,000 men after mobilization. Volunteers from the Macedonian revolutionary organizations supplemented the Bulgarian ranks. The Greeks were able to field around 110,000 men. Alone among the Balkan allies, the Greeks possessed a substantial navy, which, in addition to eight destroyers, 19 torpedo boats, and one submarine, included the formidable armored cruiser *Georgios Averof*. The Montenegrin army essentially was a partially trained militia consisting of most of the males of military age in the country. This amounted to around 36,000 men. Montenegrin immigrants in the United States returned home to add to the



Rearguard of the Ottoman army on the road Giannitsa (Greece) during the First Balkan War, November 1912. (adoc-photos/Corbis)

Montenegrin force. The Serbian army had a mobilized strength of 230,000 men.

The Ottomans had the largest single army, with the potential of 450,000 men. This army, however, lacked the homogeneity of the Balkan forces. Armenian, Greek, and Slavic soldiers in the Ottoman army could not be expected to fight loyally for the Ottoman sultan. Although the Young Turk regime had implemented some reforms after 1908, these were not yet fully realized. Also, the Ottoman forces were distributed throughout the empire. Some were fighting an insurgency in Yemen, some were still in Ottoman North Africa, and others were in Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and Syria. At the beginning of the war, they had approximately 300,000 in their European provinces. The Ottomans also had a navy that included a modern light cruiser, the *Hamidiye*; a

modern armored cruiser, the *Mecidiye*; and a number of other vessels.

The Ottoman armies were deployed as First (also Eastern or Thracian) Army under the command of Abdullah Pasha (1846–1937) and the Second (Macedonian or Western) Army led by Ali Risa Pasha (1860–1932). The most important theater was in Thrace. The Bulgarians committed the majority of their forces to confront the main Ottoman army, which was positioned to defend the Ottoman capital. Unwisely, the Ottoman commander initiated an offensive, which the Bulgarians easily deflected. They responded with a strong offensive through northeastern Thrace. The Bulgarian armies were under the nominal command of Czar Ferdinand (1861–1948) but were led by deputy commander in chief General Mihail Savov (1857–1928). The Bulgarian

First Army led by General Vasil Kutinchev (1859–1941) and General Radko Dimitriev's (1859–1918) Third Army overcame Ottoman resistance at Kirk Killase (Lozengrad) and at a massive battle raging from Buni Hisar (Pinarhisar) to Lyule Burgas (Lüle Burgaz). This later event was the largest European battle between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I.

At the same time, General Nikola Ivanov's Second Army first masked and then surrounded and besieged the Ottomans at Adrianople (Edirne). They did not immediately attempt to take the well-fortified former Ottoman capital. The Bulgarian offensive thrust the Ottomans to their final defensive positions at Chataldzha (Çatalca), about 20 miles outside of Constantinople. The presence of the Bulgarian First and Third Armies outside of Constantinople caused some disconcert among the Great Powers, especially the Russians. Ottoman forces finally rallied on November 16–17 and pushed back a Bulgarian attempt to cross the Chataldzha lines and take Constantinople. Smaller Bulgarian units, meanwhile, proceeded against little opposition into the Rhodopes and western Thrace and on toward Salonika.

In the western theater, the Greek army advanced in two directions against slight opposition. The main thrust of the Greek army was directed at Salonika. The Army of Thessaly under the command of Crown Prince Constantine (1868–1923) soon overran its namesake region, defeating a small Ottoman force at Yanitsa on November 1. After negotiations with the Ottoman commander of Salonika, Hassan Tahsin Pasha (1845–1918), the Greeks entered Salonika on November 8, only a day ahead of the Bulgarian unit moving south from Bulgaria across the Rhodopes with the same objective. An uneasy condominium ensued.

The Army of Epirus led by General Constantine Sapountzakes (1846–1931) moved into Epirus and besieged the important town of Janina (Ioannina). A unit of Italian volunteers led by Ricciotti Garibaldi (1847–1924), the son of Giuseppe, participated in this campaign. The Greeks did not immediately surround the town, so it was able to withstand their initial assaults. An uneasy condominium ensued in that city. The Greek navy seized the Aegean Island of Tenedos on October 20. This effectively closed the straits. The Greeks then held the Ottoman fleet at bay and occupied most of the rest of the Aegean Islands, including Chios and Mytilene.

The Montenegrins had two objectives, the sanjak of Novi Pazar and the northern Albanian town of Scutari (Shkodër). In pursuit of these objectives, they divided their forces into three groups. The nominal commander of all the Montenegrin forces was King Nikola (1841–1921). The Eastern Division commanded by Brigadier Janko Vukotich (1866–1927) advanced into the sanjak of Novi Pazar, while most of the rest of the Montenegrin forces advanced toward Scutari (Shkodër). The Zeta Division led by Crown Prince Danilo (1871–1939) moved along the eastern shore of Lake Scutari toward its objective, while Brigadier Mitar Martinovich's (1870–1954) Coastal Division proceeded along the western shore of the lake. Despite several direct assaults, Scutari held firm. The Montenegrins fought bravely but without many of the apparatus of a modern army. This undoubtedly hampered their ability to take Scutari.

The Serbian chief of staff, *Vojvoda* Radomir Putnik (1847–1917), planned an all-out attack on the Ottomans. He arrayed their forces in four main groups. The largest group, the Serbian First Army, commanded by Crown Prince Alexander (1888–1934),

advanced from the north into Macedonia. Meanwhile, the Serbian Second Army under General Stepa Stepanović (1856–1929)—the main part of the Serbian army—moved south from Bulgarian territory into Macedonia in order to cut off any Ottoman units retreating south. It easily defeated the Ottomans at Kumanovo in northern Macedonia and then, after engagements at Prilep and Bitola (Monastir), proceeded to occupy most of the rest of Macedonia. The Serbian Third Army commanded by General Bozhidar Jankovich overran Kosovo, the emotional center of Serbian nationalism. It proceeded on to Skoplje and from there crossed over the Albanian Alps into Albania. On November 28, elements of the Serbian Third Army reached Durrës (Durazzo) on the Adriatic coast. This was the cause of great disconcert for the Austro-Hungarians and Italians. Two smaller Serbian units entered the sanjak of Novi Pazar. Having achieved their initial aims quickly and without heavy losses, the Serbs agreed both to a Bulgarian request to send troops to participate in the siege of Adrianople and to a Montenegrin plea for help at Scutari. The Serbian Second Army went to Thrace to help the Bulgarians at the end of October 1912. Elements of the Serbian Third Army had assisted the Montenegrins at Scutari since December 1912. In February 1913, the Serbs sent an additional 30,000-man force and some artillery to help the Montenegrins.

By the time the warring parties agreed to an armistice on December 3, the only territories in Europe remaining under Ottoman control were the besieged cities of Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari; the Gallipoli Peninsula; and that part of eastern Thrace behind the Chataldzha lines.

While the Balkan allies and the Ottomans assembled in London on December 16 to

negotiate a peace settlement, the ambassadors of the Great Powers credentialed to Great Britain convened nearby to direct the course of the peace settlement and to protect their own interests. The London ambassadors' conference, on the insistence of Austria-Hungary and Italy, recognized the independence of an Albanian state that some Albanian notables had proclaimed in Vlorë (Valona) on November 28, 1912. This state blocked Serbian and Montenegrin claims to territories on the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea. These claims had the strong support of Russia. At the same time, the Austrians demanded that Serbian troops evacuate those portions of northern Albania occupied that autumn. The Great Powers were able to forestall the outbreak of war between Austria-Hungary and Russia over this issue. Talks between the Balkan allies and the Ottomans soon stalled, mainly over the issue of Adrianople, and hostilities resumed on February 3, 1913.

Fighting during this second round mainly occurred at the three besieged cities of Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari. On March 6, Janina fell to the Greeks. On the 26th, the Bulgarians, with some Serbian help, took Adrianople. The Montenegrins and assisting Serbian units bogged down around Scutari. A major assault in February failed. Only on April 23, after the departure of the Serbs under pressure from the Great Powers, did the Montenegrins succeed in entering the city after three days of negotiations with the exhausted defenders. Nevertheless, the major powers, especially Austria-Hungary, refused to sanction a Montenegrin occupation of Scutari because the London Ambassadors Conference had assigned it to the new Albanian state. After threats and a show of force, together with the promise of generous subsidies, the Montenegrins evacuated Scutari. Elsewhere, elements of

the Serbian First Army fought with the remnants of the Ottoman Second Army in central Albania. Also, the Bulgarians deflected Ottoman attacks at Bulair on the Gallipoli Peninsula and an Ottoman landing at the port of Sharkoi on the Sea of Marmara. The Ottomans intended these efforts to take the pressure off of the defenders of Adrianople and possibly even to break through to them. Also fighting resumed at the Chataldzha positions. After the fall of the three besieged cities, both sides were exhausted. On Ottoman initiative, the Bulgarians agreed to an armistice on April 15. The other Balkan allies did not participate in this second armistice. On May 30, 1913, the Balkan allies and the Ottomans signed a peace treaty in London. With the Treaty of London, the Ottoman Empire ceded its European territories west of a straight line drawn between Enos and Media (Enez-Midyé). This result clearly was preliminary. By the time of the signing of the Treaty of London, friction among the Balkan allies over the division of Macedonia had risen to a great degree. The Second Balkan War ensued soon thereafter.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Adrianople, Siege of, 1912–1913; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Naval Campaigns; Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Chataldzha, Battle of, 1912; Greece in the Balkan Wars; Janina, Siege of, 1912–1913; London, Treaty of, 1913; Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, Battle of, 1912; Montenegro in the Balkan Wars; Scutari, Siege of, 1912–1913; Serbia in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Erickson, Edward J. *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Hellenic Army General Staff. *A Concise History of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Athens: Army History Directorate, 1998.

Helmreich, E. C. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938.

International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. *The Other Balkan Wars*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1993.

Király, Béla K., and Dimitrije Djordjevic, eds. *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*. Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1987.

Balkan War, Second, 1913

The Second Balkan War, or Intra-Allied War, in the summer of 1913 was a brief but bloody conflict in southeastern Europe between Bulgaria and its erstwhile Balkan League allies Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia. The main issue among the allies was the disposition of Macedonia. During the war, the Ottoman Empire and Romania took advantage of Bulgaria's dire situation to join in the fight against Bulgaria in order to realize specific territorial claims against Bulgaria and to prevent an enlarged Bulgaria from dominating the Balkan Peninsula.

By the time of the signing of the Treaty of London on May 30, 1913, ending the Balkan War, deep divisions had emerged within the Balkan League. The main problem was the disposition of Macedonia. The Serbs sought compensation for Albania in Macedonian areas assigned to Bulgaria by the alliance treaty but occupied by Serbia during the previous autumn fighting. The Bulgarians refused to consider a Serb demand to revise the March 1912 treaty, preferring to rely on Russian arbitration. At the same time, the Bulgarians and Greeks were skirmishing near Seres and Nigrita over eastern

Macedonian territories. On May 5, 1913, the Greeks and Serbs signed an agreement directed against the Bulgarians. A feeble Russian attempt at arbitration in June never had a chance for implementation.

On the night of June 29–30, Bulgarian deputy commander in chief General Mihail Savov (1857–1928), frustrated by Russian inactivity and by worried about growing discontent in the army's ranks, launched probing attacks on the orders of Czar Ferdinand (1861–1948) against Greek and Serbian positions in Macedonia. After serving in the ranks since October 1912, many Bulgarian soldiers were eager for demobilization. The Bulgarian army command wanted to use the army or let it go home. This order was given without the direct knowledge of the Bulgarian government, which was struggling to persuade St. Petersburg to uphold its arbitration obligations from the March 1912 Bulgarian-Serbian Treaty. The Bulgarian prime minister, Stoyan Danev (1858–1949), countermanded the attack order, and General Savov complied. This caused Czar Ferdinand to fire General Savov and replace him with First Balkan War hero Radko Dimitriev. This retraction of orders and change of command had the effect of causing great initial confusion in the Bulgarian army. While some units fought, others stood aside. The Greeks and Serbs utilized the Bulgarian attacks to implement their alliance, and the Second Balkan War ensued.

In southern Macedonia near Shtip, from July 1 to July 4, the Serbian First and Third Armies inflicted heavy casualties on the Bulgarian Fourth Army and forced it back to the Bergalnitsa River. At the same time, King Constantine's (1868–1923) Greek army defeated General Nikola Ivanov's (1861–1940) Bulgarian Second Army at Kilkis on July 4 and squeezed it out of

much of southeastern Macedonia. Greek forces quickly overran and captured Bulgarian troops stationed in Salonika to enforce Bulgarian claims to that city. Bulgarian forces retreated from the Greeks and Serbs toward their prewar frontiers. At the battle of Kalimantsi on July 18, 1913, Bulgarian troops gained a defensive success and prevented the Serbian army from entering the territory of prewar Bulgaria.

By then, however, the situation for Bulgaria had worsened to the east and the north. Taking advantage of the situation, Romanian and Ottoman troops joined in the attack on Bulgaria. The Romanians objected to the establishment of a strong Bulgaria on their southern frontier and sought compensation in the town of Silistra and in southern Dobrudja (Dobrudzha). The Ottomans sought to recover Adrianople. The Bulgarians found themselves attacked on all sides. With their entire army committed to the fight against the Greeks and Serbs, they lacked forces with which to oppose the invading Ottomans and Romanians. The Ottomans reoccupied Adrianople on July 23 without having to fire a shot. Romanian units advanced against no opposition almost all the way to Sofia. The result was a Bulgarian catastrophe.

With no aid forthcoming from any Great Power, the Bulgarians had to seek terms. Toward the end of the fighting, the Bulgarians did gain two small successes. In the north, the Bulgarian town of Vidin held out against a Serbian attack. In the south, elements of the Bulgarian Second Army surrounded the Greek army advancing up the Struma River in Kresna Gorge. Only the signing of an armistice on July 31 saved the Greek army and its commander King Constantine from being surrounded at Kresna Gorge.

These late successes did not ameliorate the peace terms for Bulgaria. In the Treaty

of Bucharest (August 10, 1913) with Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia, and the Treaty of Constantinople (September 30, 1913) with the Ottoman Empire, the Bulgarians had to acknowledge complete defeat and the loss of much of the gains from the First Balkan War. For the second time in 35 years, the Bulgarian dream of Macedonia turned into a nightmare. The Second Balkan War left Serbia as Russia's only important client on the Balkan Peninsula. It also reoriented Bulgaria from Russian patronage toward Austria-Hungary and Germany. Both of these consequences were important in the development of World War I. Russia had to support Serbia in July 1914 or risk exclusion from the Balkan Peninsula. Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in September 1915.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Bucharest, Treaty of, 1913; Constantinople, Treaty of, 1913; Greece in the Balkan Wars; Kalimantsi, Battle of, 1913; Montenegro in the Balkan Wars; Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars; Romania in the Balkan Wars; Serbia in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Hellenic Army General Staff. *A Concise History of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Athens: Army History Directorate, 1998.

Helmreich, E. C. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938.

Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes

The First Balkan War of 1912–1913 was a sharp and bloody conflict in southeastern Europe that led to World War I. Most of

southeastern Europe had come under Ottoman domination by the end of the fourteenth century. Only Montenegro maintained a precarious independence from Ottoman rule. By the first half of the nineteenth century, Greece, Serbia, and Romania established independent regimes.

After their defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo Turkish War of 1877–1878, the Russians established a large Bulgarian state in the Treaty of San Stefano of March 3, 1878. Objections from Austria-Hungary and Great Britain caused a revision of the settlement at the Congress of Berlin in July 1878. San Stefano Bulgaria was trisected into a Bulgarian principality under the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan, the Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia with an Orthodox Christian governor, and Macedonia under the direct rule of the Ottoman sultan. Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia received formal Great Power recognition as states independent of all ties to the Ottoman Empire. Thereafter, all the Balkan states sought to overturn the Berlin settlement to realize their nationalist goals within the Ottoman Empire. The political elite of all of these states were convinced that only by attaining their nationalist objectives could they develop as modern states. In this thinking, Germany and Italy served as examples. These states, including Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia, all harbored irredentist aspirations against the Ottomans. Many of these aspirations overlapped, especially in Macedonia. Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian nationals all claimed Macedonia as a part of their national irredentas. All of the Balkan states sponsored cultural efforts as well as armed bands in Macedonia.

For some time these rivalries precluded the formation of a Balkan alliance directed against the Ottomans. The Young Turk

THE BALKANS, 1878–1913



revolution in 1908 and its objective of an Ottoman revival, however, engendered closer cooperation among these Balkan states. An opportunity for the realization of their nationalist objectives arose when the weakness of the Ottomans became apparent during the Italo-Ottoman War of 1911–1912. The Albanian uprisings that had begun in 1910 also demonstrated the feeble condition of the Ottoman state.

With the support of Russia, which sought to regain the position lost in southeastern Europe during the Bosnian Crisis of 1908–

1909, Bulgaria and Serbia signed an alliance in March 1912. This alliance contained provisions for the rough division of Ottoman territories. It recognized Bulgarian claims in Thrace and Serbian claims in Albania. It also included a provision for a partition of Macedonia into a Bulgarian zone and a “contested zone” in northwestern Macedonia to be arbitrated by the Russian czar if Macedonian autonomy proved to be unworkable. Bulgaria and Serbia then signed bilateral agreements with Greece and Montenegro during the spring and

summer of 1912. Other than the Bulgarian-Serbian agreement, the Balkan allies made little effort to arrange division of any territories conquered from the Ottomans. The Bulgarians in particular had little confidence in the Greek army and were convinced that they could realize their objectives in Macedonia ahead of the Greeks. Bulgaria's failure to delineate its claims in Macedonia with Greece led to great complications after the First Balkan War and was a major cause of the Second Balkan War.

While the First Balkan War arose from the strong desire of the Orthodox Christian governments in the Balkans to realize their nationalist claims to Ottoman territory, the Second Balkan War came about because of conflicting claims to Ottoman territory, especially Macedonia. During the initial phase of the First Balkan War, Serbian troops overran northern Albania and most of Macedonia. In December 1912, Austria-Hungary made its opposition to a Serbian presence in northern Albania clear. The realization that they could not realize their claims to northern Albania made the Serbs determined to hold on to the parts of Macedonia they had occupied, despite the 1912 treaty with Bulgaria. In 1913, the Serbs requested a revision of the 1912 treaty. The Bulgarians, still fighting at Adrianople, ignored the Serbian request. By March 1913, Bulgarian and Greek soldiers were skirmishing in contested regions of Macedonia. On May 5, Greece and Serbia concluded an alliance directed against Bulgaria.

Meanwhile, the Romanians pressed their claims for compensation from Bulgaria. As the largest Orthodox Christian state in southeastern Europe, the Romanians regarded themselves as the “gendarme” of the Balkans. As the extent of the Balkan League victories became clear, the Romanians sought to maintain their position in

the Balkans by seeking compensation in Bulgarian Dobrudja (Dobrudzha). After their military successes against the Ottomans, the Bulgarians were reluctant to part with any of their own territory. A Great Powers ambassadors' conference in St. Petersburg on May 8, 1913 awarded the northeastern Bulgarian town of Silistra to Romania. This decision left both Bulgaria and Romania dissatisfied. When the Bulgarians became embroiled in conflict with their allies, the Romanians utilized the circumstances to seize not only Silistra but all of Bulgarian Dobrudja.

After the signing of the treaty of London, the Bulgarians quickly transferred the bulk of their army from Thrace to Macedonia to enforce their claims against the Greeks and Serbs. Discontent at the long time of service without respite emerged in the Bulgarian ranks. The command urged the government to use the army or to send it home. On the night of June 29–30, Czar Ferdinand (1861–1948) ordered General Mihail Savov (1857–1928) to take action. Savov then ordered the army to undertake local attacks to improve its tactical position. These attacks against the Greeks and Serbs began the Second Balkan War.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Albanian Uprisings, 1910–1911; Contested Zone (Macedonia), 1912; Savov, Mihail (1857–1928)

Further Reading

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Helmreich, E. C. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938.

Thadden, Edward C. *Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965.

Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Consequences

The two Balkan Wars changed the map of southeastern Europe. A fragile Albanian state emerged, largely dependent on the Great Powers. They did not determine its final borders until the Council of Florence in February 1914. Even then, Greek and Serbian armed bands encroached on the territory of the new state.

The big winners were Greece and Serbia. Greece obtained clear title to Crete and also obtained Epirus, including the city of Janina; a large portion of southern and western Macedonia, including Salonika; and the Aegean Islands. These areas added around two million people to the Greek population. Serbia acquired Kosovo and much of Macedonia, almost doubling its territory and adding almost two million to its population. Significantly, much of this new population was not Serbian. Serbia and Montenegro divided the sanjak of Novi Pazar between them. Montenegro also gained small areas on its southern border with the new Albanian state. Bulgaria, even after defeat in the Second Balkan War, gained the Rhodope region, central Thrace including the insignificant Aegean port of Dedeagach, and a piece of Macedonia around Petrich. Much of the population of these regions was not Bulgarian. These people included Greeks, Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking Muslims), and Turks. Romania obtained southern (Bulgarian) Dobrudja (Dobrudzha). In this region of mixed ethnicity, there were relatively few Romanians. The Ottoman Empire, which had held large European territories since the fourteenth century, was almost totally eliminated from Europe by the Treaty of London. In the Second Balkan War, the Ottomans managed to

regain eastern Thrace, which remained its only possession in Europe.

The Balkan Wars created major population movements. Victorious Bulgarian armies in Thrace and Serbian armies in Kosovo and the sanjak of Novi Pazar committed atrocities against the Muslim populations of these regions. This caused some Muslims to seek safety in Constantinople and in Albania. After the Second Balkan War, pro-Bulgarian Macedonians moved out of Greek- and Serbian-controlled areas. Some Bulgarians also left southern Dobrudzha after the Romanian occupation.

The Balkan Wars were the first armed conflicts on European soil in the twentieth century and in many ways presaged World War I. Mass attacks against entrenched positions, concentrated artillery barrages, and military use of airplanes made their first appearances in European warfare. Losses to disease among both civilians and military personnel were significant. These presaged the great influenza epidemic of World War I. The larger European powers mainly ignored the lessons of the Balkan Wars. There was not enough time between the end of the Second Balkan War and the opening of World War I to process information. Nor did many of the General Staffs of the Great Powers think that the experience of the Balkan states had anything to teach them.

The two wars resulted in at least 150,000 military dead, with the Bulgarians and Ottomans suffering the heaviest losses. Many more soldiers were wounded and missing. The armies of the Balkan League killed thousands of mainly Muslim civilians during the First Balkan War. Ottoman armies in retreat vented their frustration on local Orthodox Christian populations. During the Second Balkan War, Bulgarian

troops killed Greek civilians and Greek and Serbian soldiers killed Bulgarian and pro-Bulgarian Macedonian civilians. These wars also brought about the deaths from disease of tens of thousands of civilians.

The Balkan Wars left a legacy of frustration for the Bulgarians and Ottomans, providing a basis for continued conflict in World War I. For the Bulgarians, the loss of Macedonia for a second time, was especially frustrating. San Stefano and Bucharest became conflated. They sought redress on the side of the Central Powers in World War I, where they would again lose Macedonia for a third time. Likewise, the Ottomans sought to regain some of their lost possessions, and contemplated war against Greece in the spring of 1914. They too found themselves fighting on the side of the Central Powers in World War I.

Montenegro had almost doubled its population and territory in the Balkan Wars. Montenegrin gains, however, were not the result of the success of Montenegrin arms. The wars had demonstrated the antiquated nature of King Nikola's (1841–1921) personal regime and the deficiencies of the Montenegrin army. In the competition between the Montenegrin Petrovich dynasty and the Serbian Karageorgević dynasty for leadership of the Serbian national cause, the latter emerged as the clear winner as a result of the Balkan Wars.

The Balkan Wars also imparted a sense of inflated national success among the Greeks, Romanians, and Serbs. On two occasions during the Balkan Wars, Austria-Hungary had resorted to threats of force against Serbia to protect Albania. The Austrians would make one more such threat in October 1913 before finally resorting to force. Less than a year after the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, war again erupted in southeastern Europe after the assassination of

Archduke Francis Ferdinand (1863–1914) in Sarajevo by a Bosnian Serb terrorist. This time, the Third Balkan War metamorphosed into World War I.

Within the next five years, all of the participants in the Balkan Wars would become involved in further disastrous and costly conflicts. Many of the same battlefields of the Balkan Wars, such as Gallipoli and Doiran, again saw fighting. During World War I, the populations of southeastern Europe again made great sacrifices for the nationalist aims of the political elite.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Greece in the Balkan Wars; Montenegro in the Balkan Wars; Romania in the Balkan Wars; Serbia in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Helmreich, E. C. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938.

International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. *The Other Balkan Wars*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1993.

Király, Béla K., and Dimitrije Djordevic, eds. *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*. Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1987.

Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Naval Campaigns

The naval campaigns of the Balkan Wars were of secondary importance to the land fighting. Of the Balkan allies, only Greece had a significant navy. The pride of the Greek fleet was the armored cruiser *Georgios Averof*. In addition the Greeks had

16 modern destroyers, 19 old torpedo boats, and a small submarine, the *Delphin*. The Bulgarians had only six torpedo boats and a gunboat, the *Nadezhda*. All of the Bulgarian vessels operated only in the Black Sea. The Serbs and Montenegrins had no navies. The Ottomans had a number of older warships, including two armored cruisers, six armored ships, 11 torpedo destroyers, and 30 torpedo ships. Its modern vessels were the light cruiser *Hamidiye* and the armored cruiser *Mecidiye*.

The Greek navy assumed two main objectives. The first was to blockade the Ottoman coast and to contain the Ottoman navy in the Dardanelles and thus prevent the transport of Ottoman reinforcements from Anatolia to the Balkan Fronts. This was a major factor in Bulgarian calculations for an alliance with the Greeks. The second Greek naval objective was the seizure of the Aegean Islands from the Ottomans. In these two tasks, the Greeks succeeded. By the end of 1912, the Greeks had taken all of the Aegean Islands except Samos, which they occupied in March 1913. The Greeks also used their navy and merchant marine to transport Bulgarian troops to Dedeagach and Serbian troops to San Giovanni di Medua, (Albanian: Shëngjin) Albania.

The largest naval engagement of the Balkan Wars occurred on December 16, 1912, at the Dardanelles. At that time Greeks defeated an Ottoman attempt to break out into the Aegean. A second attempt two days later also failed. Neither fleet suffered extensive damage, but the Greeks managed to contain the Ottomans in the Dardanelles.

Despite the overall Greek success, the Ottomans did enjoy some successes with their navy. Naval fire from Ottoman warships in both the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara helped to thwart the Bulgarian attack on the Chataldza lines on

November 17, 1912, and thus prevent the Bulgarian occupation of Constantinople. Also the Ottoman cruiser *Hamidiye* managed to elude the Greek blockade of the Dardanelles on December 22, 1912. It proceeded to cruise the Mediterranean. It sunk the Greek auxiliary cruiser *Makedonia* in Syra harbor in the Cyclades on January 15 and attacked a Greek transport ship carrying Serbian troops at San Giovanni di Medua, Albania, on March 18, 1913, causing heavy casualties. While the *Hamidiye*'s exploits heartened the Ottomans, they had little effect on the outcome of the war.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Greece in the Balkan Wars; Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Fotakis, Zisis. *Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910–1919*. London: Routledge, 2005.

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Hellenic Army General Staff. *A Concise History of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Athens: Army History Directorate, 1998.

Balli Kombetar

The Balli Kombetar (BK) or National Front was a nationalist resistance movement in Albania during World War II. It arose in 1942 out of concerns by conservative Albanian nationalists about the growth of the Communist resistance movement. The BK also opposed the return of King Zog (1895–1961), who had fled Albania during the Italian invasion of 1939, and sought to include Kosovo in its postwar borders. They also represented the established economic and social interests of the country.

A meeting between BK and Communists took place at Mukaj in August 1943 failed to result in a lasting arrangement. Soon afterward in September, most of the Italian occupation troops in Albania surrendered to the Germans. About the same time, the BK was undercut by the establishment of a pro-Zogist movement, the Legeliteri, who advocated the return of the king. Increasingly the BK found itself constrained by the better-equipped, Communist-led Partisan army (ANLA), which received Allied help. This caused the BK to rely on German support.

By 1944, the BK was in a position not unlike that of the Četniks in neighboring Yugoslavia. Both were anti-Communist nationalists whose anti-Communism forced them to compromise their relations with their occupiers. The German withdrawal from the Balkan Peninsula beginning in October 1944 doomed the BK. The BK always found greater support in the conservative north of Albania. Fighting continued there until the end of 1944. By 1945, the Communists were in control of all Albania. The Communists opposed the BK on the left, and the Legeliteri opposed them on the right. Because of this and its reliance on the Germans, the BK failed to develop an effective resistance alternative to the Communists in Albania.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Albania in World War II; Partisans, Albania; Zog, King of the Albanians (1895–1961)

Further Reading

Fischer, Bernd. *Albania at War, 1939–1945*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1999.

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. Vol. 2, *Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Vickers, Miranda. *The Albanians: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1995.

Berlin, Treaty of, 1878

The Treaty of Berlin was the final act of the Congress of Berlin, June 13–July 13, 1878, by which Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, and Italy revised the Treaty of San Stefano, signed earlier on March 3, that Russia had imposed on a defeated Ottoman Empire.

On April 24, 1877, Russia, the self-declared protector of the Slavic nationalities in the Balkans, declared war on the Ottoman Empire. By the end of 1877, Russia, after fighting in the Balkans and the Caucasus Mountains, had defeated the Ottoman armies and was advancing on Constantinople. On January 31, 1878, Russia accepted an Ottoman truce offer. On March 3, at San Stefano, Russian negotiators dictated a treaty that recognized the independence of Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, and a “Greater” Bulgaria.

The Great Powers, alarmed at an independent and pro-Russian “Greater Bulgaria,” called the Congress of Berlin to modify this treaty. They established two separate autonomous principalities, Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, and returned the Macedonian region to Ottoman rule, undoing Russia’s plans for a Greater Bulgaria. The new treaty also recognized the independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro. Finally, Austria-Hungary would administer the Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, territorially still a part of the Ottoman Empire. A provision of the treaty that would serve as a model for the League of Nations’ Minorities System provided special legal status to some religious groups and to non-Turkish minorities.

The three newly independent states subsequently proclaimed themselves kingdoms (Romania in 1881, Serbia in 1882, and Montenegro in 1910). Bulgaria united with Eastern Rumelia in 1885 and proclaimed full independence in 1908. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia in 1908, sparking another major crisis.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Plevna, Siege of, 1877; Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878; San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878

Further Reading

Albrecht-Carre, Rene. *A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958.

Langer, William L. *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890*. 2nd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950.

Taylor, A. J. P. *The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe, 1848–1918*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954.

Bessarabia

Bessarabia is a southeastern European territory covering some 17,600 square miles in present-day Moldavia and Ukraine, bounded by the Prut, Danube, and Dneister Rivers and the Black Sea. Its population in 1945 was approximately 2 million. Moldavians made up about 50 percent of the population, while Ukrainians were 20 percent; the remainder were Russians, Germans, Bulgarians, and Jews.

Until 1812, Bessarabia, which was named for the Bassarab dynasty that ruled much of Wallachia in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, formed the eastern boundary of Moldavia, a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. In the Treaty of Bucharest of May 1812, Russia annexed Bessarabia, and

it remained part of the Russian Empire until 1918. Bessarabia was briefly independent following the end of World War I but chose to join Romania. This decision was confirmed by the Allied powers, which formally awarded the territory to Romania in 1920 as an additional buffer against Communist Russia. The Russian government, however, continued to regard Bessarabia as its own territory.

In June 1940, in accordance with the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia and, that August, formed much of it into the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), although portions of it were also awarded to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). The Soviets also deported significant numbers of Bessarabians to Siberia. Romania retook Bessarabia following the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 in which Romanian forces participated. Approximately 65,000 of 75,000 Jews living in Bessarabia perished during the Holocaust.

The Soviet Union regained the region at the end of World War II. Although Romania became a Communist state and entered the Soviet bloc after the war, there was continued acrimony between the Soviet Union and Romania over Bessarabia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the MSSR declared itself independent and became the Republic of Moldova. Many in Romania continued to believe, however, that Moldova should be part of Romania.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Romania in World War I; Romania in World War II; Transnistrian War, 1991

Further Reading

Cioranescu, George. *Bessarabia: Disputed Land between East and West*. Munich: Ion Dumitru Verlag, 1985.

Dobrinescu, Valeriu Florin. *The Diplomatic Struggle over Bessarabia*. Iași: Center for Romanian Studies, 1996.

King, Charles. *The Moldovans, Romania, Russia and the Politics of Culture*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000.

Bihać

Bihać is a city in the Cazinska Krajina region of northwestern Bosnia of around 40,000 inhabitants that was the center of extensive fighting during the Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995. During World War II, Bihać was a part of the independent state of Croatia (NDH). It was the scene of Ustaša atrocities. In 1942, it briefly served as the Partisan headquarters, and on November 26, 1942 was the scene of the first Partisan political conference. A German offensive restored the city to NDH control, lasting until 1945. In the early Tito years, Bihać was a center of resistance to the efforts of the regime to collectivize agriculture.

During the Yugoslav Wars, Bihać and the surrounding region formed an island of Bosniak control amidst Serbian forces in Bosnia and Croatia. A local Bosniak businessman and politician, Fikret Abdić (1939–), was the leading figure in Bihać during this time. Abdić was a charismatic individual known as “Babo” (Daddy), who had been convicted of corruption in 1987 and imprisoned. At the beginning of the fighting in Sarajevo in April 1992, he participated in a failed attempt to oust the Izetbegović government. He then returned to his home base in northwestern Bosnia.

Isolated from the Bosnian government in Sarajevo, Abdić ruled Bihać as his own fiefdom. He proclaimed this to be the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (APWB). From Bihać he seems to have interacted with both Croatian and Serbian

forces to his economic and political advantage. When the Bosnian Army Fifth Corps, stationed in the Bihać pocket, attempted to enforce the rule of Sarajevo, Abdić maintained his independence with Serbian assistance. Throughout the war, extensive secret commercial undertakings among the Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs in Bihać undoubtedly enriched Abdić and his collaborators. This confused concept of all for all and all against all became emblematic of the Yugoslav Wars of 1991–1995. The joint Bosnian-Croat offensive of August 1995 effectively ended the APWB and the rule of Fikret Abdić, who then fled to Croatia. There in 2000, the Croatian government put him on trial. He served 10 years of a 15-year sentence. After his release, he resided in Croatia. As of this writing, the Sarajevo government continued to regard him as a traitor.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Izetbegović, Alija (1925–2003); Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Silber, Laura, and Allen Little. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. New York: Penguin, 1998.

Thomas, N., and K. Mikulan. *The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992–2001*. Botely, Oxford: Osprey, 2006.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. *Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995*. 2 vols. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002–2003.

Black Hand

The Black Hand was a common name for the Serbian nationalist organization dedicated to the establishment of a Serbian state including the Serbian populations of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.

Although Serbia achieved independence in 1878, nationalists were outraged that Austria-Hungary controlled Slavic territory in the Balkans. Relations with Austria-Hungary worsened after 1903 and especially after Vienna's 1908 annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two days later, a group of Serbian nationalists formed a semisecret, nationalist public patriotic society, the *Narodna Odbrana* (National Defense).

On May 9, 1911, a new group met to form *Ujedinjenje ili Smrt* (Unification or Death), also known as the *Crna Ruka* (Black Hand). This group was led by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević (1876–1917), known as “Apis” after the ancient Egyptian bull god. It was prepared to employ violent methods to achieve the goal of a Greater Serbia. Organized into cells, the group took part in *comitadji* (guerrilla) warfare in Macedonia, anti-Austrian operations in Bosnia, and political assassinations. Trading on the prestige of *Narodna Odbrana*, the Black Hand became a major force in Serbian domestic politics. It attempted the assassination of Austrian emperor Franz Joseph in 1911 and organized the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, supplying weapons to the young Bosnian terrorists. This was done apparently in the expectation that the resulting crisis would force Russian intervention to support Serbia and allow Serbia to make gains at the expense of Austria-Hungary.

After checking three Austro-Hungarian invasions in 1914, the Serbs retreated from their country in the face of a combined Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and German onslaught in the fall of 1915. The remnants of the Serbian army recuperated on the Greek island of Corfu. In the summer of 1916, they formed a contingent in the Entente force at Salonika where they fought along the Balkan Front.

In late 1916, Serbian prime minister Nicola Pašić (1845–1926) decided to destroy the Black Hand, probably both to remove a threat to his authority and to keep its activities a secret. Crown Prince Alexander also feared the power of Apis and his organization. The group's leaders were arrested and brought to trial at Salonika in May 1917. They stood accused of plotting the assassination of Crown Prince Alexander and of seeking to overthrow the Serbian monarchy. While many received prison sentences, Apis along with Rade Malobabić and Ljubomir Vulović were executed by firing squad on June 26. The organization survived, however, and was reborn as the White Hand, another secretive Serbian nationalist group that continued on in the new state of Yugoslavia. In 1953, the Serbian Supreme Court exonerated all of the Salonika defendants.

Timothy L. Francis

See also: Dimitrijević, Dragutin (1876–1917); Sarajevo Assassination, 1914; Serbia in World War I

Further Reading

Albertini, Luigi. *The Origins of the War of 1914*. 3 vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1952–1957.

Cassels, Lavender. *The Archduke and the Assassin: Sarajevo, June 28th 1914*. New York: Stein and Day, 1985.

MacKenzie, David. *The “Black Hand” on Trial: Salonika, 1917*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1995.

Remak, Joachim. *Sarajevo: The Story of a Political Murder*. New York: Criterion, 1959.

Black Sea Campaign, 1941–1944

The Black Sea campaign involved Soviet forces defending against attacking Axis powers led by Nazi Germany. Within the

Axis coalition, and taking part in action within the Black Sea Theater, were the navies and armies of Bulgaria, Romania, and Italy. During World War II, Hitler's Germany surprised the Soviet armed forces when it attacked on June 22, 1941, during Operation Barbarossa. Overall, the intent was to drive the Soviet Communists far enough from Europe as to allow two strategic objectives. One was resource-oriented, and the second was concerned with the military defense of the German homeland. The first strategic objective was to secure the agricultural resources of the Ukraine located just north of the Black Sea and to secure the petroleum resources of the Middle East and those located in and around the Caucasus region located on the eastern side of the sea—with a particular focus on the oil fields around Baku, Azerbaijan. To the German leadership, economic self-sufficiency was essential for national security. The second strategic objective was to push Soviet air power out of range of the German homeland.

On the opening day of Operation Barbarossa, German Luftwaffe aircraft conducted mine-laying operations off the home port of the Soviet Black Sea fleet at Sevastopol located on the Crimea. Four days later, on June 26, 1941, the Soviets bombed and shelled the Romanian port at Constanța with nine naval aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet in conjunction with a surface flotilla led by the *Moskva* and *Kharkov*. In this engagement, the Soviet destroyer leader *Moskva* was sunk by mines while attempting to dodge incoming rounds from coastal batteries. The Romanian destroyers *Regina Maria* and *Marasti* were involved in the battle and conducted operations against the *Kharkov* and the *Moskva*.

As the war progressed, Soviet submarines also raided Axis shipping along the Bulgarian and Romanian coasts. While the Soviets

began with a numerical superiority in ships within the theater, German air power, particularly the diving bombing Stukas, eventually took its toll. By 1943, the Black Sea Fleet had been reduced to one battleship, the *Sevastopol*; four cruisers; one destroyer leader, the *Kharkov*; eight other destroyers; and 29 submarines. By 1944, the surface vessels of the Soviet fleet were unable to mount any sustained operations due to damages inflicted and the inability to generate repairs.

Axis forces had successfully pushed the Soviets back across the Black Sea to the Caucasus during 1941–1943, taking the naval port of Sevastopol on July 4, 1942. Joining German forces in driving the Soviets back to the Caucasus were the Romanian military units the 10th and 19th Infantry Divisions and 3rd Mountain Division. During this time, the *Kharkov* and two destroyers were sunk by Stukas. Stalin then ordered that any further use of large ships would have to be authorized by his office. The tide began turning against the Axis powers in 1944 and the Soviets pushed back across the region, retaking the area around Odessa in March and then forcing the surrender of Axis forces near Sevastopol on May 9, 1944.

James Brian McNabb

See also: Romania in World War II

Further Reading

Axworthy, Mark, Cornel Scafes, and Cristian Craciunoiu. *Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945*. London: Arms and Armour, 1995.

Glantz, David M. *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995.

Roba, J. Louis. *Seaplanes over the Black Sea: German Romanian Operations, 1941–*

1944. Bucharest: Editura Modelism International Ltd., 1998.

Stolfi, Russell H. S. *Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

Boris III, Czar of Bulgaria (1894–1943)

Czar of Bulgaria whose country, though nominally an Axis power, remained autonomous throughout the war years, Boris III was born Boris Klemens Robert Maria Pius Ludwig Stanislaus Xaver, prince of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, duke of Saxony, and prince of Tirnovo, at the royal palace in Sofia on January 30, 1894. His father was Czar Ferdinand (1861–1948), who had been ruling since 1887. His mother, Princess Maria Luisa of Bourbon Parma (1870–1899), died while giving birth to his youngest sibling. Boris was educated by palace tutors and married Princess Giovanna of Savoy (1907–2000), daughter of King Victor Emmanuel III (1869–1947) of Italy, in 1930. They had two children, Maria Luisa (1933–) and Crown Prince Simeon (1937–).

Boris rose to power following his father's abdication on October 3, 1918, at the end of World War I. Bulgaria was then in desperate straits. The 1919 Treaty of Neuilly involved loss of territory and the payment of reparations. As a consequence of his country's many problems, Boris experienced an exceptionally stormy reign. The 1920s were filled with internal political strife, and economic problems forced Bulgaria to depend on Germany for supplies.

Boris favored a neutralist course for his country. He proved to be an adept diplomat and an intelligent yet cautious leader who was genuinely respected by his people for his skillful handling of the many problems



Boris III was the last real king of Bulgaria and played an important role during World War II. (Library of Congress)

besetting the kingdom. He was an unwilling junior partner in the Axis alliance during World War II. Pressured into joining the alliance by Germany, Boris regained the southern Dobrudja (Dobrudzha; Dobruja) region from Romania in 1940, which led to his being known as the “King Unifier” and the “Liberator Tsar.”

By 1941, Boris had little choice but to commit to the Axis powers and allow German troops to cross through his country en route to the Soviet Union. Unlike the other Balkan states, Bulgaria remained autonomous during the war. Although it did not invade Yugoslavia or Greece, its troops did garrison parts of Macedonia and western Thrace. In December, Bulgaria declared war on the United States and Britain, but Boris infuriated Adolf Hitler by withholding Bulgarian troops from the war effort and refusing to declare war on the Soviet Union or send Bulgarian Jews to the death camps.

His actions helped save 50,000 Jews. Boris and Giovanna also arranged for transit visas permitting thousands of other Jews to go to Palestine.

Boris's continuous obduracy regarding German policies led to a stormy meeting with Hitler at the latter's Wolfsschanze headquarters near Rastenburg on August 14, 1943, in which Boris bluntly said that Bulgaria would follow its own path. He returned to Sofia depressed over the probable eventual fate of his country. Boris died at the royal palace in Sofia two weeks later, on August 28, 1943, most likely from an embolism, although there were suspicions he had been poisoned. A regency then took power on behalf of the underage Czar Simeon II, who reigned until he was deposed on September 9, 1946.

Annette Richardson

See also: Bulgaria in World War I; Bulgaria in World War II; Military League (Bulgaria); Radomir Rebellion, 1918

Further Reading

Crampton, R. J. *A Concise History of Bulgaria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Groueff, Stephan. *Crown of Thorns: The Reign of King Boris III of Bulgaria, 1918–1943*. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1987.

Lalkov, Milcho. *Rulers of Bulgaria*. Sofia: Kibea Publishing, 1997.

Bosnia, Austrian Occupation, 1878

In 1878, Austria-Hungary occupied the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the Treaty of Berlin. After defeating the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, Russia imposed the Treaty of San Stefano on the Ottoman Empire. The treaty granted

independence to Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro; established an autonomous “greater” Bulgaria; and made Bosnia and Herzegovina an autonomous province. However, the European powers believed that this treaty would upset the balance of power in the Balkans and met in Berlin from June 13 to July 13, 1878, to modify its provisions. The resulting Treaty of Berlin, among other things, allowed Austria-Hungary to administer Bosnia and Herzegovina (and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar), although these provinces remained territorially a part of the Ottoman Empire.

In June 1878, Austria-Hungary mobilized over 82,000 troops to occupy the provinces and established a reserve army in Dalmatia. The Ottoman army in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time consisted of roughly 40,000 troops and about 53,000 local militia. The Austro-Hungarian troops met sporadic fierce opposition from portions of both the Muslim and Orthodox populations and fought pitched battles near Čitluk, Stolic, Livno, and Klobuk. Despite setbacks at Maglaj and Tuzla, the Austro-Hungarian army occupied Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, in October 1878. Resistance to the occupation force ended after three weeks of fighting and cost the Austro-Hungarians over 5,000 casualties.

Tensions remained in certain parts of the country, particularly Herzegovina, and a large number of Muslim dissidents left. With the establishment of relative stability, Austro-Hungarian authorities instituted a number of social and administrative reforms intended to make Bosnia and Herzegovina into a “model colony.” Habsburg rule eventually led to the codification of laws, the introduction of new political practices, and the start of modernization, aimed at establishing the province as a stable political entity that would help dissipate rising South Slav nationalism.

In 1908, Austria-Hungary formally annexed the territory, which precipitated a new Bosnian crisis and created the Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina that lasted until the end of World War I.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Berlin, Treaty of, 1878; Bosnian Crisis, 1908–1909; Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878; San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878; Sarajevo Assassination, 1914

Further Reading

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Jelavich, Charles, and Barbara Jelavich. *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.

Langer, William L. *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890*. New York: Knopf, 1950.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976–1977.

Bosnian Crisis, 1908–1909

The Bosnian Crisis was a regional crisis that resulted from the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 1908. It produced significant tension between Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire and, for several weeks early in 1909, threatened to cause a general European war.

By article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, Austria-Hungary was permitted to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina. This arrangement was made in consequence of an understanding between Russia and the Dual Monarchy, entered into on the eve of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, and of the support given to the

Austro-Hungarian claims by Britain and Germany at the Congress of Berlin. As the provinces were inhabited chiefly by Serbs, and as a route across that region would afford Serbia the most convenient form of the long-desired access to the Adriatic, the Serbian agents at the Congress of Berlin tried to protest against the arrangement. But the congress would not even hear the protest.

From the beginning of the occupation, Austria-Hungary counted upon ultimately obtaining permanent possession. Serbia, however, continued to hope that the provinces, or at least such a portion of them as would give access to the Adriatic, would someday be in its hands. The crisis in 1908–1909 sprang from the fact that Serbia believed that it must prevent the consummation of annexation by Austria-Hungary or give up permanently its long-cherished hopes.

Soon after the proclamation of annexation, Serbia called a part of the reserves to the colors and lodged a vigorous protest with the powers, demanding either a return to the status quo ante or compensations calculated to assure the independence and material progress of Serbia. Serbian newspapers demanded a strip of territory extending across Novi Pazar and Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Adriatic. The Government of the Dual Monarchy refused to receive the Serbian protest. It denied that Serbia had any right to raise a question as to the annexation.

For a time, the attitude of the powers was uncertain. With the exception of Germany, whose attitude at first was extremely reserved, all of the powers objected to the action of Austria-Hungary, but apparently more to the form than to the fact of annexation. As the controversy developed, Germany came quickly and decidedly to the support of its Austro-Hungarian ally.

In Russia, public opinion expressed itself strongly in support of Serbia. The Russian government, which at first had shown a disposition to do no more than record a formal protest against the infraction of the Treaty of Berlin, responded by supporting the demand first made by Turkey for an international conference to consider the matter. The British and Italian governments then supported this demand with considerable vigor, while France sought to play a conciliatory role.

Austria-Hungary declared that it was not opposed on principle to a conference, but made its acceptance depend upon the program for the conference, which, it insisted, must be agreed upon in advance. It took the position that the conference ought not to discuss the validity of the annexation, but should confine itself to registering the measure as a *fait accompli*. Russia, after considerable exchange of opinion with the other powers, submitted a project for a program, which included an item dealing with advantages to be accorded to Serbia and Montenegro. Austria-Hungary, in reply, did not flatly reject the Russian proposal, but suggested that the advantages for Serbia and Montenegro should be economic only. While the discussion was in progress, the Austro-Hungarian government endeavored to prevent the calling of the proposed conference by settling its controversy with Turkey. Such a settlement was arranged in principle on January 12, 1909. After that, Austria-Hungary claimed that there was no longer any occasion for the meeting of a conference.

Popular feeling in Serbia did not abate. There was a strong demand that opposition to the annexation should be pushed vigorously. To avert the danger of war, Russia proposed to the powers a collective *démarche* at Vienna and at Belgrade.

Germany promptly refused to take part, while Austria-Hungary hastened to make known that it would refuse to receive any such proposition. Learning that France and Britain were not inclined to lend their support, Russia quickly dropped the proposal.

The crisis was brought to a close in a manner that involved a triumph for Austria-Hungary over Serbia and for Germany and Austria-Hungary over Russia—a triumph that left behind it much bitterness of spirit in the states that were forced to yield. The humiliation that Russia and Serbia were compelled to endure was undoubtedly a very considerable factor in determining the whole course of events which from that date led directly to World War I. The precise manner in which Serbia was forced to yield was at the time veiled in a good deal of mystery, giving rise to numerous conflicting accounts of just what happened. Complete information is not yet available. It is clear, however, that Russia, under some form of strong pressure from Germany, was forced to abandon Serbia. The kaiser subsequently asserted that he stood beside his ally, Austria-Hungary, “in shining armor,” while Prince Bernhard von Bülow (1849–1929) declared that the “German sword had been thrown into the scale of European decision.” Even then Serbia yielded only under constraint from all the powers. Her humiliation was recorded in the declaration she was forced to send to Vienna (March 31, 1909):

Serbia recognizes that the situation created in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not involve any injury to the rights of Serbia. In consequence, Serbia will conform to the decision which the powers are going to take in regard to article 25 of the treaty of Vienna. Serbia, conforming to the advice of the powers agrees to renounce the attitude of protest and opposition

which she has taken since the month of October of last year. She agrees to modify the line of her political conduct in regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in the future on good terms with it. In conformity with this declaration and confident of the pacific intentions of Austria-Hungary, Serbia will bring back her army, in the matter of organization, distribution, and of state of activity, to the situation existing in the spring of 1908. She will disband the volunteer bodies and will prevent the formation of irregular bands upon her territory.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Black Hand; Sarajevo Assassination, 1914

Further Reading

Bridge, F. R. *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866–1914*. London: Routledge, 1972.

Schmitt, Bernadotte E. *The Annexation of Bosnia, 1908–1909*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937.

Bosnian Forces

Bosnian forces constituted the military effort of the Bosnian government in the Yugoslav Wars of 1991–1995. Bosnia-Herzegovina was most the most ethnically mixed of all the Yugoslav republics. Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) constituted around 44 percent of the population, Serbs around 31 percent, Croats around 17 percent, and others the remainder.

The origins of the Bosnian forces lie in the establishment by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) of a territorial defense system (TO). This was essentially a militia established at the republic level to supplement

JNA forces in case of a foreign invasion of Yugoslavia. By the end of the 1980s, when national tensions had reemerged in Yugoslavia, the Bosnian TO forces and their resources were largely under Serbian control. Also, the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina since December 20, 1990, Alija Izetbegović (1925–2003), discouraged the formation of distinctly Bosnian forces in order not to aggravate the delicate national balance in Bosnia-Herzegovina among the Bosniak, Serb, and Croat populations. He also sought to maintain good relations with the Serbian-dominated JNA. This meant that in the fall of 1990, when the Serbian TO and other Serbian-led organizations in Bosnia began to attack Bosniak and Croatian areas of Bosnia, the Bosnian state was woefully unprepared to respond militarily.

The problem became acute after the Bosnian declaration of independence on March 3, 1992. Fighting erupted throughout the country between pro-government and pro-Serbian forces. On May 20, 1992, the remaining Bosnian TO organization became the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). The new army had limited military resources to draw upon. While most Bosnian males had received military training due to compulsory service in the JNA, most heavy weapons remained under Serbian or pro-Serbian JNA control. Initially the Bosnian forces contained members of all three nationalities. The initial force that was hastily cobbled together had about 80,000 lightly armed men in four army corps under the command of Rasim Delić (1949–2010), a former career officer in the JNA.

Initially the ARBiH was multinational. As the fighting intensified, however, and as the news of widespread atrocities became known, national fissures emerged. As the Bosniaks became the chief victims of the

ethnic cleansing, murder, and rape, so did the sense of ethnic Muslim identity grow among Bosniak soldiers in the ARBiH. As many as 3,000 volunteers arrived from Muslim countries to supplement its ranks. At the same time, Serbian presence in the ARBiH, never strong, diminished. Most Croats joined separate units, which at times cooperated with the ARBiH and at other times fought it. During much of this time, the ARBiH struggled in the field, largely because of the lack of sufficient arms and equipment. By January 1995, the ARBiH had expanded to almost 200,000 men. It received some aid from Muslim countries and from NATO. It participated in the successful operations of the summer and fall of 1995 in cooperation with the Croatian army.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Izetbegović, Alija (1925–2003); JNA (Yugoslav People's Army); Storm, Operation; Sarajevo, Siege of, 1992–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes

Further Reading

Silber, Laura, and Allen Little. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. New York: Penguin, 1998.

Tarnstrom, Ronald. *Balkan Battles*. Lindsbrog, KS: Trogen, 1998.

Thomas, N., and K. Mikulan. *The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992–2001*. Botely, Oxford: Osprey, 2006.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. *Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995*. 2 vols. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002–2003.

Bosnian Revolt, 1876

The revolt that began in August 1876 in the Ottoman province of Bosnia eventually led

to the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. On July 5, 1875, peasants near Nevesinje, Herzegovina, supported by urban workers and the middle class, rebelled after Ottoman tax collectors increased taxes. By August, the number of insurgents had grown to about 12,000, and the revolt had spread across most of Herzegovina. On August 18, the rebellion spread to nearby Bosnia. Bosnian insurgents blockaded a number of large cities and Ottoman fortresses and quickly cleared a portion of territory in southwestern Bosnia along the Austrian border of Ottoman troops.

The insurgents generally wanted the Ottoman administration to transfer land to the peasants, establish a democratic system of government, and unify Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbia and Montenegro, respectively. The liberal middle class limited its demands to the incorporation of Bosnia into Serbia and Herzegovina into Montenegro.

The uprising aroused public sympathy throughout the Balkans and in Russia. The rebels received moral, material, and financial support from several countries and numerous volunteers from Russia, Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Italy. After Great Power mediation between the Bosnians and Ottoman authorities failed, Milan Obrenović (1854–1901) of Serbia and Prince Nicholas of Montenegro (1841–1921) declared war on the Ottoman Empire on June 18, 1876. This war ended in early November 1876 after Russia forced the Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II to sign a truce with Serbia. However, the rebellion in southwest Bosnia continued and had cleared southern Bosnia of Ottoman forces by mid-1877.

Because of Ottoman atrocities during the rebellion, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on April 24, 1877.

This war ended on January 31, 1878, with a Russian victory. Russia imposed the Treaty of San Stefano on the defeated Ottoman Empire, but the European powers, believing that this treaty would upset the balance of power in the Balkans, revised the treaty at the Congress of Berlin, June 13–July 13, 1878. The resulting Treaty of Berlin left Bosnia and Herzegovina territorially a part of the Ottoman Empire but allowed Austria-Hungary to occupy the provinces for administrative purposes.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Bosnia, Austrian Occupation, 1878; Bosnian Crisis, 1908–1909; Berlin, Treaty of, 1878; Obrenović, Milan (1854–1901); Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878; San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878

Further Reading

Jelavich, Charles, and Barbara Jelavich. *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.

Milojkovic-Djuric, Jelena. *The Eastern Question and the Voices of Reason: Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Balkan States, 1875–1908*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs; New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

Pavlowitch, Stevan K. *A History of the Balkans, 1804–1945*. London: Longman, 1999.

Bosnian War, 1992–1995

The Bosnian War took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina from April 6, 1992, to September 21, 1995. During this time, over 100,000 people were killed and over 1.8 million more displaced. The war resulted from a combination of political, social, and religious elements stemming from the disintegration of Communist Yugoslavia, and it

officially ended with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Paris.

In April 1992, the former people of Yugoslavia, including the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbians, began fighting for control of areas in the region of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In May 1992, the Bosnian Serb army began their siege and shelling of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. After internal fighting between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks, these two groups signed a peace agreement, creating the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 1994.

In July 1995, Serbian troops under General Ratko Mladic (1942–) invaded the region of Srebrenića in eastern Bosnia. In what later became known as the Srebrenica Massacre, the Serbian troops murdered roughly 7,779 Bosniak males in one week. Soon afterward, the Bosniak-Croatian alliance began regaining ground against the Serbian forces. With NATO arbitration, the war officially ended on December 14, 1995, with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

Immediately following the peace agreement, the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed by the United Nations. The office was formed to oversee the implementation of the aspects of the peace agreement. In addition, in 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was formed by the United Nations to prosecute war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Controversial in nature, the court has convicted numerous people for crimes in the Bosnian and Kosovo wars.

In May 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina brought a lawsuit against Serbia and Montenegro for inciting ethnic hatred and actively participating in the Srebrenica Massacre. It was the first time a nation charged another nation with genocide. On February 26,



2007, the International Court of Justice ruled that Serbian leaders failed to prevent the massacre, but ultimately exonerated the country of direct responsibility for genocide. In doing so, the court prevented further lawsuits against Serbia for monetary reparations.

The Bosnian War demonstrates the terrible power of war and the resulting human rights catastrophes. The sheer number of killings and displacements demonstrates the need for further human rights legislation and enforcement.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Sarajevo, Siege of, 1992–1995; Srebrenica Massacre, 1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995

Further Reading

Broz, Svetlana, Ellen Elias Bursac, and Laurie Kain Hart. *Good People in an Evil Time: Portraits of Complicity and Resistance in the Bosnian War*. New York: Other Press, 2004.

Brioni Agreement

The Brioni Agreement ended the 11-day war between Slovenia and the former Yugoslavia that began on June 25, 1991. Signed on July 7, 1991, on the Adriatic island of Brioni, the agreement called for a cease-fire and the removal of all Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) forces from Slovenia. It was negotiated by the European Community's (EC) Ministerial Troika (the troika was comprised of representatives from the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Portugal) in coordination with Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Yugoslavia.

All parties agreed to the following principles: (1) only the people of Yugoslavia may determine their future; (2) the situation in Yugoslavia was a fundamentally new situation, requiring ongoing monitoring and negotiations; (3) negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia would begin by August 1, 1991; (4) the Collegiate Presidency must continue to exercise the full capacity of its constitutionally derived rights, particularly those concerning the Federal Armed Forces; and (5) no party would engage in unilateral action. Furthermore, the Brioni Agreement transferred control of Slovenia's borders to the Slovenian police, who were to act in accordance with Yugoslav federal guidelines. Customs and air traffic control remained under Yugoslav control, and all

prisoners taken as a result of related hostilities on June 25, 1991, or later were to be released.

The Brioni Agreement was significant in that it guaranteed the continued engagement of the EC in the Yugoslav situation through the legal establishment of the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM). Furthermore, although it effectively suspended Slovenia's bid for independence for three months, the Brioni Agreement paved the way for Slovenia's full independence from Yugoslavia by extending a set of EC-issued prerequisites. After the Brioni Agreement was signed, the JNA withdrew its forces from Slovenia but repositioned them in Croatia, where violence continued until 1995.

Mary Kate Schneider

See also: JNA (Yugoslav People's Army); Slovene War, 1991.

Further Reading

Lukic, Rénéo, and Allen C. Lynch. *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, New York: TV Books, 1996.

Woodward, Susan L. "The Yugoslav Wars." *The Brookings Review* 10 (1992): 54.

Bucharest, Treaty of, 1913

The Treaty of Bucharest, signed on August 10, 1913, between Bulgaria on one hand and Greece, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia on the other, ended the Second Balkan War. By June 1913, the Balkan League of 1912 had fractured because of a dispute between Bulgaria, and Greece and Serbia over the disposition of territories

seized from the Ottomans during the First Balkan War, especially Macedonia. On the night of 29–30 June 29–30, Bulgarian troops undertook preemptive attacks on Greek and Serbian positions in southeastern Macedonia. The Second Balkan War ensued, and Ottoman and Romanian forces joined in the attacks on Bulgaria.

With most of its army committed in Macedonia, Bulgaria could not oppose the Ottoman and Romanian invasions. The new Bulgarian government of Vasil Radoslavov (1854–1929) sought a way out of this catastrophe. On July 20, 1913, the Bulgarians began talks in Niš, Serbia. These continued until July 24, when they shifted to Bucharest. At Bucharest, the Bulgarians had to cede southern Dobrudzha to Romania, southeastern Macedonia to Greece, and Macedonia west of the Vardar River watershed to Serbia. The Montenegrin delegation was present in Bucharest mainly to support the Serbs. In doing so, the Montenegrins sought a favorable division with Serbia of the sanjak of Novi Pazar. The Treaty of Bucharest left Romania as the largest and strongest power in the Balkans. It also greatly increased the territories of Greece and Serbia. For Bulgaria, the Treaty of Bucharest was a disaster. The Treaty of Bucharest superseded the ephemeral Treaty of London. Bulgaria went to war two years later on the side of the Central Powers largely to reverse the Bucharest decision.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan War, Second, 1913; Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Constantinople, Treaty of, 1913; Greece in the Balkan Wars; Montenegro in the Balkan Wars; Romania in the Balkan Wars; Serbia in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Helmreich, E. C. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938.

Rossos, Andrew. *Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy 1908–1914*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981.

Bucharest, Treaty of, 1918

The Treaty of Bucharest temporarily ended Romanian participation in World War I. Romania entered the war in August 1916, after the success of the Russian Brusilov offensives weakened the Austro-Hungarian army. France and Russia guaranteed Romania territorial compensation in Transylvania, Bukovina, and the Banat.

In response to Romanian entry, former German chief of staff General Erich von Falkenhayn (1861–1922) organized a combined German, Austrian, and Bulgarian force that struck Romania on three fronts and seized the capital of Bucharest on December 5. The loss of 310,000 men in four months impelled Romania to sign the Armistice of Focșani in December 1916. Hostilities resumed the following year, and Austrian and German armies defeated most of the remaining Romanian units in a summer offensive. In March 1918, Romania agreed to a second armistice.

The Treaty of Bucharest was signed in the Romanian capital on May 7, 1918, just three months after Russia signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. As with that treaty, the Treaty of Bucharest imposed ruthless terms on the loser. It stipulated that Romania cede passes in the Carpathian Mountains to Austria-Hungary, leaving Romania's northern border practically indefensible. Romania also had to cede the Dobrudja (Dobrudzha) region on the Black Sea to Bulgaria, leaving eastern Romania open to invasion from the

sea. The northern half of Dobrudja, north of the city of Constanta, was to be ruled as a German-Austria-Bulgarian mandate, while Bulgaria annexed outright the southern half. (Bulgaria had lost southern Dobrudja to Romania through the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest that concluded the Second Balkan War.) Strategically, the loss of the northern half hurt Romania more, as it meant the loss of all three mouths of the Danube River. In compensation, the treaty authorized Romania to annex Bessarabia, which had become a Soviet republic in December 1917, then an independent republic in March 1918.

The Treaty of Bucharest also imposed harsh economic terms. Germany received a 90-year lease on Romanian oil fields and nearly unlimited rights to export Romanian grain and raw materials. In the span of 18 months, the Germans seized 1 million tons of oil and 2 million tons of grain. These resources helped make possible the Ludendorff offensives and sustained the German war economy.

The one-sided terms of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest Litovsk eroded any lingering Allied sentiment for a lenient peace toward the Central Powers. But even these terms were not enough for the German military. Generals Erich Ludendorff (1865–1937) and Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) demanded outright annexation of Romania. German diplomat Richard von Kuhlmann (1873–1948) objected, believing that it was important to respect the ambitions of Germany's allies. Furthermore, Germany had promised southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria early in the war, and Kuhlmann argued that it was important to honor that pledge. Ludendorff and Hindenburg had already lost a similar battle with Kuhlmann over annexing Lithuania. The generals began a media campaign, supported by

German industrialists, to discredit Kuhlmann, but the campaign was unsuccessful.

An intimidated Romanian parliament signed the Treaty of Bucharest, but King Ferdinand I (of the Hohenzollern dynasty) delayed affixing his signature to it. The change in Germany's military fortunes in the summer of 1918 made it easier for Romania to postpone ratification, and it never actually completed the process. In October, Romania officially renounced the treaty and reentered the war.

Despite its poor performance in the war, Romania benefited greatly from the Allied victory. The subsequent Treaty of Trianon with Hungary and the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria not only reversed the Treaty of Bucharest, but brought Romania significant territorial gains.

Michael S. Neiberg

See also: Bessarabia; Dobrudja; Romania in World War I

Further Reading

Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania, 1866–1947*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1994.

Kitchen, Martin, "Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and Rumania." *Slavonic and East European Review* 54 (1976): 214–30.

Torrey, Glenn E. *Romania and World War I: A Collection of Studies*. Portland, OR: Center for Romanian Studies, 1998.

Bukovina

Bukovina is a historical region in Central Europe that has been divided between Romania and Ukraine since 1944. From the 500s until the mid-1300s, the region was part of several successive states until it became the nucleus of the Principality of Moldavia. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, ending the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–1774, awarded

Bukovina to the Hapsburgs, who annexed the province in January 1775 and first officially used the name “Bukovina.” During the 1800s, the province experienced several administrative arrangements until it became a separate province in February 1861, a status that lasted until October 1918. By 1900, Ukrainians composed the majority in the northern part of the province, and Romanians in the southern half. The province also had substantial German and Jewish minorities and small numbers of Poles, Hungarians, Slovaks, and Slovenes.

During World War I, the Austro-Hungarian and German armies fought several battles in Bukovina against the Russians and drove them out in 1917. With the collapse of Austria-Hungary in October 1918, both the Romanian National Council and the Ukrainian National Council claimed the region. In late 1918, Romanian troops occupied Bukovina, despite Ukrainian protests, and the 1919 Treaty of Saint Germain awarded the province to Romania. During the interwar years, the Romanian government attempted to “Romanize” the Ukrainians but relented somewhat in the 1930s to improve relations with the Soviet Union.

On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Union demanded that Romania cede to it northern Bukovina and, two days later, occupied this region, which it then incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Following the 1940 Soviet occupation, about 250,000 Romanians fled northern Bukovina to Romania, and the Soviet secret police, the NKVD, killed or deported to Siberia most of those who did not. In 1940–1941, about 170,000 Germans were resettled to German-occupied western Poland (*Warthegau*).

In late June 1941, the Romanian army reoccupied northern Bukovina. Between

June 1941 and August 1944, Romanian and German authorities murdered or caused the death of about 60,000 Bukovinian Jews, approximately 50 percent of the prewar Jewish population. The Soviet army returned in late August 1944. The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty formally awarded northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union, which again became a part of the Ukrainian SSR (Ukraine after 1991), and southern Bukovina to Romania, confirming the permanent division of the historical region.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Bessarabia; Romania in World War II

Further Reading

DeLuca, Anthony R., and Paul D. Quinlan. *Romania, Culture, and Nationalism: A Tribute to Radu Florescu*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1998.

Dima, Nicholas. *From Moldavia to Moldova: The Soviet-Romanian Territorial Dispute*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1991.

Georgescu, Vlad, and Matei Calinescu. *The Romanians: A History*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1991.

Gold, Hugo, ed. *History of the Jews in Bukovina*. Tel Aviv: “Olamenu,” 1958–1962. Originally published in German. English translation on the Internet.

Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars

For the Bulgarian state established after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, the Balkan Wars represented an opportunity to rectify the settlement of the Congress of Berlin. Bulgarian nationalists had been overjoyed by the Treaty of San Stefano of March 1878, which established a large Bulgarian state in southeastern Europe. The Austro-Hungarians and the British objected

to this big Bulgaria because they feared it would result in Russian domination of the entire region.

The Congress of Berlin trisected San Stefano Bulgaria. A Principality of Bulgaria under the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan ruled the region between the Danube River and the Balkan Mountains with its capital at Sofia. The autonomous Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia, south of the Balkan Mountains, had a Christian governor in Plovdiv. Macedonia returned to full Ottoman rule. After the Congress of Berlin, every Bulgarian government strove to overturn the Berlin settlement and reestablish San Stefano Bulgaria. The Young Turk seizure of power in 1908 in Constantinople raised concerns in Sofia that reforms might strengthen the Ottoman Empire and prevent the realization of a San Stefano Bulgaria. Then the Italo-Turkish War in 1911 offered the opportunity to realize Bulgarian nationalist objectives while the Ottomans were distracted and weakened by the war with Italy. The government of Ivan E. Geshov (1849–1924) decided that the time was right to realize Bulgarian nationalist objectives in the Balkans.

With Russian approval and assistance the Bulgarians began talks with Serbia in the autumn of 1911. After some difficult negotiations they reached an agreement which they signed on March 13, 1912. The open section of this treaty provided for mutual military assistance. The secret part divided Macedonia into two parts, one indisputably Bulgarian, the other, the so-called “contested zone,” left to the arbitration of the Russian czar. This marked the first time since the Congress of Berlin that the Bulgarian government had conceded the possibility that it would not obtain all of Macedonia. Nevertheless, most Bulgarian political and military officials expected to gain all

Macedonia in any future Balkan settlement. Having accomplished the alliance with Serbia, the Sofia government turned to Athens. On May 30, 1912, a Bulgarian-Greek alliance was signed. This did not contain any territorial provisions, primarily because the Bulgarians were confident that their army would occupy any disputed areas in southern Macedonia and western Thrace before the Greeks could arrive. At the end of August 1912, the Bulgarians came to an agreement with the Montenegrins.

In conjunction with its Greek and Serbian allies, Bulgaria declared war on the Ottoman Empire on October 17, 1912. The initial phase of this First Balkan War exceeded all Bulgarian expectations. The Geshov government initially had intended to seek Russian intervention to end the war after a short time of fighting. The successes of Bulgarian arms at Lozengrad and Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, however, caused the titular commander in chief of the army, Czar Ferdinand (1861–1948), and his deputy commander in chief, General Mihail Savov (1857–1928), as well as many in the government to conclude that total victory over the Ottomans was possible. The Bulgarians pursued the retreating Ottomans to the Chataldzha lines. Czar Ferdinand hoped to make a triumphal entry into Constantinople. The defeat at Chataldzha, however, made the Bulgarian army command realize that their forces were exhausted and overextended. With some sense of relief, they concluded an armistice with the Ottomans on December 3, 1912. Peace negotiations between the Balkan allies and the Ottomans began in London on December 16.

The London Peace talks did not last long. The Bulgarians insisted on obtaining Adrianople, which they had besieged since October. They also hoped to establish a presence on the Sea of Marmara. After the

Young Turks seized power in Constantinople on January 23, 1913, they denounced the armistice. The war recommenced on February 3.

With the help of the Serbian Second Army, the Bulgarians captured Adrianople on March 26, 1913. This represented the final Bulgarian triumph of the Balkan Wars. At this point the Bulgarians anticipated a national state even larger than that established at San Stefano. Even as Bulgarian troops entered Adrianople, however, Bulgaria's relationship with the Balkan allies was eroding. During the initial phase of the war, Serbian troops had occupied most of Macedonia while the bulk of the Bulgarian army fought in Thrace. When the Austro-Hungarian government indicated that it would not tolerate a Serbian presence on the Adriatic Sea in northern Albania, the Serbs sought compensation in Macedonia. Meanwhile, the lack of a clear territorial agreement with Greece led to clashes between Bulgarian and Greek troops in southeastern Macedonia around Nigrita. Possession of Salonika became a focus of Bulgarian and Greek hostility. Also, the Romanians raised the issue of compensation for Bulgarian Balkan War gains. The Romanians demanded southern Dobrudja (Dobrudzha), including the Danube port of Silistra.

The Sofia government made little effort to deal with these issues, preferring instead to rely on the support of Russia. This proved to be a mistake. In April 1913, the St. Petersburg Ambassadors conference awarded Silistra to Romania. This alienated both the Bulgarians, because of the loss of a Bulgarian city, and the Romanians, because they wanted all of southern Dobrudja. Hostilities between Bulgarian and Greek troops escalated in southern Macedonia. The Serbs began to establish permanent administrative

and cultural institutions throughout Macedonia. In despair, Geshov resigned. The ardently pro-Russian Stoyan Danev (1858–1949) replaced him. Finally the Russians somewhat reluctantly agreed to take up their arbitration responsibilities.

Up until this time, most Bulgarians had supported the war effort. A notable exception was the leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union, Aleksandŭr Stamboliski (1879–1923). By the spring of 1913, however, many of the peasant soldiers in the Bulgarian army were becoming impatient. Unrest emerged in the ranks. The army command sought to use the soldiers or to disperse them before the unrest spread throughout the army.

Before Bulgarian prime minister Stoyan Danev could begin his journey to St. Petersburg for the arbitration process, Bulgarian troops acting on the orders of Czar Ferdinand and Deputy Commander in Chief Savov attacked Greek and Serbian positions in eastern Macedonia on the night of June 29–30, 1913. The Greeks and Serbs immediately launched counterattacks. In this situation, Danev resigned on July 13. The Russians then lost interest in pursuing the arbitration process. In the absence of any Russian help, the pro-Austrian Vasil Radoslavov then assumed the responsibility of prime minister. The Bulgarians found themselves in a precarious situation. Greek forces soon wiped out the Bulgarian contingent isolated in Salonika. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian Second Army, wedged between the Greeks and the Serbs in the southeastern corner of Macedonia, suffered a major defeat as it retreated northward. To the north, the Serbs inflicted a defeat on the Bulgarian Third Army at Bregalinitisa.

By mid-July, however, as the Bulgarians assumed positions along their prewar frontier, they were able to halt the Greek and

Serbian advance. At Kilimantsi, the Bulgarians achieved a major defensive victory over the Serbs. This was ultimately to no avail. The Ottoman army, set on retaking Adrianople, crossed the frontier on July 12 and quickly reoccupied that city. Then on July 14, the Romanian army, determined to obtain southern Dobrudja, crossed the Danube in three places and advanced into central Bulgaria. With all of their forces engaged in fighting the Greeks and Serbs, the Bulgarians could not oppose these two invasions. The Ottoman advance into Bulgarian territory was particularly upsetting to the Bulgarians, because it revived memories of the 500 years of Ottoman domination of Bulgaria. With enemies all around, and with no help forthcoming from Russia or any other great power, the Sofia government asked for an armistice. Even as the Sofia government agreed to talks, the Bulgarian army succeeded in trapping the oncoming Greek army in Kresna gorge. This was too late to affect the outcome of the war.

Peace talks ensued in two separate venues. In Bucharest, the Bulgarians met with Greek, Romanian, and Serbian representatives. They conceded the loss of most of Macedonia and southern Dobrudja in the Treaty of Bucharest, signed on August 19, 1913. In Constantinople, the Bulgarians met with the sultan's government. There the Bulgarians accepted the loss of most of eastern Thrace, eliminating the gains of 1912. They signed the Treaty of Constantinople on September 30, 1912.

The Balkan Wars were a catastrophe for Bulgaria. In the two wars, the Bulgarians lost 32,000 dead, 110,000 wounded, and 34,000 dead of disease. In addition, large numbers of Bulgarian civilians died of cholera and typhus epidemics. Over 100,000 refugees flooded into Bulgaria from Greek- and Serbian-occupied parts of Macedonia.

Bulgaria had no friends among its neighbors and lost Russian patronage. The country did make some territorial gains. Western Thrace and the Rhodope region became a part of the country, adding about 10,000 square miles, including the Aegean port of Dedeagach, and 130,000 people to the country. The Balkan Wars, begun in triumph, ended in disaster for Bulgaria. In an effort to overcome the Balkan War defeat and obtain Macedonia, Bulgaria intervened in World Wars I and II on the German side. Neither effort succeeded.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Adrianople, Siege of, 1912–1913; Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Balkan War, Second, 1913; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Consequences; Bucharest, Treaty of, 1913; Chataldzha, Battle of, 1912; Constantinople, Treaty of, 1913; Dimitriev, Radko (1859–1918); Ferdinand I, Czar of Bulgaria (1861–1948); Kalimantsi, Battle of, 1913; London, Treaty of, 1913; Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, Battle of, 1912; Savov, Mihail (1857–1928)

Further Reading

- Crampton, R. J. *Bulgaria, 1878–1918*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1983.
- Hall, Richard C. *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1996.
- Helmreich, E. C. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938.

Bulgaria in World War I

Bulgaria was the smallest of the four Central Powers in terms of population, economy, and military forces. However, Bulgaria made important contributions to the Central alliance. When World War I began in



Bulgarian Army unit holding a thanksgiving mass just after an armistice went into effect, ending Bulgarian participation in World War I, September 29, 1918. (Francis A. March, *History of the World War*, 1918)

August 1914, the Bulgarian government, led by Prime Minister Vasil Radoslavov (1854–1929), proclaimed neutrality. The country was exhausted from the strenuous efforts of the First Balkan War in 1912–1913 and the catastrophic defeat of the Second Balkan War in the summer of 1913. Nevertheless, many Bulgarians demonstrated traditional pro-Russian sentiments. The popular Balkan War hero Radko Dimitriev (1859–1918) resigned his post as Bulgarian minister in St. Petersburg and accepted a commission in the Russian army. Others also volunteered for service with the Russians. Czar Ferdinand (1861–1948) and Prime Minister Radoslavov, however, inclined toward the Central Powers.

Almost all Bulgarians perceived in World War I an opportunity to reverse the disastrous Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, which had ended the Second Balkan War and deprived Bulgaria of its national goals in Macedonia. When the Ottoman Empire entered the war in October 1914, both

warring alliances recognized the strategic importance of Bulgaria and sought its inclusion on their respective sides. The price of Bulgaria's participation on either side was Macedonia. Because Serbia had secured most of Macedonia as a result of the Balkan Wars, the Central Powers held a distinct advantage. They could promise Bulgaria the immediate acquisition of Macedonia.

The best the Entente could offer, however, was eastern Thrace, then in Ottoman hands, and a portion of Macedonia at the end of the war provided that Serbia received compensation in Austria-Hungary. Serbian reluctance to surrender any of Macedonia stymied Entente efforts to attract Bulgaria. The Bulgarians negotiated with both sides until the summer of 1915.

Entente defeats in Galicia and Gallipoli persuaded Czar Ferdinand and Radoslavov that the time was propitious for Bulgaria to join the Central Powers and obtain Macedonia. On September 6, 1915, at German military headquarters in Pless, the

Bulgarian representatives signed an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary that provided for a German-Austrian-Bulgarian attack on Serbia. Concurrent negotiations with the Ottoman Empire obtained for Bulgaria the cession of the lower Maritsa River valley in eastern Thrace. This territory provided access to Bulgaria's Aegean port at Dedeagach.

On October 14, 1915, Bulgaria, in accordance with the Pless agreement, declared war on Serbia. Two days later, the Bulgarian First and Second Armies joined the ongoing Austro-Hungarian and German invasion of that country. This invasion soon overwhelmed the Serbs, who had to retreat across the Albanian mountains to the Adriatic Sea in the face of overwhelming force. Macedonia, the Bulgarian irredentist goal since the Treaty of Berlin, quickly came under Bulgarian rule. Bulgarian forces repulsed a British and French attempt launched from Salonika to assist the Serbs. Despite strong Bulgarian objections, the German high command refused to sanction the Bulgarian army to cross the Greek frontier in pursuit of the defeated British and French troops. At this point the Germans did not want to involve Greece in the war. The Germans also thought that the containment of Entente soldiers around Salonika was preferable to their utilization on the Western Front. This failure to destroy the British and French allowed the Entente forces to regroup and augment their forces around Salonika with Italian, Russian, and Serbian troops, where they posed a threat to the Central Powers' southeastern flank for the remainder of the war.

In 1916, the Germans withdrew their objections to a Bulgarian advance into Greece. Some German troops even arrived to participate. Greek forces surrendered Fort Rupel on the Struma River northeast

of Salonika without fighting on May 26, 1916. Later that summer, Bulgarian troops occupied portions of northern Greece, including Seres on August 19 and Drama and the port of Kavala on September 12. The Bulgarians also assumed occupation duties in Serbia to free German soldiers for the Western Front.

In August 1916, following the Romanian declaration of war against Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria joined the other Central Powers in an attack on Romania. Bulgarian troops advanced into the Dobrudzha against Romanian and Russian opposition, seizing the Black Sea port of Constanța in October. Together with German and Turkish units, Bulgarian forces also crossed the Danube and overran Wallachia. These attacks effectively knocked Romania out of the war and restored southern Dobrudzha, taken by Romania during the Second Balkan War, to Bulgaria.

With the reoccupation of southern Dobrudzha, Bulgaria had accomplished its major war aim. Bulgarian policy now became largely defensive. Bulgarian administrative authorities, however, did little to endear themselves to the populations in the new territories. The Bulgarian regime there was often harsh, corrupt, and inefficient.

In the autumn of 1916, an Entente offensive launched from the Salonika positions succeeded in taking a portion of southwestern Macedonia, including the city of Bitola (Monastir). An attempt to advance farther into Macedonia, however, met strong Bulgarian resistance and failed to break through the Bulgarian positions.

By 1918, the Bulgarian situation had begun to deteriorate. The country had still not recovered to any great degree from the human and material losses of the Balkan Wars. Accompanying this was the growth of discord between Bulgaria and Germany. Much of the food and raw materials

produced in Bulgaria left the country, legally and illegally going to Germany to sustain the German war effort. Bulgarians also began to dislike their allies because of German control of Bulgarian transportation and communication facilities. In addition, differences with Austria-Hungary and Germany arose over the disposition of northern (Romanian) Dobrudzha. All these issues contributed to Bulgaria's disaffection with the war. The Treaty of Bucharest, signed in May 1918 between the Central Powers and Romania, granted all of the Dobrudzha to Bulgaria but gave Germany control of much of the transportation infrastructure of the territory as well as considerable economic concessions throughout southeastern Europe. This satisfied no one. Conflict also developed between the Bulgarians and the Ottomans. The Ottomans demanded the return of the territories they had ceded to Bulgaria at the beginning of the war. Finally, having been at war off and on since 1912, the Bulgarian population began to suffer from profound war-weariness. On June 20, 1918, Prime Minister Radoslavov resigned, ostensibly over his failure to obtain a clear title to all of Dobrudzha in the Treaty of Bucharest. A government more conciliatory to a negotiated settlement with the Entente, led by Aleksandur Malinov, replaced him.

An Entente offensive in September 1918 quickly overwhelmed Bulgarian forces at Dobro Pole and broke through Bulgarian lines into Macedonia. Although some units continued to resist fiercely, much of the Bulgarian military effort collapsed. By September 25, British and French troops had crossed into Bulgaria proper. The same day, the Bulgarian czar and government decided to seek an armistice. On September 29, the Bulgarians signed the armistice at Salonika. According to its terms, the Bulgarians were

required to demobilize their army and turn all their equipment over to Entente forces. Furthermore, Bulgarian troops had to evacuate all occupied Greek and Serbian territories, including Macedonia. Finally, Bulgarian communication and transportation systems were made available for Entente operations.

Meanwhile, many of the disaffected soldiers streaming back toward Sofia accepted the loose leadership of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union, the peasant-based political party that had opposed the war from its onset. These soldiers, together with some Agrarian Union peasants, sought to inflict retribution on those responsible for Bulgaria's catastrophe. The disorganized rebels proclaimed a republic in Radomir, a small town southwest of the capital. Ragtag formations of soldiers and peasants reached the outskirts of Sofia, where on September 30, a hastily collected force, including military cadets and German troops, defeated and dispersed them. With the signing of the armistice and the abdication of Czar Ferdinand on October 4, the major goals of the soldiers were accomplished. The war was over, and the main culprit responsible for it in their view, Czar Ferdinand, had fled to Germany. Ferdinand's elder son succeeded him as Czar Boris III (1894–1943).

The Bulgarians were the last to join the Central Powers and the first to leave. Within a month of the Bulgarian armistice, the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires likewise gave up the fight. The Germans realized that with the defeat of Bulgaria, the war was lost. On October 3, 1918, the chief of the German General Staff, General Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934), recognized that because of the collapse of the Macedonian Front, "there was no longer a prospect of forcing peace on the enemy." Forty-eight hours later, the Germans contacted U.S.

president Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924), seeking his mediation to end the war.

World War I devastated Bulgaria demographically, materially, and psychologically. The army lost 101,224 dead and 144,026 wounded. In addition, some 60,000 refugees flooded the country from Dobrudja, Macedonia, and Thrace. The Treaty of Neuilly imposed reparation payments of 1.5 million gold francs to the Entente powers as well as the transfer of specified quantities of livestock and railroad equipment to Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Bulgaria also had to deliver 50,000 tons of coal annually to Yugoslavia. The war shattered the dream of a greater Bulgaria that would include Dobrudja, Macedonia, and Thrace. This was the third time in 41 years that Bulgaria had failed to achieve a unified state. The fourth failure of national unification, World War II, would effectively end that dream.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918; Ferdinand I, Czar of Bulgaria (1861–1948); Macedonian Front, 1915–1918; Neuilly, Treaty of, 1920; Zhekov, Nikola (1864–1949)

Further Reading

Crampton, R. J. *Bulgaria, 1878–1918*. New York: East European Monographs, 1983.

Hall, Richard C. *Balkan Breakthrough: The Battle of Dobro Pole 1918*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

Vlahov, Tushe. *Otnosheniya mezhdu Bŭlgariya i tsentralinite sili prez voinite 1912–1918 g.* Sofia: Bŭlgarskata komunisticheska partiya, 1957.

Bulgaria in World War II

In 1940, Bulgaria had a population of 6,341,000 people. It was ruled by both a czar and a popularly elected parliament. Czar Boris III (1894–1943) dominated the

nation's foreign policy and was largely responsible for the nation's neutrality on the outbreak of World War II in September 1939. Boris hoped that peace might be quickly achieved in Europe, and he also took note of the fact that although the Bulgarian people were largely pro-Soviet, the officers of the army were pro-German.

The weakness of Boris's policy, however, was the popular desire to attain additional territory in the Balkans. In World War I, Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers in an attempt to recoup territorial losses from the Second Balkan War. The country's defeat in that conflict led to a peace settlement that had further reduced Bulgarian territory. By 1940, the nation remained the only former Central Power that had not regained some of the land lost through the World War I peace treaties. Popular sentiment to redress this situation was high. Germany partially fulfilled these territorial ambitions on September 7, 1940, through the Treaty of Craiova, which granted the area of the southern Dobrudja region to Bulgaria.

German interest in Bulgaria was the product of the increased strategic importance of the country. By late 1940, German plans for the invasion of Greece and those for the conquest of the Soviet Union rendered Bulgaria much more significant to the Axis cause. On March 1, 1941, Sofia entered into an agreement whereby Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Powers and allowed German troops to move through Bulgarian territory. Unlike governments in other regions of eastern Europe, however, the government of Bulgaria remained autonomous.

Sofia stayed noncommitted militarily until December 13, when it declared war on the United States and Great Britain; the country never declared war on the Soviet Union. Bulgaria's military participation in World War II was limited to the Balkans and

centered on the acquisition of territory. Bulgarian troops did not take an active part in Germany’s invasion and conquest of Yugoslavia or Greece, but the army did occupy both the Yugoslav and Greek portions of Macedonia and most of western Thrace.

Beyond these actions, Bulgaria contributed little to the Axis cause and often opposed German requests in both the military and civilian sectors. Military operations were confined to garrison duties in Macedonia and Thrace, despite Berlin’s attempts to persuade Sofia to commit troops against the Soviet Union. Boris and his government also compromised little on the issue of the Jews, who formed about 1 percent of the nation’s population. By the end of the war, most of Bulgaria’s Jews had escaped extermination, although the government had confined them to labor camps to appease Berlin. Boris’s opposition to German authority increased after the defeat of Italy, which led him to seek a withdrawal from the war.

Bulgarian fortunes declined after August 28, 1943, with the death of Czar Boris III. His successor, Simeon II, was a child, and the regency that governed in his stead was less effective than Boris had been. Political unrest was compounded by popular instability due to declining Axis fortunes and a weakening of the Bulgarian home front. On November 19, 1943, Sofia experienced its first heavy attack by Allied bombers, and by late 1943, food and consumer goods were in short supply.

Support for a coalition known as the Fatherland Front and composed partially of Communists subsequently began to rise, as the Soviet Red Army marched toward Bulgaria’s northern border in the spring of 1944. Efforts by Sofia to secure a peace settlement with the Americans or the British failed. Amid mounting Soviet pressure for a Bulgarian declaration of war against

Germany, a new government acceded to Soviet demands on September 8 after Moscow had declared war on Bulgaria three days earlier. Red Army troops subsequently occupied the country and appointed members of the Fatherland Front to the government.

The new government, eager to please Moscow, committed 450,000 Bulgarian troops to the Red Army for operations in Yugoslavia and Hungary, at a cost of 32,000 killed and wounded. As operations unfolded, Communist officials in Bulgaria began the process of firmly fixing the country in the Soviet sphere of influence.

Eric W. Osborne

See also: Boris III, Czar of Bulgaria (1894–1943); Bulgaria in World War I; Bulgarian “Fatherland War,” 1944–1945

Further Reading

Groueff, Stephan. *Crown of Thorns: The Reign of King Boris III of Bulgaria, 1918–1943*. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1987.

Miller, Marshall L. *Bulgaria during the Second World War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975.

Bulgarian “Fatherland War,” 1944–1945

The Fatherland War was the name bestowed by the Communist regime on the Bulgarian military effort during World War II in the fall of 1944 and the winter and spring of 1945 fighting alongside the Soviet Union. Communist historiography often ignored the earlier Bulgarian military participation in the war alongside Nazi Germany. During the German alliance, Bulgarian forces assumed occupation duties in Greece and Yugoslavia. Although they met some guerilla resistance, they largely avoided extensive combat.

The Communist-dominated Fatherland Front seized power in Bulgaria on

September 9, 1944. The next day, Bulgaria declared war on Germany. Few German units remained in the country then, but Bulgarian occupation forces fought against their former allies as the Germans began to withdraw from the Balkans. General Ivan Marinov (1896–1979) then assumed command of the Bulgarian army. The Bulgarians then came under the rule of Soviet marshal Fedor I. Tolbukhin's (1894–1949) Third Ukrainian Front. They fought alongside Soviet units through eastern Yugoslavia and southern Hungary until the end of the war, advancing into central Europe as far as Budapest and Vienna. During this time, the Bulgarians sustained heavy losses in combat against German and Hungarian forces. These amounted to around 32,000 dead, much greater than the losses incurred in occupation duties in Greece and Yugoslavia while Bulgaria fought on the side of the Germans.

The participation of the bulk of the Bulgarian army in this campaign had two distinct advantages for the new Communist-led government in Sofia. With the army was outside of the country, the Communists extended their control throughout Bulgaria. The highly nationalist Bulgarian officer corps was not present to oppose the implementation of Communist rule. Also, the high casualties incurred in the campaign served to weaken the traditionally anti-Communist military. The new Communist-leaning government in Sofia replaced the losses among junior officers and NCO with loyal Communist cadres, who often had served in the Bulgarian Partisan movement.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bulgaria in World War II; Partisans, Bulgaria

Further Reading

Crampton, R. J. *Bulgaria*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Dimitrov, D. "Uchastieto na Bulgariya vuv voinata sreshtu hitleriska Germaniya v razvurshvashtiya etap na vtorata svetnova voina (Noemvri 1944–yuli 1945)," *Istoricheski Pregled* (Sofia), 51/4 (1995): 27–38.

Miller, Marshall L. *Bulgaria during the Second World War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975.

Bulgarian Horrors, 1876

Bulgarians were the last people in the Balkans to achieve their independence from the Ottoman Empire, and that independence came with the price of the Bulgarian Horrors of 1876. Casualty estimates vary, but tens of thousands of Bulgarians were killed by Turks following a demonstration on May 2, 1876, in which rebels issued a declaration stating, "From today on, we make known in the name of the Bulgarian people before all the world that we demand: Freedom or death to the people!"

Throughout the mid-nineteenth century, people in Bulgaria began quietly protesting against Greek dominance in their churches and Turkish dominance in their government. Instead of making a strong bid for their own freedom, however, they supported other Balkan people as they rose in revolt against the Turks. By the 1830s, some Bulgarians felt strong enough to act on their own behalf, and small, unorganized guerrilla activity started taking place in the mountains.

As the independence movement in Bulgaria grew, it divided into two factions: reformers who wanted to improve their status within the Ottoman Empire, and revolutionaries who demanded complete independence. The latter group led revolts throughout the Balkans during the 1830s and 1840s, and by the 1860s, their activities had intensified, with young revolutionaries inciting riots at community meetings

in small Bulgarian villages. A young revolutionary named George Benkovski (1843–1876) planned such a meeting on May 2, 1876, in the town of Panagyurishte in central Bulgaria. The proclamation of “Freedom or death to the people!” stirred up the townspeople, and a young school teacher sewed a flag with the motto “Liberty or Death.” The Bulgarians assembled in the square, listened to Benkovski’s inflammatory speeches, and then scattered to kill Turks wherever they might find them.

Mistakes on the side of the rebels resulted in the organization of more than 5,000 Turkish soldiers, and they began overwhelming villages where the rebels were hiding. Towns and villages fell, and by the time the looting, burning, and killing was finished, thousands of Bulgarians lay dead. Turks estimated the deaths at a mere 3,000, but a British consular agent set the number at 12,000. An American investigator later claimed 15,000 Bulgarians were killed, while Bulgarian historians now put the number somewhere between 30,000 and 60,000. Nonetheless, Russia and the other European powers were enraged at the events in the Balkans, which came to be known as the Bulgarian Horrors. These feelings eventually resulted in European intervention, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, and the liberation of Bulgaria in 1878.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Berlin, Treaty of, 1878; Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878; San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878

Further Reading

Crampton, R. J. *Bulgaria*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Perry, Duncan M. *Stefan Stambolov and the Emergence of Modern Bulgaria, 1870–1895*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993.

Walker, Dale L. *Januarius MacGahan: The Life and Campaigns of an American War Correspondent*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1988.

Bulgarian-Serb War, 1885

The Bulgarian-Serb War was fought from November 14, 1885, to March 3, 1886. After the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, Russia imposed the Treaty of San Stefano on the Ottoman Empire in March 1878. The treaty granted independence to Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro and established an autonomous “greater” Principality of Bulgaria. The European powers, believing that the treaty would upset the balance of power in the Balkans, met in Berlin from June 13 to July 13, 1878, and modified its provisions. The resulting Treaty of Berlin, among other things, reduced the size of Bulgaria by allowing the Ottoman Empire to retain Eastern Rumelia. Alexander of Battenberg (1857–1893), nephew of Czar Alexander II (1818–1881), became the ruler of the reduced Bulgaria.

On September 18, 1885, Bulgarian nationalists in Eastern Rumelia staged a bloodless coup and declared its unification with Bulgaria. The Ottoman Empire approved the coup, but Czar Alexander III (1845–1894) disapproved of this action and withdrew all Russian officers and advisers from Bulgaria, leaving the Bulgarian army without officers above the rank of captain. Serbia opposed this territorial increase of Bulgaria. The Serbian king, Milan Obrenović (1854–1901), who was having domestic problems, demanded that Bulgaria cede some of its territory to Serbia. The European powers attempted to discourage him, but Milan declared war on Bulgaria on November 13, 1885.

Following the declaration of war, the Serbian army crossed the lightly defended northwest border of Bulgaria in three columns, intending to converge on Sofia, the Bulgarian capital. Opposing Bulgarian forces slowed the Serbian advance through the mountains sufficiently for Alexander to move his main army into prepared defenses at Slivnitsa, about 20 miles northwest of Sofia. The three Serbian center divisions arrived at Slivnitsa on November 16 and halted to recover from the fierce fighting in the Dragoman Pass. The Morava division to the south was at Tran, some distance from its objective Bresnik, and the northern column had bogged down along the Danube. Between November 17 and November 19, the Bulgarian and Serbian armies fiercely fought each other in front of the village, and, by nightfall of November 19, the Bulgarians had defeated the Serbians.

On November 20, the defeated Serbian army began to retreat back to Serbia. After limited rearguard actions along the way, it crossed into Serbia by November 24. The main Bulgarian army crossed into Serbia and converged on Pirot, where the Serbian army had dug in on the heights west of the town. On November 27, the Bulgarian army, led personally by Prince Alexander, outflanked the Serbian right, and the remaining Serbian army fled to Niš. Austria-Hungary intervened on November 28, and the two leaders agreed to a cease-fire. Serbian casualties totaled 6,800, compared to 2,300 Bulgarians.

The Treaty of Bucharest, signed on March 3, 1886, in Bucharest, Romania, restored peace and the prewar borders between the two countries. By the following Tophane Agreement, signed on April 5, 1886, between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Abdulhamid II (1842–1918) recognized the prince of Bulgaria as the

governor-general of Eastern Rumelia, still a part of the Ottoman Empire. Over time, the Bulgarian government merged the administration and military forces of Eastern Rumelia with its own and, on September 6, 1908, declared total independence, including Eastern Rumelia.

Ironically, neither ruler survived the outcome of the war for long. In August 1886, a group of army officers, encouraged by the Russian government, forced Alexander to abdicate. A three-man regency found a new ruler, Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Gotha-Coburg (1861–1948), whom the National Assembly elected as prince in July 1887. The defeat so damaged Obrenović's position as ruler of Serbia that he abdicated in March 1889, and the Serbian crown passed to a regency in the name of his son Alexander (1876–1903).

Robert B. Kane

See also: Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria (1857–1893); Berlin, Treaty of, 1878; Obrenović, Milan (1854–1901); Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878; San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878; Slivnitsa, Battle of, 1885

Further Reading

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Jelavich, Charles. *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879–1886*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958.

Jelavich, Charles, and Barbara Jelavich. *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.

Pavlowitch, Stevan K. *A History of the Balkans, 1804–1945*. London: Longman, 1999.



Carol I, King of Romania (1839–1914)

King of Romania, sometimes referred to as Charles I, Karl Eitel Friedrich was born the second son of Prince Karl Anton (1811–1885) of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen and cousin to the king of Prussia on April 20, 1839, in Sigmaringen. He was educated in Dresden and Bonn and served in the Prussian army.

The ruler of Wallachia and Moldavia, Prince Alexandru Cuza (1820–1873), was overthrown in a coup d'état in 1866. Karl was advanced as a candidate to succeed him, which proved satisfactory to the governments of France, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. A plebiscite in April 1866 overwhelmingly approved the selection, and Karl ascended the throne as Carol I, Prince of Wallachia and Moldavia, on May 22, 1866.

When Carol became prince, Romania was part of the Ottoman Empire. In order to be recognized by the sultan as hereditary prince, Carol agreed to accept Wallachia and Moldavia's status as an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire, which meant that all foreign affairs would continue to be handled by Constantinople. Carol's first actions as prince were to secure the integrity of his territories and to begin the process of governmental reform. In 1866, he approved a liberal constitution modeled on that of Belgium, although it did impose restrictions on Jews. A pro-German monarch in a Francophile country,

Carol was almost forced to abdicate over the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871.

Carol sought to gain independence for Romania by secretly allying with Russia beginning in 1875. This policy culminated in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 confirmed Romanian independence, and on March 26, 1881, Carol I was proclaimed king of Romania.

Carol faced the challenge of negotiating Romania through the difficult waters of late-nineteenth-century European diplomacy. Romania's geographic location in southeastern Europe had significant ramifications for the major European powers. Austria and the Ottoman Empire saw the country as a buffer against Russian ambitions in the Balkans. Russia, which had previously assumed a protectorate over Romania, was interested in securing an outlet on the Mediterranean. Britain sought to maintain the status quo in the Balkans while France enjoyed close ties with Romania, which translated into support for Romanian nationalism.

As Europe split into two hostile armed camps, the Romanian government divided over the alliance with which it should cast its lot. Conservatives favored the Triple Alliance, while liberals advocated the Triple Entente. Carol sought to play each side off against the other. But on October 30, 1883, despite tensions over Romanians living in Transylvania, Carol concluded a secret alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany. However, relations with Vienna had been

strained by the First Balkan War in 1912, by Austro-Hungarian support for Bulgaria, and by Hungary's treatment of Romanians in Transylvania. Thereafter, while ostensibly remaining affiliated with the Triple Alliance, Carol took a more neutral stance, forced by growing pro-Entente sentiment in his country. He did present a proposal to his crown council on August 3, 1914, that Romania enter World War I on the side of the Central Powers, but the council rejected this, probably to Carol's relief. The monarch's position became increasingly difficult, as early Russian military successes against Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia led to a rising tide of sentiment for intervention in the war on the Entente side. Carol died in Sinaia, Romania, on October 10, 1914, and was replaced on the throne by Ferdinand I (1865–1927).

Dino E. Buenviaje

See also: Berlin, Treaty of, 1878; Romania in the Balkan Wars; Romania in World War I

Further Reading

Castellan, Georges. *A History of the Romanians*. Translated by Nicholas Brady. New York: East European Monographs, 1989.

Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig, eds. *The Origins of World War I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania, 1866–1947*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1994.

Kellog, Frederick. *The Road to Romanian Independence*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1995.

Carol II, King of Romania (1893–1953)

Romanian monarch who reigned from 1930 to 1940, Carol was born on October 15, 1893, at Sinaia, Romania. Carol was the

eldest child of Ferdinand I of Romania and Princess Marie (1875–1938) of Great Britain. Carol's upbringing was controlled by his great-uncle Carol I of Romania, who encouraged his fixation on German militarism, including service in a German army regiment in Potsdam. Carol toured the front in the Second Balkan War but took little part in World War I, save as a diplomatic envoy to Russia in January 1917. He provoked scandal by deserting and eloping with "Zizi" Lambrino (1898–1953) in September 1918, although the marriage was later annulled by the Orthodox Church.

During the early 1920s, Carol appeared to have reformed, marrying Helen of Greece in March 1921 and fathering a son, Michael. However, he associated himself with a single political party, the National Peasants, and he played little role in running the country, apart from founding the Romanian Boy Scouts. Before long, he met a divorcée, Elena Lupescu (1895–1977), for whom he abandoned (Magda) his marriage in August 1925 and went into exile in Paris, formally renouncing the throne in favor of his son. His father, Ferdinand, died in 1927, and in May of the following year, Carol attempted a coup but was thwarted by British intelligence. On June 6, 1930, he successfully returned to Bucharest and disbanded the regency to seize the throne from his son.

Carol's reign was disastrous for Romania. He alienated the upper classes by persecuting the surviving members of his family, exiling his siblings Nicholas and Ilena and his ex-wife Helen, allowing his mistress Lupescu to choose his advisers, and encouraging political gridlock by playing off one political party against the other.

Carol II allowed Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu's (1899–1938) Iron Guard to encourage fascism, at least until it began attacks on Lupescu, who was Jewish. His



Carol II, king of Romania from June 1930 until September 1940, in full regalia. Carol was known more for his status as a playboy than for his ruling ability. He went into exile in 1940 after being forced to abdicate. (Library of Congress)

subsequent 1933 banning of the Iron Guard led to the assassination of two prime ministers. To restore order, after the national elections in February 1938 failed to establish a political majority for any party, Carol II declared himself dictator and named the Orthodox patriarch Miron Cristea (1868–1939) as his prime minister. Carol was unable to protect Romania from the effects of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 and was forced to cede part of Transylvania to Hungary, Bessarabia to the Soviet Union, and the southern Dobrudja region to Bulgaria.

Carol II fled the country with Lupescu and the royal art collection in September 1940, leaving his son Michael as king under the control of General Ion Antonescu. He spent the rest of his life in exile in Brazil and

Portugal. He married Lupescu in 1952 and died in Estoril, Portugal, on April 4, 1953.

Margaret Sankey

See also: Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946); Iron Guard; Romania in World War II

Further Reading

Bolitho, Hector. *Roumania under King Carol*. New York: Longmans, Green, 1940.

Easterman, Alexander Levvey. *King Carol, Hitler and Lupescu*. London: V. Gollancz, 1942.

Quinlan, Paul D. *The Playboy King: Carol II of Romania*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995.

Ceausescu, Nicolae (1918–1989)

First secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) during 1965–1989 and president of Romania during 1974–1989, Nicolae Ceausescu was born the third of 10 children to peasant parents on January 26, 1918, in Scornicesti. He received only a rudimentary primary schooling before he moved to Bucharest at age 11 to work as a shoemaker's apprentice. Joining the outlawed Union of Communist Youth (UCY) in 1933, he became a regional secretary in 1936 and secretary of the central committee in 1938. Ceausescu was first arrested in November 1933, charged with inciting a strike and distributing Communist pamphlets. Upon his fourth conviction in July 1940, he was imprisoned until August 1944. In the Tirgu-Jiu prison camp, he became a protégé of Romanian Workers' Party leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1901–1965) and future premier Ion Maurer (1902–2000).

After the postwar Communist takeover, Ceausescu occupied various party posts. He became regional secretary for Oltenia in November 1946, deputy in the Ministry of

Agriculture during 1948–1950, and deputy minister of the armed forces during 1950–1954. Appointed in 1952 to the Romanian Workers' Party (PMR) Central Committee, he was made secretary in 1954 and a Politburo member in 1955. Upon Gheorghiu-Dej's death in 1965, Ceausescu became first secretary of the renamed PCR, backed by Prime Minister Maurer.

As with Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceausescu both supported rapid industrialization and minimized Soviet control. In 1967, he established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and maintained relations with Israel after the Six-Day War. Romanian diplomats also acted as negotiating brokers between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the United States. Ceausescu's popularity rose at home and abroad when he opposed the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, a stance that led to U.S. president Richard M. Nixon's visit to Romania in August 1969 and Ceausescu's return visits to the United States in 1970, 1973, and 1978. He also visited the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) in June 1971, followed in April 1972 by meetings with Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) head Yasser Arafat. Subsequently, Romania achieved most-favored nation (MFN) trade status with the United States in 1975 and was admitted to international organizations including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

Internally, the liberal tendencies of Ceausescu's early government in freeing political prisoners detained under Gheorghiu-Dej and deposing pro-Soviet members of the Securitate (the Romanian secret service) soon gave way to nationalism, a personality cult, and even more stringent Securitate

surveillance. Upon the retirement of Premier Maurer in 1974, Ceausescu assumed the newly created office of president of the republic. Natural disasters such as poor harvests and the 1977 earthquake combined with reckless trade practices and economic mismanagement led to an immense foreign debt crisis and domestic shortages. In response, Ceausescu imposed strict rationing for food and electrical power and, to boost the country's workforce, forbade abortion and contraception. His regime also began a systematization campaign to resettle villagers in agro-industrial centers, a movement that led to massive discontent and the destruction of historical landmarks. As his popular support eroded, Ceausescu increasingly surrounded himself with sycophants and appointed family members to strategic posts. His wife Elena (1916–1989) became a Central Committee member in July 1972, a member of the Politburo and head of the PCR's personnel section in 1973, and first deputy prime minister in 1980.

In the 1980s, Romania's international relations deteriorated as growing condemnation of human rights abuses accumulated. This compelled Ceausescu to renounce Romania's MFN status in 1988 before it could be revoked by the U.S. government. Unrest spread throughout Romania, marked by brutally repressed miners' strikes (1977, 1983, and 1986), the protest marches of 1987 in Iași and Brasov, and, in March 1989, an internationally released letter signed by six senior PCR members in the name of the National Salvation Front (NSF). Shortly after Ceausescu's November 1989 reelection for another five-year term, antigovernment demonstrations in Timisoara in December 1989 left 122 dead after an army intervention. Returning from a state visit to Iran on December 20, Ceausescu denounced the demonstrators and called for a pro-government rally in

Bucharest. This evolved into another protest and led to the defection of much of the army. Ceausescu and his wife fled the capital in a helicopter but were eventually captured and detained in the Targoviste military garrison. There they were tried by a tribunal of the NSF and executed on December 25, 1989.

Anna M. Wittmann

See also: Warsaw Pact

Further Reading

Deletant, Dennis. *Ceausescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965–1989*. New York: Sharpe, 1995

Fischer, Mary Ellen. *Nicolae Ceausescu: A Study in Political Leadership*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989

Cer Mountain, Battle of, 1914

The Battle of Cer Mountain was fought between the Serbian army and the invading Austro-Hungarian army during August 15–24, 1914, around Cer Mountain and surrounding villages and towns in northwest Serbia near the Croatian border. The Serbians won, making the battle the first Allied victory over the Central Powers in World War I.

On July 28, 1914, a month after the assassination of Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. The Austro-Hungarian army shelled Belgrade, the Serbian capital, the next day and Serbian towns along the Bosnia-Serbian border for two weeks, using the shelling as cover to construct pontoon bridges across the Sava and Drina Rivers. To oppose an Austrian invasion, Serbian chief of the general staff Field Marshal Radomir Putnik (1847–1917) and generals Stepa Stepanović (1856–1929) and Pavle Jurisich Sturm (1848–1922) deployed

180,000 soldiers around Volhevo in northwest Serbia.

The Austrians had allocated about 200,000 men for the pending invasion. In early August, the Austro-Hungarians, commanded by General Oskar Potiorek (1853–1933), made some preliminary attacks across the Danube River, which the Serbians repulsed with heavy losses to the invaders. On August 12, Austro-Hungarian troops crossed the Drina River to the west of Loznitsa and Lyeshnitsa and the Sava River north of Shobotz. By August 14, the Austro-Hungarian forces had established a 100-mile front, intending to converge on Volhevo.

The Austro-Hungarians possessed modern rifles and twice as many machine guns and artillery as the Serbians, and had better munitions stocks. The Serbian army was critically short of modern rifles and artillery and had just begun to replenish the munitions that it had used in the recently ended Second Balkan War. As many as 50,000 Serbian soldiers went to the front with only pitchforks and a standard-issue greatcoat and the traditional Serbian cap. However, many Serbians were experienced veterans of the Balkan Wars and were highly motivated and better trained than their Austro-Hungarian counterparts.

About 11:00 p.m., on August 15, fighting erupted when Serbian soldiers first encountered Austro-Hungarian outposts on the slopes of the Cer. By the morning of August 16, the Serbians had seized the Divacha range and dislodged the Austro-Hungarians from their positions in Borino Selo, who, after heavy casualties, retreated in some disorder.

Between August 17 and August 20, the Serbians fought well against the Austro-Hungarians and captured a number of villages and towns that the Austro-Hungarian

army had taken in its initial advances across the Drina and Sava Rivers. The Serbian army generally managed to stop repeated Austro-Hungarian advances and repulsed the Austro-Hungarians with heavy losses. In the early morning of August 19, the Serbians routed the Austro-Hungarians from Rashulijacha, causing them to withdraw back across the Drina River on August 20. Many Austro-Hungarian soldiers, fleeing in panic, drowned in the river.

With the Austro-Hungarians retreating from Cer, the Serbians sought to recapture Sabac, now heavily fortified. On August 21 and 22, the Serbian army fought its way to the western approaches of the town and, by the evening of August 23, had completely encircled the town. The next day, they discovered that the Austro-Hungarians had withdrawn the previous night. By 4:00 p.m., August 23, the Serbian army reached the banks of the Sava River, ending the first Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia.

The Serbians suffered 3,000 killed and 15,000 wounded. The Austro-Hungarian forces had about 7,000 dead and 30,000 wounded. The Serbians discovered that Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, serving with the Austro-Hungarian army, had murdered hundreds of Serbian men, women, and children in the villages occupied by the Austro-Hungarian army.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I; Balkan War, Second, 1913

Further Reading

Fryer, Charles E. J. *The Destruction of Serbia in 1915*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1997.

Glenny, Misha. *The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804–1999*. New York: Viking, 2000.

Pavlowitch, Stevan K. *Serbia: The History of an Idea*. New York: New York University Press, 2002.

Četniks

Bands of irregular guerrilla fighters called Četniks (from the Serbo-Croat term *četnici*) have come to be known for their ferocity in battle and their espousal of Serbian nationalism. The Četnik tradition originated during the time of the Ottoman Empire, when bands of Četniks were formed to fight the Turkish occupiers. These bands were first organized into recognizable military formations during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913). During World War I, they became an integral part of the Royal Serbian Army, often operating as special forces behind enemy lines. This army was one of the first in Europe to have such guerrilla detachments in its ranks. During World War II and the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia, Četnik bands in Serbia and Montenegro emerged under the command of General Draža Mihajlović (1892–1946), who decided to stay on to fight the Germans and Italians after the capitulation of the government in April 1941. After liberating areas of Serbia toward the end of 1941, the Četniks were driven into Montenegro and Bosnia by superior German forces.

A complicated and bitter civil war then broke out between the Četniks and the Communist Partisans led by Josip Broz Tito. Initially supported by the Western Allies, the Četniks were later abandoned because of their alleged collaboration with the Axis occupiers. The British government also calculated that the entirely Serb Četniks would not be able to resolve the deep divisions of the Yugoslav peoples in the postwar period. Increased Western political and military

assistance was then made available to Tito's Partisans. By the end of 1944, Mihajlović's Četniks had been defeated and discredited by the Communists.

In April 1946, Mihajlović was tried and executed as an alleged collaborator and traitor by the new Communist Yugoslav government. In parts of Serbia, Četnik anti-Communist bands were in existence until the early 1950s. Large numbers of Četniks fled Yugoslavia after the war and settled in North America and Western Europe; during the 1960s and 1970s, they occasionally undertook acts of terrorism in Yugoslavia.

A number of paramilitary forces calling themselves "Četniks" emerged in Serbia, mainly in response to the rebellion of the Krajina Serbs in Croatia in 1990. These forces later fought in Croatia and Bosnia, where they are alleged to have committed many war crimes against non-Serbs.

These contemporary Četniks, particularly those loyal to the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and led by Vojislav Seselj (1954–), claim to be the latter-day followers of Mihajlović and one of his surviving commanders in exile, Momcilo Djuic (1907–1999). They have also called for the restoration of the exiled crown prince of Yugoslavia, Aleksandar Karageorgević. Early supporters of the new nationalist agenda of Serbian president Slobodan Milošević, Seselj's Četniks later fell out with their onetime ally, mainly because of his alleged betrayal of the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs. Bitterly hostile toward both communism and Tito's Yugoslavia, which they claimed was opposed to the interests of the Serbs, Serbia's new Četniks also strove to bring about the establishment of a royalist and Orthodox "Greater Serbia" on the ruins of the Yugoslav federation.

Modern Serb Četniks have used an insignia copied from earlier Četnik models—a

black flag with a white skull and crossbones, with the words "Freedom or Death" inscribed below it, and use of the three-fingered, or Orthodox, salute. A symbol of mourning for Četniks in the past, beards have also been grown by today's Četniks. Their oath has remained, as before: "For King and Country."

Marko Milivojevic

See also: Mihajlović, Dragoljub "Draža" (1892–1946); Nedić, Milan (1877–1946); Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995

Further Reading

Ramet, Sabrina P. *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.

Tomashevich, Jozo. *The Chetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Chataldzha, Battle of, 1912

The battle of Chataldzha (Turkish: Çatalaca) was an important battle between the Bulgarian and Ottoman armies during the First Balkan War in 1912. The Chataldzha fortifications were the final defensive lines for Constantinople, taking their name from a village and railroad station located in the center of the positions. They were located in Thrace, about 20 miles outside the Ottoman capital, and extended about 30 miles from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora. The Ottomans had constructed the fortifications during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. They consisted of trenches, machine gun and light artillery positions, and heavy artillery to the rear. Natural obstacles, such as marshes, lakes, and arms of the seas, were also a part of the lines.

The Ottoman First, Second, and Third Corps manned the positions, with around 140,000 men and artillery pieces. Nizam Pasha (?–1913) commanded the Ottoman forces.

After their victory at Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, the Bulgarian First and Third Armies slowly advanced to Chataldzha. The first Bulgarian patrols arrived at Chataldzha on November 9. By November 14, most of the First and Third Armies were in front of the lines. The commander of the Bulgarian Third Army, General Radko Dimitriev (1859–1918), assumed command of both armies. The Ottomans formally requested an armistice on November 12. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian commander in chief, Czar Ferdinand, was determined to enter Constantinople. That same day, he ordered an attack. Others in the Bulgarian command, however, were not convinced this was a good idea. A Bulgarian presence in Constantinople would undoubtedly aggravate Bulgaria's traditional Russian ally. The Russians had long had their own pretensions to the ancient imperial capital. The Bulgarian armies were at the end of a tenuous logistical system, with the besieged city of Adrianople astride their supply lines. Finally, cholera had broken out in the Bulgarian ranks. Deputy Commander in Chief General Mihail Savov (1857–1928) traveled to Dimitriev's headquarters on November 15 to discuss the situation. The two Bulgarian generals agreed to make an attempt on the Chataldzha lines. The czar again ordered an attack on November 16.

At 0500 hours on a foggy November 17, the Bulgarians began their attack. General Dimitriev ordered a full frontal assault all along the lines. No tactical subtlety was employed. Effective Ottoman artillery, supplemented by fire from Ottoman warships

in the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea, pinned the Bulgarians down. The Bulgarians did succeed in taking an Ottoman position but were unable to hold it in the face of a determined counterattack. This was the closest they came to Constantinople. At 1400 hours on November 18, General Dimitriev ordered the attacks discontinued. The Bulgarians suffered 1,482 dead, 9,120 wounded, and 1,401 missing. Ottoman losses were much lower. After the battle, the Bulgarians were ready for the armistice.

After the renewal of fighting on February 5, 1913, several engagements occurred in front of the Chataldzha lines. On February 9, an Ottoman offensive launched in conjunction with an offensive at Bulair, succeeded in advancing 15–20 kilometers in the face of limited Bulgarian resistance. The Bulgarians then occupied strong defensive positions that blocked further Ottoman advance. Minor engagements occurred along the lines for the following month.

Additional fighting occurred at Chataldzha in conjunction with the final Bulgarian assault on Adrianople. A Bulgarian attack began on March 25. The Bulgarians succeeded in retaking some of the land they had lost in February, with heavy casualties on both sides. Fighting continued until April 3. On April 15, an armistice brought an end to the fighting in the First Balkan War.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Dimitriev, Radko (1859–1918); Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, Battle of, 1912; Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars; Savov, Mihail (1857–1928)

Further Reading

Erickson, Edward J. *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Cherniaev, M. G. (1824–1898)

Mikhail Grgorevich Cherniaev (Chernyayev) was a Russian soldier who led the Serbian forces in their unsuccessful war against the Ottoman Empire in 1876. Born into the family of a military officer family stationed at Bendery, Bessarabia, on October 22, 1824, he embarked on a military career that took him to the fighting in the Crimean War as well as to the Caucasus and to Central Asia.

Cherniaev's most notable military achievement was his march across the central Asian steppes and the subsequent conquest of Tashkent in 1865. This began the process that brought most of modern Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan under Russian control. In 1875, Serbian peasants in Bosnia-Herzegovina revolted against Ottoman rule. This captured the imagination of Pan Slavists in Russia. They sought a means to liberate their fellow Orthodox Slavs from Ottoman rule, and in doing so expand Russian influence into the Balkans.

Cherniaev became a prominent Russian advocate for intervention in the Balkans on behalf of the Serbs. In 1876, he obtained the position of commander in chief of the Serbian army. His military efforts met with no success in the Balkans. After suffering several defeats at the hands of the Ottomans, he resigned his command in October 1876. Serbia had to conclude an armistice.

Cherniaev eventually returned to Russia. He died on his estate near Mogliev on August 3, 1898. While Cherniaev proved to be an incompetent commander for Serbia, his failures by no means diminished

the ardor of the Russian Pan Slavs for intervention in the Balkans. In 1877, they would succeed in bringing Russia into direct confrontation with the Ottomans in the Russo-Ottoman War. This was an important step in the end of Ottoman rule in southeastern Europe.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Montenegro in Balkan Events, 1876–1878; Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878; Serbo-Ottoman War, 1876

Further Reading

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. Vol. 1, *Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

MacKenzie, David. *The Lion of Tashkent: The Career of General M. G. Cherniaev*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974.

MacKenzie, David. *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875–1878*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976.

Cold War in the Balkans

The Cold War developed in the years following the close of World War II and ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The defining aspect of the Cold War was the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union and the associated allies and coalition partners lining up on either side. During the war against Hitler's Germany, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union were allies, and the leaders of each—Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Josef Stalin—had developed an effective working relationship in pushing back and ultimately defeating the Third Reich.

With Roosevelt's death in April 1945, coupled with the loss of the unifying effect of a common enemy as Germany

surrendered, the three great victors of World War II lost the unity of purpose that had aided in the successful prosecution of the war. Within the United States, with Roosevelt gone from the scene, two schools of thought arose regarding the nature of the postwar world. One such school of thought hoped that continued cooperation between the U.S.–United Kingdom alliance and the Soviet Union would provide a secure foundation upon which global peace and prosperity might be built; while the other school doubted the desire for cooperation on the part of the Eastern Bloc. The optimistic point of view was soon tested in the unforgiving realm of mid-twentieth-century international politics, as both sides attempted to maneuver for maximum advantage in terms of both security and economic prospects.

As the defeat of Nazi Germany became apparent, Churchill met with Stalin in Moscow in October 1944 and discussed the nature of postwar Europe. The British leader, in the spirit of the wartime leadership informality, presented a sheet of paper to Stalin that became known as the “percentages agreement” regarding the disposition of postwar southeastern Europe and the Balkans. Churchill advocated for a 90 percent British role in Greece (in accord with the United States) and a 10 percent role for the Soviet Union. British interests continued to rely on sea power, and the Eastern Mediterranean was a fundamental interest for the United Kingdom as World War II was drawing to an end. In terms of Hungary and Yugoslavia, he proposed a 50/50 split between Britain and the Soviet Union. Acknowledging the interest of Stalin in the Black Sea, Churchill listed a 90 percent Soviet level of influence in Romania and a 75 percent level in Bulgaria. Churchill later would write that Stalin, using a blue pencil,

simply made a mark on the sheet of paper and passed it back in what was taken as silent agreement to what Churchill had proposed.

When the U.S. leadership received word of this informal agreement, presidential counselor Harry Hopkins persuaded Roosevelt to send a cable to Stalin that stated: “In this global war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is not interested in.” Some analysts and historians argue that when the concepts embedded in this October 1944 cable were relayed to Stalin, this marked the actual beginning of the Cold War. For in the communication, President Roosevelt had informed Stalin that the United States reserved the right to weigh in on any international decision including those involving the Balkans and southeastern Europe. What caused great concern in the Kremlin was that the United States and its allies would be denying the Soviet Union the same right within Western spheres of influence; this is, in fact, what took place in Italy. In short, the United States introduced a postwar policy perspective that denied the Soviet Union equal status to the United States, at least from the Russian perspective.

From the American perspective, it had become apparent that Soviet Russia intended to work for the destruction of capitalism and the Western way of life, and to extend the Kremlin’s version of communism around the globe. Irrespective of ideological concerns, it also became apparent to American leaders that the *modus operandi* for Stalin was to quietly enter into prolonged discussions regarding an issue while the Soviet army advanced; once the army was in place, Stalin would then begin to negotiate seriously. This was not lost on the Americans, as Harry Truman stated after taking the reins of the presidency: “they

confront us with an accomplished fact and then there is little we can do.”

At the close of World War II, Moscow and the Red Army enjoyed a preponderance of influence in southeastern Europe and the Balkans except in Greece and Turkey; and within the United States, a determination developed that it would be necessary for the security of Western interests to block the expected Soviet attempts at expansion. While the Soviets consolidated gains in Romania and Bulgaria, it supported a leftist armed insurgency in Greece. As a result, the United States committed sizable resources as part of the Truman Doctrine to fight the Kremlin’s destabilizing efforts in Greece and Turkey. Thus, socialist governments came to power or were put into power by the Soviet Union in almost all of the Balkan states with the exception of Greece and Turkey, who became aligned with the United States and, eventually, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Bulgaria and Romania, meanwhile, became members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. Unfortunately for the designs within the Kremlin, Yugoslavia and Albania became exceedingly independent-minded and circumvented Moscow’s attempt at creating extended access into the eastern Mediterranean.

At the beginning of the Cold War, Yugoslavia was arguably the most anti-Western nation in Europe, and Belgrade was selected as headquarters by Stalin of the Cominform. However, the leader of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, was also one of the most independent-minded leaders in all of Europe and found himself in significant conflict with the wishes of the Kremlin. Exploiting this fissure, the United States supported Yugoslavia’s break from the Cominform in 1948. Tito then entered into the “Balkan Pact” with Greece and Turkey, and by

1954, the Soviet Union’s control in the Balkans was largely confined to the Black Sea area by virtue of Moscow’s control in Bulgaria and Romania.

The leader of Albania, Enver Hoxha (1908–1985), had developed closer ties to the Soviets than had Tito, but after Stalin’s death in 1953, Albania’s relationship with Moscow weakened as Khrushchev attempted to focus on improving relations with Tito and Yugoslavia. By 1956, Hoxha left for China to visit with Mao Zedong, and the People’s Republic of China soon became Albania’s largest supplier of aid. Moscow became extremely displeased with Albania, and in November 1961, every Warsaw Pact nation broke relations with Albania.

Even within the Black Sea region, as witnessed in Romania during the 1960s and 1970s, Moscow’s influence also dissipated as Russia’s share of Romania’s foreign trade fell from 40 percent in 1965 to 16 percent by 1974. Moreover, Romania was the only Eastern Bloc state to participate in the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, as the nation became more open to the West and to China. By the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the level of influence the Kremlin enjoyed in the Balkans immediately after the close of the Second World War had receded considerably as the Balkan states struggled to find their own way and to lessen the impact of great power politics upon the region.

James Brian McNabb

See also: Hoxha, Enver (1908–1985); NATO in the Balkans; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Truman Doctrine; Yugoslav Overflight Incidents, 1946; Yugoslav-Soviet Split

Further Reading

Boll, Michael M. *Cold War in the Balkans: American Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Communist Bulgaria, 1943–1947.*

Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1984.

Kuniholm, Bruce. *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Rajak, Svetozar. "Chapter 10: The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945–1956." In *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, edited by Melvyn Leffler and Arne Westad, vol. 1, *Origins, 1945–1962*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Resis, Albert. "The Churchill-Stalin Secret Percentages Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October, 1944," *American Historical Review* 83 (April 1978): 368–87.

Constantine I, King of Greece (1868–1923)

Born in Athens on July 21, 1868, Constantine was the first modern Greek king born on Greek soil. He was the eldest son of King George (1890–1947), born Prince William of Denmark and brother of Queen Alexandra of England, who was brought to Athens in 1863 to establish a new dynasty. Constantine's mother was Grand Duchess Olga of Russia, daughter of the Grand Duke Constantine (1851–1913) and granddaughter of Czar Nicholas I.

Constantine (1827–1892) was educated privately within the royal palace and became fluent in English, French, German, and classical Greek. He joined the Greek army as a lieutenant, and soldiering soon became a passion. After studying at the Leipzig and Heidelberg universities in Germany, Constantine served for a time as an officer in the German army. In 1889 he married Sophia, sister of Kaiser Wilhelm II.

In 1897, Constantine led the Greek army to defeat in fighting against Turkey, which



Constantine I, king of Greece during World War I. (Library of Congress)

nearly cost George I the throne. In 1909, disgruntled Greek army officers forced Constantine into exile, but he returned to Greece when Eleuthérios Venizélos (1864–1936) became premier in October 1910. Constantine restored his military reputation in 1912 when he led the army to victory over Turkey in the First Balkan War and secured Salonika.

In March 1913, Constantine became king after the assassination of his father. During the early period of his reign, Constantine was immensely popular. In 1913, he again led the army to victory, defeating a badly weakened Bulgaria and annexing Kavala, after Salonika the second-most important port in the northern Aegean. Constantine had ended Ottoman rule in southern Macedonia, Epirus, and the islands of the archipelago, and some Greeks dared to hope that he might secure Constantinople itself.

World War I, however, brought crisis for Greece. The population was torn in their loyalties. Greeks were grateful to France, Britain, and Russia for helping them secure their freedom a century before, but they also admired Germany, with which Constantine also had strong ties. In November 1914, Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. A victorious Ottoman Empire would be a major blow to Greek aspirations, and Premier Venizélos wanted Greece to join the war on the side of the Entente. The king favored Germany, but *raison d'état*, most notably Allied naval power in the Mediterranean, led him to demand Greek neutrality.

In 1915, the Allies pressed Greece to join their side, promising Turkish territory if Greece would participate in operations against the Dardanelles. Constantine refused, whereupon Venizélos resigned in March and Constantine took real power himself; but Venizélos won the June 1915 elections and returned to the premiership. Sharp differences between Venizélos and Constantine led to political chaos in Greece and created the conditions for Allied intervention. In October, Venizélos invited in the Allies, who landed troops at Salonika.

Constantine then demanded that Venizélos resign. Following the Allied defeat in the Gallipoli campaign at the end of 1915, Constantine sided with the Central Powers. While he mobilized the Greek army against Bulgaria, he also failed to honor a 1913 treaty pledging support to Serbia if Bulgaria invaded that country. In May 1916, he surrendered Fort Rupel to Bulgaria, opening eastern Macedonia to the threat of Central Powers attack and imperiling the Allied position at Salonika. In August, the Bulgarians seized the port of Kavalla. Meanwhile, with Allied assistance, Venizélos

established a rival Greek government in Crete and Salonika. At the same time, however, the Allies continued to negotiate with Constantine.

On December 1, French sailors and marines landed from ships at Athens and were attacked and driven off by Greek royalist troops and civilians. This fiasco led the Entente to act, although Constantine remained in power for a time because of his friendship with French premier Aristide Briand. The latter's departure from office brought Allied intervention in June 1917. Constantine was forced into exile in Switzerland with his eldest son, Crown Prince George, who was strongly pro-German. Constantine's younger son Alexander (1893–1920) stayed behind in Greece to act in his absence, and Venizélos returned to Athens as premier.

Alexander died in October 1920 from the bite of a pet monkey, and his younger brother, Paul (1901–1964), declined the throne. Subsequently, Venizélos sought to renew his mandate. The November 1920 elections brought a crushing defeat for him and his followers, with the result that Constantine returned to Greece that December to a tumultuous reception. However, Constantine's decision to continue an imperialist war against Turkey in western Anatolia, which ended in the complete defeat of the Greeks, proved his undoing. In September 1922, the army forced him to abdicate in favor of the crown prince as King George II. Constantine, Sophia, and some other members of the royal family settled in Palermo, Sicily, where Constantine died on January 11, 1923.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922; National Schism (Greece), 1916–1917; Venizélos, Eleuthérios (1864–1936)

Further Reading

- Clogg, Richard. *A Short History of Modern Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Hibben, Paxton. *Constantine I and the Greek People*. New York: Century, 1920.
- Leontaritis, George B. *Greece and the First World War: From Neutrality to Intervention, 1917–1918*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940.
- Mélas, George M. *Ex-King Constantine and the War*. London: Hutchinson, 1920.
- Valti, Luc. *Mon Ami le Roi: La Vérité sur Constantin de Grèce*. Paris: Éditions de France, 1938.
- Willmore, J. Selden. *The Story of King Constantine as Revealed in the Greek White Book*. London: Longmans, Green, 1919.

Constantinople, Treaty of, 1913

The Treaty of Constantinople, signed on September 30, 1913, between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, ended the Second Balkan War between these two states. The Treaty of London of May 1913 ended the First Balkan War between the Balkan allies and the Ottoman Empire. This treaty limited Ottoman presence in Europe to the territory east of a line from Enez on the Aegean Sea to Midya on the Black Sea. Bulgaria obtained much of western Thrace, including the important city of Adrianople (Edirne, Odrin). The Balkan allies soon fought among themselves over the division of Ottoman spoils. The Ottomans took advantage of this conflict to enter the war against Bulgaria on July 12 and to reoccupy much of the territory they had lost to Bulgaria. They entered Adrianople on July 23 and crossed the prewar Bulgarian frontier several days later. The Ottomans preferred to deal with the Bulgarians separately from the Greeks, Romanians, and Serbs.

Talks began on September 6 in Constantinople. The Bulgarians had little basis for negotiation. The Ottomans regained almost all the territory the Bulgarians had taken in the battles of Lozengrad, Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, and Adrianople during the First Balkan War. The Bulgarians retained western Thrace, with a small Aegean port at Dedeagach, and the northeastern corner of Thrace on the Black Sea. Immediately after the signing of the treaty, the Bulgarians and Ottomans began negotiations for an alliance directed against Greece and Serbia. As soon as the Balkan Wars were concluded, the two losing states in the Balkan Wars sought to reverse its dictates. These negotiations did not succeed. The two recent enemies never could overcome their distrust of each other. The talks eventually became, however, a basis for the Bulgarian–Ottoman agreement of September 3, 1915, which was a part of Bulgaria's entry into World War I on the side of the Central Powers.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan War, Second, 1913; Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

- Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Helmreich, E. C. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938.
- Rossos, Andrew. *Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy 1908–1914*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981.

Contested Zone (Macedonia), 1912

The Contested Zone was an area of northwestern Macedonia in the Ottoman vilayets

of Kosova and Monastir, extending from Lake Ohrid in a northeasterly direction along the southeastern edge of the Shar Mountains as far as the Serbian frontier, including the cities of Skoplje and Kumanovo.

This territory was delineated in the secret annex of the Bulgarian-Serbian alliance agreement of March 1912. In the event of a successful war against the Ottoman Empire, if Macedonia could not obtain autonomy, then Bulgaria and Serbia would divide it. The treaty allotted the region northwest of the Contested Zone to Serbia, and the region southeast of the zone to Bulgaria. The treaty assigned the disposition of the contested zone to the arbitration of the Russian czar. He could divide it between Bulgaria and Serbia or assign it all to one or the other, according to his own predilections. Both Bulgaria and Serbia accepted this arraignment as a means to facilitate the alliance agreement.

In order to persuade the Bulgarians to accept the agreement, the Russians gave them private assurances that they would obtain the eastern bank of the Drin River at the town of Struga north of Lake Ohrid. The Bulgarians anticipated that they would receive most, if not all, of the Contested Zone. When Austro-Hungarian objections to the Serbian presence in northern Albanian and the Adriatic coast forced the Serbs to withdraw from these regions, they sought compensation in Macedonia, including the entire Contested Zone. This brought them into conflict with their Bulgarian allies. Russian diplomacy failed to resolve the problem. Before the Russian czar could exercise his arbitration obligations, the Bulgarians attacked their Serbian allies on June 29, 1913. This brought about the Second Balkan War and the complete defeat of Bulgaria.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes

Further Reading

Helmreich, E. C. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912–1913*. New York: Russell & Russell, 1969.

Russos, Andrew. *Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy 1908–1914*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981.

Thadden, Edward C. *Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965.

Corfu Channel Incident, 1946

The Corfu Channel Incident consisted of three separate events in 1946, involving British Royal Navy ships in the channel between Corfu and the Albanian coast and the new Communist government of Albania.

On May 15, 1946, Albanian forts fired on the cruisers HMS *Orion* and HMS *Superb* as they were crossing the Corfu Channel, following an inspection of the strait. The ships were not hit, but the British government formally demanded an official apology from the Albanian government. The Albanians refused, claiming that the British ships had entered Albanian territorial waters.

On October 22, 1946, the cruisers HMS *Mauritius* and HMS *Leander* and the destroyers HMS *Saumarez* and HMS *Volage* sailed northward through the Corfu Channel to test the Albanian reaction to their right of innocent passage. As the ships passed close to the Albanian coast near the Bay of Saranda, the *Saumarez* hit a mine, which blew off its bow. As the *Volage* began towing the *Saumarez* south to Corfu harbor, it also hit a mine, blowing off its bow. After 12 hours, both ships managed to reach Corfu harbor. The two ships suffered 44 dead and 42 injured, and the *Saumarez* was damaged beyond repair.

On November 12–13, 1946, the Royal Navy carried out an additional minesweeping operation in the Corfu Channel in Albanian territorial waters without the consent of the Albanian government. The ships, covered by an aircraft carrier, cruisers, and other warships, discovered and cut the moorings of 22 contact mines. The minefield appeared to have been deliberately designed and not randomly placed. British authorities at Malta examined two of the cut mines and determined that they were German, but without any rust and marine growth. They had been freshly painted, and the mooring cables were recently lubricated. The examiners concluded that two Yugoslav minelayers at the request of the Albanian government had laid the mines around October 20.

The Albanian prime minister Enver Hoxha (1908–1985) complained to the United Nations about the British incursion into Albanian waters. On December 9, 1946, Britain accused Albania of laying the mines and demanded reparations for the earlier incidents. The Albanian government denied the British allegations in a reply, received by the British on December 21.

Britain brought a case against Albania to the International Court of Justice. In December 1949, the court directed Albania to pay some £800,000 (\$1,904,679) to Britain. The Albanian government refused to pay anything. Britain then broke off talks aimed at establishing diplomatic relations with the post–World War II Albanian government. The two countries ultimately restored diplomatic relations in 1991. Five years later, Albania agreed to pay \$2 million to Britain in delayed reparations. Britain, in return, gave the Albanian government 1,574 kilograms of gold, looted by the Axis powers and awarded to Albania by a postwar committee, that Britain had held since 1948.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Cold War in the Balkans; Hoxha, Enver (1908–1985)

Further Reading

Gardiner, Leslie. “The Eagle Spreads His Claws: A History of the Corfu Channel Dispute and of Albania’s Relations with the West, 1945–1965” (book review by David Floyd). *International Affairs* 43, no. 2 (April 1967): 372–73.

Prifti, Peter R. *Socialist Albania since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978.

Wright, Quincy. “The Corfu Channel Case.” *American Journal of International Law* 43, no. 3 (July 1949): 491–94.

Corfu Declaration, 1917

The Corfu Declaration was a manifesto issued on July 20, 1917, by representatives of the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian peoples announcing their intention to form a united kingdom after the war. The declaration was the product of a conference on the Adriatic island of Corfu during July 7–20, 1917. Corfu was controlled by the Serbian government-in-exile and protected by the Allied navies. Attending the conference were members of the Yugoslav Committee and representatives of the Serbian government-in-exile. Ante Trumbić (1864–1938) led the Yugoslav Committee, representing Croats and Slovenes. In 1914, lands inhabited by both these peoples were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Nicola Pašić (1845–1926) led the Serbia government-in-exile. Representatives of the Kingdom of Montenegro were also present.

The agreement had 13 points. Among them was the decision by these Slavic peoples to create a united state following the defeat of the Central Powers. A constitutional monarchy under the Karageorgević

dynasty of Serbia, it would be known as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

There was to be full equality among all the ethnic groups politically, linguistically, religiously, and legally. Both the Cyrillic alphabet used by the Serbs and the Latin alphabet used by the others were permitted. A constitution was to be drafted after the war, providing for both universal male suffrage and secret ballot.

The new pact enabled the many south Slavic parties to present a united front to the Western powers, forestalling any territorial ambitions by Italy. On December 1, 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (renamed Yugoslavia in 1929) came into being.

A. J. L. Waskey

See also: Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918; Macedonian Front, 1916–1918; Serbia in World War I

Further Reading

Bannan, Alfred J., and Achilles Edelenyi. *Documentary History of Eastern Europe*. New York: Twayne, 1970.

Djokic, Dejan. *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918–1992*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003.

Hudson, Kate. *Breaking the South Slav Dream: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia*. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2003.

Corfu Incident, 1923

The Corfu Incident was a crisis between Greece and Italy in 1923 that developed after unknown assailants killed three Italian army officers, sent to settle a boundary dispute between Greece and Albania, and their Albanian interpreter in northern Greece near the Albanian border.

The Treaty of London, ending the First Balkan War on May 30, 1913, made Albania an independent state, and an International

Boundary Commission, created by the London Conference of Ambassadors, established its borders with Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro in early 1914. During World War I, Italian and Serbian forces occupied the country. In January 1920, French, British, and Greek delegates at the Paris Peace Conference developed a plan to partition Albania among newly established Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece to end the conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia over Albania. However, both the Albanians and the United States objected, and, in March 1920, U.S. president Woodrow Wilson officially recognized an independent Albania.

The official boundary between Albania and Greece remained disputed. The two nations submitted their dispute to the Conference of Ambassadors, an intergovernmental agency, founded in 1919 by Britain, Italy, France, and Japan to resolve international disputes. The League of Nations authorized the conference to establish a commission to determine the boundary between the two countries. Several countries, including Italy, provided small military detachments to help the commission conduct the survey. General Enrico Tellini (1871–1923) of the Italian army was selected to head the commission.

From the beginning, the Greek government and the commission were at odds with each other. The Greek delegate eventually accused Tellini of favoring Albania's claims. Then, on August 27, 1923, unknown assailants murdered Tellini and three of his assistants—Major Luigi Corti, Lieutenant Luigi Bonacini, and their Albanian interpreter—near the Greek town of Ioannina near the Greek-Albanian border. Some sources attributed the attack to Greek nationalists, but the Greek government officially stated that Albanian bandits had killed the men even though they had not been robbed.

On August 29, 1923, the Italian government issued an ultimatum to Greece in which it demanded 50 million lire in reparations and the execution of the killers. However, the Greek government could not identify the killers and refused to pay the indemnity. Benito Mussolini, the Fascist leader of Italy, then ordered Italian military forces to bombard and occupy Corfu, a Greek island that occupied a strategic position off the very southern coast of Albania at the entrance to the Adriatic Sea. The Italian military action on August 31, 1923, killed at least 15 civilians.

Greece now appealed to the League of Nations, which condemned the Italian attack and occupation. The Conference of Ambassadors mediated the dispute, and Italy and Greece agreed to accept its decision. The conference ordered Greece to apologize and pay reparations to Italy, which the Greek government did. In exchange, the Italian forces would leave Corfu, which they did on September 27, 1923.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Corfu Channel Incident, 1946

Further Reading

Barros, John. *The Corfu Incident of 1923: Mussolini and the League of Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997.

Costa, Nicolas J. *Shattered Illusions: Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1998.

Massock, Richard G. *Italy from Within*. New York: Macmillan, 1943.

Cretan Crisis, 1896

In 1896, a crisis on the Greek island of Crete led to the independence of Crete and then its

eventual union with Greece. The history of Crete, the largest and most populous of the Greek islands, goes back to the Minoan civilization (c. 2700–1420 BC), regarded as the earliest recorded civilization in Europe. Over time, Mycenae, Rome, the Byzantine Empire, Arabs, Venice, and, since 1669, the Ottoman Empire had ruled the island.

Christian Cretans joined the Greek War of Independence of 1821, but the Ottomans reconquered the island by 1828. Crete was not included in the Greek state established by the London Protocol of 1830. The Ottoman sultan ceded the island to Muhammad Ali of Egypt, but the 1840 Convention of London returned Crete to the Ottomans.

The Cretans revolted against Ottoman rule in 1841, 1858, and 1866. These successive rebellions gained the Christian Cretans some privileges, such as the right to bear arms, equality of Christian and Muslim worship, Christian councils of elders with jurisdiction over education and customary and family law, and, after the 1866 revolt, control of local administration. Despite these concessions, the Christian Cretans wanted to ultimately unite with Greece.

In the summer of 1878, the Cretans rebelled again. This time, the British intervened and converted the 1867–1868 Organic Law into the Pact of Halepa. According to this agreement, Crete became a semi-independent parliamentary state, governed by a Christian Ottoman governor, within the Ottoman Empire.

In 1889, disputes between the liberals and conservatives in the Cretan parliament led to another revolt and the abrogation of the Pact of Halepa. Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II's (1842–1918) government sent troops to the island and used the insurgency as a pretext to establish martial law. In September 1895, the Cretans revolted again, during which they massacred a number of Muslims. In

March 1896, the sultan replaced the Christian governor with a Muslim. By the summer of 1896, the Ottoman forces had lost military control of most of the island.

In November 1896, Greece dispatched troops to the island to help the Cretans. After a new Cretan insurrection began in early 1897, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Greece in April 1897 and defeated the Greek forces in Crete. Britain, France, Italy, and Russia now intervened and forced the sultan to withdraw his troops. The four powers established a committee of four admirals to govern the island until Prince George of Greece arrived on December 9, 1898, to govern the island as an autonomous state within the Ottoman Empire. Greek-speaking Muslims began leaving the island. In 1908, the Cretan deputies declared union with Greece, an act formally recognized internationally in the 1913 Treaty of London.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Abdulhamid II (1842–1918); Greco-Ottoman War, 1897; Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832

Further Reading

Georgios, Prince of Greece. *The Cretan Drama: The Life and Memoirs of Prince George of Greece, High Commissioner in Crete (1898–1906)*. Edited by A. A. Pallis. New York: R. Speller, 1959.

Koliopoulos, John S., and Thanos M. Veremis. *Greece: The Modern Sequel, from 1831 to the Present*. New York: New York University Press, 2002.

Woodhouse, C. M. *Modern Greece: A Short History*. 5th ed. London: Faber and Faber, 1991.

Crete, Battle of, 1941

The Germans had employed small airborne forces with spectacular success in

May 1940 in order to secure key bridges in their invasion of the Netherlands and Belgium. The assault on Belgium in particular provided a spectacular example of what the new tactics of vertical envelopment might accomplish when German paratroopers captured two key bridges over the Albert Canal as well as the formidable bastion of Fortress Eben Emael. German chancellor Adolf Hitler developed the plan, which his field commanders had greeted with considerable skepticism.

The Germans sent a force of just 78 men against Eben Emael with its 1,200-man garrison. Landing directly on top of the fort in gliders, the Germans employed 56 hollow-charge explosives to blow up its armored turrets and casemates. The tiny attacking force secured its objective in only 28 hours. The vital bridges at Veldwezelt and Vroenhoven were also taken by coup de main, all of which allowed the German ground forces to move forward.

The first large-scale invasion by airborne forces in history, however, occurred a year later on the island of Crete. Beginning in late 1940, Hitler acted in the Balkans to counter Soviet moves there and to shore up his southern flank before invading the Soviet Union. In November 1940, he forced Hungary and Romania to join the Axis and accept German troops. Bulgaria followed suit in March 1941, and in April, the Germans conquered Yugoslavia.

German troops also came to the aid of the hard-pressed Italians in Greece. The Greeks had the bulk of their divisions fighting the Italians in Albania and had only three divisions and border forces in Macedonia, where the Germans attacked. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) sent to Greece was unprepared to deal with German armor and the Luftwaffe, and during April 26–30, the BEF was precipitously evacuated from

Greece. Many of the 43,000 British troops taken off were landed on Crete. British naval units were savaged by the Luftwaffe. The Royal Navy lost 26 vessels, including two destroyers, to German air attack, and many other ships were badly damaged.

In May 1941, the Germans invaded Crete. This operation, dubbed *Merkur* (mercury), was conceived and planned by the head of German paratroopers, Generalleutnant Kurt Student (1890–1978). He saw it as the forerunner of other, more ambitious airborne operations against the island of Malta or even Suez. Hitler saw it only as a cover for his planned invasion of the Soviet Union, to secure the German southern flank against British air assault and protect the vital Romanian oil fields at Ploesti. The invasion would be conducted by parachutists and mountain troops brought in by transport aircraft. British prime minister Winston Churchill's decision to try to hold Crete, unprepared and bereft of Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter support, ignored reality.

Major General Bernard Freyberg (1889–1963) commanded British forces on Crete, with a corps centered on the Second New Zealand Division. Ultra intercepts provided Freyberg with advance knowledge of German intentions and identified the German drop zones and targeted airfields. Ironically, the intercepts actually also hampered Freyberg's dispositions because they revealed that the Germans were sending a seaborne force as well. The latter turned out to be only a small-scale operation easily blunted at sea, but the threat led Freyberg to divert some of his scant resources from the three airfields to the coast, which probably cost him the battle. Freyberg also made a major blunder in not releasing stocks of weapons and not forming a Cretan home guard before the invasion.

Merkur began on May 20. The Germans barely managed to secure one airfield, at

Malerne. This was sufficient, for they were then able to bring in mountain troops by transport aircraft and to expand the perimeter. The Luftwaffe was able to hit Crete and the Royal Navy units offshore with impunity. The British withdrew to the coast on May 28. Thus, in little more than a week of fighting, the British were forced into another evacuation. The few cutoff elements that remained were forced to surrender on May 31.

British and British Empire forces sustained 3,479 casualties (1,742 dead) and 11,835 prisoners. The Cretans also paid a heavy price. They fought the Germans with what little means they had and suffered savage reprisals both in the battle and during the subsequent occupation. The Germans sustained 6,700 casualties (3,300 dead) and 200 transport aircraft destroyed. Although there were concerns in the Luftwaffe that codes might have been broken, nothing was done.

Hitler was furious at the heavy German losses and removed Student from command during the battle. Never again did Hitler employ paratroops in airborne assault in significant number. From that point on, Student's men were used mainly as elite infantry. Ironically, the Allies now embraced paratroop operations.

The Battle for Crete also demonstrated that warships without fighter support were defenseless against attacking aircraft. British admiral Andrew Cunningham's Mediterranean Command smashed the German amphibious operation of May 21–23 sent to reinforce the airborne troops on Crete, sinking a number of the small craft shuttling troops and killing several hundred Germans. But the Luftwaffe then mauled the Royal Navy ships, sinking three cruisers and six destroyers; six other ships, including two battleships and an aircraft carrier, were heavily damaged. More than 1,800 British

sailors died. Churchill ignored this lesson, which would cost the Royal Navy two capital ships in the South China Sea in December 1941. Hitler's aggressive Balkan moves barred Soviet expansion in the region and secured protection against possible British air attack from the south. These goals accomplished, he was ready to move against the Soviet Union.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Germany in the Balkans during World War II; Greece, Invasion of, 1941; Greece in World War II

Further Reading

Kiriakopoulos, G. C. *The Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941–1945*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995.

MacDonald, Cullum. *The Lost Battle: Crete 1941*. New York: Free Press, 1993.

Pack, S. W. C. *The Battle for Crete*. London: Ian Allan, 1973.

Thomas, David. *Nazi Victory: Crete 1941*. New York: Stein and Day, 1973.

Crimean War, Balkan Operations

The Russian General Staff prepared and recommended bold plans immediately before the political crisis which led to war. However, Czar Nicholas I (1796–1855) gave approval to the safest alternative, the occupation of the Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia) and being ready to launch attacks on the Caucasian front. The main aim was a political push to force the Ottomans to accept Russian demands. Nicholas ordered his commanders to begin the invasion of the Principalities on May 28, 1853, which was duly carried out after a month long concentration with the crossing of the Pruth (Prut) River on July 3.

The Ottoman war council accepted a strategic plan in which the Balkan front would remain in an active defense around the Danube River, conducting only limited attacks and harassment raids, while the Caucasian front would launch attacks deep into Russian territory and try to capture dominant ground blocking Russian approach roads while keeping the fortresses secure. A renegade Habsburg officer, Ömer Lütfü Pasha (Omar Latas; 1806–1871), was chosen to defend the Danubian region. While the ill-equipped and poorly led Ottoman Army of the Caucasus suffered a series of blunders and defeats, the Army of the Danube under the able command of Ömer Pasha launched medium-sized surprise attacks to Kalafat and Oltenitsa within Wallachia with remarkable efficiency. The Russian commander in chief, Prince Mikhail Gorchakov (1792–1861), ordered his local commanders to attack decisively to the recent Ottoman gains. Ottoman troops beat the overconfident Russian attacks and inflicted heavy casualties.

The arrival of the first group of allied soldiers at Gallipoli and Constantinople forced the Russians to change their strategic plans. The main idea was now to capture Edirne before the allied troops could come into action. The initial part of the plan was carried out easily by occupying the lightly defended Dobrudja. However, the second part of the plan, the capture of Silistra, turned out to be impossible, even though the expected allied units failed to arrive on time.

The Russian attacks on Silistra started on May 16, 1854. The victorious commander of the previous war, Count Ivan Paskievitch (1782–1856), had little regard for the Ottoman military, and his faulty leadership negated the advantages of the Russians. The defenders of Silistra pushed back

three major assaults. The massive toll of casualties and allied concentration in Varna harbor forced the tactical commander, Prince Alexander Gorchakov (1798–1883), to abandon the siege and retreat on June 21. A hasty Ottoman attack against the Russian garrison in Giorgio speeded up the withdrawal and the entire Danube basin, except a portion of Dobrudja, was evacuated by the Russians. A Habsburg memorandum to Russia effectively finished military operations in the Balkans and the Russian army of occupation pulled back its last unit in mid-August.

Mesut Uyar

See also: Dobrudja; Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878

Further Reading

Baumgart, Winifred. *The Crimean War 1853–1856*. London: Arnold Pub., 1999.

Dodd, George. *Pictorial History of the Russian War*. London: W&R Chambers, 1856.

Gürel, A. Tefvik. *1853–1855 Türk-Rus ve Müttefiklerin Kırım Savaşı*. Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1935.

Croat Forces, 1991–1995

Formally known as the National Guard Corps (*Zbor narodne garde*, or ZNG) and later as simply the Croatian army (*Hrvatska vojska*, or HV), these were forces loyal to the government of Croatia who fought in the war for Croatia's independence from Yugoslavia. "Croat forces" may also include forces fighting on behalf of Croats during the Croat-Bosniak conflict in Bosnia.

The war in Croatia began on March 31, 1991, and officially continued until the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed on November 21, 1995. In the earliest days of the conflict, combatants fighting on behalf

of Croatia were largely Croatian police officers. As the conflict escalated, the ZNG was officially created from 1,000 special police officers and 9,000 volunteers on April 12, 1991, by Croatian president Franjo Tudjman. The first brigade was formed on May 1, 1991. Additional volunteers joined the ZNG, and on June 15, 1991, Tudjman appointed Staff General Martin Špegelj (1927–2014) to command the forces. By August 1991, Croat forces in Croatia had grown to 60,000 members and four brigades.

Croatia was the second-most populous Yugoslav republic, and of approximately 4.7 million people, 78 percent were Croats, 12 percent were Croatian Serbs, and 10 percent were of other ethnicities. After the Croat nationalist Tudjman was elected in 1990, Croatian Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia began to agitate for autonomy, declaring an independent Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). After a violent clash at the Plitvice Lakes National Park on March 31, 1991, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) was sent to intervene in Croatia. The JNA's presence in Croatia significantly increased as the situation degenerated into war, and the JNA was vastly better armed than the opposing Croat forces. To remedy this imbalance, Špegelj led Croat forces in the Battle of the Barracks between September and December 1991, resulting in the successful capture of heavy arms from JNA barracks throughout Croatia.

By December 31, 1991, the Croat forces included 230,000 members falling into 60 brigades. Combat brigades ranged in size from 500 to 2,500 men. On January 2, 1992, the UN-brokered Sarajevo Agreement ended the first phase of the war. Ethnic cleansing and the detention of prisoners in camps continued on both sides through 1992, and full-scale fighting resumed on January 22, 1993, with the Croat-led

Operation Maslenica. The final major battle of the war in Croatia was Operation Storm, August 4–7, 1995, in which 130,000 ZNG/HV personnel decisively defeated the JNA in the RSK, regaining nearly 4,000 square miles of territory under the command of Major General Ante Gotovina (1955–).

Meanwhile, in neighboring Bosnia, Croat forces organized under the Croatian Defense Council (*Hrvatsko vijeće obrane*, or HVO) to defend Croat interests in the Croat-Bosniak conflict. The Croat-Bosniak conflict began on June 19, 1992, and continued through February 23, 1994, officially ending with the adoption of the Washington Agreement on March 18, 1994. During the conflict, the HVO grew to include 45,000 personnel. By 1994, in addition to HVO personnel, 3,000–5,000 ZNG/HV troops were fighting on behalf of Croats in Bosnia.

Mary Kate Schneider

See also: Croat War, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Magaš, Branka, and Ivo Žanić. *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991–1995*. New York: Routledge, 2001.

Thomas, Nigel. *The Yugoslav Wars (1): Slovenia and Croatia 1991–1995*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Russian and European Analysis. *Balkan Battlefields: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict 1991–1995*. 2 vols. Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002.

Croat War, 1991–1995

The Croat War of 1991–1995 was a major component of the Yugoslav Wars, in which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

collapsed into its national components. Throughout this time, the events in Croatia were closely interconnected with those in Bosnia. The origins of this conflict date back to World War II, when the Croatian fascist Ustaša regime relentlessly persecuted its Serbian minority. The Serbs, who had lived in the northwestern (Krajina) and eastern (Slavonia) regions of Croatia since the end of the seventeenth century, responded by joining Četnik and Partisan units. A bloody conflict ensued throughout the region. After the Partisan victory in 1945, the regime of Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) established a federal republic and muted nationalist sentiments. After Tito's death, the concept of federal Communism declined, and nationalism returned to the Yugoslav republics.

The emergence of Franjo Tuđman (1922–1999) as president of Croatia in April 1990 brought events in Croatia to the point of war. Tuđman was a former Partisan fighter who had become a strong Croatian nationalist during the later years of the Tito regime. His government promoted a strong nationalist position, adopting symbols from the Ustaša past such as the red-and-white checkerboard (*šahovnica*) and the *kuna* currency. These and other Croatian nationalist actions, such as the overt use of the Latin alphabet, renaming streets, and purging Serbs from state jobs, especially in the police, alarmed the Serbian minority, which constituted around 12 percent of the population. The Serbian population in Krajina and Slavonia received encouragement and support from the Serbian nationalist government of Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006) in Belgrade. After a positive referendum in May 1991, Croatia declared independence on June 25. The new state was unprepared to defend its new status. By this time, the Serbian communities had



A Croatian army tank coming from the front line arrives while Croatian troops leave the recaptured town of Knin, August 10, 1995. Croatian troops were concentrating in the capital of the self-declared “Serb Republic Krajina,” recently retaken by Croatian government forces. (AP Photo/Darko Bandic)

already begun to assert their own authority separate from Zagreb and to arm themselves with the aid of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). Like all other Yugoslavs, they had trained in the territorial defense units (TO). They maintained their right to remain in Yugoslavia. The Croats themselves failed to build an effective fighting force based upon the TO. The JNA took control of TO resources in Croatia. The Croatian government was forced to rely upon the police.

Throughout the spring of 1991, the Serbs erected barricades in Krajina. Fighting between the Croats and Serbs began in the summer when the inadequately armed Croatian police attempted to enforce the authority of the Zagreb government in the Serbian regions. The ambush and killing of 12 Croatian policemen at the village of Borovo Selo on May 1, 1991, marks the beginning of the Croatian War. Skirmishing

continued in the Krajina region throughout the summer. By July, the Serbs had eliminated Croatian government units there and had established a capital at Knin. By September, the Serbs had expanded their areas of control into northern Dalmatia.

The largest arena of combat between Croatian government forces and Serbian militias occurred around the Slavonian city of Vukovar. The city itself, like much of Slavonia, had a mixed population including Croats and Serbs as well as Czechs, Hungarians, Slovaks, Ukrainians, and others left over from the Habsburg era. In August 1991, the JNA, by then largely a Serbian force, joined Serbian militias to bring the Zagreb government-held town under siege. The Croatian forces within the city numbered only around 1,800 men. They were heavily outgunned and outnumbered by the surrounding Serbs. The Croatian government lacked the military resources to relieve the

city. The besiegers preferred to use artillery rather than a direct infantry assault to overcome the defenders. At first the JNA and the militias failed to coordinate their efforts. Finally on November 18, the Serbs overcame the exhausted defenders and took the city. Many civilians died during the siege. The Serbian militias massacred many of the civilian and military wounded in the city hospital. Some Serbian commanders were later indicted for war crimes for this incident.

During the fall of 1991, fighting also occurred around the historic city of Dubrovnik. The JNA, assisted by some Montenegrin TO forces, surrounded the city by the end of October. JNA artillery caused much damage in the old city. JNA troops engaged in widespread looting, especially in the tourist hotels. Pleasure craft in the harbors also suffered damage from JNA artillery. The massacre at Vukovar and the destruction around Dubrovnik caused much outrage and considerable damage to the Serbian cause throughout Europe and the United States.

The fighting in Croatia came to a temporary end due to the efforts of the United Nations. Cyrus Vance (1917–2002), an American diplomat acting on behalf of the UN, negotiated an armistice signed between the Croats and Serbs in Sarajevo on January 2, 1992. An initial effort by the European Community (EC) in the fall of 1991 to end the fighting failed. The Vance effort established a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia to monitor the armistice and to disarm the two sides. The UNPROFOR arrived in March 1992 and established itself between Croats and Serbs. The Croats accepted the armistice and the *de facto* loss of around one-third of their territory because they lacked the military ability to defeat the Serbs. The Serbs

accepted the armistice because they had realized their main objective, the establishment of a Serbian entity connected to those in Bosnia and Serbia. The looming crisis in Bosnia also provided incentive for both sides to reach some kind of temporary accommodation.

When war in Bosnia erupted in April 1992, the armistice in Croatia held. The Zagreb government utilized the next two years to intervene in Bosnia. It also made considerable efforts to acquire arms and training for its forces. It had not abandoned the concept of sovereignty over all of Croatia. During this time, the Croats also undertook several limited operations against the Serbs in the Krajina region. In January 1993 they seized the Maslenica Bridge near Zadar. This reestablished the land route between northern and southern Croatia. In September 1993, they attacked some Serbian artillery positions near Gospić. After some fighting, UNPROFOR took over the positions and the armistice held. This was a gain for Croatia.

Through strenuous effort, the Croats obtained mainly former Soviet Bloc military equipment from various sources that would enable them to undertake rapid offensive action. Especially important to the Croat plans was the acquisition of 24 MiG fighter bombers, 30 Mi-8 transport helicopters, and 8 Mi-24 helicopter gunships. They intended to carry out a “blitzkrieg” strategy.

By 1995, the Croatian government forces had armed and trained to the point that they were prepared to attack the Serbs and establish government control over all Croatia. In March 1995, some fighting occurred around Livno. The initial phase of the planned Croat offensive, however, began on May 1 when Croat forces quickly overran the Serbian salient of western Slavonia. The operation ended the next day with the capture of

the salient and the surrender of the Serbian units there.

The larger Croat effort began in the summer. On July 25, Croatian forces intervened in northwestern Bosnia to prevent the loss of Bihać to the Serbs and their Bosnian ally Fikret Abdić (1939–). After forcing the Serbs to withdrawal from Bihać, the Croats then initiated Operation Storm (*Oluja*) on August 4. This was directed at the Serbian forces in Krajina. The Croat offensive quickly overwhelmed the Serbian defenders. Knin, the Krajina capital and main Croat objective, fell on August 5. These attacks occurred in conjunction with an offensive mounted from Bihać by the Bosnian army against the Bosnian Serb forces. The JNA was unable to render any significant assistance to the Serbs in Krajina or in Bosnia. By August 8, the campaign had ended. The remnants of the Serbian forces together with most of the Serbian civilian population began to evacuate into Bosnia and on into Serbia. Three hundred years of a Serbian presence in Krajina was over.

After the success of Operation Storm, the Croats continued their cooperation with the Bosnian government forces in Operation Maestral, directed against the Bosnian Serbs. This effort began on September 8 and continued through most of the month. Operation Maestral, like Operation Storm, benefited from NATO's Operation Deliberate Force, which was directed against the Bosnian Serbs. It had begun on August 30 and lasted until September 20. The Croatian army continued to fight in Bosnia in conjunction with Bosnian government forces until the cease-fire on October 12. The Dayton Peace Accords established a settlement that returned Vukovar and eastern Slavonia to Croatia in 1997.

Although initially the Croatian army suffered from lack of heavy weapons and poor

organization, it was able to overcome these deficiencies and ultimately achieve its objective of establishing Croatian government control over the entire country. Praiseworthy as this effort was, the complicity of some members of the Croat forces in war crimes cannot be overlooked. The expulsion of the Serbs from Krajina remains an overt example of ethnic cleansing.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bihać; JNA (Yugoslav People's Army); Storm, Operation, 1995; Tudjman, Franjo (1922–1999); UNPROFOR; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes

Further Reading

Silber, Laura, and Allen Little. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. New York: Penguin, 1998.

Thomas, N., and K. Mikulan, *The Yugoslav Wars (2), Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992–2001*. Botely, Oxford: Osprey, 2006.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. *Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995*. 2 vols. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002–2003.

Cypriot Civil War, 1963

Cyprus negotiated independence from British administration in 1960, but its early constitution failed to strike a workable compromise between Greek majority and Turkish minority interests. Just three years into its tenure as an independent republic, Cypriot civic tension erupted into the Cypriot Civil War.

In November 1963, President Makarios III (1913–1977), a Greek Cypriot and Orthodox archbishop, proposed a set of constitutional revisions. While Turkish Cypriot vice president Fazil Küçük (1906–1984) considered that plan, Turkey rejected it outright. Amidst mounting tensions in the capital of Nicosia, on December 21, Greek Cypriot

police intercepted a Turkish Cypriot couple along the dividing line between the Greek and Turkish quarters of the city (later called the Green Line). Among the gathering crowd, shots rang out and left the two Turkish Cypriots dead. Spurred by the news, members of underground organizations on both sides entered into armed skirmishes. Küçük and Turkish Cypriot officials withdrew from the government.

As fighting dwindled in the presence of UN peacekeeping forces, many Turkish Cypriots relocated from remote villages to Nicosia's heavily defended Turkish quarter. In June 1964, the Cypriot House of Representatives (only representing Greek Cypriots) established a National Guard to which men aged 18 to 59 could be called for service. The idea was to unify and discipline the uncontrolled bands of Greek Cypriots roaming the countryside. President Makarios invited back exiled Greek general Georgios Grivas (1898–1974), a legendary freedom fighter against the British, to lead the National Guard. Turkish Cypriots viewed that action as an attempt to upgrade the National Guard into a Greek Cypriot army. In response, Turkey began invasion preparations. A warning from U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson dissuaded Prime Minister İsmet İnönü (1884–1973) from invading the island, although shortly thereafter, Turkish planes fired on Greek Cypriots who were sacking Turkish Cypriot villages.

In July, U.S. diplomat Dean Acheson (1893–1971) met in Geneva with Greek and Turkish representatives to hammer out a compromise: Greek Cypriots would get *enosis* (union) with Greece, Greece would compensate Turkish Cypriots wishing to emigrate, and Greece would hand over to Turkey the Aegean island of Kastellorizo. Makarios rejected the Acheson Plan; he called its provision of Turkish Cypriot enclaves and a Turkish sovereign military base a form of partition.

Grivas, responding to Turkey's air strikes, led the National Guard in sacking two Turkish Cypriot villages. Turkey massed troops on its border with Greece and threatened invasion if Greek Cypriots did not meet an ultimatum. In partial compliance, Grivas resigned from the guard and returned to Greece. Turkish troops did not retreat, however. U.S. president Johnson, again alerted to the now imminent possibility of two North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations going to war, sent Cyrus Vance as special envoy to all three countries. In Ankara in November 1967, Vance successfully negotiated for Greece and Turkey to remove simultaneously all troops from Cyprus, except those permitted by the 1960 treaties, and for Turkish troops to withdraw from the Greek border. Full-scale war was averted and independence reestablished. Makarios, reelected to office in February 1968, chose not to dismantle the National Guard. In 1974, it would rise up against him in a coup that in the end established partition.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Cyprus War, 1974

Further Reading

Clogg, Richard. *A Concise History of Greece*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Jacovides, Andreas J. *The Cyprus Question: Its Dimensions, Implications and Prospects for a Solution*. Washington, DC: Center for Mediterranean Studies, 1980.

Veremis, Thanos, and Mark Dragoumis. *Historical Dictionary of Greece*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1995.

Cyprus War, 1974

On July 15, 1974, disaffected Greek Cypriots who favored *enosis* (union with Greece)

launched a coup against Cypriot leader and archbishop Makarios III (1913–1977). He was replaced by Nikos Sampson (1935–2001), a staunch proponent of *enosis* who had the backing of Greece’s military junta in Athens. At the time, the island of Cyprus was peopled by both Greeks and Turks, and elements of each of those factions sought to control the entire island for themselves. Turkey was outraged by the move and promptly mobilized a force of some 40,000 troops, which invaded northern Cyprus in the pre-dawn hours of July 20, 1974 at Kyrenia (Girne). At the time, Greek Cypriots could count on only about 12,000 active-duty troops and perhaps another 15,000 ill-trained and ill-equipped reservists. The Turkish troops had little trouble seizing and holding about 3 percent of northern Cyprus within 48 hours.

The Turkish invasion precipitated a flurry of international diplomacy, and late on July 22, the UN Security Council managed to broker a cease-fire. Meanwhile, because of the ease with which the Turks had invaded Cyprus, the Greek military government in Athens fell on July 23. The following day, a new Greek government under Constantine Karamanlis (1907–1998) was formed, and he sent delegates to a hastily arranged peace conference in Geneva, Switzerland, which occurred from July 25 to July 30. In the meantime, Karamanlis decided not to pursue any additional direct military action in Cyprus because Turkish forces were too numerous and had already established a strong defensive position in northern Cyprus.

The Greeks and the Turks were unwilling to enter into serious negotiations, however, and the Geneva talks ended in failure on July 30. Turkey, realizing that it held the upper hand, decided to launch a full-scale military offensive from northern Cyprus on

August 14, with the goal of capturing and holding some 40 percent of Cyprus (essentially all of the northern third of the island). It accomplished this by August 16, with its occupation extending as far south as Lourojina. The Turks disguised their July and August offensives as “peace operations.”

As a result of the Turkish invasion and occupation, perhaps as many as 200,000 Greeks living in northern Cyprus fled their homes and became refugees in the south. It is estimated that 638 Turkish troops died in the fighting, with another 2,000 wounded. Another 1,000 or so Turkish civilians were killed or wounded. Cypriot Greeks, together with Greek soldiers dispatched to the island, suffered 4,500–6,000 killed or wounded, and 2,000–3,000 more missing.

Meanwhile, the United Nations established a permanent cease-fire line, known as the Green Line, which effectively divided Cyprus into a Turkish-controlled northern zone and a Greek-controlled southern zone. With the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus in 1975 (which is not recognized by most of the international community), some 60,000 Turks living in southern Cyprus migrated to the Turkish-controlled northern zone that same year. The Green Line continued to exist as of this writing, and some 25,000–30,000 Turkish troops remained stationed in the north. The brief war and its inconclusive aftermath have radically changed the population distribution in Cyprus.

Whereas before 1974, Greeks and Turks were relatively well distributed throughout the island, Cyprus became almost completely bifurcated, with most Turks living in the northern part, and Greeks in the southern part. In May 2004, the two-thirds of Cyprus controlled by the Greeks entered

the European Union as the Republic of Cyprus. The Cypriot territory still controlled by Turkey was not included in this move.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also: Cypriot Civil War, 1963

Further Reading

Crawshaw, Nancy. *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with*

Greece. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978.

Joseph, Joseph S. *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

D

Dayton Peace Accords, 1995

The Dayton Peace Accords brought temporary peace between the Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs following the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. In November 1995, after more than three years of war in Bosnia, President Bill Clinton (1946–) helped the leaders of these states negotiate a peace treaty. With estimates of 100,000 to 400,000 people dead and the country of Bosnia in ruins, the process of nation-building under the auspices of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began. Since the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 161 people have been indicted on charges of ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and other acts.

The Bosnian War—also known as the Balkan War—began on April 6, 1992. Three political parties emerged from the first Bosnian democratic election in 1990, with each party representing a major ethnic group. These parties, representing the Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats, formed an uneasy coalition to maintain state unity. When Bosnia declared independence in April 1992, the Yugoslav People's Army (of Serbia) surrounded Bosnia and began its military campaign.

Three years later, following involvement by Croatian, Bosnian, and Serbian forces, the three groups met with President Bill Clinton in Dayton, Ohio, to reach a peace agreement. The Dayton Peace Accords divided Bosnia into the separate republics

of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. Further requirements maintained the capital city of Sarajevo, established a three-part government, required democratic elections, assured refugees right of return, excluded war criminals from political life, and mandated an international peacekeeping force.

Following the agreement, the United Nations established the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to examine charges of ethnic cleansing and other war crimes. Peacekeeping forces discovered mass graves located outside the Bosnian city of Srebrenica, where a reported 7,779 Bosniak males were killed by Serbian forces in July 1995. The Serbian siege and bombardment of the city of Sarajevo, which lasted for nearly three years, led to the deaths of thousands of Muslim Bosniaks as well. As of March 2006, 161 people had been indicted for crimes related to the Bosnian War by the ICTY.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bosnian War, 1992–1995; Vance-Owen Plan, 1993; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Cousens, Elizabeth M., and Charles K. Cater. *Toward Peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Accords*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.

Morton, Jeffrey S., et al. *Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years after the Break-up of Yugoslavia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Dimitriev, Radko (1859–1918)

Bulgarian general and diplomat and Russian army general, Radko Ruskov Dimitriev was born on September 24, 1859, in Gradets, Bulgaria (then Ottoman Empire). Radko Dimitriev participated in the April 1876 Bulgarian national uprising against the Ottomans and served in the ensuing Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 as a volunteer with a Russian Cossack unit. After the war, he was among the first graduates of the Bulgarian Military Academy in Sofia and later attended the Nikolaevski General Staff Academy in St. Petersburg.

Dimitriev served in the Bulgarian-Serbian War of 1885 as a staff officer in the Western Corps and rose in the ranks of the Bulgarian army, particularly distinguished by his pro-Russian perspective and charismatic personality. His short stature caused some observers to compare him to Napoleon. During the First Balkan War of 1912–1913, he commanded the Bulgarian Third Army in its descent upon eastern Thrace, achieving important victories against the Ottomans at Lozengrad and Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar. He directed the combined Bulgarian First and Third Armies during the Bulgarian assault on the Chataldzha lines outside Constantinople in November 1912 that failed to breach the Ottoman defensive positions. Dimitriev commanded Bulgarian armies during the catastrophic Second Balkan War in 1913.

After the Second Balkan War, Dimitriev became Bulgarian minister in St. Petersburg, but in August 1914, he resigned this post to accept a command in the Russian army. He led the Russian Third Army against the Austro-Hungarians into Galicia that autumn, but his Third Army suffered a serious defeat in the May 1915 German counterattack at

Gorlice-Tarnów. The initial German artillery barrages decimated his soldiers, who had failed to prepare secure positions. His army also suffered heavy losses in the ensuing retreat from Galicia, to the extent that the Third Army ceased to be an effective force. After this disaster, Dimitriev was relieved of command of the Third Army. A major reason for his relief was his failure to prepare fortified positions, but he also squabbled constantly with his superiors at the Southwestern Front headquarters and at Stavka, insisting on the delivery of additional munitions for his troops and, after the initial German attack, demanding an immediate withdrawal of his forces.

Dimitriev later served on the Northern Front, commanding the II and VII Siberian Corps and afterward the Russian Twelfth Army. He retired after the March 1917 revolution but remained in Russia. During the Russian Civil War, Red forces shot Dimitriev along with some 100 other officers as hostages at Rostov-on-Don on October 18, 1918. Dimitriev was an energetic and charismatic leader who commanded the loyalty of his subordinates and respect of his peers but whose victories in the Balkan Wars and World War I were overshadowed by his defeats.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Chataldzha, Battle of, 1912; Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, Battle of, 1912.

Further Reading

Azmanov, Dimitur. *Bulgarski visshi, Voenachalnitzi prez Balkanskata i Purvata svetovna voina*. Sofia: Voinno izdatelstvo, 2000.

Rutherford, Ward. *The Russian Army in World War I*. London: Cremonesi, 1975.

Stone, Norman. *The Eastern Front, 1914–1917*. New York: Scribner, 1975.

Dimitrijević, Dragutin (1876–1917)

Born in Belgrade on August 19, 1876, Serbian army colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević attended the lycée and the military academy in Belgrade. A brilliant and energetic student, he was nicknamed “Apis” after the ancient Egyptian bull-headed god, and the name stuck. Although he quickly moved into a position in the Serbian General Staff, Dimitrijević above all remained an ardent patriot, dedicated to the creation of a Greater Serbia by any means possible, including the use of espionage, conspiracy, and assassination.

In 1901, Dimitrijević helped organize the first failed attempt to murder the unpopular and pro-Austrian King Alexander Obrenović (1876–1903). Dimitrijević was successful in 1903, when the conspiracy succeeded in killing Alexander, his wife, and three others. The new king, Peter I Karageorgević (1844–1921), was grateful for his services, and Dimitrijević advanced rapidly in the Serbian military. Captain Dimitrijević spent a decade in various command and staff posts, broken by language study in Berlin during 1906–1907. From 1910, he taught tactics at the Belgrade Military Academy, where he became a staunch advocate of reform.

In 1911, Dimitrijević, who supported formation of a Greater Serb state organized under the Karageorgević dynasty, helped found *Ujedinjenje ili Smrt* (Unification or Death), commonly known as the Black Hand. This tightly organized, conspiratorial network was established under the larger and public patriotic society Narodna Odbrana (National Defense). The Black Hand conducted subversive activities in Bosnia and Macedonia and even attempted

to assassinate Austrian emperor Franz Joseph in 1911.

Prior to the First Balkan War, Apis carried out a reconnaissance mission behind Turkish lines in Albania. He contracted an illness while on this mission and took no part in the fighting. In mid-1913, Colonel Dimitrijević became chief of the Intelligence Department in the Serbian General Staff. In this position he actively plotted political assassinations to secure his goal of a Greater Serbia. Although the Black Hand gained influence in Serbian domestic politics, relations with the civilian administration cooled by 1914, particularly after the failed attempt to kill the Bosnian governor, Austro-Hungarian army general Oskar Potiorek (1853–1933), that January.

In the spring of 1914, Dimitrijević instigated a plot against Archduke Franz Ferdinand, possibly fearing that the archduke’s proposed reforms would weaken Slavic unrest in Bosnia. Three young Bosnian Serbs were recruited in Belgrade, trained and supplied in Serbia, and sent to Sarajevo. They succeeded in shooting and killing the archduke and his wife on June 28, 1914. This event brought on the crisis that led directly to the Great War.

In late 1916, with the Serbian government in exile, Prime Minister Nicola Pašić decided to destroy the Black Hand, probably to remove independent factions within the army. On December 15, Dimitrijević and his principal partisans were arrested in Salonika. They were brought before a military tribunal in May 1917. Condemned to death on sham charges, Dimitrijević was shot on June 26, 1917.

Timothy L. Francis

See also: Black Hand; Sarajevo Assassination, 1914; Serbia in World War I

Further Reading

Albertini, Luigi. *The Origins of the War of 1914*. 3 vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1952–1957.

Cassels, Lavender. *The Archduke and the Assassin: Sarajevo, June 28th 1914*. New York: Stein and Day, 1985.

Remak, Joachim. *Sarajevo: The Story of a Political Murder*. New York: Criterion, 1959.

Djilas, Milován (1911–1995)

Milován Djilas was a Yugoslav Communist revolutionary, advisor to Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia's press czar in charge of propaganda, writer, and noted dissident. Born to a Serbian family on June 12, 1911 in Podbišće in Montenegro, Djilas studied law and philosophy at the University of Belgrade, became a Communist student leader, and was imprisoned during 1933–1935 for his radical politics. In 1937, he met Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980), then head of the illegal Communist Party, and soon became his chief assistant and close friend. Tito appointed Djilas to the Yugoslav Communist Party Politburo in 1940.

During World War II, Djilas played a major role in organizing the Partisan Uprising and took an active leadership role in the resistance to the German army occupation. In 1944, he traveled to Moscow, where he held the first of a series of meetings with Soviet dictator Josef Stalin (1879–1953). Djilas later described these in his dissident manifesto *Conversations with Stalin* (1962).

In Yugoslavia's postwar government, Djilas became a cabinet minister in charge of propaganda and was noted for his ruthless imposition of cultural subjugation. He greatly influenced Tito's 1948 decision to break with the Soviet Union in order to pursue an independent, socialist path. But by

the end of the decade, Djilas had grave doubts about both Stalinism and Yugoslavia's ability to implement self-managed socialism.

Because of his calls for increased liberalization and his criticism of the Communist Party that were published in the party daily *Borba* in April 1954, Djilas was ousted from the party and received an 18-month suspended sentence. However, when his article "The Storm in Eastern Europe" appeared in a major American magazine supporting the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, he was imprisoned for three years. In 1957, his prison sentence was increased to seven years after the manuscript of his book *The New Class* was smuggled to the West and published. This work was the first authentic exposure of Eastern bloc Communists as a "new elite" dedicated to self-aggrandizement and power and therefore not so different from the capitalists they had replaced. Djilas was released in 1961 but imprisoned again in 1962 after the publication of the disdainful *Conversations with Stalin*. He received a pardon in 1966, was allowed to travel, and held a visiting professorship at Princeton University in 1968.

Djilas renounced communism entirely in *The Imperfect Society*, published in 1969, and became a hero among Communist dissidents. During the 1990s, he opposed the breakup of Yugoslavia and decried the fervent nationalism that precipitated the bloody Balkan conflicts that soon ensued. Djilas died in Belgrade on April 20, 1995.

Josip Mocnik

See also: Partisans, Yugoslavia; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslav-Soviet Split

Further Reading

Djilas, Milován. *Conversations with Stalin*. Translated by Michael B. Petrovich. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962.

Djilas, Milovan. *Rise and Fall*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985.

Sulzberger, C. L. *Paradise Regained: Memoir of a Rebel*. New York: Praeger, 1989.

Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918

The battle of Dobro Pole from September 14 to 16, 1918, was the decisive battle on the Macedonian Front. After their 1916 offensive, the Bulgarians lacked the strength to undertake further attacks on Entente positions in Macedonia. They strengthened their defenses with new trenches, barbed wire, and strong points, and waited for their German allies to win the war on other fronts. Dobro Pole was a fortified line along a limestone ridge along the prewar Greek-Serbian border. The name means “Good Field” in Slavic. This referred to the relatively level region behind the Bulgarian positions.

Through 1917 and 1918, the strength and morale of the Bulgarian army had eroded as the Germans transferred their forces from Macedonia to the Western Front and as the quantity and quality of Bulgarian provisions and war materials declined. By the summer of 1918, all that remained of the German presence on the Macedonian Front was the command and staff structure of the German Eleventh Army, which by this time had mainly Bulgarian troops, some specialists, and some largely immobile heavy artillery.

Meanwhile, the Entente forces based on Salonika had increased. French Colonial, Greek, Italian, and Serbian soldiers supplemented the original British and French contingents on the Macedonian Front while tons of supplies fortified the resolve and filled the stomachs of the Entente men.

After two years of relative inertia on the Macedonian Front, Entente forces, prodded by Serbs eager to return to their homeland,

sought a decisive action. The realization that the seizure of the Dobro Pole positions could open up the entire line and bring total victory caused the Entente to plan for battle.

On September 14, the Entente began a heavy artillery attack on the Dobro Pole positions. The next morning French, French Colonial, and Serbian troops began their assaults. After two days of heavy fighting, the Entente forces broke through the Bulgarian positions. The absence of Bulgarian commander in chief Nikola Zhekov (1865–1949), who was in Vienna for medical treatment, hindered the Bulgarian response to this crisis. Two Bulgarian divisions collapsed, and the soldiers rejected attempts of their officers to restore order. While some went home, many surged toward Sofia to punish those responsible for their years of suffering. Meanwhile, a supplemental British and Greek attack launched on September 18 at Lake Doiran failed.

By September 21, Entente forces had reached the Vardar River. This afforded them a fairly easy route to the north. The breakthrough forced the Bulgarians to withdraw their units west of Dobro Pole to avoid being cut off by the Entente advance. With few Central Powers units available to reinforce the retreating Bulgarians, and with discontent growing in the Bulgarian ranks, the Bulgarian government on September 26 decided to seek a way out of the war. On September 29, the Bulgarian delegation in Salonika signed an armistice with the Entente. Bulgaria was the last country to join the Central alliance, and the first to leave it. In the aftermath of the armistice, a combination of Bulgarian cadets and Germans defeated the mutineers.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bulgaria in World War I; Doiran, Battles of, 1915–1918; Macedonian Front, 1916–1918; Zhekov, Nikola (1864–1949)

Further Reading

Hall, Richard C. *Balkan Breakthrough: The Battle of Dobro Pole 1918*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

Palmer, Alan. *The Gardeners of Salonika*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.

Dobrudja

Dobrudja (Bulgarian: Dobrudzha) is a Balkan territory located between the lower Danube River and the Black Sea. Dobrudja's 9,000 square miles are today divided between Romania and Bulgaria. In 1945, the aggregate area held some 860,000 people. The population is principally Romanian in the north and Bulgarian in the south, with pockets of Turks and Tartars dispersed throughout. The principal city of Dobrudja is Constanța (population 79,000 in 1945), Romania's principal port. Always of strategic importance, the area was in dispute between the Byzantine and Bulgarian Empires but fell to the Turks in 1411. It remained part of the Ottoman Empire until the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. The Treaty of Berlin in 1878 assigned the bulk of Dobrudja to the Kingdom of Romania and a smaller southern section to the new autonomous Principality of Bulgaria.

While Bulgaria was hard-pressed by the Serbs during the Second Balkan War in 1912, Romania occupied the southern section to a line between Silistra and Balchik. The Treaty of Bucharest in 1913 confirmed Romanian control over all of Dobrudja, but Bulgaria refused to reconcile itself to the loss of the southern portion, the richest agricultural land of Bulgaria. When Romania joined the Entente in 1916, Bulgaria, one of the Central Powers, invaded Dobrudja with the intention of regaining its lost territory. The defeat of the Central Powers, however,

thwarted Bulgarian hopes, and Dobrudja remained Romanian.

On September 7, 1940, Bulgaria, with the backing of Nazi Germany, was able to regain southern Dobrudja. The Germans forced Romania to accept the Treaty of Craiova but mandated an exchange of population. Some 110,000 Romanians were forced to relocate from the south to the north, and 62,000 Bulgarians were forced to leave their homes in northern Dobrudja and resettle in the south. Overall, Romania lost 2,970 square miles and 875,000 people of Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

Bulgaria, which had not declared war on or participated in the invasion of the Soviet Union, joined the Soviet military campaign against Nazi Germany in the fall of 1944. Although Bulgaria was not recognized as a cobelligerent, Soviet treatment of Bulgaria differed from the treatment of Romania and Hungary. Reparations were demanded of both, and Romania was forced to return Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. With the support of the Soviet Union, the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 confirmed Bulgaria's retention of the territory it had gained in southern Dobrudja through the Treaty of Craiova. During the policy of forced collectivization and Bulgari- zation under Bulgarian premier Vulko Chervenkov (1900–1980) in the early 1950s, more than 100,000 Turks were displaced from Dobrudja and immigrated to Turkey.

Bernard Cook

See also: Berlin, Treaty of, 1878; Romania in the Balkan Wars; Romania in World War I

Further Reading

Crampton, R. J. *A Concise History of Bulgaria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania, 1866–1947*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1994.

Dodecanese Campaign, 1944

The islands of the southern Aegean Sea off the southwest coast of Anatolia were known through much of their history as the Eastern or Southern Sporades (“scattered”). The islands include Rhodes, Karpathos, Kassos, Haliki, Kastellorizo (Castlerosso), Alimia, Tilos, Symi (Simi), Nissyros, Kos (Cos), Pserimos, Astypalea, Kalymnos, Tenedhos, Leros, Lipsi, Patmos, Arki, and Agathonissi. Early in the twentieth century, the Young Turks revoked the historic privileges enjoyed by the islanders, who were part of the Ottoman Empire. Twelve islands (*dhodkeka nisia*) joined in a failed protest against the loss of these privileges, and the name of *Dodecanese* stuck as a term for all these islands, even though they exceeded 12 in number.

In 1912, as a consequence of the Italo-Turkish War, the Dodecanese Islands passed to Italian control. In 1941, the Germans joined their Italian allies in garrisoning the islands, which were inhabited chiefly by Greeks. The Italians had naval and air bases on Rhodes, the strategic key to the area. There was also an airfield on Kos, a seaplane base and naval batteries at Leros, and an air base on Scarpanto.

When Italy surrendered on September 8, 1943, the Dodecanese were occupied by two poorly equipped Italian divisions totaling 37,000 men; Italian morale was very low. The Germans had one division of 7,000 men, which was well equipped with tanks and artillery. The local Greek population was excited at the prospect of liberation by the Allied powers.

British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill (1874–1965) ordered that operations be conducted against the Dodecanese Islands. He believed that success there

would open the way to the Dardanelles and the Balkans. He also sought to induce Turkey to join the war and to remove the stain of Britain’s defeat in World War I at Gallipoli. The original plan for an invasion of the Dodecanese, prepared by the Middle East Command, was known as Operation Mandibles, but it was subsequently renamed Operation Accolade. Churchill appealed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) and to General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) for aid to liberate the Dodecanese. The Americans, who were preparing a landing on the Italian peninsula at Salerno, rebuffed him. Roosevelt also suspected that the British hoped to open a new front in the Balkans. Coincidentally, the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting in Quebec ordered most of the landing ships in the Middle East to the Indian Ocean, which starved the operation of needed assets.

When Italy surrendered on September 8, 1943, three British operatives led by Major Lord George Jellicoe (1918–2007) parachuted onto Rhodes. They contacted Italian authorities there and urged them to take the Germans prisoner. However, Admiral Inigo Campioni (1878–1944), commander of Italian forces in the Aegean, hesitated. The Germans, meanwhile, acted swiftly and soon subdued the Italians.

The British nonetheless proceeded with some landings, and by October 1943—with a force of 5,000 men and a small flotilla—they secured several islands, among them Kos, Samos, Patmos, and Leros. They were not able, however, either to gain air superiority or take Rhodes, and as long as the Germans were secure at Rhodes, the British could not hold the Dodecanese.

On October 3, 1943, the Germans went on the offensive, attacking Kos. Heavy bombing of the island by Stuka aircraft reduced

the British defenses, and soon the British force there surrendered. Churchill refused to consider a withdrawal, instead ordering that Leros and Samos be held at all costs. Indeed, the British reinforced Leros. On November 12, the Germans attacked Leros with overwhelming force, taking it four days later. The British troops remaining in the Dodecanese then withdrew.

Among British units involved were the Long Range Desert Group, the Special Boat Squadron, the Raiding Forces' Levant Schooner Flotilla, the King's Own, the Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the Durham Light Infantry. The Greek navy provided seven destroyers to assist the more numerous British vessels. In the offensive, the British lost four cruisers damaged and two submarines, six destroyers, and 10 small coastal vessels and minesweepers sunk. The Royal Air Force flew 3,746 sorties and lost 113 aircraft out of 288 involved. The British army lost in all about 4,800 men, while the Italians lost 5,350. German casualties totaled some 1,184 men, 35,000 tons of shipping (between late September and late November 1943), and 15 small landing craft and ferries. The operation failed as a consequence of Campioni's hesitation, German aggressiveness, noncooperation by the Americans, and the inadequacy of British resources. Holding the islands, however, stretched German resources, ultimately tying down some 60,000 Germans who might have been better employed elsewhere.

After the war, the British governed the Dodecanese until 1947. The islands were then turned over to Greece.

A. J. L. Waskey

See also: Germany in the Balkans during World War II; Greece in World War II; Italy in the Balkans during World War II

Further Reading

Churchill, Winston S. *The Second World War*. Vol. 5, *Closing the Ring*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951.

Gander, Marsland L. *The Long Road to Leros*. London: Macdonald, 1945.

Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. *The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943*. London: Chatham, 1998.

Holland, Jeffrey. *The Aegean Mission: Allied Operations in the Dodecanese, 1943*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988.

Molony, C. J. C., et al. *The Mediterranean and Middle East*. United Kingdom Military Series, edited by J. R. M. Butler. Vol. 5, *History of the Second World War*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1973.

Pitt, Barrie. *Special Boat Squadron*. London: Century Publishing, 1983.

Smith, Peter, and Edwin Walker. *War in the Aegean*. London: William Kimber, 1974.

Doiran, Battles of, 1915–1918

The Battles of Doiran were a series of three main engagements between Bulgarian forces and British and Greek units around Lake Doiran located along the 1914 Greek-Serbian frontier in southern Macedonia during World War I. Lake Dorian had already been the location of a sharp battle between the Bulgarian Second Army and the Greek army on July 6, 1913, during the Second Balkan War, in which the Greeks forced the Bulgarians to retreat to the north.

During World War I, initial fighting in this area developed on December 8–10, 1915, as elements of the Bulgarian Second Army pushed the British Expeditionary Force back across the Greek frontier. Earlier that fall, British and French troops had landed at Salonika. These units had moved north

along the line of the Vardar River in an effort to link up with the hard-pressed Serbian army in central Macedonia. After this Bulgarian success, because of the demands of their German allies, they halted at the Greek frontier.

Over the next year, the Bulgarian First Army established defensive positions all along the old Serbian-Greek frontier, including formidable ones around the northern edge of Lake Doiran. These were located along the ridge line and included trenches, barbed wire, machine gun nests, and artillery. The area remained relatively calm through 1916.

On April 24, 1917, after two days of artillery fire, the British 122th Division and two Greek regiments attacked the Bulgarian positions west of the lake. This attack was intended to take pressure off of the hard-pressed Romanians and Russians. The 9th Plevan Division of the Bulgarian First Army held its ground. Another attack on May 8 and 9 had the same result. The Entente forces made no appreciable gains. The British attempted another attack in April 1918, without success.

The final major engagement at Doiran occurred in September 1918 as a part of the great Entente offensive that succeeded in knocking Bulgaria out of the war. On September 18, 1918, four British Divisions, the Greek Cretan Division and a regiment of French Zouaves attacked the Bulgarian

First Army positions around Lake Doiran. By September 20, the attacks died away. The Bulgarian lines held everywhere. The Bulgarians achieved a major defensive victory against the Entente attack. They had little time to enjoy this success, however. The French and Serbian breakthrough of the Bulgarian positions to the west at Dobro Pole forced the Bulgarians to retreat all along the line. British airplanes harassed the retreating Bulgarians and caused numerous casualties. Nevertheless, the Bulgarians still celebrate their September 1918 victory at Doiran as illustrative of Bulgarian military prowess, even though it had little impact on the outcome of the war.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bulgaria in World War I; Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918; Macedonian Front, 1916–1918

Further Reading

- Falls, Cyril. *Military Operations, Macedonia*. 2 vols. Nashville, TN: Battery Press, 1996.
- Hall, Richard C. *Balkan Breakthrough: The Battle of Dobro Pole 1918*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
- Nedev, Nikola. *Doiranskata epopeya 1915–1918*. Sofia: Aniko, 2009.
- Wakefield, Alan, and Simon Moody. *Under the Devil's Eye: Britain's Forgotten Army at Salonika 1915–1918*. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2004.

E

EAM/ELAS

EAM (Greek National Liberation Front) and ELAS (Greek People's Liberation Army) refer to the Greek leftist resistance movement and its military arm during the Axis occupation of Greece during World War II. (Note: The abbreviations are from the Greek words for the noted groups.)

Leftist Greeks founded the Greek Communist Party (KKE) on November 4, 1919. During the interwar years, the KKE supported the formation of labor unions, played a prominent role in strikes and antiwar demonstrations, and supported the formation of Popular Front movements after 1933. In 1936, General Ioannis Metaxas (1871–1941) seized control of the government, outlawed the KKE, and imprisoned or exiled over 2,000 KKE members. When the Germans invaded Greece in April 1941, the KKE was in a state of disarray.

After the German conquest, several hundred KKE members escaped and went underground. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, a reconstituted KKE attempted to form an anti-Fascist resistance organization but received little support from the center and rightist parties. Nevertheless, the KKE established the EAM on September 27, 1941, with representatives of the KKE, the Socialist Party of Greece (SKE), the Union for People's Democracy (ELD), and the Agricultural Party of Greece. The EAM formally called for the liberation of Greece from the Nazis and Italians.

The KKE soon became the dominant group within the EAM. Georgios Siantos (1890–1947) was appointed as the acting leader as Nikolaos Zachariadis (1903–1973), the KKE's leader, was interned at Dachau. During the autumn of 1941, EAM expanded its influence throughout Greece. In February 1942, EAM formed its military wing, the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS), which fought German, Italian, and Bulgarian occupation forces starting in summer 1942.

In October 1943, the ELAS attacked the non-Communist National Republican Greek League (EDES) and the National and Social Liberation movement (EKKA), resulting in civil war. By spring 1944, the ELAS had destroyed the latter group, forced the remaining EDES fighters to evacuate to Corfu, and liberated a large area of the Greek mainland from Axis control. In March 1944, EAM established the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA) and, in April, held elections to the PEEA's parliament in which women were, for the first time, allowed to vote.

The establishment of a government of national unity, under George Papandreou, in May 1944, temporarily ended the civil war. After liberation in October 1944, the tensions between EAM and the rightist, nationalist republican forces, supported by Britain, escalated. Because of disagreements about the disarmament of ELAS, now numbering about 50,000, and the formation of a national army, the EAM ministers resigned on December 1.

The EAM organized a demonstration in Athens on December 3, 1944. Police fired on the crowd, killing 25 protesters and wounding 148 others. This clash escalated into a month-long conflict, the “December events,” between ELAS and British and Greek governmental forces. The British and Greek government victory led to the Varkiza Agreement of February 1945, which disbanded ELAS. In April, SKE and ELD left EAM, leaving the KKE as the only party in the EAM.

The government conducted a “white terror” campaign against EAM-KKE supporters during the rest of 1945, which eventually led to the outbreak of the Greek Civil War in March 1946. Former ELAS fighters formed the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), which fought Greek government forces, backed first by Britain and then the United States, until 1949. During the Cold War, the Greek government outlawed the KKE, vilified EAM/ELAS as Communist subversive groups, and accused them of various crimes against their political rivals. After Andreas Papandreou (1919–1996) came to power in 1981, the government recognized EAM as a wartime resistance movement and honored former ELAS fighters with state pensions.

Robert B. Kane

See also: EDES; Greece, Invasion of, 1941; Greek Civil War; Papandreou, George (1888–1968)

Further Reading

Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos. *By Fire and Axe: The Communist Party and the Civil War in Greece, 1944–1949*. New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Brothers, 1978.

Kousoulas, D. George. *Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party*. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Leeper, Reginald. *When Greek Meets Greek*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1950.

EDES

EDES (National Republican Greek League) was the largest of the non-Communist resistance groups during the Axis occupation of Greece during World War II. (Note: The abbreviations are from the Greek words for the noted groups.)

On September 9, 1941, Colonel Napoleon Zervas (1891–1957), a former army officer with centrist political views, established EDES. Politically republican oriented, it strongly disliked the exiled king, George II (1890–1947), and had some vague leftist/socialist tendencies.

On the same day, Komninos Pyromaglou (1890–1980), a friend and assistant of exiled Nikolaos Plastiras (1883–1953), arrived in Greece from Nice to form a republican organization with socialist content. After contacting Zervas, Plastiras took command of EDES and, in October, established a five-member Executive Committee. As the organization grew, EDES contacted British headquarters in Cairo, looking for funds, weapons, and guidance.

EDES was initially limited to Athens but steadily grew with the support of many prominent Venizelist and Republican military figures. EDES contacted EAM and tried to establish some form of cooperation. The negotiations failed over the Communists’ demands to merge EDES with its military force, the Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS), and their distrust of Zervas’s pro-British attitudes.

On July 23, 1942, after intense British pressure and more than a month after the official appearance of ELAS, Zervas and a handful of companions set out for the Valtos Mountains in west central Greece. Epirus remained the primary area of EDES operations to the end of the occupation.

Supported by British parachute drops, EDES quickly gathered some 100 fighters. The first major EDES operation was the destruction of the Gorgopotamos viaduct in central Greece by a joint force of British commandos and EDES and ELAS forces, November 25–26, 1942. Although the operation, one of the greatest sabotage acts in occupied Europe, was successful and greatly boosted the prestige of the nascent Greek resistance, it also caused a significant rift between EDES and ELAS. The British loudly lauded EDES's role in the operation and generally ignored the contribution of the ELAS forces although the ELAS fighters outnumbered the EDES fighters, presaging the future problems between the two resistance groups.

Making relations between the two guerrilla groups worse, the ELAS several times accused EDES and other rival organizations of collaborating with the occupation forces. As a result, ELAS attacked EDES forces, numbering about 10,000 fighters, in October 1943, triggering a civil war. In addition, Stylianos Gonatas, initially an EDES political leader in Athens, supported the collaborationist Security Battalions. In February 1944, the EDES and the 12th German Army, at the height of the fighting between the two resistance groups, declared an armistice to fight the ELAS. On the other hand, EDES accused ELAS for its pro-Soviet views and crimes against non-Communists.

The two groups agreed to a fragile truce in February 1944 with the establishment of a government of national unity under George Papandreou (1919–1996). However, in December, two months after the liberation, ELAS forces in Athens attempted to overthrow the government, and other ELAS units attacked EDES positions in Epirus. During the fighting in Athens, ELAS again accused EDES of collaboration since the

Germans had explicitly exempted EDES from its propaganda attacks. The numerically superior ELAS forces defeated the EDES in Epirus, and EDES's remaining fighters were evacuated to Corfu. After British and government forces defeated the ELAS in Athens in January 1945, EDES forces returned to Epirus, where a portion of them assisted in the expulsion of the Cham Albanians.

Robert B. Kane

See also: EAM/ELAS; Greece, Invasion of, 1941; Greek Civil War; Papandreou, George (1888–1968)

Further Reading

Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos. *By Fire and Axe: The Communist Party and the Civil War in Greece, 1944–1949*. New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Brothers, 1978.

Leeper, Reginald. *When Greek Meets Greek*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1950.

Mazower, Mark. *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–44*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001.

Enver Pasha (1882–1922)

The chief of general staff and the war minister of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, Enver was one of the leading figures of the military wing of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), and after the Sublime Porte raid (1913), he became the leader of the military wing of the CUP. His influence in joining the war alongside the Germans propelled him to become the primary actor in the Ottoman Turkish side in both military and political terms.

Enver was born in Constantinople on November 22, 1882. After graduating from the military high school, the Military Academy, and the General Staff College, he was



During World War I, Enver Pasha's charisma and flamboyant style allowed him to dominate the Ottoman government. Thus he bears great responsibility for the Ottoman Empire's ultimate defeat. (Perry-Castaneda Library)

assigned to Macedonia as a general staff captain (1902). His duties there requiring struggle against the guerrillas influenced him to embrace their tactics and nationalist ideals. The experience he acquired against these guerrilla groups and the fact that he joined the CUP in those years formed the basis for his subsequent military and political career.

In July 1908, while stationed in Macedonia, Enver disobeyed his superiors and took to the mountains with the army units under their command clearly imitating guerrillas that they had fought against. This would prove to be the spark that ended the 33-year-long authoritarian rule of Abdulhamid II

(1842–1918), who was forced to declare the Second Constitution (July 23, 1908). Due to his role in restoring the constitution, Enver was celebrated as the “hero of liberty.” Next year, the so-called March 31 affair ended with the deposition of the sultan.

Enver served as military attaché in Berlin during 1909–1911, which gave him the opportunity to observe the military and social structure of Germany. These observations were influential in cementing his admiration for Germany and his strong conviction for the invincibility of the German ground forces. Enver's fame in the eyes of the public grew even larger thanks to his successes in Tripoli (Libya) against the Italians. He was not able to return to Constantinople during the initial phases of the Balkan War.

The unexpected and humiliating defeats that had been suffered at the hands of Balkan nations turned the politics of the empire upside down. The disillusioned officer members of CUP decided to overthrow the government, which was labeled by many as too lenient, unpatriotic, and conciliatory. A small group of officer conspirators under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Enver launched a raid into the offices of the prime ministry and forced the government to resign.

The loss of Edirne (Adrianople) to Bulgarians with the signing of the peace treaty of London on May 30, 1913, turned out to be a serious blow to the prestige of the new CUP-led regime, which had legitimized its military coup by promising to retain Edirne at all costs. Nevertheless, the regime was saved at the last minute with the initiation of hostilities between Bulgaria and Greece and Serbia on the night of June 29. Young general staff officers immediately demanded action, while the

civilian wing of the CUP and the generals were still indecisive and wavering. Soon the real authors of the coup d'état, hawkish general staff officers led by Enver, forced the timid leaders to act. Amidst the fear of a new war, advancing Ottoman units occupied Edirne without a fight on July 21.

In 1914, as the new generalissimo of the empire by combining the offices of war ministry and the general staff under his authority, Enver initiated a large-scale reorganization of the Ottoman military, including the forced retirement of the old officers and the promotion of young officers in their place. These young officers would form the backbone of the military leadership during World War I and the Turkish National War for Liberation. Enver's belief in the supremacy of German military thought and his conviction for the eventual German victory were so strong that he left the command of the Ottoman army to the German General Staff during World War I. It was his idea to create a new front in the East against Russia, which would expand the scope of the war theater so that it would be easier for the Germans to achieve victory on the Western Front. The Germans naturally welcomed this idea. In December 1914, he personally took command of the Ottoman forces in a large-scale attack against the Russians in Eastern Anatolia, although he did not have any conventional combat experience. The operation ended terribly when thousands of Turkish troops died in freezing weather; nevertheless, this failure greatly boosted the German General Staff's trust of Enver.

The CUP leadership, including Enver, went into exile in order to escape from possible prosecution after the disastrous end of World War I. He first went to Berlin, then moved to Moscow, where he sought support for the Turkish resistance in Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal's (Atatürk; 1881–1938)

success as the leader of the nationalist movement in Anatolia meant that conditions were not suitable for Enver's return. He later traveled to Central Asia and tried to organize resistance against the Russians among the Turkic peoples. Motivated by radical Turkish nationalism, he tried to repeat his success in Macedonia and Tripoli. He was killed in action against the Russians near Belcivan, in modern Tajikistan, on August 4, 1922.

Ahmet Özcan

See also: Adrianople, Siege of, 1912–1913; Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars; Young Turks

Further Reading

Haley, Charles D. "The Desperate Ottoman: Enver Paşa and the German Empire." *Middle Eastern Studies* 30, no. 1 (January 1994): 1–51; 30, no. 2 (April 1994): 224–51.

Turfan, Naim. *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2000.

Yamauchi, Masayuki. *The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia (1919–1922)*. Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1991.

Epirus

Epirus is a region of the western Balkan Peninsula lying between the Pindus Mountains and the Ionian Sea. In the past, it enjoyed periods of independence under Hellenistic and Byzantine rulers. In modern times, it has had a complicated existence in contention between Albania and Greece.

In later Ottoman times, the area corresponded to the vilayet of Yanya (Ioannina, Janina). During the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, Epirus became the object of a major

Greek offensive. The Greek Army of Epirus invaded the area on October 18, 1912. The Greeks conducted siege operations around the city of Janina. Much of the resistance came from local Albanians, who sought inclusion in the new Albanian state. Janina fell to the Greeks on 6 March 6, 1913. The Treaty of London of May 30, 1913, and the subsequent Treaty of Bucharest of August 1913 assigned most of Epirus, including Janina, to Greece. Austro-Hungarian and Italian insistence on the establishment of a viable Albania, however, ensured that the northern area of Epirus went to Albania. The Greeks maintained a strong interest in the region. On March 2, 1914, Epirote Greeks, with the collusion of elements in Athens, proclaimed the Autonomous Republic of Northern Epirus. The Greek government was reluctant to sustain this regime, and it formally withdrew its forces in June. Nevertheless, Greek irregulars continued to maintain a presence in the region. The weak government in Tirana was unable to enforce its authority there.

After the outbreak of World War I, the Albanian state collapsed. Greek forces returned to the region in October 1914. Northern Epirus was recognized as an integral part of Greece. In November 1916, French troops moving west from Salonika entered Korçë and recognized an “autonomous province,” or based upon the city. They soon withdrew this recognition. In 1917, Italian forces pushed most of the Greeks out of the region. After the end of the war, Epirus again became an area of contention between Greece and the Italian-supported Albanian state at the Paris Peace Conference. On July 20, 1919, Italy and Greece concluded the so-called Tittoni-Venizalos agreement, by which Greece

recognized the Italian protectorate over Albania. In return, the Italians accepted Greek control of northern Epirus. The agreement lapsed because of Greece’s involvement in Asia Minor. Greece’s defeat there caused it to accept the loss of Northern Epirus for the time being.

Benito Mussolini’s (1883–1945) attack on Greece in October 1940 revived the question of Epirus. Greek forces not only repelled the Italian incursion but advanced into Albania to occupy Northern Epirus. They remained there until the German invasion of Greece in April 1941. Epirus then came under Italian rule until Italy’s surrender in September 1943. Then the Germans took over control of the region. After World War II, much of Epirus became a battleground of the Greek Civil War from 1945 to 1949. The border between Albania and Greece remained closed during most of the Cold War, while a formal state of war existed between the two countries. Only in 1987 did the state of war end. At the same time the Greeks abandoned claims to Northern Epirus.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Greece in the Balkan Wars; Greece in World War I; Greek Civil War; Italy in the Balkans during World War I; Janina, Siege of, 1912–1913

Further Reading

Petsalis-Diomidis, N. *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference 1919*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1978.

Stickney, Edith Pierpont. *Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in European International Affairs, 1912–1923*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1926.

Vickers, Miranda. *The Albanians: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1995.

F

Ferdinand I, Czar of Bulgaria (1861–1948)

Ferdinand I of Bulgaria was a Bulgarian prince and later czar. Born on February 26, 1861, in Vienna, Ferdinand was the fifth and youngest son of Prince Augustus of Saxe-Coburg (1818–1881) and Gotha and Princess Clementine d'Orléans (1817–1907), the daughter of Louis Philippe, the deposed king of the French. Ferdinand promoted himself to inherit the Bulgarian throne when it became empty after the Russian-supported overthrow of Prince Alexander Battenberg (1857–1893) in 1886, and to general surprise, he received the offer of the throne. Thereafter, Ferdinand maintained a deep personal suspicion of Russia.

As prince of Bulgaria, Ferdinand pursued a foreign policy that sought to use the Great Power rivalries to Bulgaria's advantage. He obtained a rapprochement with Russia in 1895. In 1908, he conspired to proclaim full independence from the Ottoman Empire for Bulgaria in conjunction with Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, he assumed the title of czar. During the First Balkan War of 1912–1913, Bulgaria initially achieved significant victories. Ferdinand, who always had theatrical tendencies, dreamt of an imperial entry into Constantinople. In the Second Balkan War, however, Bulgaria suffered catastrophic defeats that shook Ferdinand's control.

When World War I began, Ferdinand and his prime minister, Vasil Radoslavov

(1854–1929), wavered between the Entente and the Central Powers, seeking to regain the territorial losses of the Balkan Wars. The Central Powers appeared to be in the better position to help Bulgaria realize this goal, so in the autumn of 1915, Ferdinand followed his personal predilections and led Bulgaria into an alliance with them and an attack on Serbia. The Bulgarian collapse in September 1918 led to popular unrest, culminating in the Radomir Rebellion that forced Ferdinand from the throne. On October 4, 1918, he abdicated in favor of his son Boris of Tŭrnovo and fled to Germany. Ferdinand died in Coburg on September 10, 1948, having outlived both his son Czar Boris (b. 1894), who died in 1943, and Prince Kyril (b. 1895), who was executed by Bulgarian Communists in 1946.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Boris III, Czar of Bulgaria (1894–1943); Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Bulgaria in World War I

Further Reading

Constant, Stephen. *Foxy Ferdinand, Tsar of Bulgaria*. New York: Watts, 1980.

Iovkov, Ivan. *Koburgŭt*. Sofia: Partizdat, 1980.

Madol, Hans Roger. *Ferdinand von Bulgarien, der Traum von Byzanz*. Berlin: Universitas, 1931.

Fiume/Rijeka, 1919–1924

This small independent state, consisting of the city of Fiume and rural areas to its north, existed between 1920 and 1924.

Known as Rijeka since 1945, it is a part of present-day Croatia.

Between 1719 and November 1918, Fiume existed as an essentially autonomous entity with the Holy Roman Empire (Austria-Hungary after 1867). After World War I ended, both the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia) and Italy claimed the city, but the Great Powers favored the establishment of an independent buffer state. A South-Slav National Committee and an Italian National Council contended for control of the city, leading to its occupation by British and French troops. The Italian poet Gabriele D'Annunzio (1863–1938) and his followers occupied the city from September 12, 1919, until late December 1920, and, a year later, proclaimed the Italian Regency of Carnaro.

On November 12, 1920, Italy and Yugoslavia signed the Treaty of Rapallo, which affirmed the independence of Fiume. D'Annunzio refused to acknowledge the agreement, and Italian troops expelled him from the city after fighting from December 24 to December 30, 1920. In April 1921, the voters approved the plan for a Free State. In the first parliamentary elections, voters gave the Autonomist Party 6,558 votes while the National Bloc, composed of Fascist, Liberal, and Democratic Parties, received 3,443 votes. The leader of the Autonomist Party, Riccardo Zanella (1875–1959), became the president.

From April to October 1921, political control of Fiume was in a constant state of flux with the Italian National Council of Fiume, the Italian military, a nationalist

extraordinary government, an Italian royal commissioner, and a group of D'Annunzio loyalists in control for successive short terms. In October, the autonomist Zanella became provisional president until March 3, 1922, when Italian Fascists took control. In early March 1922, Italian troops returned control to the constituent assembly, still loyal to the Italian annexationists.

On January 27, 1924, Italy and Yugoslavia signed the Treaty of Rome, which allowed Italy to annex Fiume and Yugoslavia to annex Sušak. The government-in-exile of the Free State considered these annexations invalid and continued to act as Fiume's legal government. After Italy surrendered in September 1943, the issue of Fiume resurfaced. In 1944, a group of citizens supported the formation of a confederacy of Fiume, surrounding cantons, and nearby islands. President Zanella of the government-in-exile still sought the reestablishment of the Free State. However, Yugoslavian authorities occupied the city, now called Rijeka, on May 3, 1945 and successfully obtained the city in the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.

Robert B. Kane

Further Reading

- Macartney, Maxwell H. H., and Paul Cremona. *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy, 1914–1937*. London: Oxford University Press, 1938.
- Nicolson, Harold. *Peacemaking, 1919*. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1965.
- Woodhouse, John. *Gabriele D'Annunzio: Defiant Archangel*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

G

Gallipoli, 1915

The largest amphibious landing in history until World War II, the Gallipoli campaign was an Allied operation in 1915 on the Gallipoli Peninsula of European Turkey in the battle between the Allies and Turkish forces for control of the Dardanelles Straits. Turkey had entered the war on the side of Germany and the Central Powers. This created serious supply problems for Russia, as it cut off easy access to its allies from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. British leaders, seeking a way to expedite the war that had bogged down in the stalemate of trench warfare on the Western Front, saw a campaign against Turkey as offering several advantages. A successful attack against the Dardanelles might drive Turkey from the war and open a supply lane to Russia. In addition, an Allied victory might draw German troops to the East. French leaders, who wanted the major effort on the Western Front, nonetheless went along.


The initial plan was to force the straits with a naval operation alone. Once the fleet had overcome the Turkish shore batteries and entered the Sea of Marmara, it was hoped that Greece, and perhaps Romania and Italy, would abandon their neutrality and join a Balkan coalition against Turkey. Additionally, the planners believed that the appearance of a British fleet off Constantinople might bring the downfall of the Turkish government and cause that country to switch sides. The prime mover behind the plan was First Lord of the Admiralty

Winston Churchill (1874–1965), but War Minister Field Marshal Horatio Kitchener (1850–1916) joined Churchill in supporting the expedition. He saw the operation as a repayment to Russia for having eased pressure in the East in 1914, even though Russia was not then fully mobilized.

In January 1915, a huge fleet of French and British ships, including 18 battleships under Admiral Sackville Carden (1857–1930), gathered at Lemnos Island 60 miles from the entrance to the Dardanelles, which were mined and guarded by Turkish forts on both sides. The first attack was launched on February 19 against the forts at the entrance of the straits, but the attack was called off due to weather. The second attack was made on February 25. The defensive positions were overpowered by the naval bombardment, and the Turkish and German defenders withdrew.

When Carden tried to continue the attack through the straits on March 13, however, the defenders shelled the Allied minesweepers with mobile howitzer batteries. The Allied attack was repulsed. Under great pressure from London to continue the attack, Carden resigned and was replaced by Rear Admiral Sir John de Robeck (1862–1928). On March 18, Robeck's forces tried once again to force the straits. Attacking in three waves, the Allied fleet was almost successful. However, when three Allied capital ships were sunk by mines and two others were put out of action, Robeck abandoned the attack.

With the failure to force the straits from the sea, efforts shifted to an amphibious



landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Sir Ian Hamilton (1853–1947), commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Forces, was charged with that mission. The southern end of the peninsula was chosen as the point of attack. There were very few efforts

to prepare the Allied troops, most of whom had little or no combat experience. There was little concern on the part of the Allied leadership. The Turkish army was held in such contempt that no serious efforts were made to study its methods, command

structure, strength, or dispositions, despite the fact that the Allies were about to undertake a potentially difficult and demanding amphibious landing. To make matters worse, maps of the peninsula, some taken from tourist guide books, were out of date and often inaccurate, and no detailed reconnaissance of the landing areas had been undertaken.

Meanwhile, 84,000 Turkish and German defenders under the command of German general Otto Liman von Sanders (1855–1929), ably assisted by Turkish colonel Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938), had not been idle. Well alerted to the probability of an Allied invasion, von Sanders organized six divisions of the Turkish army in defensive positions. The peninsula was hilly and rocky, and he made excellent use of the terrain, fortifying the hills just beyond the likely Allied invasion beaches and placing the bulk of his troops in locations where they could be rushed to any eventual Allied landing site.

On April 25, 1915, some 75,000 troops went ashore, including 30,000 from Australia and New Zealand and some 17,000 from France. The French troops went ashore on the Asiatic side of the straits at Kum Kale, where they encountered a large Turkish force. Advance there proving impossible, on the 27th, the French were extracted and transferred to Cape Helles.

On the European side of the Dardanelles, the Allies selected five landing points from which British forces under Lieutenant General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston (1864–1940) would attack the heights in the peninsula's center at Cape Helles, where the shoreline was rent by ravines and gullies, presenting only a few small strips of beach backed by cliffs. The Turks were well entrenched on the high ground, and the difficult terrain, unmapped and unknown to the

Allies, concealed enemy machine-gun nests and snipers. The Allied landings spearheaded by the 29th Division were well planned and executed fairly efficiently because, by luck, they occurred in weakly held areas. Once ashore, however, the troops were beset by confusion and irresolute leadership that typified the entire campaign, and they failed to press their advantage by a rapid advance inland. The advantage went to the defenders, who rushed forces to counter the landings, and the Allies soon found themselves pinned down on the beaches.

The Anzac Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood (1865–1951), made a separate landing north of the promontory of Gaba Tebe (later called Anzac Cove). The Australian and New Zealand troops made it to the landing beaches in good order, but before they could move inland, Turkish troops from the 19th Division under Kemal's forceful leadership occupied the Sari Bahr Ridge that dominated the landing sites. The Anzacs gained little ground against the defenders. For the next three months, they held this land at terrific cost, while British howitzers and naval guns had little effect against the Turkish positions on the heights. Allied troops who were dug in near the coast endured months of inconclusive but costly engagements. Reinforcements were sent to both sides, and the sweltering summer brought high Allied casualties from both the fighting and disease. What had been envisaged as a swift, decisive action to secure the peninsula degenerated into the horrifying conditions of trench warfare, not unlike those that prevailed on the Western Front.

In London, Kitchener, Churchill, and the British cabinet clung tenaciously to the hope of a strategic victory in the East

through the first great amphibious operation of modern times. Increasing numbers of troops were deployed, and some gains were made in the southern peninsula during June. On August 6–10, a new effort was made to carry the heights at Sari Bahr. Fresh troops were landed at Suvla Bay, north of Anzac Cove, with orders to advance inland against the high ground, but poor leadership resulted in another failure. While Allied officers and men milled around near the landing point, the Turks had time to prepare for the coming attack, which they easily repulsed. By September, it was clear that the Gallipoli campaign was a disaster, but it was not until year's end that British authorities could accept the fact and order a withdrawal.

In October, General Sir Charles Monro (1851–1933) replaced Hamilton. He concluded that the Allied situation ashore was unsatisfactory and that without major reinforcement, the army ashore would be at serious risk over the winter. Kitchener arrived on an inspection trip and recommended evacuation. On December 7, the cabinet concurred. Monro predicted up to 40 percent losses in an evacuation, but the withdrawal was completed by January 9, 1918, without loss of life. It was the largest such operation of its kind in history until the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkerque (Dunkirk) during World War II.

The Gallipoli campaign proved an expensive enterprise. A half million men had deployed to the Dardanelles, of whom about 252,000 became casualties. Turkish records are incomplete, but their official casualty record of 151,309 is undoubtedly far too low. Regardless, the way to Constantinople was still blocked and would remain so for the rest of the war. Russia was cut off from easy access to its Allies, and the

ensuing economic chaos helped bring on the Russian Revolution of 1917. Instead of a morale-building victory, the Gallipoli campaign had brought the British and French a costly failure.

James H. Willbanks

See also: Kemal, Mustafa (1881–1938); Ottoman Empire in World War I

Further Reading

Fewster, Kevin, Hatice Basarin, and Vesihi Basarin. *Gallipoli: The Turkish Story*. London: Allen and Unwin, 2004.

James, Robert Rhodes. *Gallipoli: The History of a Noble Blunder*. New York: Macmillan, 1965.

Laffin, John. *Damn the Dardanelles! The Agony of Gallipoli*. London: Osprey, 1980.

Moorehead, Alan. *Gallipoli*. New York: Harper, 1956.

Pugsley, Christopher. *The ANZACs at Gallipoli*. Melbourne, Australia: Lothian, 2000.

Travers, Tim. *Gallipoli 1915*. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2002.

Germany in the Balkans during World War I

Germany's strategy and aims in the Balkans from 1914 to 1918 were driven by the need to support its allies—Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey—and to defeat attempts by Russia, Britain, and France to dominate the area. German leaders viewed military success in the Balkans as vital to keeping their allies in the war and ensuring continued access to the Balkans' strategic resources. In the end, however, German successes in southeastern Europe did little to influence the war's outcome.

Prewar German military and political aims in the Balkans were governed by

alliance politics. German support of Austria-Hungary's goals in the Balkans in the years leading up to the war was central to the conflict's outbreak and spread in 1914. Yet this almost unconditional encouragement of the Dual Monarchy was a comparatively recent development. Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), who unified Germany in 1870 and forged alliances with Austria and Russia after the Balkan crisis of 1877–1878, avoided such a commitment. Germany's 1879 alliances were defensive. Bismarck was content to leave the Habsburg monarchy to its own devices in the Balkans, saying famously that the region was “not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.”

After 1890, however, Bismarck's successors, led by the new kaiser, Wilhelm II (1859–1941), nursed greater ambitions in southeastern Europe. Fears of encirclement by Russia and France, along with the drive for economic dominance in the Balkans and the desire to bolster ties with the Ottoman Empire and gain entry into the Middle East, led a succession of German officials to pursue a more forward policy, including encouraging Austria-Hungary to take a more aggressive stance toward Serbia and the other small states in the region.

At the same time, German and Austro-Hungarian military planners began coordinating plans for war with Russia and Serbia, assuming that such a conflict would escalate into a general two-front European war. The German General Staff's approval of the Schleiffen Plan in 1905 reflected a growing assumption by the German military that an Austro-German confrontation with Russia anywhere in eastern Europe would escalate into a two-front war that Germany and the Dual Monarchy could win only if Germany could defeat France with a lightning attack in the west before Russia could fully mobilize. This questionable assumption of war

was strengthened by Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and its humiliating diplomatic reversal in the crisis surrounding the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1909. The Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 further destabilized the region, leaving Turkey weaker and Germany and Austria-Hungary more concerned about Serbian and Russian ambitions. For Germany and Austria, the rising military strength of both Serbia and Russia made action imperative before the military balance shifted against them.

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914 and the ensuing crisis provided the flashpoint for the outbreak and spread of war. Russian mobilization to counter Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia triggered the opening German attack on France and Belgium—an action that not only precipitated war with France and Belgium, but also brought Britain into the conflict.

The subsequent course of the war dictated German actions in the Balkans. Germany's central strategic priority was to secure her southeastern flank and isolate Russia. The failure of Austria's initial offensive against Serbia and the deterioration of her strategic position in Galicia, along with the stalemate in the west and Turkey's and Bulgaria's entries into the war on the side of the Central Powers, forced the German high command to divert military and economic resources to southeastern Europe to bolster their allies. The German Eleventh Army, under the command of General August von Mackensen (1849–1945), led the Austro-Hungarian–Bulgarian–German attack on Serbia in October 1915. The Eleventh Army remained along the Macedonian Front for the remainder of the war.

The June 1916 Russian offensive, launched under the command of General A. A.

Brusilov (1853–1926), against the Dual Monarchy scored spectacular initial successes and brought the Austrians to the brink of collapse. The “Brusilov Offensive” brought Romania into the war on the side of the Allies. The German high command was obliged to send massive reinforcements to halt the Russian attacks and deal with the new threat from Romania. Fortunately for the Germans and their allies, they quickly halted the Russians and turned to deal with the Romanians, who proved ineffective. Entente forces on the Macedonian Front attempted to support the Romanians with offensives in the Lake Doiran and Struma River areas to tie down Bulgarian forces and prevent a Bulgarian move against southern Romania, but these attacks proved insufficient. Caught in a pincer between German and Austrian forces advancing from the north and a mixed force of German, Bulgarian, and Turkish troops advancing from the south, the Romanian army and government abandoned Bucharest on December 7, 1916, and withdrew to Moldavia on the Russo-Romanian border. The Romanian threat to the Central Powers in the Balkans was over.

There was little further military activity in the Balkans until summer 1918. By this time, most German units and movable equipment had left the Balkans in order to participate in the great Western Front offensives in spring 1918. Only a command and staff shell remained as Army Group Scholtz. This combined the German Eleventh Army, which by then contained many Bulgarian units, with the Bulgarian First Army. Although eliminating Romania ended the immediate crisis for Germany and her allies, the victory did little to improve their overall strategic position. The Russian Revolution and Russia’s subsequent withdrawal from the war only inflamed home front discontent among the Central Powers. Meanwhile, the

Allies continued to strength their base at Salonika. By the time the Allies launched an offensive in Macedonia on September 14 against the Bulgarians at Dobro Pole, German forces in France were retreating, Germany was facing defeat and the Habsburg and Ottoman monarchies were facing collapse. Two German divisions that were rushed to Bulgaria arrived too late to help against the Entente offensive. After Bulgaria left the war on September 29, the remnants of the German Eleventh Army slowly retreated north into Austro-Hungarian territory.

In the end, the Balkans had proved more of a liability than an asset to the Germans—their military successes in the region notwithstanding. The drain on Germany’s resources growing out of the need to constantly prop up their allies ultimately contributed to Germany’s defeat.

Walter F. Bell

See also: Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I; Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918; Bulgaria in World War I; Macedonian Front, 1916–1918; Romania in World War I; Serbia in World War I

Further Reading

Hall, Richard C. *Balkan Breakthrough: The Battle of Dobro Pole, 1918*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

Herwig, Holger. *The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918*. London: Arnold, 1997.

Strachan, Hew. *The First World War, Volume I: To Arms*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Germany in the Balkans during World War II

The Balkan Peninsula is bounded by the Black Sea to the east, the Aegean and the Mediterranean to the southeast, and the

Adriatic Sea to the west. At the time of World War II, six states occupied the Balkans—Romania, Bulgaria, parts of Hungary, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania. The Balkans' northern boundary is considered to be the Danube and Sava Rivers. During World War II, the Balkans played a central role in the strategy of Nazi Germany and impacted the German war effort in ways unforeseen by Adolf Hitler and the German High Command at the war's onset.

Throughout World War II, Germany had three objectives in the Balkans: to ensure access to the region's resources, particularly Romanian oil fields; to consolidate its southern flank as a base for the war against the Soviet Union; and to prevent the western allies from gaining bases from which they could bomb targets in Germany and eastern Europe.

Between September 1939 and June 1941, Hitler's approach to the Balkan states evolved depending on the overall military situation and Germany's relations with Italy and the Soviet Union. Mussolini's Italy, which had occupied Albania in 1939, nursed ambitions vis-à-vis Yugoslavia and Greece. The Soviet Union, with whom Germany had signed a nonaggression pact in August 1939, also had territorial designs on its borders with Rumania as well as the traditional Russian dream of controlling the Turkish Straits.

Germany's swift victories in Poland in September 1939 and France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940 transformed Germany's position in the Balkans. Hitler could now assert German dominance over the small states of the region. The need to force Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia to allow a German military presence and to make them German satellites gained urgency with Hitler's decision to launch Operation Barbarossa against the

Soviet Union scheduled to begin in mid-1941. In addition, Mussolini, without consulting the Germans, had invaded Greece from Albania in October 1940. The Greeks actually drove the invaders back into Albania. Mussolini's actions further created an opening for Britain to come to Greece's aid and create a front in southeastern Europe. Germany would have to mount a military operation against Greece (Operation Marita) both to rescue its Italian ally and consolidate its southern flank before invading the Soviet Union.

The major problem in invading Greece was to get German troops to the Greek frontier. Germany would need the cooperation of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Opening a diplomatic offensive in November 1940, Hitler used a combination of strong-arm tactics and promises of economic and territorial rewards to bring Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria into line. Yugoslavia, however, proved more difficult. Although Hitler induced the government of the regent Prince Paul to join the Axis, a coup by the Yugoslav military on March 27, 1941, overthrew Prince Paul's (1893–1976) government, thus jeopardizing the entire German position. Even though the new government offered to sign a nonaggression treaty with Germany and allow German troops to pass through southeastern Yugoslavia and cross into Greece, Hitler, incensed by anti-German demonstrations in Belgrade, ordered an attack on Yugoslavia.

The German conquest of the Balkans took only three weeks. On April 6, the Luftwaffe undertook a heavy bombing raid against Belgrade. Two days later, the German Twelfth Army crossed the Yugoslav frontier from its assembly areas in western Bulgaria. On April 10, the XLIV Panzer Corps invaded Yugoslavia from its position in Romania. At the same time the German

Second Army entered Yugoslavia from the north. Hungarian and Italian units accompanied their German allies. Yugoslav resistance quickly collapsed. Young King Peter (1923–1970) fled the country, and the Yugoslavs surrendered on April 18, 1941.

Meanwhile, the German Twelfth Army continued on into Greece. It entered Thessalonika on April 9. The Germans brushed aside a British force of two divisions and one armored brigade on the Bulgarian frontier and quickly occupied the entire country. By April 30, the British withdrew precipitously by sea, leaving Greece to deal with the Germans alone. The Germans continued their move south with the conquest of the island of Crete by means of the first-ever airborne invasion, launched on May 20. The British and New Zealand forces were once again forced to evacuate the island. By June 1, the Germans were in control of Crete. Through his aggressive political and military moves, Hitler had blocked Soviet influence in southeastern Europe, secured his southern flank for the invasion of the USSR, and eliminated any chance for Britain to create a base in Greece from which they could threaten Germany from the south.

Axis conquest of the Balkans, however, created a new set of problems for the Germans and Italians. From the start until the Germans' withdrawal from the Balkans in late 1944, the occupiers found themselves embroiled in savage guerilla wars in both Greece and Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia in particular, an uprising of Communist partisans, led by Marshall Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980), grew into a major insurgency that eventually tied down 15 German divisions. In addition, the Germans had to deal with ethnic and sectarian clashes among Yugoslavia's Serb, Croat, Albanian, and Muslim elements. Civil war raged between Tito's Communists on one side and the

Serbian-based Četniks and predominately Croat and pro-Fascist Ustaša on the other. German regular army and SS units committed massive atrocities in reprisal for guerilla attacks as well as against suspected partisans and Jews, the Četniks, and Ustaša militias carried out genocidal massacres against Jews, and Serbo-Croats viewed as hostile to their own goals. Italy's surrender to the Allies in September 1943 placed a further strain on German military resources when the latter had to disarm their former allies and take over their areas of occupation.

Hitler's difficulties in southeastern Europe intensified in mid-1944 as the Soviet advance into Romania and Bulgaria threatened to cut off German forces in the Balkans. In October, the Germans withdrew their troops from Greece, Albania, and southern Yugoslavia. They conducted a skillful retreat from the western Balkans for the remainder of the war. After the Red Army and Tito's partisans took Belgrade on October 20, 1944, the Germans retreated to Croatia and Slovenia, where they and allied Croatian and Slovenian forces held out until the end of the war in May 1945.

The German occupation of the Balkans proved costly in terms of human casualties, both civilian and military, growing from guerilla war and genocide. Military and civilian deaths totaled nearly 2 million. It set the stage for a Communist takeover in Yugoslavia and a prolonged civil war in Greece. There were echoes of World War II in the Balkans 40 years later in the wars surrounding the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Walter F. Bell

See also: Albania in World War II; Bulgaria in World War II; Četniks; Crete, Battle of, 1941; Greece in World War II; Hungary in World War II; Italy in the Balkans during World

War II; Romania in World War II; Tito, Josif Broz (1892–1980); Ustaša; Yugoslavia in World War II

Further Reading

Blau, George E. *Invasion Balkans! The German Campaign in the Balkans, Spring 1941*. Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press, 1997.

Hoare, Marko. *Genocide and Resistance in Hitler's Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks, 1941–1943*. London: Oxford University Press (for the British Academy), 2006.

Pavolowitch, Steven K. *Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

Shephard, Ben. *Terror in the Balkans: German Armies and Partisan Warfare*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.

Greco-Italian War, 1940–1941

The Greco-Italian War of 1940–1941 originated in the grandiose dreams of the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) to recreate the Mediterranean realm of the ancient Roman Empire. He adopted a hostile policy toward his eastern neighbors Greece and Yugoslavia. The Greeks sought protection from Mussolini's expansionist policies in an arrangement with the other Balkan states, the Balkan Entente, in 1934. Later, the Greek dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas (1871–1941) attempted to thwart the Italians by establishing close relations with Nazi Germany, especially in the economic realm. This was to no avail.

Mussolini indicated his hostile intentions towards Greece after April 7, 1939, when Italian forces occupied neighboring Albania and supported Albanian claims on northwestern Greece (Epirus). Mussolini was eager to replicate the German successes

of the spring and summer of 1940. Italian intentions became clearer on August 15, 1940, when the Italian submarine *Delfino* torpedoed and sunk the Greek light cruiser *Ellis* in the harbor of the Greek Aegean island Tenos. On October 28, 1940, at 0300 hours, the Italian ambassador in Athens delivered an ultimatum demanding that Italian troops occupy strategic points throughout the country. The Italians wanted to annex northwestern Greek territories to Albania and to take over the Ionian Islands and some of the Aegean Islands. They intended to first take Epirus and the Ionian Islands, and afterward drive on Thessaloniki. In spite of strenuous Italian efforts to gain their support, the Bulgarians remained aloof from the operation.

Metaxas immediately rejected the ultimatum. The Italian attack from Albanian territory into northwestern Greece began soon thereafter. Lieutenant General Sebastiano Visconti Prasca (1883–1961) commanded the Italian forces. Under the leadership of General Alexander Papagos (1883–1955), the Greeks responded to the Italian attacks with a spirited resistance. The Greek lack of armor and antitank weapons made little difference. Poor weather and inadequate equipment hampered the Italian advance from the start. They made little progress. In an effort to shake up the Italian command, on November 9, Mussolini replaced General Prasca with General Ubaldo Soddu (1883–1949). Soddu recognized that the offensive against the Greeks had failed. After the partial destruction of the Julia Division, he ordered his troops to go over to the defensive.

The Greeks launched their counteroffensive all along the front on November 14. By this time, the Greeks had concentrated a force in the northwest that outnumbered the invaders. The Greeks succeeded in pushing

the Italians back into Albanian territory. Italian tanks and trucks were not capable of advancing over the miserable mountain roads in the region. The lack of adequate port facilities in Albania also hampered the ability of the Italians to maintain logistical support for their soldiers. During their counteroffensive, Greek troops occupied most of southeastern Albania, including the important cities of Korçë, Pogradec, and Gjirokastër. Poor logistics, poor weather and Italian reinforcements prevented the Greeks from reaching the important port city of Vlorë. By mid-December, both sides had reached a stalemate, with Greek forces occupying almost a quarter of Albanian territory. General Ugo Cavallero (1880–1943) replaced General Soddu in mid-December. By this time British aid had begun to bolster the Greeks. A Royal Air Force (RAF) contingent of antiaircraft guns, bombers, and fighters arrived. The British undertook missions to harass the Italian rear areas in Albania. No British ground forces, however, deployed due to Metaxas's fear of provoking the Germans.

The stalemate continued through most of the winter months of 1941. After Metaxas's death on January 29, 1941, the new Greek government authorized the appearance of British ground forces. Four divisions of British troops began to arrive in March. In mid-March, the Italians attempted an offensive. By that time, German intervention was looming. The Italians wanted to make some gains before the appearance of German forces. They achieved little in the face of determined Greek resistance.

Mussolini's failure in Greece initially gave his German ally Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) little cause for concern. The appearance of the RAF in Greek air fields, however, was an entirely different matter. With Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Soviet Russia, scheduled for the next spring, Hitler

became concerned about the fighting between Greece and Italy. In general, the presence of the RAF in Greece was a threat in being to the southern flank of Operation Barbarossa—specifically, the RAF could bomb the vital Romanian oilfields and production facilities around Ploesști. In December 1940, Hitler decided that he must intervene on the side of the Italians to remove this potential problem. On December 13, 1949, he issued the instructions for Operation Marita, the invasion of Greece through Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

The Germans initially counted on the cooperation of Yugoslavia. A coup on March 26, 1941, ousted the pro-German regime. The invasion of Yugoslavia then became an additional goal of Operation Marita. This operation began on April 6. Within a week, German, Hungarian, and Italian forces had overrun Yugoslavia. Despite British assistance, Greece surrendered on April 20.

During the Greco-Italian War, the Greeks demonstrated a marked ability to conduct both defensive and offensive operations in extremely difficult conditions of terrain and weather. Greek morale generally remained high. In contrast, the Italian equipment proved to be of poor quality and little use. Italian morale remained low throughout the campaign. The Italians sustained 165,000 casualties, including over 40,000 dead and missing. The Greeks lost 13,408 dead and 42,485 wounded in the fighting.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan Entente, 1934; Greece, Invasion of, 1941; Greece in World War II; Italy in the Balkans during World War II; Metaxas, Ioannis (1871–1941)

Further Reading

Burgwyn, H. James. *Mussolini Warlord: Failed Dreams of Empire, 1940–1943*. New York: Enigma Books, 2012.

Cervi, Mario. *The Hollow Legions: Mussolini's Blunder in Greece, 1940–1941*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971.

Mazower, Mark. *Inside Hitler's Greece*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993.

Greco-Ottoman War, 1897

The Ottoman administration tried its best to stay away from war. However the overconfident Greek leadership saw the situation for annexing Crete and even expanding on the mainland further north as ripe for exploitation. A reinforced battalion-sized Greek paramilitary force with some Italian volunteers attacked Ottoman border towers and defeated a border company in Kranya (Krania) on April 9. Even though they were repulsed and retreated back to Greece the next day, the incident forced the administration to declare war on Greece on April 17, 1897.

The Greco-Ottoman War of 1897 was fought in two separate theaters of operations; Alasonya-Thessaly and Yanya (Janina)—Epirus. For the first time, the Ottoman high command put contingency plans into use. The plan was simple: strategic defense by an army corps (two infantry divisions) in the Yanya region, and strategic offensive by a field army (seven infantry divisions and one cavalry division) in the Alasonya region.

The main idea was to force Greeks to overstretch their initial defensive lines, which were very close to the border. The main body of the Ottoman Alasonya Army would try to fall behind the Greeks before they were able to retreat back to the Yenisehir Line. Thousands of reserve soldiers enthusiastically flooded the recruitment centers, and officials encountered difficulties forcing them to send home excess numbers of reserves. Thanks to the availability of good railways, most of the units reached

their destination on time, and 40,000 personnel and 8,000 pack animals were transported in 20 days. The transportation of baggage from the last train station to Alasonya, however, took an inordinate amount of time and effort due to poor road conditions and lack of transportation assets.

The initial stage of the campaign showed all the shortcomings of an inexperienced but excessively enthusiastic army. Officers and soldiers sometimes ran toward the enemy as if in a race without paying attention to combat tactics and techniques, and the first casualty figures of officers jumped to abnormally high levels. Instead of conducting the encirclement maneuver as planned, most units simply tried to push the Greek defenders back by frontal assaults. The second stage proceeded along the same lines as the first. Ottoman units pushed the Greek defenders back without attempting encirclement maneuvers, and the Greeks safely evacuated their defenses retreating to their last defensive line.

Although confidence and firmer control under fire replaced the combat inexperience of the Ottoman rank and file, the first battle of Velestin (Velestino) was a disaster. In this encounter, a forced reconnaissance turned into a futile and bloody assault which proved that the Ottoman officers especially needed more experience. The operations on the Yanya Front did not go smoothly, either. In the meantime, an unexpected Greek assault of April 18 dislocated the Yanya Corps and defeated the Second Division. Even though the Yanya Corps gained confidence and recaptured the lost ground in two weeks, it remained on the defensive afterward. The three pitched battles—Velestin, Çatalca (Farsala), and Dömeke (Domokos)—in front of the last Greek defensive line turned out to be decisive. The Greek defenders were beaten in

detail and lost any chance to safeguard the road to Athens. However, thanks to the limited nature of Ottoman aims and the timely intervention of the Great Powers, Greece was saved from further humiliation.

Mesut Uyar

See also: Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Greece in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Bartlett, Ellis A. *The Battlefields of Thessaly: With Personal Experiences in Turkey and Greece*. London: John Murray, 1897.

Bigham, Clive. *With the Turkish Army in Thessaly*. London: Macmillan and Co., 1897.

von der Goltz, Colmar, *Der Thessalische Krieg und die Türkische Armee*. Berlin: E. S. Mittler und sohn, 1898.

Sun, Selim. *1897 Osmanlı-Yunan Harbi*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1965.

Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922

This war, lasting from May 1919 to October 1922, between Greece and Turkish nationalists occurred as a result of the partition of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and produced continuing animosity between Greeks and Turks. When World War I broke out in 1914, the Ottoman Empire had about 2.5 million Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians in Anatolia. King Constantine of Greece (1868–1923) declared neutrality, but Prime Minister Eleuthérios Venizélos (1864–1936) hoped to obtain Greek-inhabited eastern Thrace, the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, and parts of western Anatolia around Smyrna (Izmir). When he began negotiations with the Allies, the king dismissed him. Venizélos, with the help of the Entente, eventually forced Constantine to abdicate in May 1917. Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire

on July 2, 1917. The Treaty of Sèvres, concluded on August 10, 1920, between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire, among other provisions, allocated these territories to Greece.

Meanwhile, after the Armistice of Moudros, signed in May 1919, 20,000 Greek troops occupied Smyrna. The Greeks of Smyrna greeted the Greek troops as liberators, and the Turkish army put up little opposition to the Greek landings. However, a Turkish nationalist killed the Greek flag-bearer, resulting in shooting that killed between 300 and 400 Turks and 100 Greeks. During the summer of 1920, the Greek army launched several offensives that extended Greek control over much of western Anatolia.

In October 1920, the Greek army renewed its advance into Anatolia to pressure Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938), the leader of the Turkish nationalists, to sign the Treaty of Sèvres. The advancing Greeks could not decisively defeat the Turks, who retreated in an orderly fashion.

In early 1921, the Greek army resumed its advance but met stiff resistance from the entrenched Turks. On January 11, 1921, the Turkish forces halted the Greek advance at the first battle of Inonu and defeated the Greeks at the second battle of Inonu on March 30. These Turkish military successes caused the Allies to meet in London to consider amending the Treaty of Sèvres.

In early July 1921, a reinforced Greek army launched another major offensive against Turkish troops along the Afyonkarahisar-Kutahya-Eskisehir line. The Greeks broke through the Turkish defenses and occupied these strategically important cities but halted for a month. Kemal used this delay to retreat to the east of the Sakarya River and organize defensive lines about 62 miles from Ankara.

In early August 1921, the Greek army advanced on the Turkish defenses. From August 23 to September 13, the fighting saw-sawed across the Turkish defenses. Then, the Greek army tried to capture Haymana, 25 miles south of Ankara, but the Turks held out. Exhausted by the ferocity of the battle, the Greeks decided to withdraw to their lines of June. The Greeks then retreated to Smyrna.

In March 1922, the Allies tried to negotiate a cease-fire between the Greeks and Turks, but Kemal insisted that Greeks withdraw from Anatolia. The Turks then defeated the Greeks at the Battle of Dumlupınar near Afyon on August 30, 1922. On September 9, Turkish troops occupied Smyrna, and the remaining Greek forces evacuated Anatolia. The Turks destroyed the city and killed most of the Greeks left. News of the massacre at Smyrna caused over a million Greeks to leave Anatolia for Greece. In retaliation, Greece forced about 500,000 Turks living in Greece to immigrate to Turkey.

As Kemal's forces advanced toward the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, Italian and French forces abandoned their positions at the straits, leaving the British alone. On October 15, 1922, Britain, France, Italy, Greece, and Kemal signed the Armistice of Mudanya by which the western allies retained control of eastern Thrace and the Bosphorus and the Greeks evacuated these areas. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923, recognized the independence of the Turkish Republic, the end of Greek territorial claims in Anatolia, and Greece's acceptance of its prewar borders.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Kemal, Mustafa (1881–1938); Macedonian Front, 1916–1918; Lausanne, Treaty of, 1923; Sèvres, Treaty of, 1920; Smyrna,

Destruction of, 1922; Venizélos, Eleuthérios (1864–1936)

Further Reading

Clogg, Richard. *A Short History of Modern Greece*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Howard, Douglas A. *The History of Turkey*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001.

Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezul Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 2, *Reform, Reaction and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Greece, Invasion of, 1941

On April 6, 1941, German forces undertook a massive invasion of Greece. The Italians had previously invaded Greece on October 28, 1940. Within weeks of the unprovoked Italian aggression, the Greeks not only repelled the Italians, but advanced into Italian-held Albania. Difficult weather and topography imposed a stalemate during the winter of 1940–1941. Soon after the Italian attack, Britain offered aid to the Greeks. At first, Greek dictator Ioannis Metaxas (1871–1941) agreed only to British air and material support in order not to antagonize the Germans. After his death on January 29, 1941, the new Greek government accepted a British offer of ground troops.

The appearance of British forces in Greece alarmed Adolf Hitler (1889–1945), because he perceived them as a threat to the southern flank of the upcoming invasion of Soviet Russia, Operation Barbarossa. Also the Royal Air Force (RAF) bases in Greece were proximate to the vital

Romanian oil fields at Ploes̃i. Consequently, Hitler decided that the British must be eliminated from Greece before the Germans embarked upon Operation Barbarossa.

The German staff prepared Operation Marita for the invasion of Greece. Vital for effort was Bulgaria's joining the Tripartite Pact on March 1, 1941. This gave the Germans Bulgarian bases and a long frontier across which to invade Greece. An attempt by the Germans to enlist Yugoslav help failed when Serbian officers overthrew the compliant Yugoslav government on March 26, 1941. An enraged Hitler then included the invasion of Yugoslavia within the scope of Operation Marita.

The German invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia began on April 6, 1941. The German Twelfth Army under the command of General Wilhelm List (1880–1971) came up against the Greek fortifications called the Metaxas Line, which stretched from the Aegean Sea, along the Struma River and curved to the west along the Bulgarian frontier. The Greek Second Army (Western Macedonia) was arrayed all along the Metaxas Line. The Greek First Army (Epirus) was committed to the Albanian Front. The Greeks did not intend to defend western Thrace beyond the Struma River. General Alexander Papagos (1883–1955) commanded the Greeks. Assisting the Greeks was a British expeditionary force of around 50,000 men led by General Henry Maitland “Jumbo” Wilson (1881–1964), which also included Australian and New Zealand troops. These troops arrived from Egypt at the end of March, and deployed with the Greek Second Army.

Within three days of the invasion, German forces broke through the Metaxas Line at a point considered inaccessible by the Greeks. It immediately headed for Thessaloniki, which it entered on April 9. This compelled

the British and Greek defenders to abandon the Metaxas Line and to withdraw south from Macedonia and Albania. They attempted to establish defensive positions first at the Aliakmon River, then later at Thermopylae, near the site of the ancient battle between the Persians and the Spartans in 480 BC. But the Germans breached the Aliakmon River defense on April 15 and reached Thermopylae on April 22. By this point the British force had already decided to evacuate Greece.

On April 23, some members of the Greek high command, with its units in Epirus isolated from the rest of its forces, decided to surrender. Despite opposition from some Greek generals, and without the approval of the Greek government, Greek First Army commander General Georgios Tsolakoglou (1886–1948), surrendered the entire Greek army to the German invaders at Larissa on April 21, 1941. Tsolakoglou surrendered to the Italians on April 23, at the insistence of the Germans. Meanwhile, continuing their fighting retreat, the British evacuated most of their troops from Piraeus and Volos in an operation reminiscent of Dunkirk the previous year. The RAF contingent flew to Crete and to Egypt, while other forces escaped to Crete. By late April, most of the British force had successfully evacuated, despite a successful German attack on the Isthmus of Corinth on April 25 in an effort to block the British withdrawal.

The Germans entered Athens on April 27. By April 30, all the British were captured or gone and the campaign was over. The Germans established a collaborationist regime under General Tsolakoglou. Greece was parceled out among the Bulgarians, Italians, and Germans. Having swiftly overrun Greece with relatively few casualties, the Germans prepared to invade Crete.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Crete, Battle of, 1941; Greco-Italian War, 1941; Greece in World War II; Salonika; Tsolakoglou, Georgios (1886–1948)

Further Reading

Blau, George E. *Invasion Balkans! The German Campaign in the Balkans, Spring 1941*. Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press, 1997.

Mazower, Mark. *Inside Hitler's Greece*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993.

Tarnstrom, Ronald. *Balkan Battles*. Lindsbrog, KS: Trogen, 1998.

Greece in the Balkan Wars

Greece's defeat in the short 1897 war against the Ottoman Empire increased its determination to secure territory in Epirus, Macedonia, and Thessaly as well as Crete and the Aegean Islands. This defeat also convinced Greek military and political leaders that some kind of alliance with the other Balkan states would be necessary to accomplish their nationalist goals. The Young Turk seizure of power in Constantinople in 1908 and the possibility of revived Ottoman power increased the urgency of realizing these goals.

In 1909, the Athens government began a series of overtures to Sofia for a formal alliance. After the Bulgarians signed a treaty with Serbia on March 13, 1912, they began negotiations with the Greeks. The Greek navy, which had among its ships eight destroyers and the large armored cruiser *Georgios Averof*, was an important asset to a Balkan alliance, because it could check the resupply of European forces and the transfer by sea of Ottoman reinforcements from Anatolia to Europe. The Greeks had a small peacetime army that upon mobilization would grow to 110,000 men. National Guard, Cretan volunteers, and an Italian

legion increased the numbers by another 70,000. On May 29, 1912, the Bulgarians and Greeks signed an alliance agreement. A significant flaw in this arrangement was the lack of a clear division of Ottoman territories between Bulgaria and Greece. This was mainly because the Bulgarians were confident that their armies could gain the greater portion of Ottoman territories.

Fighting in the First Balkan War began on October 18, 1912. The Greek army advanced in two directions. The Army of Thessaly moved north toward Thessalonica (Salonika). After a sharp fight at Giannitsa on November 1, the Army of Thessaly occupied much of southern Macedonia and entered Thessalonica on November 8, one day ahead of a Bulgarian detachment coming from the north. The Army of Epirus advanced to the northwest. By early December, it had attacked the important town of Ionnina (Janina), but it lacked the forces to fully implement a full siege. Meanwhile, the Greek fleet took control of the Aegean Sea. It blocked the Ottoman navy in the Dardanelles and at the same time landed Greek forces on most of the Aegean Islands.

The Greeks did not participate in the December 1912 armistice so that they might continue their efforts to take Ionnina. There they increased the numbers of artillery pieces and troops during December. Although a major assault on January 20 failed, another attack on March 6 led by Crown Prince Constantine (1868–1923) succeeded. Greek troops entered the city that same day.

Meanwhile, the Greeks and Bulgarians contested the division of southern Macedonia. Skirmishes between Bulgarian and Greek troops erupted there in the spring of 1913. Salonika in particular was a point of contention. Serbian disputes with Bulgaria over the division of northern Macedonia led

to the conclusion of a Greek-Serbian alliance on June 1, 1913. One month later, the Bulgarians launched attacks on Greek and Serbian positions in Macedonia. The Greek counterattack inflicted a severe defeat on the Bulgarian Second Army. The Greeks pushed the Bulgarians out of southern Macedonia and eliminated the isolated Bulgarian garrison in Salonika. The Greek advance up the Struma River, however, almost ended in disaster when Bulgarian forces surrounded the Greeks in the Kresna Gorge. The conclusion of an armistice on July 31, 1913, saved the Greeks from defeat.

Greece was a big winner in the Balkan Wars. At a cost of around 8,000 dead and 45,000 wounded, the Greeks gained considerable territories in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia. In addition, the Greeks obtained most of the Aegean Islands and the formal annexation of Crete. These annexations only increased the appetite of Greek nationalists for further territories in Thrace and Anatolia as well as the great prize of Constantinople.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan League, 1912; Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Balkan War, Second, 1913; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Consequences; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Naval Campaigns

Further Reading

Fotakis, Zisis. *Greek Naval Strategy and Policy 1910–1919*. London: Routledge, 2005.

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Hellenic Army General Staff. *A Concise History of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Athens: Army History Directorate Publication, 1998.

Jowett, Philip S. *Armies of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Oxford: Osprey, 2011.

Greece in World War I

When World War I erupted in the summer of 1914, the Greek government was unprepared to participate. Even though Greece had an alliance with Serbia dating from May 1913, Greek prime minister Eleuthérios Venizélos (1864–1936) was unable to secure Greek intervention on the side of the Entente, which he personally favored. The Greek king Constantine I (1868–1923) and much of the Greek army officer corps, however, were pro-German. Constantine was the German kaiser's brother-in-law. Many senior officers had received military training in Germany. Furthermore, the Greek army and state were exhausted from their efforts in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 and needed time to recover. The Greek government was concerned that with Serbia engaged against Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria might use the opportunity to attack Greece to gain territories lost in the Second Balkan War of 1913. Finally, the Ottoman Empire still represented a threat to Greece because of disputes over Chios and Mytilene in the Aegean Islands. Because of these issues, Venizélos, despite his personal inclinations, indicated to Serbia that Greece would not fulfill its treaty obligations.

The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of Austria-Hungary and Germany on November 1, 1914, provided new incentive for Greek action. In January 1915, the British offered Greece Ottoman territory in Asia Minor in return for intervention in the war and aid to Serbia. The Greek army opposed any venture in Asia Minor because of concerns about Bulgaria. Venizélos attempted to bring Greece into the war to participate in the Gallipoli campaign. The Russians had no desire to see the Greeks in

Constantinople. As a result Venizélos resigned on March 6.

In the autumn of 1915, Venizélos returned to power. At the same time, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and prepared to invade Serbia. On October 3, 1915, Venizélos consented to Entente landings in Salonika. The British and French intended to move up the Vardar River to aid the Serbs. Because of King Constantine's opposition to his policies, however, Venizélos resigned again on October 5, just as the first Entente units disembarked in Salonika. For the time being, they were unwelcome guests in Greece. In December 1915, the Bulgarians forced the British and French back across the Greek frontier. The Entente forces then took measures to establish themselves in and around Salonika. The Entente further violated Greek neutrality by depositing the remnants of the Serbian army on Corfu after its trek across the Albanian Alps.

A Bulgarian offensive in May 1916 brought the war further onto Greek territory. On 26 May the Greek garrison of Fort Rupel surrendered without a fight to the Bulgarians. This indicated the degree within the Greek military of antagonism toward the Entente presence in Greece. Later that summer, a Bulgarian offensive brought much of southeastern Macedonia under Bulgarian control, including the towns of Drama, Kavala, and Serres. The Bulgarians also briefly occupied Florina.

With both warring sides violating Greek neutrality, a cabal of pro-Entente Greek military officers decided to act. On August 30, 1916, with the encouragement of Venizélos, they established a pro-Entente government in Salonika in opposition to the royal neutralist government in Athens. Venizélos, having first toured the Aegean Islands to gather support, joined the officers on October 9 and established a separate Greek

government and army. This division is known as the "national schism."

The Entente attempted to force the issue by landing troops in Athens in December 1916. Royalist forces offered strong opposition and compelled the British and French to withdraw. After armed intervention against the royalist regime failed, the Entente imposed a naval blockade around Greece and expanded their presence in northern Greece. Finally, on June 10, 1917, the French demanded that King Constantine abdicate within 24 hours and prepared to occupy Athens. Confronted with overwhelming force, and with no help possible from the Central Powers, Constantine complied with the ultimatum. Constantine's second son Alexander (1893–1920) assumed the throne because his elder brother George (1890–1947) shared his father Constantine's pro-neutralist sentiments. King Alexander agreed to the formation of a national government under Venizélos. The national schism of almost a year was over. Greece then declared war on the Central Powers on June 30, 1917, the final European state to enter the war.

After a period of training and refitting, during the spring of 1918, the Greek army joined the other Entente forces on the Macedonian Front. Six Greek divisions added over 290,000 men to the British, French, French Colonial, Italian, and Serbian troops already there. By time the Greeks arrived, the Russian soldiers on the Macedonian Front had succumbed to revolutionary ideas and had left the front. The Greek army achieved some success against the Bulgarians at the battle of Yerbichna in May 1918, pushing the Bulgarians out of fortified positions northwest of Salonika. The joint British-Greek effort at Lake Doiran in September 1918, however, stalled in the face of determined Bulgarian

resistance. After the conclusion of the Bulgarian armistice in Salonika on September 29, Greek forces occupied western (Bulgarian) Thrace and entered Constantinople with other Entente troops.

Greece's success in World War I was a prelude to the disastrous intervention in Asia Minor and war against Turkey during 1919–1922. It raised national expectations and inflated anticipated capabilities. Defeat in that war compelled the Greeks to evacuate Asia Minor and also to leave much of eastern Thrace and the island of Imbros, which they had occupied at the end of World War I. Nevertheless they did retain western Thrace.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bulgaria in World War I; Constantine I, King of Greece (1868–1923); Doiran, Battles of, 1917–1918; Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922; Macedonian Front, 1916–1918; Salonika; Venizélos, Eleuthérios (1864–1936)

Further Reading

Clogg, Richard. *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Hall, Richard C. "Bulgaria, Romania and Greece." In *The Origins of World War I*, edited by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Leon, George. *Greece and the Great Powers*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1978.

Petsalis-Diomidis, N. *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference (1919)*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1979.

Greece in World War II

When war erupted in Europe in 1939, the Greek government attempted to remain neutral. By that time, the Greek economy

depended heavily upon commercial relations with Nazi Germany. The Greek dictator, Ioannis Metaxas (1871–1941), admired his German counterpart. He had been among those Greek army officers who favored the Central Powers during World War I. The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini (1883–1945), however, had designs on Greece. He aspired to control the eastern Mediterranean Sea region. Especially after the German successes in western Europe in the spring of 1940, he wanted to demonstrate to Nazi Germany that Fascist Italy was capable of similar feats of arms.

During the summer of 1940, the Italians began a series of provocations directed against Greece. The most overt of these was the sinking of the Greek light cruiser *Helle* in the harbor of Tinos on August 15, 1940, by an Italian submarine. Metaxas refused to respond to these actions. He hoped that his good relations with Nazi Germany would keep Greece out of the war. In this hope he was soon disappointed. On October 28, the Italian ambassador in Athens presented an ultimatum demanding that Italian troops be permitted to occupy a number of strategic points throughout Greece. Metaxas famously replied with the single negative, "no." Later that day, Italian troops began the invasion of Greece from bases in Italian occupied Albania. The Greek armed forces responded vigorously to the Italian invasion. By mid-November, a Greek counteroffensive had thrown the Italians out of Greece. Greek forces occupied much of southern Albania before winter conditions imposed a stalemate. Britain sent some material aid to the Greeks. Metaxas, however, refused to allow British military forces into Greece for fear of provoking the Germans.

After Metaxas died on January 29, 1941, the new Greek government invited further



German panzer units move southward through Greece in April 1941 despite heavy spring rains and muddy roads. (Library of Congress)

British assistance. Airmen and army personnel began to arrive in the spring. The appearance of British forces in Greece alarmed Adolf Hitler (1889–1945), because he perceived them as a threat to the southern flank of the upcoming invasion of Soviet Russia, Operation Barbarossa. Also, the Royal Air Force (RAF) bases in Greece were proximate to the vital Romanian oil fields at Ploesti. To eliminate this potential threat, and to help the stricken Italians, the Germans prepared Operation Marita for the invasion of Greece. A pro-British coup in Belgrade on March 26 caused Hitler to incorporate an invasion of Yugoslavia within Operation Marita.

The Greeks had most of their forces divided between southern Albania and prepared defensive positions facing Bulgaria known as the Metaxas Line. A British force that arrived from Egypt in March 1941 supplemented the Greeks. The Germans

attacked Greece from Bulgaria on April 6. They reached Thessalonika on April 9. This advance separated Greece from Yugoslavia. It also caused the British and Greeks to abandon the Metaxas Line and retreat to the south. They attempt to establish a defensive position at the Aliakmon River, but that position was breached by the Germans on April 15. Then at Thermopylae, near where the Persians and the Spartans once battled in 480 BC, the British and Greeks attempted one more defense. The Germans reached Thermopylae on April 22.

By April 23, the British force having opted to evacuate Greece, some members of the Greek high command, with its units in Epirus isolated from the rest of its forces, decided to surrender. General Georgios Tsolakoglou (1886–1948, the First Army commander, surrendered the entire Greek Army to the German invaders of Greece at Larissa on 21 April 1941. Although some

Greek generals opposed the surrender, they were unable to prevent it. Because of German insistence, Tsolakoglou surrendered to the Italians on 23 April. These surrenders occurred without the sanction of the Greek government. The British continued with their fighting retreat. They succeeded in evacuating most of their troops from Piraeus and Volos in an operation reminiscent of Dunkirk the previous year. Most went to Crete. The RAF contingent flew to Crete and to Egypt. In an effort to block the British withdrawal, the Germans undertook a successful attack on the Isthmus of Corinth with airborne forces on 25 April 25. By then, however, most of the British had succeeded in getting away. King George II (1890–1947) and some of his ministers fled to Crete, and afterwards to Egypt. He spent the war in Great Britain. On April 27, German forces entered Athens. By April 30, all the British either were captured or had evacuated Greece. On May 20, German paratroops attacked British and Greek forces on Crete. By June 1, German and Italian troops had established control over the island and seized most of the Aegean Islands.

The Germans and their allies divided Greece into zones of occupation. The Bulgarians, who had not participated in the invasion, took southeastern Macedonia and most of western Thrace. The Germans reserved for themselves southern Macedonia, including Thessaloniki, the city of Athens, a strip of land in Thrace on the Turkish border, most of Crete, and three Aegean Islands near Turkey, Chios, Lesbos, and Samos. The Italians took all of the remainder, which included the eastern tip of Crete, most of mainland Greece, and the Ionian Islands.

Even though the Italians technically controlled most of mainland Greece, the

Germans determined the occupation government. On 29 April 29, 1941, the Germans appointed General Tsolakoglou to be the prime minister of the collaborationist government in Athens. The previous prime minister, Alexander Koryzes (1885–1941), who had succeeded Metaxas, committed suicide in the wake of Greece's disastrous defeat. Tsolakoglou's position was similar to that of Henri Pétain (1856–1951) in France and of Milan Nedić (1877–1946) in Serbia. Tsolakoglou proved to be an incompetent ruler who garnered little popular support. During his rule, Greece began to experience food shortages and inflation. The occupiers looted much food and material from Greece. The poor condition of the Greek economy caused the Germans to replace Tsolakoglou with a civilian economics expert, Konstantinos Logothetopoulos (1878–1961) on December 2, 1942. Ioannis Rhallis (1878–1946) replaced him on April 7, 1943, and remained in office until the German withdrawal in October 1944. Cooperation with the Germans, however, yielded few tangible results. By the end of 1941, famine gripped the country due to German expropriation of food resources. As many as 250,000 Greeks died of starvation during the most intense part of the famine from 1941 to 1943.

Armed opposition to foreign rule soon emerged throughout Greece. The resistance quickly attracted British support. The most important resistance organization was the National Liberation Front (EAM). It was largely guided and led by members of the Greek Communist Party. In this respect it was the Greek counterpart of the Yugoslav Partisan movement. It formed in the fall of 1941. The armed component of EAM was the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), which was established in December 1942. These two organizations are

usually referred to collectively as EAM/ELAS. EAM/ELAS was the largest Greek resistance movement. The main EAM/ELAS leader was Stephanos Saraphis (1890–1957). Because he was not a Communist, he never achieved the dominance over his organization that Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) enjoyed in Yugoslavia. It operated throughout the country, and appealed not only to Communists but also to all those Greeks intent on fighting the foreign occupation.

The other main resistance movement was the National Republican Greek League (EDES). The leader of this nationalist and royalist organization was Colonel Napoleon Zervas (1891–1957). It was much smaller than EAM/ELAS and mainly limited to Epirus. EDES was somewhat analogous to the Četnik movement of Dragoljub Mihailović (1893–1946) in Yugoslavia. Even though it did receive some British aid, its numbers were too few for it to mount a serious threat to the occupying forces.

The Axis forces responded to resistance quickly and ruthlessly to any sign of resistance. The Bulgarians brutally suppressed a general uprising in southeastern Macedonia around Drama in September 1941. The Germans and Italians committed atrocities in their campaigns against resistance fighters. The Greeks were undeterred by these actions.

Upon entering Greece, the Germans imposed severe restrictions on the Greek Jewish community. With the assistance of the Bulgarians, they deported the Jewish populations of Salonika, Greek Macedonia, and Thrace beginning in March 1943. Most of these died in Auschwitz. After the Italian surrender of September 1943, the Germans extended their control to the Italian zones of mainland Greece. The remaining Greek Jewish communities from Athens and the Aegean islands were deported in March

1944. Because of these actions, over 60,000 Greek Jews perished.

When the Italians left the war in September 1943, EAM/ELAS managed to seize most of their equipment and supplies. By the end of 1943, EAM/ELAS and EDES had come into conflict against each other. EAM/ELAS easily dominated EDES. As a result, EAM/ELAS established political control of much of Greece. By 1944 the Germans and the collaborationist government only maintained a presence in the major cities and in the transportation routes linking them. After the defection of Bulgaria and Romania to the Allies in the fall of 1944, the German position in Greece became impossible to sustain. In October 1944, German forces began a systematic retreat out of the country. As they left, EAM/ELAS spread its control throughout Greece.

In the wake of the German withdrawal, the British army landed in Athens on October 18, 1944, with a number of anti-Communist Greek politicians in tow. They intended to ensure that the Communist EAM/ELAS movement would not establish a postwar government. A pro-EAM/ELAS mutiny among Greek Royalist forces stationed in the Middle East had alerted the British to the danger of a Communist takeover of Greece. Initially EAM/ELAS cooperated with the British, but by December 1944, this had ended. Athens became the arena of heavy fighting between EAM/ELAS forces and the British. A number of collaborationists eager to redeem themselves supported the British. As many as 10,000 people died in this Battle of Athens. A cease fire on January 11, 1945, ended the fighting but not the hostility. Outright civil war began anew the next year between British supported Royalist forces and the Communist-led antigovernment guerillas.

World War II had a devastating effect on Greece. As many as 500,000 people died from starvation, actions of the occupiers of civil strife. Much of the infrastructure was damaged. Three more years of heavy fighting in the Greek Civil War loomed before peace would finally come to Greece.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Greece, Invasion of, 1941; Greek Civil War; Metaxas, Ioannis (1871–1941); Tsolakoglou, Georgios (1886–1948)

Further Reading

Clogg, Richard. *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Mazower, Mark. *Hitler's Europe: How the Nazis Ruled Europe*. New York: Penguin, 2008.

Mazower, Mark. *Inside Hitler's Greece*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993.

Stavrianos, L. S. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958.

Greek Civil War

The Greek Civil War was fought between Greek Communists and non-Communist military organizations during the period 1942–1949. In April 1941, the Germans occupied Greece. Greek king George II (1890–1947) and his government left and established a government-in-exile in Egypt. The German occupation led to the formation of several resistance movements by late 1941, including the National Liberation Front (EAM), founded in September 1941 by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE); the liberal Greek National Republican League (EDES); and the National and Social Liberation (EKKA). The largest group was the EAM and its military wing, the Greek National Liberation Army (ELAS). As a

broad democratic republican movement against fascism, the EAM quickly won the support of many non-Communists.

Between 1942 and 1944, left-wing and right-wing resistance groups fought the Germans, and, by the end of 1943, ELAS with about 20,000 men controlled much of northern Greece and had limited German control to the main towns and connecting roads. EDES had about 5,000 men, almost all of them in Epirus. EKKA only had about 1,000 men.

Each resistance group accused the others of collaborating with the Germans, leading to a fratricidal conflict to establish the leadership of the Greek resistance. ELAS units burned villages and executed suspected collaborators and, in spring 1944, destroyed the EKKA. In October 1943, ELAS attacked the EDES, precipitating open conflict until a British-sponsored cease-fire in February 1944.

In March 1944, the EAM, controlling much of the country, established the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA), essentially a third Greek government. In May 1944, representatives from all political groups met in Lebanon and formed a government of national unity, mainly because Joseph Stalin (1879–1953), the Soviet leader, directed the KKE to avoid harming Allied unity. George Papandreou (1888–1968) became its prime minister.

By autumn 1944, with the Soviet army advancing into Romania, the Germans began withdrawing from Greece. British troops, commanded by General Ronald Scobie (1893–1969), landed in Greece in early October, and entered Athens on October 13. Papandreou followed a few days later. The king stayed in Cairo, pending a referendum to decide the future of the monarchy.

The Papandreou government now attempted to disarm the resistance organizations. Fearing that the disarmament of



Rebels are paraded through the streets of Langadia, east of Salonika, Greece, after capture by Greek government forces, February 12, 1948. The bloody, five-year Greek Civil War pitted the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) against U.S.- and British-backed nationalists. (AP Photo)

ELAS, now numbering 50,000, would leave ELAS defenseless against the right-wing militias, EAM submitted an alternative plan. When Papandreou rejected the plan, EAM withdrew from the government. On December 1, General Scobie directed the dissolution of ELAS, but the KKE refused.

On December 3, a large EAM demonstration in Athens led to full-scale fighting between ELAS and the government. British forces intervened as the Greek government had few forces to oppose ELAS. By December 12, ELAS controlled most of Athens and Piraeus, but the British and government forces slowly regained control. A December 24 conference, presided over by Winston Churchill (1874–1965), the British prime minister, failed to provide a solution as the more moderate members felt that the EAM/ELAS demands were too excessive.

By early January, British and Greek forces had driven the ELAS from Athens.

Papandreou resigned and General Nikolaos Plastiras (1883–1953), a firm anti-Communist, became prime minister. On January 15, 1945, Scobie agreed to a cease-fire in exchange for ELAS's withdrawal from Athens and Thessaloniki and its demobilization in the Peloponnese.

During the fighting in Athens, the KKE executed up to 8,000 "collaborators" and suspected collaborators, and the withdrawing Communists took another 20,000 hostages with them. As a result, support for the KKE declined, and most of the prominent non-Communists in EAM left the organization. At the same time, right-wing extremist gangs executed known and suspected Communists.

In February 1945, the various Greek factions signed the Varkiza Agreement, which called for the complete demobilization of all guerrilla and paramilitary groups, an amnesty for all political offenses,

a referendum on the monarchy, and a general election as soon as possible. The KKE now changed its objective to peacefully establishing a “people’s democracy.” However, the new Greek army and right-wing extremists continued their war against the ex-members of EAM. Many ELAS members hid their weapons, and 5,000 escaped to Yugoslavia.

In February 1946, the KKE, despite the lack of support from Stalin, renewed armed struggle in Greece. On March 31, 1946, the day of the national elections, ELAS veterans, now the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), infiltrated into Greece from Albania and Yugoslavia and attacked Litochoro. By late 1946, the DSE had about 10,000 fighters, mainly in the mountains of northern Greece. Average Greek citizens found themselves between DSE fighters who killed members of right-wing gangs and these gangs and the army who imprisoned and killed Communists and Communist sympathizers.

In 1947, the DSE launched large-scale attacks across northern Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, and the army responded with massive counteroffensives. However, when the army arrived, the DSE fighters had melted back into the mountains and their safe havens in Albania and Yugoslavia. In December 1947, the KKE formed a Provisional Democratic Government and moved to full-scale conventional war in an attempt to seize a major town as its seat of government.

In response, the government banned the KKE, suppressed its press, cracked down on KKE members and sympathizers, and increased the size of the army. In December 1947, the DSE lost 1,200 fighters in a major battle around Konitsa. Still, the DSE, with about 20,000 fighters and a network of sympathizers and informants across Greece,

had extended its operations to the Peloponnese and close to Athens.

By 1947, the Greek army had grown to 90,000 men with British training, equipment, and money. When Britain announced that it could no longer afford this burden, President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) announced that the United States would now assist Greece. By early 1948, American money, advisers, and equipment had begun to arrive in Greece, enabling the Greek army to launch a series of major offensives in central Greece. These offensives inflicted some serious defeats on the DSE, raising army morale and lowering the morale of the DSE.

Until 1948, Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980), loyal to Stalin, had supported the DSE. In June 1948, the Soviet Union broke off relations with Yugoslavia, but the DSE leaders chose to remain loyal to Stalin. In July 1949, Tito closed the Yugoslavian-Greek border to the DSE guerrillas and disbanded their camps inside Yugoslavia. The split with Tito led to a witch hunt for Tito sympathizers inside the KKE, leading to disorganization and demoralization within the DSE and a decline of support for the KKE.

In August 1949, the new commander of the Greek army, General Alexander Papagos (1883–1955), launched a major offensive against DSE forces in northern Greece, resulting in heavy DSE losses. By September 1949, most of its fighters had surrendered or escaped into Albania, but the Albanian government now prohibited DSE military operations from Albanian territory. On October 16, the KKE agreed to a ceasefire that ended the civil war.

Although the Greek government had prevented a Communist takeover, the civil war left Greece with a legacy of political division and personal animosities, extensive devastation, deep economic problems, client

status to the United States, and suspicions of its northern neighbors, which lasted into the 1980s. Yet, unlike Albania and Yugoslavia, Greece did not undergo 40 years of Communist rule and its attendant consequences. The West hailed the end of the civil war as an early victory in the Cold War, although Stalin had not actively supported the Communist insurgency in Greece.

Robert B. Kane

See also: EAM/ELAS; Greece in World War II

Further Reading

Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos. *By Fire and Axe: The Communist Party and the Civil War in Greece, 1944–1949*. New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Brothers, 1978.

Kousoulas, D. George. *Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party*. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Leeper, Reginald. *When Greek Meets Greek*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1950.

Greek Military Coup, 1909

Also known as the Goudi Coup, for the Athenian neighborhood where it began, the Greek military coup of 1909 initiated the division between liberal republican forces and conservative monarchal forces that marked Greek politics through much of the twentieth century.

The Greek military had been humiliated by its rapid defeat in the war against the Ottoman Empire in 1897 and by its lack of success in irregular operations in Macedonia. The leaders of the 1909 coup were members of the Military League, who sought to emulate the Young Turk coup the year before. They wanted to modernize the military and adopt a more aggressive foreign policy. They also sought to limit the role of the monarchy in the military.

They initiated their actions on August 14, 1909, in the Goudi Barracks with a set of demands sent to the government. The situation stalemated for the next several weeks. A decisive figure in the person of Eleuthérios Venizélos (1864–1936), the prime minister of autonomous Crete, then went to Athens in December 1909 to resolve the situation. Only the next year, when new elections were held in August and a government came into being in October, was the Greek political situation resolved. Venizélos represented a republican sensibility and advocated an active foreign policy. Nevertheless, he endeavored not to antagonize conservative and royalist elements in the military and politics. He introduced a new constitution and initiated diplomatic contacts with the Bulgarian government that would lead to the formation of the Balkan League.

The British and French sent missions to reorganize respectively the Greek navy and army. The Greek military coup of 1909 led to the participation of Greece in the Balkan Wars and the national schism of World War I. Echoes of this issue resounded through the Greek Civil War of 1945–1949 and the Greek military coup of 1967.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Greco-Ottoman War, 1897; Greek Civil War; Venizélos, Eleuthérios (1864–1936)

Further Reading

Clogg, Richard. *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Papacosma, S. Victor. *The Military in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup d'État*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1977.

Stavrianos, L. S. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958.

Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832

A revolt against the Ottoman Empire, the Greek War of Independence from 1821 to 1832 culminated in the creation of an independent Greece under the protection of European powers.

By the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was in control of Asia Minor and the majority of the Balkan region, including Greece. Although many Greek professionals preferred to remain under Ottoman rule, a class of dedicated independence enthusiasts agitated for a separate Greek state. Greek writers in the late eighteenth century began to express a sense of Greek national identity in their work. The popular author Rhigas Velestinlis stirred his generation to revolt by clamoring for a war of liberation for all Balkan people. All were influenced by both the American Revolution and the French Revolution that had taken place decades earlier.

In 1814, professional Greek merchants began to establish societies geared toward the liberation of Greece. Backed by Russia, such groups as the *Filiki Etairia* (Friendly Society—FE) became more popular as the Ottoman Empire attempted to crack down on political dissent. FE, led by Alexander Ypsilantis, who served as a Greek military liaison to the czar in Moscow, claimed to have the full backing of the Russian state.

Unable to stem the tide of revolution, the Ottomans watched as Ypsilantis orchestrated an abortive revolt on March 6, 1821. FE troops marched into the Danubian principalities in the hope of starting a full-scale uprising in the Balkans. The movement stimulated the outbreak of other localized revolts in the region against the rule of Sultan Mahmud II (1792–1828). The latter had sought to enhance imperial authority at the expense of

sovereignty for local villages. In response, groups in the Peloponnese and western Greece (Rumeli) rose against their local Islamic ruler Ali Pasha (1744–1822) in April.

The Greeks proclaimed their independence at Epidauros on January 13, 1822, after an earlier uprising in Morea. Lacking military hardware and political unity, the independence movement managed to survive initial reprisals and form a more united revolutionary government. In 1822, a national assembly was created, followed by regional assemblies. By mid-1822, Greek forces had achieved great success. They now held most of the Peloponnese, including the islands of Hydra, Spetses, and Psara, as well as an area north of the Gulf of Corinth. That region included the important cities of Athens, Thebes, and Mesolonghi.

The Greeks fought the Turkish armies of the Ottoman sultan alone until 1825. In February that year, the sultan's troops were aided by the Egyptian Army of Muhammad Ali (1769–1849) and regained control of continental Greece. In response, the governments of the United Kingdom, Russia, and France demanded the withdrawal of the Egyptians and an armistice with the sultan with the Treaty of London for Greek Independence (1827).

When Egyptian reinforcements landed at Navarino, the three allied governments sent a far larger naval force that destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet in the Battle of Navarino on October 20, 1827. The involvement of European powers in the independence war, particularly Russia and Great Britain, convinced Ottoman rulers to tolerate the new Greek independence movement or face a trade cutoff. In 1828, one of the many Russo-Ottoman Wars helped to hasten Greek independence.

The independence of Greece was guaranteed by its allies in the London Protocol

of 1830, although fighting and political turmoil continued for a few more years. Greece finally emerged as a sovereign political state in 1833 under Otto of Bavaria, a monarch approved by its allies.

Jason Newman

See also: Navarino, Battle of, 1827; Ypsilantis (1815–1867), Alexander (1792–1828)

Further Reading

Clogg, Richard. *A Concise History of Greece*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Dakin, Douglas. *The Greek Struggle for Independence*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.

Paroulakis, Peter. *The Greeks: Their Struggle for Independence*. Darwin, Australia: Hellenic International Press, 1984.

Woodhouse, C. M. *Modern Greece: A Short History*. 5th ed. Boston: Faber and Faber, 1991.

Greens (Montenegro)

The Greens (*zelenaši*) were Montenegrins who opposed unification with Serbia in the new Serb, Croat, and Slovene state in 1918. The name came from ballots used in the voting for the Grand National Assembly in Pogorica in November 1918. Those who favored Montenegrin separatism marked green ballots, while those who wanted union with the new South Slav state used white ballots. The Whites won overwhelmingly, in part due to the occupation of the country by the Serbian army. The losers, who then were mainly rural and tribal, rebelled at the beginning of 1919. They besieged Cetinje but lacked the arms and numbers to prevail against Whites and their Serbian allies. This so-called “Christmas Rebellion,” which took place during the Serbian Orthodox Christmas season, soon collapsed. The Greens continued

to insist that Montenegrins and Serbs were separate peoples. During the interwar period, they pressed for Montenegrin autonomy within the Yugoslav state.

When the Italians invaded Montenegro in April 1941, some Greens collaborated with them. There was a dynastic connection between Italy and Montenegro. The queen of Italy, Elena (1873–1952), was the daughter of the last Montenegrin king Nikola (1841–1921). By the end of 1941, the Italians found that cooperation with the better-armed and more numerous Četniks was more effective. This undercut the activities of the Greens. After the Germans replaced the Italians in occupying Montenegro in September 1943, some Green elements continued to cooperate. Many of them withdrew with the Germans a year later.

The Yugoslav Wars of 1991–1995 revived the Green cause. Under the leadership of Milo Djukanović (1962–), Montenegro gradually separated itself from the destructive Serbian nationalist policies of Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006). After a referendum passed on May 21, 2006, Montenegro realized the Green program and declared independence on June 3, 2006.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Italy in the Balkans during World War II; Montenegro in World War I; Nikola, King of Montenegro (1841–1921); Yugoslavia, Collaborationist Forces in World War II

Further Reading

Banac, Ivo. *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.

Roberts, Elizabeth. *Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.

Tomasevich, Jozo. *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

H

Handschar SS Division

This unit was a mountain infantry division of the Waffen SS, consisting mostly of Muslim Bosnians; the first non-German Waffen SS division during World War II. The name came from the curved Turkish scimitar (“Handschar” in German), a historic symbol of Bosnia.

On April 6, 1941, the German army invaded Yugoslavia and quickly occupied the country. The Germans established the pro-Nazi independent state of Croatia, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose population consisted of Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs, and Muslim Croats and occupied portions of Slovenia and Serbia. Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Italian-controlled Albania occupied other portions of the former Yugoslavia.

SS-Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler (1900–1945), fascinated by Islam and believing Muslims to be fearless warriors, targeted the Muslims of Bosnia for a Croatian SS division. Later, about 10 percent of the future division’s men would be Catholic Croats. Himmler also believed that the Croats were of Aryan, not Slavic, descent, making them racially acceptable for the SS. Finally, the Nazis hoped to use the creation of a Muslim SS division as the first step in gaining the support of the world’s 350 million Muslims against the Western Allies.

To form the division, Himmler, on February 13, 1943, obtained Adolf Hitler’s approval. Himmler also needed the approval of

the ostensibly independent Croatian government, led by Ante Pavelić (1889–1959). The Croatian government initially had problems with the idea but eventually agreed on March 5, 1943. By mid-1943, the division numbered 26,000 men, including 2,800 Catholic Croats.

The new division was officially designated as the “13 SS Frei.Gebirgs Division (*kroatien*).” It received its full name, “*13 Waffen-Gebirgs-Division der SS ‘Handschar’ (kroatische Nr. 1)*,” in May 1944. The division had two infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a reconnaissance company, a panzerjager company, an antiaircraft company, a pioneer battalion, and other support units. The division had three commanders during the war: *Standartenfuhrer* Herbert von Obwurzer (1888–1945), March 9, 1943–August 1, 1943; *Oberfuhrer* Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig (1899–1946), August 1, 1943–June 1, 1944; and *Oberfuhrer* Desiderius Hampel (1895–1981), June 1, 1944–May 8, 1945.

The members of the Handschar Division wore the regular SS uniform with a divisional collar patch showing an arm, holding a scimitar over a swastika; a Croatian arm-shield (red-white chessboard) on the left arm; the oval mountain troop “Edelweiss” patch on the right arm; and the Muslim fez in field gray (normal service) or red (“walking out”) with the SS eagle and death’s head emblazoned. Non-Muslim members could wear the standard SS mountain cap.

By September 1943, the completed division had arrived in occupied France for its initial training. At Villefranche, some

malcontents, led by three Communists who had infiltrated the division, mutinied and killed five German officers. The majority of the troops did not participate in the rebellion, and, in fact, either had no idea that the mutiny had occurred or actively helped suppress it. The Germans executed 14 soldiers as mutineers.

The division completed its training in Silesia by mid-February 1944 and returned to Bosnia for action against Josef Tito's Partisans. Operating in northeastern Bosnia, western Serbia, and southern Sirmium, the division participated in several anti-Partisan operations. With the advance of the Soviet army to the Croatian border in late 1944, the division transferred to southern Hungary and fought as a front-line unit. Many Muslims now deserted and returned to Bosnia to protect their homes and families. The remaining men fought valiantly against overwhelming odds but were slowly driven out of Hungary into Austria. The remnants of the division surrendered to British troops on May 8, 1945. Postwar Yugoslavian authorities extradited 38 officers, mostly German and Yugoslav *Volksdeutsche*, for trial as war criminals and executed 10 of them.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Partisans, Yugoslavia; Pavelić, Ante (1889–1959); Ustaša

Further Reading

Bishop, Chris. *Waffen-SS Divisions, 1939–45*. London: Amber Books, 2007.

Blandford, Edmund L. *Hitler's Second Army: The Waffen SS*. Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International, 1994.

Herf, Jeffrey. *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009.

Mousavizadeh, Nader. *The Black Book of Bosnia: The Consequences of Appeasement*. New York: Basic Books, 1996.

Herzegovina Revolt, 1875

The most significant rebellion in Herzegovina against the Ottoman Empire occurred in mid-June 1875 because of the harsh treatment by the Bosnian rulers of the Ottoman province of Bosnia of the mostly Catholic and Orthodox population.

In the 1870s, the Ottoman sultan Abdul Mecid I (1823–1861) announced a number of reforms that included new rights for the empire's Christian subjects, a new basis for army conscription, and an end to the hated tax-farming system. However, the powerful Bosnian landowners either resisted or ignored the reforms. These landowners often instituted more repressive measures, which included a steadily increasing tax burden, against their Christian subjects.

On June 19, 1875, the Catholics in the Gabela and Hrasno districts of lower Herzegovina, ignited by overtaxing, rebelled against the Ottoman authorities. On July 9, Orthodox Christians around the village of Nevesinje in eastern Herzegovina also rebelled. A general uprising of the entire Christian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina subsequently ensued. More than 150,000 people took refuge in Croatia. The Ottomans responded with both government troops under the recently appointed Bosnian governor and irregular troops led by local landowners.

Because the Ottoman authorities could not suppress the uprisings, the unrest quickly spread to the Christian populations of the other Ottoman provinces in the Balkans. The Ottoman military committed many atrocities during its attempts to suppress the unrest in the Balkan provinces. These atrocities led to Russian intervention in the Balkans to protect the Slavic Orthodox population and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. Russia

defeated the Ottoman Empire and imposed significant losses of Ottoman territory in the Balkans with the March 1878 Treaty of San Stefano. Concerned about the establishment of an independent “great” Bulgaria, Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), the prime minister of Germany, called a European conference in Berlin the following July to rewrite the original treaty. The new Treaty of Berlin still severely reduced Ottoman territories and power in Europe but allowed Austria-Hungary to occupy and govern Bosnia and Herzegovina, although the provinces nominally remained under Ottoman sovereignty. Austria-Hungary officially annexed the province in 1908.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Berlin, Treaty of, 1878; Bosnian Crisis, 1908–1909; Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878; San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878

Further Reading

Aksanok, Virginia. *Ottoman Wars, 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged*. Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman, 2007.

Miller, William. *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801–1927*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1936.

Palmer, Alan. *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire*. New York: M. Evan and Company, 1972.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 2, *Reform, Reaction and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

The Holocaust in the Balkans

The Holocaust primarily refers to Nazi Germany’s effort to destroy Europe’s nine million Jews. In the end, under the direction of German chancellor Adolf Hitler (1933–

1945), six million Jews were murdered. It was an act of genocide, an attempt to fully eliminate, through state-sponsored, systematic murder, an entire group of people. Although the Jews were the principal target, the Holocaust also involved the deaths of others, namely those deemed by the Nazis to be destructive to the fabric of German society, including gypsies, the mentally and physically disabled, homosexuals, and political dissidents. During World War II, the Nazi policy toward the Jews became known as “the Final Solution.” It was called this for it was their desire to put to an end, once and for all, the age-old “Jewish Question,” the *Judenfrage*, in Europe. The solution involved complete and total extermination of European Jewry. During the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the implementation of the policy began. The majority of the killing was done by the German SS and mobile killing units known as the *Einsatzgruppen*. Initially, the annihilation effort involved random, uneven acts of violence. During 1942, the Nazis constructed death camps in Poland to facilitate and effectuate the killing process. As the Nazis advanced across Europe, they were assisted in committing mass death by non-German collaborators.

Earlier in 1941, the German army moved to the southeast. The Germans and Italians attacked Yugoslavia and Greece. Romania and Bulgaria had already joined the Axis Powers. Jewish communities in the Balkan region were subsequently at risk for discrimination, ghettoization, deportation, and extermination. The fate of the Balkan Jews during the Holocaust was similar to that of Jews elsewhere. There were varying levels of protection and persecution in the region. On the whole, the fate of individual Jews in the Balkan countries was often more secure than in Central and Eastern Europe, where



Bulgarian policemen oversee the deportation in Skopje, Yugoslavia, of Macedonian Jews to the German death camps in March 1943 in Bulgaria-occupied Skopje. (AP Photo/U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Courtesy of Jewish Historical Museum, Belgrade)

their numbers were larger. While still tragic, many Jews from this area of Europe were saved due to the noncooperation of their governments or fellow citizens with the German orders for deportation and extermination. Violence by angry mobs and betrayal of Jewish communities was less common here, although there were still occurrences of such behavior.

Albania

Albania, unlike other European countries, had a Muslim majority. It was also a country that actively sought to protect the Jewish population within its borders. Compared with Jewish communities in neighboring countries, Albania's Jewish population was very small. In 1937, the Jewish population numbered around 300.

In Albania, the Italian occupation regime proactively safeguarded its citizens,

including Jews. The government additionally accepted Jewish refugees from neighboring nations. This protection continued to some degree after September 1943, when the Italians withdrew from the war and German units occupied Albania. The local population protected many Jews. Albanians treated them as part of the wider community and regarded Jewish refugees who came to their country as "guests." The inclusion and protection of Jews was compatible with the Albanian customs of hospitality, known as *Besa*. Around 2,000 Jews survived the war in Albania

Bulgaria

Bulgaria joined the Axis powers in 1941 to allow Germany passage to Greece in return for an annexation of former territory from neighboring Greece and Yugoslavia. At the time, less than 1 percent of Bulgaria's

population was Jewish, about 50,000–55,000 persons. The majority of those lived in the capital city of Sofia.

Unlike many other European countries, Bulgaria did not have a significant problem with anti-Semitism historically. Nevertheless, anti-Jewish legislation was implemented in 1940, but the impact was generally less harsh. Economic and social restrictions were imposed on the Jewish community. To minimize Jewish concentration in urban centers, many Jews were dispersed throughout the country. Some Jewish men of working age were deported to slave-labor camps within the country, but none to death camps. Due to a shortage of medical personnel during the war, Jewish doctors and pharmacists were allowed to be released from labor camps and given assignments in Bulgarian territories. Some leniency for converts to Christianity and for Jewish war veterans was also provided. Bulgarians did enact a law that required Jews to wear a plastic yellow button, but that law was revoked quickly.

In 1944, the Bulgarians overturned their anti-Jewish laws after years of resisting pressure from the Germans to deport their Jews. The Bulgarian Jews were largely spared. The Jews of Bulgaria were considered Bulgarian by their government. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church also protested anti-Jewish treatment. This explains why so few lives were lost. Those who were killed, were killed because they were of a differing nationality. In 1943, Jews from the annexed territories, including Thrace in Greece and Macedonia in Yugoslavia, were deported by the Bulgarian government to Treblinka and were all subsequently murdered at the death camp.

Today, however, there remain few Jews in Bulgaria. More than 40,000 Bulgarian Jews immigrated to Israel after World War II and the establishment of a Communist government.

Greece

Jews had been in Greece since ancient times. At the time of World War II, the Jewish population of Greece numbered about 76,000. About 3,500 Jews lived in the capital of Athens and about 2,000 on the island of Corfu. There was also an old Sephardic settlement in Salonika (Thessaloniki) of about 55,000 that could trace its origins to the fifteenth century.

The Greek Jewish community was very traditional, with little formal education and large, close-knit families. Most Jews were employed in professions involving trade and commerce and spoke Ladino. Despite increasing anti-Semitic propaganda, about 13,000 Jews fought in the Greek army at the time of the German invasion. The area of Salonika was occupied by German forces that were fully intent on the destruction of the Jewish community there.

Restrictions on the Jewish community in Greece began in July 1942 with the introduction of forced labor and ghettoization. The Germans were able to subdue the Jewish population by promising them relocation to Poland, offering them Polish money, and convincing their chief rabbi to go along with German orders to save their lives. After the deportations began, over 60,000 Jews were killed, mostly at Auschwitz, exterminated in the gas chambers. The process began immediately upon arrival.

Putting up a strong resistance to the Germans, the internal population of Greece was less likely to aid in the Final Solution than in other locations. In Athens, Greeks assisted local Jewish leaders in disappearing into the mountains. Others were able to survive by joining the Greek resistance movement. Some avoided it through intermarriage with non-Jews. Yad Vashem lists 313 Greeks amongst the righteous gentiles for their efforts to save the Jews. Among the notable was

Archbishop Damaskinos Papandreou (1891–1949) of Athens. He spoke out on behalf of Greece’s Jewish citizens. He encouraged his fellow Greeks to do all they could to protect them, to hide them, and to aid their escape. Quoting the Apostle Paul, he publicly proclaimed, “In our national consciousness, all the children of Mother Greece are an inseparable unity: they are equal members of the national body irrespective of religion . . . Our holy religion does not recognize superior or inferior qualities based on race or religion, as it is stated: ‘There is neither Jew nor Greek.’” Despite his courageous efforts, between 80 and 90 percent of Greek Jews were murdered in the Final Solution. Greece, in fact, suffered one of the highest percentages of losses of its Jewish population during World War II.

Romania

Romania had one of the largest Jewish populations in Europe at the start of World War II. It had a population of over 700,000. According to the 2004 International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania Final Report, which was prepared under the direction of Elie Wiesel (1928–), a Holocaust survivor from Sighetu Marmatiei in Transylvania, approximately 280,000 to 380,000 Jews died in Romania or in lands controlled by Romania. Under the dictatorship of General Ion Antonescu (1882–1946), Romania enthusiastically participated in the elimination of its Jewish population and Jewish communities in occupied territories. As in other countries, Jews were first subjected to anti-Semitic legislation and then received harsher treatment. Beginning in 1940, laws were passed to start the process of removing Jews from the economy and from national life. Jews were expelled from government service, schools, and the arts. Legislation was also enacted to provide for Romanian control over Jewish personal

and commercial property. Religious properties, including synagogues, cemeteries, and residences for rabbis, were seized. Jewish agricultural properties were seized and turned over to the state and then Jews were expelled from rural areas. Skilled Jews were used to train Romanian workers, but unskilled Jews were not as lucky. They were made to work in labor camps under difficult conditions. Non-Jewish Romanians were permitted by law to take any Jewish living quarters they desired as their own. Jews were prohibited from marrying non-Jews and prohibited from having Romanian names. At one point, Jews were even prohibited from converting to Christianity. These were facets of the larger program of homogenizing Romania’s people known as “Romanianization” and protecting “Romanian blood.”

In addition to state-sanctioned discrimination, Romania’s Jews were subjected to sporadic violence and pogroms. The Bucharest pogrom of January 1941 resulted in the murder of about 120 Jews. Later, in June 1941, several thousand Jews were killed in the Iași pogrom. Many Romanian Jews were deported to Transnistria in the western Ukraine. Many died of starvation and disease. Others were simply massacred.

What Jewish life remained in Romania was difficult and desperate. In a curious turn, Antonescu refused to comply with German orders to deport Romania’s Jews to the death camps. Although a confirmed anti-Semite, it appeared he had his own agenda and was not prepared to follow the orders of an invading government. In this regard, many Romanian Jews escaped a worse fate.

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia originally tried to preserve its neutrality. After a pro-German government was overthrown by pro-British officers,

Germany and Italy invaded the country in the spring of 1941 and partitioned the country. Macedonia was given to Bulgaria to control, while Croatia was a German satellite that was created by the German government. The Croatian government was an extremist, nationalist government that served at the whim of German authority, a true “puppet” state ironically called, “the Independent State of Croatia.”

Consequently, Croatia initiated many of the discriminatory practices against the Jews that were found in Germany as soon as they took power in 1941 and immediately set in place the mechanisms for genocide. Jews were forced to wear the yellow Star of David as in Germany. They believed the Jews were an inferior race and sought their destruction. Ultimately defeated by the Soviets and Yugoslav partisans, the Germans left the country in 1945. Only 76,000 Jews lived in Yugoslavia, which was less than one-half of 1 percent of the population. The Jewish community was engaged in industry, trade, and commerce, with the Jews in Serbia and Croatia being financially more successful than in other regions. They enjoyed full civic and economic freedoms until the 1930s, when a few laws were passed restricting their access to higher education and business licenses.

In Serbia, which had no tradition of anti-Semitism prior to the German occupation, Jews were rounded up by the Germans and shot by the thousands. By mid-1942, Jews were eliminated from Serbia. In Croatia, deportation began in 1942 to Auschwitz, while some of the Jews were either shot or died in forced labor camps. Croatia killed almost 50 percent of its Jewish population in their own labor camps. About 60,000 Yugoslav Jews perished during this period. The Macedonian region was under the control of the Bulgarians as part of an

agreement with the Germans and the Jews living there were deported and perished in Treblinka.

Bonnie K. Levine-Berggren

See also: Albania in World War II; Bulgaria in World War II; Greece in World War II; Romania in World War II; Yugoslavia in World War II

Further Reading

Dawidowicz, Lucy S. *The War against the Jews, 1933–1945*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1975.

Hilberg, Raul. *The Destruction of the European Jews*. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1985.

Mojzes, Paul. *Balkan Genocides*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011.

Totten, Samuel, and William S. Parsons, eds. *Centuries of Genocide*. 4th ed. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Horseshoe, Operation, 1998

Operation Horseshoe is the name sometimes given to the attempt by Serbian armed units to squeeze the Albanian population out of most of Kosovo by applying force on three sides. The Serbian failure in the Yugoslav Wars and especially the expulsion of most of the Serbian population from Croatia put pressure on the Belgrade government to maintain control of the heavily Albanian region of Kosovo.

The Kosovo insurgency began in 1996 when a well-armed and well-organized Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began to attack Serbian police and civilians. By 1998, the insurgency had gained control of considerable territory in Kosovo. The government of Slobodan Milošević (1941–2007) undertook a counterattack sometimes termed Operation Horseshoe. After the

expulsion or murder of much of the Kosovo Albanian population, the Serbian government's intention was then to repopulate Kosovo with Serbian refugees from Croatia.

The Serbian offensive began on February 28, 1998. Using heavy weapon and air power, the Serbs drove the KLA back, killing a number of civilians and forcing several hundred thousand from their homes. Most of these fled to Albania and Macedonia. Threats of United Nations sanctions and NATO airstrikes caused Milošević to feign compliance with demands to withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo. At the same time, Serbian military units continued to attack Kosovar civilians. Renewed violence at the beginning of 1999 led the Serbs to again force the Albanian population from Kosovo. In response, NATO began on March 24 its "Allied Force" air campaign against Serbian targets in Kosovo and Serbia. The Serbs forced an additional 200,000 Kosovo Albanians into Albania and Macedonia. Many died in the difficult conditions of the refugee camps. These expulsions ended only when NATO ground forces entered Kosovo two days after Milošević signed a peace agreement on June 10, 1999. He was indicted for war crimes in Kosovo.

Whether Operation Horseshoe began in February 1998 or in January or March 1999 remains unclear. Whenever it began, or whether it even really existed, the Serbian actions associated with Operation Horseshoe remain one of the most notorious examples of ethnic cleansing in post-World War II European history. Overall at least 300,000 Kosovo Albanians were displaced during this time.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Milošević, Slobodan (1941–2006); Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Judah, Tim, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.

Thomas, N., and K. Mikulan. *The Yugoslav Wars (2), Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992–2001*, Botely, Oxford: Osprey, 2006.

Wolfgram, Mark A. "Operation Horseshoe Did Not Exist." <http://www8.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/wolfgram.doc>.

Hoxha, Enver (1908–1985)

Founder of the Albanian Communist Party and Albanian head of state (1944–1985), Enver Hoxha was born on October 16, 1908, in Gjinokaster, Albania. Hoxha studied at a French secondary school in Korçë, Albania, and then at the University of Montpellier in France. While in France, he began writing for a Communist newspaper. In 1934, he became a secretary in the Albanian consulate in Brussels, but his consular appointment was canceled in 1936 because of articles he wrote criticizing the Albanian monarchy. He then returned to Albania to teach French in Korçë.

In 1939, the Italian army invaded Albania, ousted the monarchy, and established a puppet regime. Hoxha was fired from his teaching position for refusing to join the Albanian Fascist Party. He opened a retail tobacco store in Tirana that also served as a front for his Communist activities. In 1940, he became the founder and head of the Albanian Communist Party, also serving as editor of the party's newspaper. During World War II, Hoxha assembled a guerrilla force of 70,000 men that fought the occupying Italian army and then the Germans who arrived to assist their ally. In 1944, the Italians withdrew their forces from Albania. Soon thereafter, the Communists established

a provisional Albanian government in October 1944 with Hoxha as prime minister and defense minister.

The Western Allies recognized this government in 1945, expecting that Albania would later hold free elections. When elections were held and the Communists were the only candidates, Great Britain and the United States rescinded their recognition. The country's leaders proclaimed a People's Republic in Albania in January 1946. Yugoslav Communists had assisted their Albanian comrades during the war, and the two states engaged in a monetary and customs union after World War II. Suspicious of his neighbor's desires to make Albania a province of Yugoslavia, however, Hoxha cut all ties with Yugoslavia in 1948. That same year, he renamed the Albanian Communist Party the Workers' Party. He relinquished the premiership to Mehmet Shehu in 1954 but remained in control as head of the party with the title of first secretary.

In 1961, Hoxha cut his nation's ties with the Soviet Union in response to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's (1894–1971) de-Stalinization campaign. At about the same time, the Soviet Union severed relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Hoxha then began relying on the PRC for economic support, viewing Mao Zedong

(1893–1976) as the only true Stalinist remaining in power. Shortly after Mao's death in 1976, relations between China and Albania began to cool as Hoxha criticized the new Chinese leadership. The PRC ended all assistance programs to Albania in 1978.

As Hoxha's health declined in the late 1970s, preparations began for a succession of leadership. In 1980, he appointed Ramiz Alia (1925–2011) as the party's first secretary, bypassing longtime premier Mehmet Shehu (1913–1981). Hoxha tried to persuade Shehu to step aside voluntarily. When this failed, he had the Politburo publicly rebuke Shehu, who allegedly committed suicide in 1981. Hoxha died in Tirana on April 11, 1985, his nation the most cut off from the outside world in all Europe.

John David Rausch Jr.

See also: Albania in World War II; Partisans, Albania; Yugoslav-Soviet Split

Further Reading

Halliday, Jon, ed. *The Artful Albanian: Memoirs of Enver Hoxha*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1986.

Orizio, Riccardo. *Talk of the Devil: Encounters with Seven Dictators*. Translated by Avril Bardoni. New York: Walker, 2002.

Ilinden Uprising, 1903

The *Ilinden*, or St. Elijah's Day, Uprising took place in Ottoman-ruled Macedonia and Thrace in August 1903. It is sometimes called the *Ilinden-Preobrazhenski* (St. Elijah's Day–Transfiguration Feast Day) uprising because it began on St. Elijah Day, August 2 according to the old calendar (August 15, new style); and because on August 6 (August 19, new style), a republic was proclaimed at Krushevo in the Ottoman province of Monastir (Bitola) in Macedonia and a revolt erupted in the Ottoman province of Adrianople.

In 1893, the predecessor of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) was founded in Salonika. It established cells throughout Macedonia in order to prepare for a general uprising. The uprising began on Ilinden, August 3. In Krushevo, a "Republic of Krushevo" was proclaimed. On August 6, pro-Bulgarian elements in the Adrianople province revolted and proclaimed a "Republic of Strandzha," named after the local mountain range. Initially the rebels enjoyed some local success. Undoubtedly most of the Slavic-speaking Christian population and many of the Vlachs supported the uprising. The other peoples in Macedonia, among them Jews, Greeks, Slavic-speaking Muslims, and Turks, were less enthusiastic.

Ottoman authorities responded quickly against the lightly armed rebels with their regular army as well as with irregular forces. The Bulgarian government failed to respond

to appeals for help. The Great Powers applied pressure to force Bulgaria to remain inactive. Also, the Sofia government was reluctant to support a movement that it did not directly control. As a result, the revolt sputtered through September. By October, it was over. Casualties were high. As many as 8,816 men, women, and children perished in the revolt, 200 villages were burned, and 30,000 refugees fled, mainly to Bulgaria.

The revolt was ill conceived, ill timed, and ill led. Nevertheless, it had several important consequences. In the aftermath of the revolt, the Austro-Hungarians and Russians reached the so-called Mürzteg agreement. At a hunting lodge in Mürzteg Styria, Austro-Hungarian emperor Franz Joseph (1830–1916) and Russian tsar Nicholas II (1861–1918) reaffirmed the status quo in the Balkans and sanctioned a largely stillborn reform program for the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The Ilinden Uprising also motivated the Sofia government to strengthen its position in the Balkans so that it could respond more directly to a future revolt. In 1904, Bulgaria and Serbia reached an economic and political agreement. While this proved to be transient, in 1912, they formed the alliance that served the basis for the First Balkan War. This war ended Ottoman rule in almost all of Europe. Finally, modern Macedonian historiography recognizes the Ilinden Uprising as an import effort for national identity and independence carried out by Macedonians as distinct from Bulgarians.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Macedonia; VMRO

Further Reading

Crampton, R. J. *Bulgaria 1878–1918: A History*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1983.

Perry, Duncan. *The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Revolutionary Movements, 1893–1903*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988.

Rossos, Andrew. *Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2008.

Iron Guard

The Iron Guard was an extreme right-wing (Fascist) organization that existed in Romania from 1927 to 1941. Also known as the Legion of the Archangel Michael (LAM), it professed anti-Communist and anti-Semitic views and became infamous for its role in the Romanian Holocaust.

Corneliu Zelea Codreanu (1899–1938), the founder of the Iron Guard, initially helped establish the League of National Christian Defense in 1922, but he later broke up with it and formed the LAM in 1927. In its early days, Codreanu declared that the LAM had no program and only embraced a fierce belief in God while promoting nationalism and anticorruption. In spring 1930, Codreanu and his followers formed a new militant organization called *Garda de Fier* (“The Iron Guard”) to combat Communist and antinationalist forces; yet since only the LAM joined it, this in effect was but a change of name. At the same time, LAM agitators went to the countryside in hopes of mobilizing peasant masses in support of their organization and oftentimes against the Jews. Pogroms followed in multiple towns and villages across Romania,

and the Iron Guard was subsequently declared illegal in 1933 by Prime Minister Ion Duca (1879–1933). This did not discourage the Iron Guard activists, who assassinated Duca in retaliation, and the movement flourished.

Between 1934 and 1937, the Iron Guard assumed a mass following and won up to 25 percent of all votes in multiple elections, though under an assumed name of the All for the Fatherland Party. Realizing that the movement could no longer be successfully banned or controlled, King Carol II (1893–1953) invited Codreanu in February 1937 to form a government, an offer he refused. In response, King Carol declared all parties illegal and assumed dictatorial powers, arresting Codreanu and several other legionaries in the process. Codreanu and his 13 followers were assassinated in 1938, presumably during an escape attempt, and the Iron Guard once again retaliated by killing Prime Minister Armand Calinescu (1893–1939). After a temporary exile and multiple persecutions, Horia Sima (1907–1993), the new leader of the Iron Guard, and other legionaries were allowed to return to Romania in April 1940.

Though the violence against Jews was not novel to the movement, the Iron Guards committed their most gruesome acts between their return in 1940 and the final crackdown on the movement in 1941. During these months, at least 600 Jews were slaughtered, though the number was probably higher. Many were tortured, humiliated, and brutally beaten before they were murdered. Ion Antonescu (1882–1946), who received full dictatorial powers on September 6, 1940, initially attempted to form a government with the Iron Guard leaders, but the relationship turned sour quickly. The situation worsened when the Iron Guards broke into the prison and

brutally murdered 64 former politicians and officers who were incarcerated for their suspected involvement in Codreanu's murder. In this tense environment, Antonescu prepared to crush the Iron Guards with Hitler's approval, while Sima was preparing a coup to oust Antonescu.

On January 21, 1941, the legionaries' riot broke out in Bucharest, and a massacre followed. Also known as the Bucharest pogrom, this violence directly touched at least 1,360 Jews, of which 1,107 were tortured or murdered, and six synagogues were desecrated. It was also the most gruesome of all prior cases; dead bodies were hanged on meat hooks with their intestines out and had "Kosher meat" signs on them. The riot was put down three days later, over 9,000 Iron Guards were arrested, and the movement was crushed. Sima, however, along with many others, went into exile in Spain, from where he continued his political engagements until his death in 1993.

Irina Mukhina

See also: Carol II, King of Romania (1893–1953); Romania in World War II

Further Reading

Ioanid, Radu. *The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940–1944*. Published in Association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000.

Klepper, Nicolae. *Romania: An Illustrated History*. New York: Hippocrene Books, 2002.

Livezeanu, Irina. *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.

Morgan, Philip. *Fascism in Europe, 1919–1945*. London: Routledge, 2003.

Italy in the Balkans during World War I

After achieving national unity in 1861, the Italian government continued to harbor aspirations to territories beyond the Italian Peninsula. Many of these were in the Balkan Peninsula. They included Dalmatia, at that time ruled by the Habsburg Empire, and Albania, then under the authority of the Ottoman Empire. During the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, Italy and its nominal ally Austria-Hungary cooperated at the London Ambassadors Conference to insure Great Power support for an independent Albania. The Treaty of London of May 30, 1913, confirmed Albanian independence. This thwarted the attempts of Balkan allies Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia to take over this territory. After the outbreak of World War I, the fragile new Albanian state collapsed. In early December 1914, before they entered the war themselves, the Italians sent troops to occupy the city of Vlorë (Valona) and the Adriatic island of Sazan (Saseno) off of Vlorë. This action was intended to maintain Italy's interests in Albania as Greek, Montenegrin, and Serbian troops occupied parts of the country, and to insure that Austro-Hungarian influence did not increase there.

After the outbreak of the war in the summer of 1914, the Italians negotiated with both belligerent alliances. On April 26, 1915, they agreed to enter the war on the side of the Entente. In return, Italy was to receive the Balkan areas of Vlorë and Sazan as well as a protectorate in central Albania. Italy was also to obtain most of Dalmatia. This brought Italy into direct competition with Serbia, which also sought to gain Habsburg Adriatic territories. Balkan interests remained subordinate to Italy's

desire to acquire Austrian Alpine territories. Nevertheless, in order to realize their Albanian ambitions, the Italians expanded their presence to Vlorë's hinterland. 80,000 Italian troops landed at Vlorë in the autumn of 1915. At the end of 1915, they established a line of control in the north along the Shkumbin River. After they defeated and overran Montenegro and Serbia, Austro-Hungarian forces occupied Albania north of that river. In June 1917, the Italians proclaimed a protectorate over Albania. At the same time, they extended their control over southern Albania to expel Greek irregular and pro-King Constantine forces from northern Epirus. Italian forces in Albania also made contact with other Entente forces along the Macedonian front, which then stretched from the Adriatic Sea at the mouth of the Shkumbin River to the Aegean Sea near the mouth of the Struma River.

In response to the pleas of their Entente allies, the Italians dispatched the 35th Infantry Division to Salonika to buttress the Entente effort there. They would have preferred to add this division to the Italian forces in Albania, which engaged in regular conflict with the Austro-Hungarians. This division assumed positions in the bend of the Cherna River in the central part of the Macedonian Front. For most of the war, it made little headway against the Bulgarians. It did participate in the great Entente offensive of September 1918, which broke through the Bulgarian positions further east at Dobro Pole and resulted in the withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war.

The armistice of November 11, 1918, did not end the Italian effort in the Balkans. They continued to maintain considerable forces in Albania. The Rome government intended to establish a protectorate over as much of Albania as possible and to prevent

Greek and Serbian (Yugoslav) claims at a minimum. On July 20, 1919, Italy and Greece concluded the so-called Tittoni-Venizelos agreement, by which Greece recognized the Italian protectorate over Albania. In return, the Italians accepted Greek control of northern Epirus. The establishment of a viable Albanian central government as a result of the Congress of Lushnjë in 1920 and Italian domestic instability led the Italians to sign an agreement on September 3, 1920, with the new Albanian government to withdraw from Albania. The island of Sazan remained under Italian control. The Italians would return within 20 years.

Nor did the end of the fighting in 1918 indicate the conclusion of Italian efforts in Dalmatia. The Paris Peace settlement refused to honor the commitment made in the 1915 Treaty of London to give Dalmatia to Italy. Instead Dalmatia became a part of the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia). The border between the two states remained contentious until the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo of November 12, 1920, which assigned to Italy Istria, the Adriatic islands of Cres, Lastovo, and Lošinj, and the Dalmatian city of Zadar (Zara). Italian Adriatic holding grew further in 1924 when Italy annexed the free city of Fiume (Rijeka). Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) did not abandon Italy's Balkan interests. After taking power in Rome in 1922, he gradually restored the Italian protectorate over Albania and adopted a hostile position toward Greece and Yugoslavia. Italy returned in force to the region beginning in the spring of 1939.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Albania in the Balkan Wars; Albania in World War I; Fiume/Rijeka, 1919–1924; London, Treaty of, 1913

Further Reading

Burgwyn, H. James. *The Legend of Mutilated Victory: Italy, the Great War and the Paris Peace Conference*. London: Greenwood, 1993.

Sifka-Theodosiou, Aneliki. "The Italian Presence on the Balkan Front (1915–1918)," *Balkan Studies* 36, no. 1 (1995): 69–82.

Villari, Luigi. *The Macedonian Campaign*. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1922.

Italy in the Balkans during World War II

The Italians had long harbored ambitions in the Balkans. Even before World War I, they had aspired to areas of the Austro-Hungarian Adriatic coast and to Ottoman Albania. The Treaty of London of 1915 promised most of these areas to Italy in return for participation in the war on the side of the Entente powers. Only Woodrow Wilson's (1856–1924) adamant refusal at the Paris Peace conference in 1919 to transfer large populations of Albanians and South Slavs to Italian control prevented the terms of the treaty from being realized. All Italy obtained was the port of Zara (Zadar) and a few Adriatic Islands. In 1923, they also annexed the port of Fiume (Rejeka) after it had endured a brief period of independence.

None of these gains were enough to satisfy the aspirations of Benito Mussolini (1883–1945). He spoke of reestablishing the Roman Empire and called the Mediterranean Sea "our lake." In pursuit of this aim, Mussolini adopted disruptive policies in the Balkans, especially toward the new Yugoslav state. After King Alexander (1888–1934) established his personal regime in Yugoslavia, Mussolini harbored anti-Yugoslav Croatian fascists (Ustaša). Italian agents were also involved in the assassination of King

Alexander in Marseille in 1934. During the 1930s, the Italians established a virtual protectorate in Albania through the government of King Zog (1895–1961).

In April 1939, seeking to emulate his German ally's annexation of Czechoslovakia the previous month, Mussolini ordered Italian forces to invade and occupy Albania. When they landed on April 7, 1939, they met some Albanian resistance, which they quickly overcame. Italian king Victor Emmanuel III (1869–1947) assumed Zog's title of king of the Albanians.

The conquest of Albania was insufficient to sate Mussolini's appetite for Balkan territory. He utilized the presence of Albanian minorities in Greece and Yugoslavia to raise territorial claims. The overwhelming German successes in western Europe in May and June 1940 and Italy's futile intervention in the war against France led Mussolini to seek military glory and "living space" in the Balkans. Since Germany had strong economic ties to Yugoslavia, Mussolini decided to act against Greece. In a rapid campaign he sought to overrun the Greek mainland and seize control of most of the Ionian and Aegean Islands.

The Italians intended to provoke the Greeks by undertaking a number of attacks, including the sinking of the Greek light cruiser *Helle* on August 15, 1940. Finally, on October 28, after the Greek government rejected an Italian ultimatum to allow Italian troops to occupy a number of strategic points throughout the country, the Italians invaded northwestern Greece from bases in Albania. The Italian forces quickly bogged down because of the rugged terrain and the fierce resistance they encountered. A Greek counteroffensive threw the Italians out of Greece and out of about a quarter of Albania. The Italian-Greek War stalemated through much of the winter of 1940–1941.



Italian prime minister Benito Mussolini on the Greek front, observing Italian troops on the Narta Mount, March 1941. (Roger Viollet/Getty Images)

The arrival of British airmen and soldiers drew the attention of German dictator Adolf Hitler (1889–1945). He decided to intervene on behalf of his beleaguered ally.

The Germans prepared Operation Marita for an attack on Greece. A coup by a pro-British cabal of Yugoslav Air Force officers in Belgrade on April 26 forced the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the plans for the operation. German, Hungarian, and Italian troops invaded Yugoslavia on April 6. The Yugoslavs surrendered on April 17. German and Italian troops continued on into Greece. Greek forces surrendered on April 20.

The defeat of Greece and Yugoslavia made the realization of an Italian empire in the Balkans possible. The Italians occupied much of Greece. They annexed much of Slovenia and most of the Adriatic Coast. Montenegro was restored as a kingdom with Victor Emanuel assuming his father-in-law King Nikola's (1841–1921) old title. They attached parts of Kosovo and

Macedonia to Albania. Italy also assumed a zone of influence in the new Ustaša-ruled state of Croatia.

Expansion into the Balkans soon proved to be far beyond the resources of Mussolini's Italy. In the summer of 1941, resistance to Italian rule emerged throughout the region. This was especially the case in Montenegro and in Bosnia, then under Croatian rule. Italian troops initially responded with brutality. While that temporarily succeeded in suppressing the outbreaks, the Italians realized that they lacked the means and the will to continue that way. By the fall of 1941, local Italian commanders sought arrangements with Serbian resistance forces (Četniks). They supplied weapons and exchanged intelligence. By the winter of 1942, they began to cooperate in military operations against the Communist Partisans. Although the Italian occupation forces in Greece and Yugoslavia frequently behaved with great brutality and occasionally

perpetrated horrific atrocities, in comparison to the Germans, they appeared relatively benign. Jews and others seeking to escape harsh conditions in German-ruled areas of Greece and Yugoslavia frequently sought refuge in the Italian areas.

Nevertheless, by 1943, the Italians were becoming exhausted from their efforts in the Balkans and their failures in North Africa and Soviet Russia. Whole areas nominally under Italian occupation were devoid of Italian military presence. Strong resistance movements developed even in previously quiescent Albania. The coup in Rome ousting Mussolini on July 25, 1943, and the subsequent Italian surrender on September 8 meant doom for the Italian empire in the Balkans and for many of the Italian servicemen stationed there. The Germans moved quickly to occupy strategic locations in the Italian-occupied territories and to disarm the Italian armed forces. The Germans met shows of Italian reluctance or resistance with great brutality. Most Italian troops were interned or killed. A few managed to escape and join local Albanian, Greek, and Yugoslav resistance groups. Mussolini's dreams of an Italian empire in the Balkans ended tragically for Italians and for Balkan peoples.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Četniks; Fiume/Rijeka, 1919–1924; Greco-Italian War, 1940–1941; Nikola, King of Montenegro (1841–1921); Partisans, Albania; Partisans, Yugoslavia; Ustaša; Zog, King of the Albanians (1895–1961)

Further Reading

Burgwyn, H. James. *Mussolini Warlord: Failed Dreams of Empire, 1940–1943*. New York: Enigma Books, 2012.

Pavlowitch, Stavan K. *Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

Thomas, N., and K. Mikulan. *Axis Forces in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945*. Oxford: Osprey, 1995.

Tomasevich, Jozo. *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Izetbegović, Alija (1925–2003)

In September 1996, Alija Izetbegović was elected to the new tripartite presidency of Bosnia and was selected as the presidency's chairperson. Izetbegović was born on August 8, 1925, in Bosanski Samac, a town in northeastern Bosnia. His homeland had long been subjected to instability resulting from intense ethnic and religious differences on the Balkan Peninsula. In Izetbegović's youth, Bosnia was a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which had emerged after the Habsburg dynasty collapsed in World War I.

During World War II, the Nazis annexed Bosnia and terrorized the country. After the war, Communists led by Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) came to power, and Bosnia and Herzegovina became a member republic of Tito's Yugoslavia. Izetbegović, who, like Tito, had fought against the Nazi Party, now opposed the Communists and joined the Young Muslims to protect Islam. His dissent resulted in the government arresting him, and in March 1946, he was sentenced to five years at hard labor.

In 1951, Izetbegović began studying law in Sarajevo. After receiving his degree, he became a legal adviser to a construction company. Around 1980, he retired from this position and began writing about Islam. In 1984, his book *Islam between East and West* promoted the religion as a bridge between modern Western Europe and traditional Eastern European culture. By this

time, Tito had died, but Izetbegović's writings still raised government retribution. In 1983, he and several other prominent Muslims were sentenced to prison for disloyalty.

When Izetbegović was released in 1989, conditions in Yugoslavia were changing dramatically. The age-old ethnic and religious tensions grew, expressed through nationalist and anti-Communist fervor that eventually led to independence movements in many of Yugoslavia's provinces, particularly Croatia and Bosnia. In 1990, Izetbegović and other Muslim activists organized the *Stranka Demokratske Akcije* (SDA), or Party of Democratic Action. They demanded the establishment of a market economy, multi-party democracy, and a united Bosnia. In November, Bosnia held an open election, and Izetbegović ran as the SDA's candidate for the governing seven-member council. He received 37 percent of the vote and thus won a seat. In December, he was chosen president of the council, making him president of Bosnia. The question remained as to what Bosnia's relationship would be with the other Yugoslav states.

In 1991, a civil war erupted in neighboring Croatia. The following year, amid this turmoil, Bosnian Serbs declared their independence from Bosnia, claiming more than half of that state's territory. While Croatia, meanwhile, issued a declaration of independence from Yugoslavia and thus hastened the fall of that nation, Bosnia decided to hold its own referendum on nationhood. Bosnians voted overwhelmingly to break from Yugoslavia. Serb extremists in the Serbian areas then joined with the Yugoslav army, surrounded Sarajevo with roadblocks, and bombarded it.

Izetbegović had hoped to avoid bloodshed. All during 1991, he had contained radicals within his own Muslim community and

tried to reach a negotiated settlement with Yugoslavia. After Croatia seceded, however, it was clear that continued membership in Yugoslavia would mean domination by Serbs, who were now the most powerful group in the Yugoslav nation.

In April 1992, the United States and the European Community recognized Bosnia's independence. The Serbs, however, continued to attack Bosnian cities as they began "ethnic cleansing," forcing Muslims and Croats out of areas by relocating or killing them. Izetbegović entered negotiations with the Serbs, but at one point, while on his way back to Bosnia from Portugal (the site of the talks), they captured and threatened to kill him. An international protest led to his release after one night in captivity.

Throughout 1992, the situation in Bosnia worsened. Izetbegović tried to get the West to intervene with military assistance, if necessary, to stop the ethnic cleansing, but he obtained only a limited and uncoordinated response. In 1993, the United States and Britain proposed a plan that would divide Bosnia into provinces, each of them autonomous and distributed among Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. Izetbegović did not like the plan because it would allow the Serbs to keep land they had captured from the Bosnians and thus reward aggression. Bosnia's position, however, was weak, so he reluctantly agreed to the proposal. The Bosnian Serbs, though, rejected it and demanded a completely independent state carved from Bosnia.

By 1994, Izetbegović was presiding over a desperate situation. Although the Bosnian Serbs had a falling out with the Yugoslav Serbs who had supported them, they continued to battle Bosnia with great success. In addition, although Western European nations and the United States condemned Serb aggression, they did little to stop it

and restricted their military action to occasional air strikes against the Bosnian Serb army. Izetbegović was able to exert his authority only over a small portion of Bosnian territory, as the Serbs controlled most of it. Late in 1994, a precarious truce took hold in Bosnia, one that ultimately led to a more permanent peace, when in November 1995 Izetbegović and Croat and Serb leaders signed a peace accord known as the Dayton Agreement (1995), ending the fighting in Bosnia.

The agreement called the establishment of a tripartite presidency, with representatives from each of the three groups. In the ensuing election, held in September 1996, Izetbegović was elected as the Bosnian representative to the presidency. As the recipient of the largest number of votes, Izetbegović was also appointed to serve a two-year term as chairperson of the presidency.

Citing health reasons, Izetbegović announced in June 2000 that he would step down in October, two years before his term expired. He was replaced by Martin Raguz (1958–). Izetbegović died on October 19, 2003, of complications from injuries received from a fall at his home.

Neil A. Hamilton

See also: Bosnian War, 1992–1995; Dayton Peace Accords, 1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Kaplan, Robert D. *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Magas, Branka. *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Breakup 1980–1992*. New York: Verso, 1993.

Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. New York: TV Books, 1996.

Janina, Siege of, 1912–1913

The siege of Janina (Albanian: Janinë; Greek: Ioánnina; Turkish: Yanya) was a protracted engagement during the First Balkan War, 1912–1913. Janina was the seat of the Ottoman vilayet of the same name. Although the mixed population of the city was predominantly Greek, the countryside was mainly Albanian. Janina was the southern counterpart of Scutari (Shkodër), a fortified city on a lake. Together, Janina and Scutari marked the northern and southern expectations of Albanian nationalists. The Ottomans had fortified the city under the direction of General Colmar von der Goltz (1843–1916). Fortified positions protected the west, south, and east of the city. The most important of these was Fort Bizani (Bijan), southeast of the city. At the beginning of the First Balkan War, there were two Ottoman divisions and about 90 big guns in the city, under the command of Brigadier General Esat Pasha (1862–1952). It was the main objective of the Greek campaign in Epirus.

The Greek Army of Epirus, under the command of General Constantine Sapundzakes (1846–1931), reached the city at the beginning of November. An Italian volunteer legion under the command of General Ricciotti Garibaldi (1847–1924), the son of Italian national hero Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882), soon joined the Greeks. By that time, Albanian irregulars and Ottoman troops retreating from Macedonia had supplemented the garrison. The besieging forces lacked sufficient numbers to extend

their lines completely around the city and the lake of the same name north of the city, leaving the north open. For that reason the garrison continued to receive reinforcements and supplies from the Albanian hinterland. The Greeks did not sign the armistice, mainly in order to continue their siege operations at Janina. The first Greek assault on the fortress on December 14 took some forward Ottoman positions, but not Fort Bijan. After seizing Koritsa northeast of Janina on December 20, 1912, the Greeks were able to expand their lines around the northeastern corner of Janina and restrict the flow of reinforcements and supplies into the city. The Ottomans maintained an active defense, launching counterattacks against the Greek positions. Another full frontal Greek assault on the city failed on January 22. Crown Prince Constantine (1868–1923) then assumed command of the besieging forces. Another attack began on March 5. It pushed past Fort Bijan and soon overwhelmed the exhausted defenders. Esat Pasha surrendered the morning of the next day. The Greeks took around 8,600 Ottoman prisoners and 108 guns at a cost of 500 dead and wounded. Another 2,800 Ottomans died in the final battle. Much of the Ottoman garrison was able to escape to the northeast. The conclusion of the siege enabled the Greeks to shift much of their army eastward for the looming confrontation with Bulgaria over Macedonia.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Albania in the Balkan Wars; Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Greece in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Erickson, Edward J. *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Hellenic Army General Staff. *A Concise History of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, Athens: Army History Directorate, 1998.

JNA (Yugoslav People's Army)

The JNA, *Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija*, is the common abbreviation for the Yugoslav People's Army, which existed between 1945 and 1992 as the military arm of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The JNA grew out of the Yugoslav partisan army of World War II and lasted until the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia collapsed into civil war in the 1990s. In 1992, the JNA transitioned into being the military of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (composed of Serbia and Montenegro, which were not universally recognized under the name Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).

Germany, Italy, and Hungary invaded Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, after Serbian military officers led a coup against the Yugoslav government, which had bowed under German pressure to join the Tripartite Pact, the Axis powers of World War II. An armistice was reached 11 days later, with the Serbian-dominated Royal Yugoslav Army surrendering, but guerilla warfare resistance movements were formed and lasted until the end of the war. The largest resistance movements were the Četniks, a Serbian nationalist movement, and a Communist Party movement, both of which eventually came into conflict with each other, as well as the forces of the puppet governments set up by Germany.

The roots of the JNA derive from the National Liberation Army (NLA), the “Partisans,” which used some nationalist rhetoric against the occupation but was politically organized as the military expression of a Communist political movement. The Partisan resistance movement benefited from commanders with experience in the Royal Yugoslav Army and generals who had fought in the Spanish Civil War. In addition to locally organized resistance units typical of guerilla warfare against a stronger occupying force, the Proletarian Brigades were formed with soldiers drawn from across Yugoslavia and were designed to be used throughout the country. The Proletarian Brigades were intentionally and openly designed to be a political component of the Communist movement in Yugoslavia. Despite large numbers of occupying Axis forces and numerous German offensives against concentrations of Partisan forces, the NLA was able to seize territory throughout the war and eventually use conventional warfare tactics to drive the Axis forces from Yugoslavia with heavy Soviet and Western ally support.

Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) had become the leading figure of the Partisan resistance forces during World War II. The mass-resistance, guerilla-warfare nature of the Partisans led to an inherent blurring of military-civilian distinctions in the NLA that existed alongside the administrative structures created by the resistance government of the Communist movement, the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). The popular support for the NLA during the war, which had not relied simply on anti-occupation nationalism, provided an important source of political legitimacy for the Communist-led government after the war. Alternative political movements were

ruthlessly suppressed. On March 1, 1945, the NLA was formally renamed the Yugoslav Army, which would later be renamed the Yugoslav People's Army on December 22, 1951.

The JNA operational doctrine was rooted in the independent foreign policy of Yugoslavia, the experience of the NLA during World War II, and the increased threat of invasion from the Soviet Union after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The greatest military threats, as during World War II, were assumed to come from much more powerful countries since Yugoslavia was sandwiched both geographically and politically between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. After World War II, Yugoslavia positioned itself as a non-aligned Communist state, having split with the Soviet Union over economic, territorial, and political issues. Yugoslavia continued to receive economic and military aid that had begun during World War II and continued into the early 1950s from the United States and other Western powers. Until the thawing of relations with the Soviet Union during the late 1950s, Yugoslavia invested heavily in a traditional conventional military through enormous domestic expenditure and military aid from the United States (approximately 500,000 active military with large mobilization capacity). By the 1960s, the size of the JNA had been cut by more than half as the perceived external threat declined.

A new vision of the JNA was developed under the doctrine of Total National Defense in 1969 after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact. Unable to resume massive military spending, the Yugoslav government saw the invasion as a warning that the Soviet Union might begin to see the invasion of Yugoslavia as something that could be achieved quickly and

easily without international consequence, bringing Yugoslavia under the Soviet Union's control. Costs aside, conventional resistance by a country the size of Yugoslavia to the asymmetric threat of the Soviet Union in the 1960s seemed futile at best. Instead, under the new doctrine, the JNA during the 1970s and 1980s was designed to fight an asymmetric war by using delaying actions at the borders of the country long enough that the mass of the public could form into resistance units throughout the country, but particularly in the urban centers and mountainous regions throughout Yugoslavia.

The goal of the doctrine was to deter invasion by having a military strategy designed around rapid mass-mobilization of the population and eventual widespread guerilla warfare resistance that would cause any invasion to be long and costly. In practice, the JNA would briefly delay a massive invasion long enough to be joined by a militia (fighting independently as the Territorial Defense Force [TDF], not subordinate to the JNA) composed of a majority of the population. Weapon stores, even if not fully modern, would be established throughout the entire country and would be immediately available to the TDF—e.g., each large factory would have its own weapon store. The JNA would then fight in concert with the militia, attacking and defending invading forces from all sides. As a last resort, the JNA would divide itself into smaller units and would switch to guerilla warfare alongside the mobilized population. As a small country with a potentially overwhelming threat, Yugoslavia was also unable politically to join the NATO alliance to deter aggression. The technological advantage of the Soviet military was also something Yugoslavia could not hope to compete with through conventional warfare. The role of the JNA was therefore

transformed into an important piece of a broader deterrence strategy focused on increasing the perceived costs of invasion. By delaying any overwhelming invasion long enough to arm and organize the minimally trained population, uncertainty would be introduced for the invader and the possibility created of a massive occupation force needed to deal with a lengthy guerilla war.

The political fragmentation of Yugoslavia began in January 1990 after the revolutions across Eastern Europe in 1989, but political tensions between constituent republics had been increasing dramatically for the decade after Tito's death on May 4, 1980. The JNA, ideologically supportive of communism as an institution, had played a role in keeping the country unified throughout Tito's leadership and played a political role in attempting to squash the increasing political conflicts between the republics of Yugoslavia after his death. A struggle for power and autonomy between constituent republics and the federal government, politically supported by escalating use of nationalism during the 1980s, led to Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence and a multisided war for territory beginning in June 1991. Multiparty elections held in Slovenia and Croatia in 1990 were seen as a threat to the JNA, which had a Serb-dominated officer corps.

The Territorial Defense Forces and their weapon stores would have helped Slovenia and Croatia develop separate militaries

from the JNA loyal to the increasingly independent republics. The JNA successfully seized the weapon stores of the Croatian TDF, but the JNA's attempts to neutralize the TDF of Slovenia in 1990 was only partially successful and had actually intensified the political crisis. Croatian and Slovenian officers in the JNA began working to build independent military organizations with arms smuggled into the country. By the summer of 1991, the JNA had failed in an attempt to maintain a unified Yugoslavia by preventing Slovenian independence and transformed into simply the army of Serbia fighting a war for territory in Croatia and Bosnia. On May 20, 1992, the JNA was officially transformed into the military of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of the former republics of Serbia and Montenegro.

Brian G. Smith

See also: Partisans, Yugoslavia; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. Vol. 2, *Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Rogel, Carole. *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998.

Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. New York: Penguin USA, 1996.

K

Kalimantsi, Battle of, 1913

The battle of Kalimantsi was an important engagement between the Bulgarian Fourth Army and the Serbian Third Army during the Second Balkan War in 1913. In the initial round of fighting in the Second Balkan War, the Bulgarian Fourth Army had suffered heavy losses in a defeat by the Serbian First and Third Armies around the Bregalnitsa River in southeastern Macedonia. On July 13, the Fourth and Fifth Armies came under the unified command of General Mihail Savov (1857–1928), the former deputy commander in chief of the Bulgarian army. He established strong defensive positions on the Bulgarian side of the old Bulgarian-Ottoman frontier in southeastern Macedonia on the Kalimantsi plateau. The Serbian Third Army under the command of General Božidar Janković (1849–1920) began its attacks on July 18 in pouring rain against the Bulgarian Fourth Army. An allied Montenegrin division participated in the attacks. The Bulgarians held their positions, pushing the Serbs back with bayonet charges. By July 19, the main fighting had ended, although some fighting continued in the area for the remainder of the war. Nevertheless, the Serbs were unable to proceed further.

This was an important defensive victory for the Bulgarians. The Serbs and Montenegrins lost around 2,700 dead and over 5,000 wounded. Bulgarian casualties were probably similar. The victory prevented a Serbian invasion of Bulgaria. It also allowed the Bulgarians to shift some forces south to

attack and contain the Greek army, then advancing up the Struma River valley. It was too late, however, to save Bulgaria. With Ottoman and Romanian forces moving unopposed into southeastern and northeastern Bulgaria, respectively, the Bulgarians had to accept an armistice on July 31, 1913.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan War, Second, 1913; Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Savov, Mihail (1857–1928)

Further Reading

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Skoko, Savo. *Drugi Balkanski rat 1913, Knjiga druga. Tok i završetak rata*. Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1968.

Karadžić, Radovan (1945–)

Radovan Karadžić served as the president of the former self-declared but unrecognized Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina until July 1996. Karadžić was born on June 19, 1945, in Petnjica, Yugoslavia. He trained as a psychiatrist and worked in state hospitals and then with Unis Co. In 1990, he cofounded the Serbian Democratic Party. He was the leader of the self-declared Serbian republic that was created within Bosnia after Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović declared the republic's independence from Yugoslavia in early 1992.

Karadžić denied that he and his associates officially endorsed the Serbian ethnic

cleansing campaigns that were conducted in efforts to create huge Serbian-held regions within Bosnia, repeatedly claiming that Serbian forces were merely trying to protect Serbian enclaves from attacks by the nation's Muslims. Karadžić agreed to resign from office in July 1996 following his indictment on war crimes charges. He appointed as his successor Biljana Plavšić (1930–), who in September 1996 was elected president of the Bosnian Serb region Republika Srpska.

In August 1997, Karadžić rejected a U.S. offer that would have allowed him to avoid extradition and prosecution for war crimes by relocating to another, undisclosed country. He continued to maintain a large and active following of hard-liners in Serbia and to dominate affairs in Serbia, many feel in violation of the Dayton Agreement.

In late December 2001, the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, still a dominant force in Bosnian Serb politics, expelled Karadžić, along with his closest aide and former Bosnian parliamentary speaker Momčilo Krajišnik (1945–). On July 21, 2008, Serbian authorities arrested the disguised Karadžić in Belgrade. They turned him over to the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague, Netherlands. As of 2011, he remained there as the legal case against him proceeded.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bosnian War, 1992–1995; Dayton Peace Accords, 1995; Srebrenica Massacre, 1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Cigar, Norman L. *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing."* College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995.

Fogelquist, Alan F. *Handbook of Facts on: The Break-Up of Yugoslavia International Policy and the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina.* Whitmore Lake, MI: AEIOU Publishing, 1993.

Magas, Branka. *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Breakup 1980–1992.* New York: Verso, 1993.

Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation.* New York: TV Books, 1996.

Karageorge (George Petrović; 1768–1818)

Karageorge, also known as “Black George” because of his long black hair, was a legendary leader and founder of the core of the modern Serbian state. Under his direction, rebel forces and local village chiefs achieved local autonomy then independence from the Ottoman Empire. Although the period of independence for Serbia under Karageorge was brief, he cleared a path for later Serbian nationalists to seize and secure the country's autonomy.

Born George Petrović on November 14, 1768, Karageorge was a peasant in Serbia who spent much of his youth herding goats. In 1787, he moved to Austria and joined the Austrian army. He earned distinction as a soldier on campaigns in Italy and against the Turks. By the early 1790s, he had returned to Serbia and settled down as a livestock trader and father of seven sons, one of whom, Alexander, would someday rule Serbia as a prince.

The province of Serbia had long been chafing under the rule of the Ottoman Turks. Imbued with strong nationalist sentiment, the Serbians longed for autonomy and the restoration of an independent Serbian state, although it had been centuries

since such a state existed. As the Ottoman Empire began to show signs of weakness in the early nineteenth century, nationalist factions within Serbia launched campaigns against the Turks to claim their independence.

In 1804, Karageorge, now a seasoned soldier, helped organize the rebel chiefs and priests against the rebellious Turkish Janissaries, an elite military corps that ruled Serbia in an arbitrary and cruel manner. The Serbian rebel force quickly defeated the Janissaries, earning for themselves the gratitude of Ottoman sultan Selim III (1761–1808), who viewed the Janissaries as an uncontrollable military force.

Karageorge demanded from Selim III Serbian autonomy in return, a proposal that Selim decidedly rejected. Encouraged by his military successes, Karageorge began a war of independence against the Turks in 1805. The following year, he led the Serbians to a series of victories against the Turks, most notably at battles in Misar and Belgrade. The Serbian cause was aided by the outbreak of war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in December 1806, which brought Russia into direct involvement in Serbian affairs. With tacit promises of Russian support, the Serbians continued their campaign against the Turks, convinced that the Russians would ensure Serbian independence if they won the war, one of many conflicts that made up the Napoleonic Wars. Russia did indeed defeat the Turks, but in the resulting treaty, Serbia's claims of autonomy were largely overlooked. With Serbia's status left undetermined, Karageorge soon found himself and his country in the midst of struggles and intrigues between the Austrian Empire, Russia, France, and the Ottoman Empire. In addition, although Karageorge had proven himself a strong and resourceful leader, his leadership was contested among the

Serbians. A constant undercurrent of diplomatic negotiations among the great European powers was the power struggle between Karageorge and Serbia's other chiefs and military leaders, foremost among them Miloš Obrenović (1780–1860), the future Prince Miloš.

By the end of 1808, Karageorge was growing tired of the endless international negotiations. He called together a group of officials and notables at his home and, after three days of traditional celebrations, had himself proclaimed "hereditary Supreme Leader." Almost three weeks later, the Russian State Council approved his actions. Russia recognized Karageorge as the strongest Serb leader and thus lent limited support for his rule. As a ruler, Karageorge quickly worked to consolidate his power, establishing an appointed council and ending local autonomy, as Karageorge assumed the power of appointing local chiefs rather than allowing them to be elected as was traditional.

The outbreak of the next phase of the Napoleonic Wars put an end to Russian protection or guidance for Serbia, as French emperor Napoleon I launched a massive campaign against Russia in 1812. Although the Treaty of Bucharest, signed by Russia and the Ottoman Empire that same year, guaranteed Serbia independence, the Turks took advantage of Russia's distraction to reconquer Serbia. By October 1813, the Turks had invaded Belgrade, and Karageorge had fled across the border into the Hungarian provinces of the Austrian Empire. When he asked to reside in Russia, the Austrians arrested him and his followers and kept them jailed in several locations. The Turks asked for his return, but the Austrians refused. The Russians finally succeeded in getting his transfer to the principality of Moldavia.

Another Serbian independence movement was launched in 1815 by Karageorge's old foe Obrenović. Karageorge and his followers hoped to return to Serbia to join in the fight, but Obrenović would not permit it. Nevertheless, Karageorge was smuggled into Serbia in June 1817 by the Society of Friends, a secret Greek organization working toward Greek independence. Their pleas for aid from Obrenović had been refused, and they hoped that Karageorge would support and lead a general insurrection against the Turks in the Balkans. When Obrenović discovered Karageorge's presence in Serbia, he ordered him killed, fearing that his rival would attempt to oust him from power. Karageorge was axed to death on July 25, 1817. Obrenović did not stop with his assassination, however. In order to placate the Ottoman sultan, Karageorge's head was stuffed and sent to Constantinople. His legendary exploits remained firmly rooted in Serbian minds, however, and his heirs rivaled for power with Obrenović's heirs in the decades to come.

Michael D. Johnson

See also: Obrenović, Miloš (1780–1860); Serbian War of Independence, 1804–1818

Further Reading

Clissold, Stephen, ed. *A Short History of Yugoslavia: From Early Times to 1966*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.

Dedijer, Vladimir, et al. *History of Yugoslavia*. Translated by Kordija Kveder. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974.

Petrovich, Michael Boro. *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804–1918*. 2 vols. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.

Kemal, Mustafa (1881–1938)

Turkish army general and political leader, and first president of the Turkish Republic,

Mustafa Kemal was born Mustafa Rizi in Salonika, Greece, on March 12, 1881. He began military schooling at age 12. Mustafa proved so adept at mathematics that he earned the nickname “Kemal,” meaning “The Perfect One.” The young man liked the name and made it part of his own, preferring to be known as Mustafa Kemal and later Kemal Atatürk.

Commissioned a lieutenant in 1902, Kemal served ably in a number of staff posts and combat commands. During the turbulent years before the outbreak of World War I, he became active in the emerging reformist Young Turk movement. In 1909, he took part in the march on Constantinople to depose Sultan Abdulhamid II (1842–1918) but soon after turned his attention away from politics to military matters. During 1911–1912, he saw action as a major during the Italo-Turkish War when the Italians invaded Libya. A year later, as a lieutenant colonel, he was chief of staff of a division based at Gallipoli during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913.

Kemal was overshadowed during this period by the rise of his flamboyant contemporary Enver Pasha (1881–1922), a dashing, politically minded officer, leader of the Young Turks, and a remarkably inept general. Kemal and Enver disagreed violently about the encouragement of German influence in the Turkish government and armed forces. Unlike his rival, Kemal believed that Turkey should remain neutral in World War I, doubted the chances of the Central Powers, and resented Enver's invitation to Berlin to send a military mission not only to advise but actually to command Turkish forces.

After a period of exile as military attaché in Sofia, Bulgaria, Kemal was recalled and, with the rank of colonel, appointed to command the 19th Division based at Rodosto

on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Although in charge only of the area reserves and subordinated to German general Otto Liman von Sanders (1855–1929), Kemal took the initiative that established him as a great soldier during the Allied amphibious landings of April 1915. He immediately committed his troops and led them in a series of fierce counterattacks to combat the landings that pinned the Allied troops to the beaches.

When the Allies tried another landing at Suvla Bay on August 6, 1915, Kemal was given command of that area as well. By early 1916, when the Allies had evacuated their forces, Kemal was hailed as the “Savior of Constantinople.” Subsequently promoted to general, he took command of XVI Corps and continued his success against the Allies in defending Anatolia in March 1916. He was the only Turkish general to win victories against the Russians.

Kemal’s accomplishments, as well as his annoyance at being subordinate to the Germans, so threatened and angered Enver Pasha that he relieved him of command in 1917, placing him on sick leave. A year later, with the German-Ottoman alliance facing defeat by the Allies, Enver recalled Kemal to command the Seventh Army in Palestine. Outnumbered by General Sir Edmund H. Allenby’s (1861–1936) better-equipped British forces, the best Kemal could achieve was to extricate the bulk of his command and withdraw first to Aleppo and then to the Anatolian frontier, an orderly retreat that saved his army.

With the Allied victory in the war and collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Kemal used his assignment as inspector general of the armies in eastern and northeastern Anatolia to strengthen those elements working for a free and independent Turkish nation. On May 19, 1919, ignoring the sultan’s attempt to remove him, Kemal issued orders that all

Turks fight for independence. In April 1920, Kemal established a provisional government in Ankara. He became president of the National Assembly in Ankara and successfully directed Turkish forces in the defeat of Greek forces in eastern Anatolia during 1921–1922.

With the external threat overcome, Kemal ended the sultanate on November 1, 1922. The Treaty of Lausanne granted almost all the concessions that Turkey demanded, and Kemal proclaimed the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1923, with himself as president. He then set about implementing reforms that limited the influence of Islam and introduced Western laws, dress, and administrative functions.

Although an autocrat, Kemal, who took the title Atatürk in 1934, encouraged cooperation between the civil and military branches and based his rule on the concept of equality of all before the law. His achievements in every field of national life were extraordinary and, almost singlehandedly, he inspired Turkey to take its place among the modern nations of the world. Atatürk died on November 10, 1938, in Istanbul.

James H. Willbanks

See also: Gallipoli, 1915; Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922; Ottoman Empire in World War I; Sakarya River, Battle of, 1921

Further Reading

- Erickson, Edward J. *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000.
- Fewster, Kevin, Hatice Basarin, and Vesihi Basarin. *Gallipoli: The Turkish Story*. London: Allen and Unwin, 2004.
- James, Robert Rhodes. *Gallipoli: The History of a Noble Blunder*. New York: Macmillan, 1965.
- Kinross, Lord. *Atatürk: Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey*. New York: William Morrow, 1965.

Laffin, John. *Damn the Dardanelles! The Agony of Gallipoli*. London: Osprey, 1980.

Macfie, A. L. *Atatürk*. New York: Longman, 1994.

Moorehead, Alan. *Gallipoli*. New York: Harper, 1956.

Kosovo, Battle of, 1915

This battle was fought between the Serbian army and the Bulgarian army and portions of the German army in Kosovo between November 10 and December 4, 1915. In early 1915, the German chief of the general staff Erich von Falkenhayn (1861–1922) convinced the Austro-Hungarian chief of staff Franz Conrad von Hoetzendorf (1852–1925) to launch a second invasion of Serbia. If this invasion succeeded, Serbia would be knocked out of the war, and Germany and Austria-Hungary would have a rail link to their other ally, the Ottoman Empire. In September, Bulgaria, eyeing Serbian territory that the Bulgarians felt was theirs, signed a treaty of alliance with Germany and quickly mobilized its army. Combined German and Austrian-Hungarian forces invaded Serbia in October 7 and occupied Belgrade, the capital, two days later.

On October 14, 1915, the Bulgarian army crossed the Serbian border across the northern border toward Niš and across the southern border toward Skopje and drove the Serbian army back along both fronts. In early November, Marshal Radomir Putnik (1847–1917), the Serbian commander in chief, attempted to pull his two incomplete armies together to halt the Bulgarian advance. However, on November 10, the Bulgarian First Army crossed the South Morava River and struck the weakened Serbian army in the direction of Niš and Priština. For two days, the greatly outnumbered Serbian army held Prokuplje but eventually had to retreat.

The retreating Serbian army again attempted to stop the advancing Bulgarians near the city of Gnjilane. The Serbs then tried a desperate counterattack toward Vranje and Kumanovo to join Anglo-French troops but were again defeated. On November 24, units of the Bulgarian First Army took Priština. The entire Bulgarian army, supported from the north by parts of the Eleventh German Army, now advanced against the Serbians. The battle ended on December 4 with the capture of Debar. The Serbs lost 30,000 soldiers, 199 guns, 150 cars, and vast quantities of other military equipment.

Following this battle and into early 1916, over 400,000 defeated and worn-out Serbian troops and civilian refugees retreated toward the Adriatic coast through Albania in what became known as the “Great Serbian Retreat.” Allied ships transported about 130,000 Serbian soldiers and 60,000 Serbian refugees to various Greek islands, including Corfu. About 70,000 soldiers and 140,000 civilians died in Albania of starvation, extreme weather, and Albanian reprisals during the retreat.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Bulgaria in World War I; Serbia, Invasions of, 1915; Serbia in World War I

Further Reading

Adams, John Clinton. *Flight in Winter*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1942.

Fryer, Charles. *The Destruction of Serbia in 1915*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1997.

Krunich, Milutin, and Leah Marie Bruce. *Serbia Crucified: The Beginning*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918.

Mitrović, Andrej. *Serbia's Great War, 1914–1918*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007.

Kosovo Liberation Army

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA; Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves) was a guerrilla force that fought for Kosovo's independence from Yugoslavia, and later from Serbia. Most of the group's members were ethnic Albanians, who make up approximately 90 percent of Kosovo's 2 million people. Although the KLA officially disbanded in July 1999, many of its commanders and fighters joined forces with the National Liberation Army in Macedonia and other satellite organizations to continue their fight for an independent Kosovo.

The KLA formed around 1990 as a small band of peasants committed to the liberation of Kosovo. The province had been an autonomous region from 1974 to 1989, and its degree of home rule was virtually equivalent to that of any republic of the former Yugoslav federation. However, Kosovo's autonomy was rescinded in 1989 by Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006), who cited a need to suppress separatism and protect non-Albanian ethnic minorities living in Kosovo. For several years, most Kosovar Albanians followed a policy of nonviolence in their efforts to have their autonomy restored. As severe repression against ethnic Albanians by Serbian police and Yugoslav army forces continued unabated through the mid-1990s, the KLA began to carry out well-planned attacks against carefully chosen Serbian targets. Beginning in 1997, open clashes erupted between KLA rebels and government forces.

In 1998, Milošević launched a crackdown on the KLA and also on ethnic Albanian villages throughout the province. In an effort to ferret out the rebels, Serbian police began terrorizing citizens suspected of providing shelter or support for the KLA.

The crackdown drove many Kosovars into the arms of the KLA, and the group's membership swelled to an estimated 35,000 fighters. In early 1999, the Serbs began a heightened military campaign to destroy the KLA, burning entire villages, driving tens of thousands of civilians from their homes, and causing many civilian casualties. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) responded to this aggression by launching air strikes against Yugoslavia to help prevent further attacks on Kosovar Albanians.

By the onset of the NATO air strikes, the KLA's force had dwindled to roughly 3,000 fighters. However, by June 1999, a groundswell of volunteer fighters from Albania and from among fleeing refugees brought the KLA force within Kosovo to an estimated 17,000—with another 5,000 volunteers in training in Albania. Although the KLA remained far outnumbered by the heavily armed Yugoslav military, the NATO air war hindered the mobility of the Yugoslav troops, further equalizing the battlefield. On June 9, NATO and Yugoslav officials signed the Military-Technical Agreement, paving the way for the complete withdrawal of Serbian troops and the demilitarization of the KLA.

Despite the agreement, factions within the KLA remained divided over the prospect of disarmament under any peace plan negotiated between NATO and the Yugoslav government. The group's most radical members formed a rival armed faction, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo. The splinter group comprised former KLA members who refused to accept anything less than full independence.

Although little was known about the KLA's command structure, Hashim Thaci (1968–), leader of the Democratic Party

of Kosovo, emerged as its nominal head. Former KLA commander Ramush Haradinaj (1968–) became prime minister of Kosovo in December 2004 but resigned in March 2005 after being indicted for war crimes charges tied to his time as a KLA commander. Haradinaj surrendered to the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in The Hague.

Lisa McCallum

See also: Kosovo War, 1998–1999

Further Reading

Clark, Wesley. *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*. New York: Public Affairs, 2001.

Glenny, Misha. *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804–1999*. New York: Viking, 1999.

Kosovo War, 1998–1999

During the 1980s, increasing Serbian repression radicalized many moderates among the 90 percent majority Albanian population in the Serbian province of Kosovo. With the threat of violence increasing, Ibrahim Rugova (1944–2006), the elected president of the Republic of Kosovo since 1992 but not recognized by Yugoslavia, pleaded for a UN peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

On April 22, 1996, the secret Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) carried out a series of attacks against Serbian security personnel throughout the province. When Albania collapsed into violence in 1997, a good deal of that nation's military hardware was looted and found its way in the hands of the KLA in western Kosovo. Although the United States branded the KLA a terrorist organization, neither it nor other Western powers made any effort to stem the flow of arms and money to it.

The Yugoslav army responded to the KLA attacks with considerable force, attacking base areas in remote areas of Kosovo. In the ensuing fighting, a number of civilians were killed, sometimes deliberately. Although the Serbs sought talks with Rugova, he rejected any negotiations with Serbian officials and insisted that the talks be only with the Yugoslav government over independence.

In May 1998, the Yugoslav army carried out a major military operation in Kosovo, Operation Horseshoe. This was intended to drive much of the Albanian civilian population out of Kosovo. In response, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched in June an air demonstration, Operation Determined Falcon, over the Yugoslav borders.

President Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006) reached an agreement with the president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin (1931–2007), to cease offensive military operations and begin negotiations, but Milošević and Rugova met only once, in Belgrade, on May 15. By this time, the United States was clearly backing the KLA. Heavy fighting occurred during the summer, with atrocities committed by both sides and the destruction of churches and mosques. By the fall, with winter approaching, Serbian forces drove some 250,000 Albanians from their homes in acts of ethnic cleansing.

U.S. diplomats attempted to hammer out a deal in which the Yugoslav army halted its attacks, while NATO peacekeeping troops entered the province. At the same time, the KLA was to drop its bid for independence. A cease-fire agreement was brokered on October 25, 1998. A Kosovo Verification Mission was established with unarmed observers.

The inadequacy of this effort was soon apparent, as the violence increasingly



Kosovar refugees set up tents at a camp in Blace, Macedonia, April 1, 1999. (Getty Images)

shifted to urban areas, including assassinations and bombings on both sides. A turning point in the war occurred on January 15, 1999, with the so-called Račak Massacre in which a number of ethnic Albanians were found murdered, their bodies mutilated.

Meanwhile, contentious and plodding talks occurred at Rambouillet, France, between the parties during February–March 1999, with NATO secretary-general Javier Solana acting as a go-between. On March 18 the Albanian, U.S., and British representatives to the talks signed what became known as the Rambouillet Accords. This agreement called for the autonomy of Kosovo, the development of democratic institutions, and the protection of human rights. This was to be guaranteed by an invited international civilian and military force. The Serb and Russian delegations refused to sign the agreement, however. The Serbs' counterproposal was so extreme as to be rejected even by their Russian ally.

With the Serbs recalcitrant, NATO launched a bombing campaign during March 12–June 11, 1999. It was the first time that NATO conducted a military campaign against a sovereign nation, and the first military operation for the German air force since World War II. All the NATO powers participated to some degree, including Greece, whose government actually opposed the war. In all, NATO carried out some 38,000 sorties. The proclaimed goal of the campaign was announced as “Serbs out, peacekeepers in, refugees back.” That is, Yugoslav troops had to leave Kosovo, to be replaced by an international peacekeeping force so that ethnic Albanian refugees might return to their homes.

Clearly NATO planners initially underestimated the force that would be required. Indeed, Milošević was emboldened to intensify Serb efforts to clear Kosovo of its Muslim non-Serb population, sending hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing into

neighboring Bosnia, Albania, Montenegro, and Macedonia. By April 1999, the UN reported that nearly 850,000 people—the vast majority of them ethnic Albanians—were driven from their homes.

In response, NATO intensified the air effort, hitting not only strategic targets but increasingly Yugoslav army units on the ground, including individual tanks and artillery pieces. Dual-use targets struck include infrastructure such as bridges over the Danube as well as television towers and political party headquarters in Belgrade. On May 7, 1999, NATO bombs inadvertently hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three and wounding 20, sharply straining relations between Washington and Beijing and producing anti-American demonstrations throughout China.

With NATO actively considering the dispatch of ground troops, which U.S. president William J. Clinton (1946–) opposed, in early June 1999, Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari (1937–), former Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (1938–2010), and London banker Peter Castenfeldt convinced Milošević to back down and accept a peace agreement that ended the war and halted the NATO bombing campaign. On June 9, NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia formally signed a peace agreement that admitted a military presence, the Kosovo Force, within Kosovo under the UN but incorporating NATO forces.

On June 11, NATO troops (KFOR, Kosovo Force) entered Kosovo in Operation Joint Guardian as the Yugoslav army exited the province. Although no NATO lives were lost in the bombing campaign, as many as 1,500 Serb civilians were killed. NATO claims of military damage inflicted were found to be inflated, and many of the targets struck (such as tanks) turned out to be decoys. This was a consequence of Serb

ingenuity that overcame NATO technology but was also the result of restrictions to minimize the chance of casualties among the aircrews that had kept the NATO aircraft above 15,000 feet.

The war left Kosovo in near chaos. Within a matter of a few weeks, a half million Kosovo refugees returned to the region. By November, more than 800,000 had returned. In Serbia, meanwhile, large demonstrations called for the removal of Milošević from power. The Kosovo War was the major factor driving him from power in 2000. On February 17, 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. The United States and most European states recognized the new state; Serbia and Russia did not. Around 10,000 KFOR troops remain in Kosovo.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Horseshoe, Operation, 1998; Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA); NATO in the Balkans

Further Reading

Clark, Wesley. *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*. New York: Public Affairs, 2001.

Glenny, Misha. *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804–1999*. New York: Viking, 1999.

Kumanovo, Battle of, 1912

The Treaty of Berlin had shaped the borders of the Ottoman Balkans in such a way that it was nearly impossible to defend it against multiple enemies. Coupled with this, Ottoman political and military leadership determined to preserve every inch of the empire's territory, and they had great faith in the military capacity of territorial defense units. Moreover, overconfident general staff officers insisted on being on the offensive

at the operational level while conducting defensive operations at the strategic level, which was a key element in the newly introduced German doctrine. They naively hoped that the small militaries of the Balkan states would not have the means to launch coordinated assaults, thereby giving Ottoman units ample opportunities to defeat them one by one. Ottoman planners disregarded all the viable alternatives and tried in vain to design a war strategy that would fit these conflicting ideas. The flawed outcome of all these priorities and factors was the grouping of available units into two geographically isolated field armies: the Western Army (*Garb Ordusu*), and the Eastern Army (*Şark Ordusu*).

The Ottoman Western Army tried to employ the strategic defense with the operational offensive. But in contrast to its eastern sister, the Western Army divided its units into the Vardar Army, four corps-sized groups (Yanya, Ustruma, İškodra, and Mür-ettab [redif/reserve] VIII Corps) and four independent detachments in order to protect every inch of its area of responsibility against the concentric attacks of its four adversaries. Additionally, only a bit more than half of the assigned troops were mobilized due to a lack of transportation and slow mobilization, which further limited the army's chances of success. The Ottoman planners identified the Serbian army as the main threat and so tasked the Vardar Army to block and then annihilate it. Similarly, the Serbian commander in chief, General Radomir Putnik (1847–1917) was also looking for a decisive pitched battle by making use of 11 infantry divisions and combat support units to fix and envelop the Ottoman units.

Most of the Vardar Army divisions had to travel more than 100 kilometers in order to reach their concentration area near Kumanovo. The commanding general, Halepli Zeki Pasha (1862–1943), employed

aggressive covering-force tactics, while some of his divisions were still trying desperately to reach their tactical destinations between October 14 and 21. Zeki Pasha's tactics worked quite well and First Serbian Army could not establish contact with the Second Serbian Army. However, he did not wait for his remaining four divisions to arrive, as he thought the time was ripe for attack, even though the Serbs had twice the number of men on hand as the Ottomans. Three divisions fixed the Serbs and three more launched flanking attacks from both sides on October 23. The ambitious assault achieved remarkable success initially but at the end of the day, without effective artillery support and reserves, Zeki Pasha was unable to tip the balance in his favor. The ill-trained, ill-equipped and poorly led redif divisions began to waver, and massive Serbian artillery fire crushed and demoralized them the next day. Zeki Pasha somehow managed to keep his demoralized redifs in their make-shift defensive positions against the all-day-long infantry assaults. However, panic seized them immediately after Zeki Pasha ordered a retreat, and all discipline and order was lost.

Mesut Uyar

See also: Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars; Putnik, Radomir (1847–1917); Serbia in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Erickson, Edward J. *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Hallı, Reşat. *Balkan Harbi (1912–1913), Garp Ordusu, Vardar Ordusu ve Ustruma Kolordusu*. Vol. 3, section 1, 2nd printing. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1993.

Lake Prespa, Battle of, 1917

The Battle of Lake Prespa, northwest of Salonika, during March 11–22, 1917, occurred on the Balkan Front between Central Powers forces from Bulgaria and Germany, and Entente troops mainly from France and Serbia. The Allied offensive, launched at the lake on the Greek and Serbian border, was undertaken to divert German assets from the Nivelle Offensive (April 16–May 9, 1917) on the Western Front. Toward that end, the Allied commanders in the Balkans, French général de division Maurice Sarrail (1856–1929) and British general George Milne (1866–1948), were ordered to launch offensive operations. Sarrail planned a repeat of the previous year's offensive by the Entente, which had taken Monastir (Bitola) in Serbia the previous November.

In January 1917, Sarrail received an additional four divisions. Officially, he commanded 600,000 men, but widespread sickness and the need to defend Salonika reduced the number of French and Serbian troops available for offensive operations to only some 100,000 men. These faced a similar number of Bulgarian and some German soldiers, who were well dug in on high ground. The British undertook a supporting attack to the east at Lake Doiran against the Bulgarian Ninth Pleven Division. The Bulgarians were under the overall command of German general Otto von Below (1857–1944).

Sarrail commenced offensive operations on March 11, 1917, striking northward in the area between Monastir and Lake Prespa, against the Bulgarian Sixth Vidin and Eighth Tundhza Divisions. Milne's supporting attack at Lake Dorian on the other side of the Balkan Front began the next day.

Both sides suffered from the blizzard-like late winter weather. The Bulgarian defenders used gas and flamethrowers to limit the Entente attacks to gains of only a few hundred yards. Bulgarian counterattacks launched on March 17 pushed into the western Entente flank and forced Sarrail to abandon gains elsewhere. Entente troops then withdrew to regroup. By March 22, they were back at their starting points, having sustained some 14,000 casualties from the fighting and sickness. The Bulgarians lost 3,482 in the March fighting, and as many as 2,000 prisoners. British attacks in the Dorian sector resumed in late April, and there was additional fighting in May near Monastir by French and Serbian units, and along the Struma River by British troops. The Entente made some small gains during the spring of 1917, but paid a heavy price with losses of over 13,000 men. Afterward, both sides were exhausted. Sarrail then halted all offensive operations along the Balkan Front. It remained relatively quiet until the summer of 1918, when French general Louis Franchet d'Espéray (1856–1942) began preparations for the fall offensive that would force Bulgaria out of the war.

Jon C. Anderson Jr.

See also: Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918; Doiran, Battles of, 1915–1918; Macedonian Front, 1915–1918; Zhkov, Nikola (1864–1949)

Further Reading

Falls, Cyril. *Military Operations: Macedonia*. 2 vols. London: HMSO, 1933, 1935.

Markov, Georgi. *Golyamata voina i Bŭlgarskata strazha mezhdu Sredna Evropa i Orienta 1916–1919*. Sofia: Prof. Marin Drinov, 2006.

Palmer, Alan. *The Gardiners of Salonika*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.

Lausanne, Treaty of, 1923

The Treaty of Lausanne established peace between the Allied powers and Turkey. Unlike the Treaty of Sèvres, the terms of which the Allies dictated to the Ottoman government in 1920, the Treaty of Lausanne signed on July 24, 1923, was a negotiated peace. The Treaty of Sèvres had been a humiliation for Turkey. Under its terms, Greece assumed control over Smyrna and the hinterland as well as all of Ottoman Europe outside of Constantinople. The treaty also removed the Arabic-speaking lands and Armenia from Ottoman control and established an autonomous Kurdistan under League of Nations guidance. It fixed the size of the Turkish army at 50,000 men, and it also left in place the capitulations that gave foreigners the right of extraterritoriality and established foreign control over many aspects of the Turkish financial system.

The terms of the treaty set off a wave of nationalism in Turkey, personified in Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938), known as Atatürk. On August 19, 1920, the National Assembly, called into session by the sultan to approve the Treaty of Sèvres, instead rejected it and denounced as traitors those

who had supported it. The sultan then dissolved Parliament, which led Kemal to establish a rival government in the interior of Anatolia. He soon concluded an agreement with Russia that proved beneficial to both nations. Turkey recognized Russian incorporation of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and half of Armenia. In return, Turkey received surplus Russian arms and Russia's diplomatic support, including its recognition of Turkish control over the other half of Armenia.

Kemal soon took advantage of the Russian arms to go to war against Greece in Smyrna. Although Greek prime minister Eleuthérios Venizélos (1864–1936) sent forces into Anatolia, Kemal carried out a brilliant military campaign in the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922, during which he retook Smyrna and its hinterland and then turned north against Constantinople. Italy, which had come to see Greece as a more immediate rival than Turkey, agreed to withdraw its own occupation troops after a defeat at Kemal's hands in Central Anatolia. This led the British and French also to depart.

Turkish success on the battlefield produced gains at the bargaining table. In November 1922, a conference to consider revisions to the Treaty of Sèvres opened in the Swiss city of Lausanne. Plenipotentiaries from eight nations negotiated there for seven months. As evidence of their parity at the conference, Turkish diplomats successfully rejected a draft treaty presented in April 1923. The two sides resumed talks until a revision met with the approval of all parties in July.

The Treaty of Lausanne abrogated the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres. It included no provisions for the autonomy of Kurdistan, thus recognizing its reincorporation into Turkey. The capitulations continued in

theory, but only a handful of Western legal and medical advisers remained in Turkey after 1923. Eastern Thrace and all of Anatolia returned to Turkish control, settling border disputes with both Greece and Bulgaria. The military terms of the treaty were also favorable to Turkey. Greece agreed not to fortify its Aegean islands and also promised not to fly military aircraft over Turkish airspace.

The treaty also resolved the delicate issue of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The International Straits Committee established at Sèvres and composed of Great Britain, France, and Italy remained in place, but Turkey became a member. More importantly, the committee lost the right of intervention granted in the previous treaty. Thereafter, determinations about the security of the straits were the preserve of the League of Nations. In exchange for these concessions, Turkey recognized British control of Cyprus and Italian authority in the Dodecanese Islands.

The treaty also freed Turkey from reparation payments that the Ottoman government had accepted in the Treaty of Sèvres. In return, Turkey agreed to pay outstanding prewar debts incurred by the Ottomans to the other signatories.

The treaty represented a major triumph for Kemal and the Turkish nationalists. Eleuthérios Venizélos, former prime minister, signed for Greece. He had been one of the most vocal supporters of Greek territorial aims in Turkey, and his signature symbolized the end of Greek designs across the Aegean Sea. The United States and Russia, although not signatories, lent support.

The treaty also led to one of the largest forced movements of populations in history. It took religion as a basis for defining ethnicity and implicitly argued that religious minorities could not exist within the newly created borders. As a result, more than 1.2 million Eastern Orthodox Christians

moved from Turkey to Greece, 150,000 of them were from Constantinople (soon to be renamed Istanbul). Similarly, 380,000 Muslims moved from Greece to Turkey. The flood of refugees caused financial and social problems for both nations.

The Treaty of Lausanne must be understood as a monumental triumph for Turkey. It formally ended any chance of the return of the sultanate, and it established Turkey as a power in the Middle East, eastern Europe, and Central Asia. The biggest losers under the treaty were the independence-minded Kurds and the Armenians who now had to live under Turkish and Soviet control. The treaty also significantly reduced tensions in the region among Greece, Italy, and Turkey, thus calming the Balkans considerably.

Michael S. Neiberg

See also: Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922; Kemal, Mustafa (1881–1938); Sèvres, Treaty of, 1920

Further Reading

Busch, Briton Cooper. *Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918–1923*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976.

Kinross, Lord John Patrick Balfour. *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*. New York: Morrow, 1977.

Macfie, A. L. *Atatürk*. New York: Longman, 1994.

Macfie, A. L. *The End of the Ottoman Empire, 1918–1923*. London: Longman, 1998.

McCarthy, Justin. *The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire*. London: Hodde Arnold, 2001.

Levski, Vasil (1837–1873)

Vasil Levski was a leading figure in the Bulgarian struggle to achieve independence from the Ottoman Empire. He was born

Vasil Ivanov Kunchev on July 18, 1837 (OS July 6) in Karlovo in Ottoman ruled Bulgaria into a family of craftsmen. At first he sought a religious avocation, entering a monastery and becoming a deacon in 1859. He soon became involved in activities promoting Bulgarian nationalism and independence from the Ottoman Empire.

In 1862, Levski joined the Bulgarian Legion and fought in Serbia against the Ottomans. In this fighting he gained the name Levski, “Leonine.” He then returned to Bulgaria and abandoned his religious calling. For the next six years, he taught school. He joined the Second Bulgarian Legion in Belgrade in 1868, but concluded that the Legion was unlikely to achieve Bulgarian independence. The next year, he helped to found the Bulgarian Revolutionary Secret Committee in Bucharest.

In 1870, Levski returned to Bulgaria to work for the outbreak of armed revolution against the Ottomans. He traveled around Bulgaria to spread the idea of an independent Bulgaria and to organize revolutionary groups who prepared to fight against the Ottomans. Ottoman authorities arrested him near Lovach in December 1872. On February 18, 1873 (OS February 6), the Ottomans hung Levski in Sofia. The location of his execution now has a monument dedicated to him. His work and martyrdom helped to prepare for the April Uprising of 1876, and inspired many of its participants. Vasil Levski remains a heroic figure in the history of the Bulgarian revival.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bulgarian Horrors, 1876; Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878

Further Reading

Crampton, R. J. *Bulgaria*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Genchev, Nikolai. *Vasil Levski*. Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 1987.

Macdermott, Mercia. *The Apostle of Freedom*. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1967.

Little Entente

The Little Entente was an interwar defensive alliance comprised of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, proposed by Eduard Beneš, foreign minister of Czechoslovakia. Beneš saw the agreements as a way to prevent the restoration of the Habsburgs and Hungarian revanchism after World War I when the Treaty of Trianon awarded the three countries substantial territory of the Kingdom of Hungary. A series of bilateral agreements were signed: August 14, 1920, between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; April 23, 1921, between Czechoslovakia and Romania; and June 7, 1921, between Romania and Yugoslavia, with subsequent treaties being entered into by the member nations. The accord between Yugoslavia and Romania was aimed at Bulgaria, which had territorial claims against both countries resulting from the First and Second Balkan Wars. These mutual assistance treaties called for aid in the event of a Hungarian attack or, in the case of Romania-Yugoslavia, aggression by Bulgaria, but did not apply to other countries. Its greatest accomplishment was stopping twice the attempted restoration of Habsburg ex-emperor Charles (1887–1922) to the throne of Hungary in 1921.

The Hungarians nicknamed arrangement the Little Entente. The French approved of the alliance to replace its former ally of Imperial Russia despite initial skepticism. They viewed it as a necessity in a possible future two-front war against Germany. France strengthened its ties to the organization

through a series of bilateral treaties with the members starting in 1924 with Czechoslovakia, 1926 with Romania, and 1927 with Yugoslavia. Because of lingering hostility between Czechoslovakia and Poland over the possession of Teschen (Cieszyn, Těšín), the French were never able to tie the Little Entente into a larger anti-German eastern European alliance system including Poland.

With the rise of Nazi Germany after 1933, the organization established, in Geneva, a permanent Council of Foreign Ministers, Secretariat, and Economic Council, all of which attempted to encourage political and economic cooperation. As the members began to pursue more independent foreign policies in the 1930s and French support waned, the organization lost much of its value. It played no role in the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938. The Munich Agreement and the German annexation of the Sudetenland October 1938 effectively ended the alliance. Thereafter, both the Romanian and Yugoslav governments scrambled to establish good relations with Nazi Germany.

Gregory C. Ference

See also: Romanian Campaign in Hungary, 1919; Trianon, Treaty of, 1920

Further Reading

Ádám, Magda. *The Little Entente and Europe (1920–1929)*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1993.

Campus, Eliza. *The Little Entente and the Balkan Entente*. Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1978.

London, Treaty of, 1913

The Treaty of London was a peace settlement of the First Balkan War signed on May 30, 1913, between representatives of the Balkan allies Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and

Serbia, and those of the Ottoman Empire. The terms had already received the approval of the London conference of Great Power ambassadors, which had overseen the process to ensure that the interests of the Great Powers were upheld.

By terms of this settlement, the Ottomans ceded all European territories west of a more-or-less straight line drawn from Enez (Enos) on the Aegean Sea to Midya (Midia) on the Black Sea as well as the island of Crete. The Great Powers reserved for themselves the right to delineate the borders of the new state of Albania and the Aegean Islands formerly under Ottoman control. The Great Powers had already recognized the independence of Albania, which had been proclaimed in Vlorë on November 28, 1912. The Great Powers also assumed responsibility for handling the financial issues resulting from the war.

The settlement proved to be ephemeral, because of disputes among the Balkan allies over the disposition of Ottoman territories. In particular, the Bulgarians contested Greek and Serbian claims to Macedonia. Already on May 5, 1913, the Greeks and Serbs had concluded an alliance against Bulgaria. This came into play on June 30, 1913, when Bulgarian army units attacked Greek and Serbian positions in southern Macedonia. The resulting Second Balkan War ended in catastrophe for Bulgaria, when Ottoman and Romanian forces entered the war on the Greek and Serbian side. The Treaty of Bucharest of August 10, 1913, between Bulgaria on one hand, and Greece, Romania, and Serbia on the other; and the Treaty of Constantinople of September 30, between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, ended hostilities of the Second Balkan War. The settlement of World War I in turn superseded these treaties.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Greece in the Balkan Wars; Montenegro in the Balkan Wars; Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars; Serbia in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Helmreich, E. C. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938.

Rossos, Andrew. *Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy 1908–1914*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981.

Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, Battle of, 1912

The battle of Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar (Turkish: Lüleburgaz-Pınarhisar) was the largest battle in terms of numbers of participants of the Balkan Wars, and the largest land battle in Europe between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I.

The Bulgarian Third Army seized the Ottoman Fortress of Lozengrad (Turkish: Kirkilise) on October 23, 1912. After several days of rest, the Bulgarian Third Army together with the more westerly positioned Bulgarian First Army resumed their advance on October 27 as the Ottomans brought up into Thrace additional forces from Constantinople. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian Second Army screened the Ottoman fortress of Adrianople.

On October 29, the aggressive commander of the Bulgarian Third Army, General Radko Dimitriev (1859–1918), attacked the

Ottomans along a 20-mile front between the Thracian villages of Lyule Burgas on the southern end and Buni Hisar to the north. The Ottomans temporarily deflected the Bulgarian attacks. General Vasil Kutinchev's First Army appeared around Lyule Burgas (1858–1941) on October 30. The addition of the First Army gave the Bulgarians around 110,000 men against Abdullah Pasha's (1846–1937) 130,000 Ottomans. The First Army turned the Ottoman flank. By October 31, the Ottoman left flank collapsed. The Ottoman forces then fled the battlefield toward Constantinople. Only the Chataldzha fortifications remained between the Bulgarians and the Ottoman capital.

General Dimitriev deserves credit for this victory. Had the Bulgarians begun an immediate pursuit, they might have destroyed the Ottoman forces. Bulgarian casualties and exhaustion prevented this. The Bulgarians lost 20,162 men including 2,534 dead. Most were in the more heavily engaged Third Army. The Ottomans lost around 22,000 men and at least 45 guns.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Chataldzha, Battle of, 1912; Dimitriev, Radko (1859–1918); Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Erickson, Edward J. *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Vachkov, Alexander. *The Balkan War 1912–1913*. Sofia: Anzhela, 2005.

M

Macedonia

Although Macedonia is a small nation that recently seceded from Yugoslavia, it was in ancient times a huge empire that was home to Alexander the Great, one of the greatest warriors the world has known.

The first known residents of Macedonia were Neolithic peoples who settled in the northern part of the country around 6200 BC. About 3,000 years later, Greek-speaking shepherd tribes settled in the mountain regions and then on the plains between the Aliakmon and Axios Rivers. The people of the region came to be known as Macedonians after around 700 BC, at which time much of the region was in the hands of the Greeks, who considered the indigenous peoples barbaric. The Greek control of much of the area forced the Macedonians, under Amyntas III, to focus on unifying the plain and upland regions. Amyntas's son Philip II ruled in the fourth century BC and was instrumental in expanding Macedonia northward. In 338 BC, he conquered Greece and established a huge empire that was expanded further by his son, Alexander the Great, after Philip was murdered in 336.

Alexander the Great expanded the empire to cover Persia and Egypt and as far as northern India. His reign was a time of great cultural and artistic growth, but he died without a clear heir. Without a smooth succession, the empire dissolved into a number of small kingdoms that were divided by warfare for about 20 years, when Alexander's European

regent, Antipater, gained control. Antipater and his son Cassander managed to control Macedonia and Greece until about 297 BC, but when Cassander died, Macedonia fell into confusion and conflict once more. The Antigonids won control of the region in 277 BC but were ousted by the Romans in 197 BC. The Romans, who made Macedonia a province in 148 BC, retained control until the Roman Empire came to an end at the close of the fourth century AD. At that time, Macedonia became part of the Byzantine Empire and fell prey to a series of invasions by Goths, Huns, Vandals, and Bulgars. Large numbers of Slavs from other parts of eastern Europe settled in Macedonia during the sixth century.

The next significant epoch of Macedonian history lasted from 1371 to 1912, which marked the rule of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans had gained control by defeating challenges from Serbia, Bulgaria, and other countries. The period of Ottoman control was not smooth. There was extensive unrest because of tensions between Christians and Muslims, and by the end of the nineteenth century, Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia all claimed Macedonia, which complicated the conflict over the region. In 1903, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO), led the so-called Ilinden (St. Elijah's Day) revolt against Ottoman rule. It was soon crushed. In an effort to end Ottoman rule in Macedonia, the Bulgarians and Serbs, with the support of Russia, concluded an alliance in March 1912. In a secret codicil to the alliance, they agreed to a

partition of Macedonia, but left a disputed section, the “contested zone,” to Russian arbitration. Greece and Montenegro joined the Balkan League later that year.

In the first of the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia wrested control of the region from the Turks, but they then fell into disagreement among themselves. The Second Balkan War (1913) was fought among those three nations and resulted in the division of the region among them with most of the territory taken by Greece and Serbia. During World War I, Bulgaria occupied the region. Bulgaria’s defeat at the end of the war returned most of Macedonia to Greek and Serbian rule.

After World War I, Macedonia was reabsorbed into Serbia, which was part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and which became known as Yugoslavia in 1929. The union was short-lived. During World War II, Yugoslavia was broken up and distributed among Italy, Germany, and Hungary with most of Yugoslav Macedonia again occupied by Bulgaria between 1941 and 1944. Internal fighting among the Yugoslav peoples at that time saw most of the Macedonian support going to partisan leader Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980). In 1944, the partisans met and agreed that Yugoslav Macedonia would become part of a future Yugoslav federation. When Tito formed his new nation, he recognized the Macedonians as a distinct ethnic group, supported the creation of an independent Macedonian church, and even printed a standard grammar for the Macedonian language.

Macedonia remained a republic within Yugoslavia, a Communist state, until the early 1990s. In 1990, the republic’s government claimed that Serbia, Yugoslavia’s dominant republic, planned to annex Macedonia. The Macedonians were already dissatisfied with the Yugoslav federation

following Tito’s 1980 death, and tensions grew. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia gave up power in 1990, and in Macedonia, the League of Communists of Macedonia was defeated in multiparty elections. Yugoslavia’s constituent republics jockeyed for increased autonomy. In June 1991, Macedonia dropped the word “Socialist” from its official name. Afraid that the secession of Croatia and Slovenia would increase Serbia’s power, the republic’s population voted overwhelmingly in support of secession in a September 8, 1991, referendum, although Albanians and Serbs who lived in the republic boycotted the vote. There was some tension between Serbia and Macedonia, but the violence seen in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina after those republics left the federation did not materialize in Macedonia. Macedonia seceded from Yugoslavia in November 1991.

Although secession did not bring with it violence, Macedonian independence did cause some serious problems. The most notable of those problems was the initial refusal of the international community—driven by Greece—to recognize the new nation. Greece insisted that the name Macedonia was Greek and that the new nation had articles in its new 1991 Constitution that suggested it had territorial ambitions regarding the Greek province of the same name. Athens also objected to Skopje’s use of the Star of Vergina, which had been Alexander the Great’s emblem, on its flag. Greece blocked recognition by the European Community (now the European Union) and refused to negotiate with Macedonia, even after the government amended the Macedonian Constitution to claim that it had no interest in territorial expansion into Greece.

The lack of recognition created economic difficulties. Greece blockaded Macedonia,

and its other possible supplier, Serbia, was the subject of a UN embargo that Macedonia observed even though it was not itself recognized. The nation's economic difficulties worsened because the rejection of recognition made it impossible to gain foreign aid or loans. Macedonia was finally admitted into the United Nations in 1992 as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Other problems remained; the nation's ethnic Albanians lobbied for greater rights, which led to riots in Skopje in 1992 and new riots in 1995 over the government's rejection of the establishment of an Albanian-language university in Tetovo. In addition, thousands of Bosnians flooded the nation in efforts to escape the war in their homeland. Clashes between Macedonia's army and ethnic Albanian guerrillas continued into 2001.

The fate of the nation's new democratic institutions, which had already been challenged by claims of electoral fraud, were thrown into doubt when President Kiro Gligorov (1917–2012) barely survived a bomb attack in 1995. Constitutionally mandated methods for the appointment of a temporary leader eased many of those fears, although Gligorov was not able to return to office. Boris Trajkovski (1956–2004) was elected president of Macedonia in December 1999. In February 2004, Trajkovski was tragically killed in a plane crash. His successor, former prime minister Branko Crvenkovski (1962–), was elected in April 2004.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan League, 1912; Contested Zone (Macedonia), 1912; Ilinden Uprising, 1903; Macedonian War, 2001; VMRO

Further Reading

Cosmopoulos, Michael B. *Macedonia: An Introduction to Its Political History*.

Winnipeg: Manitoba Studies in Classical Civilization, 1992.

Philips, John. *Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004.

Poulten, Hugh. *Who Are the Macedonians?* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

Rossos, Andrew. *Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008.

Roudometof, Victor, ed. *The Macedonian Question: Culture, Historiography, Politics*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2000.

Macedonian Front, 1915–1918

The Macedonian Front was the line of conflict established between mainly Bulgarian forces, augmented by some Austro-Hungarian and German units, and Entente forces, which contained contingents from most of the Entente powers, during World War I in southeastern Europe. The Macedonian Front extended from the Adriatic Sea in Albania across the Balkan Peninsula to the Aegean Sea in contemporary Greece. Fighting developed in this region in October 1915 when the Bulgarians joined in a joint Austro-Hungarian and German attack on Serbia. British and French units landed at the neutral Greek port of Salonika and moved northward up the Vardar River valley in an effort to help the beleaguered Serbs. The Bulgarians under the overall command of General Nikola Zhekov (1895–1949) stopped this attempt and forced the Entente units back across the Greek frontier in December 1915. Their German allies forbade the Bulgarians from pursuing the British and French, primarily because they preferred to keep them

confined around Salonika rather than to face them on the Western Front.

At the beginning of 1916, the Bulgarians established defensive positions along the Greek frontier. These stretched from the mouth of the Struma River on the Aegean westward to the Shkumba River in Albania. In Albania, Austro-Hungarian troops confronted Italians in an extension of the front. There the front remained largely static for most of the war. Meanwhile, the Entente built up its forces in Salonika. French colonial, Italian, Russian, and Serbian units joined those of the British and French. French general Maurice Sarrail (1856–1929) oversaw the Entente increase in forces and establishment of a strong base in Salonika and positions in the hills of southern Macedonia confronting the Bulgarians. In the spring of 1916, the Germans lifted their ban on intrusion into Greek territory. The Bulgarians gained a bloodless victory when the Greek garrison of Fort Rupel, which commanded the flow of the Struma River into Greece, surrendered to them on May 26, 1916. In the summer of 1916, with Romanian intervention into the war on the Entente side pending, both sides prepared offensives. The Bulgarians were the first to act. Beginning on August 17, they advanced on two wings of their front. In the east they quickly occupied southeastern Macedonia, including the towns of Drama and Seres and the port of Kavala. In the west they advanced to Florina. An Entente offensive, however, threw the Bulgarians out of Florina and pushed them back as far as Bitola, which Serbian troops entered on November 19, 1916. This marked the return of Serbian forces to their prewar territory.

After the fall of Bitola, fighting along the Macedonian Front died down. It remained relatively inactive during 1917. The Entente forces undertook a few desultory attacks on

the Bulgarian positions, without much success. During this time, Entente command withdrew the Russian contingents from the front because news of the revolution at home had made them combat ineffective. They were all gone by the beginning of 1918. The entry of Greece on the Entente side on July 2, 1917, brought the Greek army to the Macedonian Front. This more than made up for the loss of the Russians. At the end of 1917, General Sarrail was recalled to France. General Louis Guillaumat (1863–1940), a veteran of the Verdun fighting, replaced him.

Meanwhile, the relative lull of 1917 had an erosive effect on the Central Powers forces. In the fall of 1917, the Germans withdrew much of their manpower and material for use in the planned great Western Front offensive. They maintained a presence on the Macedonian Front with Army Group Scholtz, which consisted of the command structure in charge of the German Eleventh Army and the Bulgarian First Army. By this time most of the units in the German Eleventh Army were themselves Bulgarian. At the same time, the material condition of the Bulgarians seriously declined. Bulgarian soldiers lacked adequate boots, clothing, and food. The food crisis extended through the entire country. Bulgarians were exhausted from their efforts at war, which extended back to 1912 and the First Balkan War. Disorders erupted in the Bulgarian ranks in the summer of 1918.

In June 1918, the aggressive General Franchet d'Espéray (1856–1942) replaced Guillaumat as commander of the Entente forces. Entente attacks on Bulgarian positions correspondingly increased during the summer of 1918. The Bulgarians suffered a serious reversal when the Greek army together with some French units attacked the fortified ridge at Yerbichna (Skra di

Legen) at the beginning of June 1918. By this time, Bulgarian morale was too low for army commanders to contemplate a counterattack.

On September 13, 1918, concentrated Entente artillery fire on the Bulgarian positions at Dobro Pole began the decisive battle of the Macedonian Front. The next morning French, French Colonial, and Serbian units assaulted the Bulgarian positions. After two days of heavy fighting, the Bulgarian lines collapsed. This afforded the Entente soldiers access to the Vardar River valley and a relatively easy route into Macedonia. To the east of Dobro Pole, a supplementary Entente offensive at Doiran undertaken by British and Greek units failed. Nevertheless, as the French and Serbs surged through the gap at Dobro Pole, Bulgarian units on either side had to withdraw.

The entire Macedonian Front began to cave in. The Austro-Hungarians and Germans, already hard pressed on other fronts, made some effort to rush divisions to Macedonia to strengthen the Bulgarians. Meanwhile, discipline in at least two Bulgarian divisions collapsed. Demoralized and disaffected troops refused orders and streamed to the rear. They were determined to go to Sofia to punish those members of the political elite they held responsible for all their suffering. In these disastrous circumstances, the Bulgarian government decided to leave the war. Its representatives signed an armistice with the Entente in Salonika on September 29. It took effect the next day.

The Austro-Hungarian and German divisions arrived too late to prevent the Bulgarians from leaving the war, but in time to defeat the attempt of the rebel Bulgarian soldiers to reach Sofia. The Bulgarian government and monarchy survived the second Bulgarian military defeat in six years. Meanwhile, the Entente forces

advanced deep into Macedonia and on into Serbia. They reached Skoplje on September 29 and Belgrade on November 1. Like the Western Front, the Macedonian Front remained relatively firm through most of the war. Its collapse at Dobro Pole in September 1918, however, heralded the end of the war where it began, in southeastern Europe.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918; Doiran, Battles of, 1915–1918; Zhekov, Nikola (1864–1949)

Further Reading

Falls, Cyril. *Military Operations, Macedonia*. 2 vols. Nashville, TN: Battery Press, 1996.

Hall, Richard C. *Balkan Breakthrough: The Battle of Dobro Pole 1918*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

Palmer, Alan. *The Gardeners of Salonika*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.

Macedonian War, 2001

The Macedonian War was an armed conflict between ethnic Albanian nationalists represented by the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA), and the security forces of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM; henceforth, Macedonia). The conflict began in January 2001 and ended in August 2001 following the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.

The conflict in Macedonia stemmed from longstanding grievances held by Macedonia's ethnic Albanian community against the government of Macedonia. Albanians are Macedonia's largest ethnic minority, comprising approximately 25 percent of its population. Macedonia's 1991 secession from Yugoslavia was remarkably peaceful, and relations between Macedonians and



Macedonian special police forces officers and press photographers run for cover in Tetovo as Macedonian guns began pounding ethnic Albanian rebel positions in the hills above the city, March 22, 2001. (AP Photo/CTK/Otto Ballon Mierny)

Albanians remained stable until the late 1990s, when ethnic Albanians began to mount increasing grievances against the Macedonian government. Grievances included demands to make Albanian a constitutionally designated official language of Macedonia; improved Albanian-language education (including state recognition of an Albanian-language university in the city of Tetovo), and greater access to employment. In 1994, ethnic Albanians in western Macedonia declared themselves part of an autonomous republic called Illyrida, and in 1997, the Albanian flag was illegally raised alongside the Macedonian flag in the cities of Gostivar and Tetovo. These acts triggered fears amongst Macedonians of an attempt to create a “Greater Albania.”

The 1999 conflict in Kosovo and subsequent military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

triggered a massive refugee crisis in Macedonia as 360,000 displaced Kosovar Albanians (as much as 18 percent of Macedonia’s total population) crossed Macedonia’s porous northwestern border. This sudden influx of ethnic Albanians, including many veterans of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), in conjunction with mounting ethnic grievances, pushed Macedonia past the tipping point of war.

Violence erupted on January 22, 2001, in the city of Tanuševci, when a group of NLA supporters armed with hand grenades attacked the local Macedonian police station. Four days later, on January 26, 2001, a second attack took place as the NLA claimed responsibility for a train bombing. Tensions remained high and attacks against Macedonian police continued, reaching a flashpoint on March 22, 2001, when an Albanian father and son suspected of

carrying a grenade were killed by police at a checkpoint. The NLA was told to leave Macedonia but rejected this ultimatum, and the Macedonian offensive began on March 25, 2001. Violence continued through the spring and summer, until a cease-fire agreement was signed on July 5, 2001, to be enforced by NATO. However, the NLA refused to uphold this agreement and continued to engage in increasingly brutal violence against the state.

The Ohrid Framework Agreement, signed on August 13, 2001, officially ended the war in Macedonia. The agreement granted many Albanian demands, including making Albanian an official language. In exchange, the Albanians agreed to recognize the authority of the Macedonian government and to disband the NLA. The NLA was not an official party to the discussions leading up to the agreement, and a NATO mission, Operation Essential Harvest, began on August 22, 2001, with a 30-day mandate to ensure the disarmament of the NLA.

Mary Kate Schneider

See also: Kosovo War, 1998–1999; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Judah, Tim. “Greater Albania?” *Survival* 43, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 7–18.

Neofotistos, Vasiliki P. *The Risk of War: Everyday Sociality in the Republic of Macedonia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.

Ortakovski, Vladimir T. “Interethnic Relations in the Republic of Macedonia.” *Southeastern European Politics* 2, no. 1 (May 2001): 24–45.

Phillips, John. *Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004.

Mahmud II, Ottoman Sultan (1785–1839)

Born at Topkapı Palace in Constantinople on 20 July 20, 1785, as the youngest son of Sultan Abdulhamid I (1725–1789), Mahmud succeeded to Mustafa IV on July 28, 1808, following an armed coup led by Alemdar Mustafa Pasha (1755–1808). Alemdar had aimed at restoring to the throne the formerly deposed sultan Selim III (1761–1808). Because Selim was assassinated before his arrival to the Topkapı Palace, Alemdar declared Mahmud as the new sultan. The latter appointed Alemdar the grand vizier and convened an assembly of provincial rulers in Constantinople that adopted the Deed of Agreement (*Sened-i Ittifak*). This constitution-like document sought to legitimize the status of local powerholders as semi-independent tax collectors and military contractors of the central government. In mid-November 1808, however, popular uprising led by the Janissaries deposed Alemdar Mustafa’s government. It was the culmination of a movement opposed to the establishment of new military units as well as to the seizure of the central government by provincial elements.

Following the end of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806–1812 with the Treaty of Bucharest (May 28, 1812), Mahmud initiated a gradual policy designed to restore central authority over the provinces. In the first years of the 1820s, he succeeded in reasserting its power over most of the provincial centers in Anatolia as well as over Thrace, Macedonia, and the Danube districts. The elimination of some local Muslim notables, especially that of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha in Epirus, facilitated the emergence

of the Serbian and Greek national movements. In Arabia, the Wahhabite insurgency was crushed down by the troops of Muhammad Ali Pasha (1769–1849), the governor of Egypt.

While still maintaining his allegiance to the sultan, Muhammad Ali gradually transformed his province into a semi-independent unit with its newly established regular army. When the Ottoman forces proved incapable to subdue the Greek rebellion begun in 1821, the sultan once again appealed to Muhammad Ali for assistance, promising to cede to him the governorship of Crete and the Peloponnesus in return for his services. By April 1826, the Greek rising came to an end, and it seemed to Mahmud that the time had come to carry out the expected military reform. The aimed project was to establish new trained regular troops within the Janissary corps. He previously ensured the support of the religious and bureaucratic elites as well as some of the upper Janissary officers.

Nevertheless, three weeks after the new *Eshkindji* units started their European-style drills, the Janissaries rose up in arms on the night of June 14. The sultan reacted with speed and determination. A joint force composed of the loyal troops, some of the Muslim population of Istanbul, and religious students managed to defeat the rebels on June 15 with considerable bloodshed. Two days later, an imperial order declared the Janissary corps abolished. Thus, the last great organized force that had stood in the way of restructuring the military and the political centralizing project was removed.

Instead, a new professional central army was established under the name of *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediyye* (Victorious Troops of Muhammad). The new units were trained on contemporary European drills. Their first instructors were a few

Ottoman officers who had had experience with the former attempts of Sultan Selim III and Alemdar. Shortly thereafter, Husrev Pasha (1769–1855), the second commander in chief (*serasker*), has changed the drill system. He appointed a French drill sergeant the instructor of the infantry units and a Piedmontese officer that of the cavalry squadrons. In this process, the sultan appeared as the first Ottoman sultan wearing a uniform-like European dress with the Egyptian fez on his head. Most of the soldiers enrolled in *Asakir-i Mansure* were from the Turkish-speaking population of Rumelia and Anatolia. Muslim nomadic and tribal communities such as Turkmens, Kurds, Albanians, and Lazs resisted service as regular full-time soldiers, but took part in the expeditions as contractual auxiliary forces as part-time contractual warriors. Non-Muslim Ottoman subjects were totally kept outside of the army and had only minor representation in the navy.

In the 1830s, many expeditions were launched with regular troops and auxiliary forces of irregular soldiers against the tribes in Bosnia, Albania, southeastern Anatolia, and Iraq who rebelled against forced conscription and paying increased taxes. Forced volunteers mobilized during the 1828–1829 Russo-Ottoman War, and the two battles against the Egyptian forces of Muhammad Ali (1832–1833; 1839) proved to be ineffective. In 1834, a provincial militia (*Redif*) was established to provide the regular army with reserve forces. Sultan Mahmud and Husrev Pasha (1769–1855) filled the commanding posts of the new army with their favorites and slaves, most of whom were not skilled and educated officers. The Ottoman Military Academy started to function at the end of 1836. At the same time, professional European officers were replaced by official military missions sent by European states.

Foreign officers and engineers were also employed in the modernization of Ottoman arms industry to be runned with steam machinery.

In spite of all his efforts, Mahmud II was not able to see his military forces defeating the the Greeks and their allies. The British-Russian-French joint fleet destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian navy on October 20, 1827, inside the harbor of Navarino. The 1828–1829 Russo-Ottoman War ended in defeat. Finally, the Ottoman army lost twice against the Egyptian troops of Muhammad Ali. Only the intervention of the European Great Powers prevented their advance toward Constantinople. By the Treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829), the Ottoman state agreed to cede to Russia the Danube delta in Europe and the province of Akhaltsikhe. A heavy war indemnity and the recognition of the autonomy of Serbia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Greece were other clauses. The Convention of Kütahya (April 8, 1833) conferred on Muhammad Ali the government of Syria and the province of Adana. On June 24, the Egyptians, once again, decisively routed the Ottoman army at Nizib. On July 1, Mahmud died, probably without learning of his army's last defeat.

Gültekin Yıldız

See also: Mehmet Ali (1769–1849); Russo-Ottoman War, 1806–1812; Russo-Ottoman War, 1828–1829

Further Reading

Aksan, Virginia H. *Ottoman Wars, 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged*. London: Pearson Longman, 2007.

Aktepe, M. Münir-Levy, A. “Mahmud.” In *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. Van Donzel, and W. P. Heinrichs. Leiden: Brill, 2009.

Yıldız, Gültekin. *Neferin Adı Yok: Zorunlu Askerliğe Geçiş Sürecinde Osmanlı Devleti'nde Siyaset, Ordu ve Toplum (1826–1839)*. Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2009.

Mahmud Muhtar Pasha (1866–1935)

Mahmud Muhtar, Ottoman general during the Balkan Wars, was born in Constantinople on December 11, 1866. He attended the Galatasaray Imperial High School, where he found the opportunity to learn French. In 1885, however, he was removed by his father from the Galatasaray and sent to the Ottoman Military Academy (*Mekteb-i Harbiyye*). The same year, he was sent with a group of Ottoman cadets to the German Military Academy in Metz. He graduated as lieutenant in 1888 and entered into the Second Infantry Regiment of Guards in Berlin. Simultaneously he attended courses at the Staff College in Berlin. After graduating as a staff officer, he returned to Constantinople and became staff instructor at the Harbiye. As colonel of a cavalry regiment of the Salonika Army, Mahmud Muhtar took part in the 1897 Greco-Ottoman War. He distinguished himself in the battles of Velestin and Dömeke by attacking and capturing a Greek battery placed on the summit of a hill. Seriously wounded toward the end of this cavalry charge uphill, he was returned home soon after the encounter.

Mahmud Muhtar left the Ottoman capital for Egypt in 1903 and stayed there until the declaration of the Turkish constitution in 1908. Then he was promoted to the rank of general and appointed commander of the First Division of Imperial Guards (*Hassa Ordusu*) located in Istanbul. Though not a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, he was a fervent partisan of

constitutional government. In the military mutiny of April 13, 1909, Mahmud Muhtar took immediate action against the rebels. He held the War Ministry with his troops and resisted the insurgents until the final resignation of the Cabinet. Upon learning that the insurgents threatened his life, he escaped from Constantinople for Salonika with the help from the German and British embassies. He returned to Constantinople following the dethronement of Abdulhamid II (1842–1918) by the Young Turks.

In May 1909, however, a law was passed reducing the ranks of army officers who had not attended the Staff College. As his diploma from the German Staff College was no more deemed valid, Mahmud Muhtar Pasha's rank was reduced to that of colonel. During the early constitutional period, Mahmud Muhtar served as the governor of Izmir from June 1909 to 1911. At the beginning of 1911, he was appointed minister of marine. When the Balkan War broke out in the next year, Mahmud Muhtar Pasha requested active military service. Holding the rank of major-general, he first commanded the Third Army Corps on the right wing of the Eastern Army (Thracian Army). In the early days of war mobilization, the Third Army Corps was located in Kırkkilise (today Kırklareli) to ensure a slower retreat toward Vize and Saray in the case of a superior enemy attack. As the initial defeat at Kırkkilise was caused mainly by the panic of Ottoman troops, he rallied the soldiers and succeeded in checking the Bulgarian advance between Vize and Pınarhisar. According to him, the main deficiencies of Ottoman army during the Balkan War were the untrained soldiers, unfinished road constructions, and bad sanitation and logistics as well as the absence of skilled and active officers. He also found the main point of assembly as improper. His choice

was Ergene instead of the Edirne-Kırkkilise Line.

Mahmud Muhtar personally commanded skirmishes around Vize between October 28–30 and even made attacks against Bulgarians the following two days. On 1 November 1, he was appointed the commander of the new established Second Eastern Army and charged to organize the Terkos-Çatalca line of defense, which barred the way to Istanbul. On 17 November 17, 1912, during the Bulgarian attack on the Çatalca positions, Mahmud Muhtar began a counterattack. While leading his men at the front, he fell badly wounded and left the battlefield.

In February 1913, Mahmud Muhtar went to Berlin as the Ottoman ambassador. While there, he advised the Ottoman government to remain neutral in the coming war. Subsequently, he was removed from the post with the signing of the German-Ottoman alliance. He did not return home, however, and remained in Germany. Later, he moved to Switzerland. In 1916, Muhtar wrote to ask for an active military appointment. Enver Pasha (1881–1922), then the minister of war, offered him an inspectorship of the Eastern Anatolian armies. Upon his refusal of this offer, Mahmud Muhtar was pensioned off and debarred from active service.

After nine years living abroad, he returned in 1922 with his family to Constantinople. In the summer of 1929, while undergoing a cancer treatment in Switzerland, he was informed that the Turkish government now held him responsible for the payment due for the battleships ordered while he was minister of marine in 1912. He opened a lawsuit against the state, which ended with the probably inevitable conclusion of his responsibility for the debt being confirmed. He never returned to his homeland.

Mahmud Muhtar suffered a heart attack during a ship travel from Egypt to Italy and died on March 18, 1935. He was buried in the Imam Shafei Cemetary near Cairo.

Gültekin Yıldız

See also: Chataldza, Battle of, 1912; Greco-Ottoman War, 1897; Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, Battle of, 1912; Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Paşa, Abdullah. *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın Balkan Harbi Hâtıratı*. Edited by Tahsin Yıldırım and İbrahim Öztürkçü. Istanbul: Dün Bugün Yarın Yayınları, 2012.

Paşa, Mahmud Muhtar Paşa. *Balkan Harbi Üçüncü Kolordu'nun ve İkinci Doğu Ordusunun Muhârebeleri*. Edited by A. Basad Kocaoğlu. Istanbul: İlgi Kültür Sanat, 2012.

Paşa, Mahmud Muhtar. *Acı Bir Hatıra: 1328 Balkan Harbinde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Mahmoud Moukhtar Pasha [Mahmut Muhtar Pasha, Mon commandement au cours de la Campagne des Balkans de 1912]*. Paris and Nancy: Berger-Levrault, 1913.

Mărășești, Battle of, 1917

The battle of Mărășești was fought from August 6 to September 3, 1917, between the invading Austro-Hungarian and German forces and the Romanian and Russian armies in northeastern Romania. This was the largest of three important battles on the Romanian front in the late summer and early fall of 1917.

An offensive by the newly reorganized Romanian army preceded this battle. This offensive was undertaken by the Romanian Second Army commanded by General Alexandru Averescu (1859–1938) and the Russian Fourth Army on July 24, 1917. Here, despite heavy losses, the Romanian army initially defeated the invaders. The

spread of revolutionary ideas in Russian army units stationed elsewhere on the front caused the offensive to halt prematurely on July 29.

Seeking to gain the initiative and hoping to knock Romania out of the war, the Austro-Hungarians and Germans launched an offensive against the Romanian First Army commanded by General Eremea Grigorescu (1863–1919) and some Russian units at Mărășești beginning on August 6. The fighting continued until September 3. The Romanians again sustained high casualties but held their positions. At the same time, another Austro-Hungarian–German offensive began against the Romanian Second Army at Oituz. Here, too, the Romanians withstood the invaders' attacks but at a high cost.

The three battles demonstrated that the Romanian army had overcome many of its weaknesses that had caused the overwhelming defeats of the previous year. The defensive victories at Mărășești and Oituz in particular enabled the Romanian government in Iași to continue the war for another six months. Unfortunately, the collapse of Russia early the next year negated the 1917 victories and made further prosecution of the war impossible. Romania left the war on March 5, 1918, with the Preliminary Treaty of Buftea. Romania then returned to the war on the side of the victors on November 9, 1918.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Averescu, Alexandru (1859–1938); Romania in World War I

Further Reading

Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania, 1866–1947*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Torrey, Glenn. *The Romanian Battlefield in World War I*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011.

Treptow, Kurt W., ed. *A History of Romania*. Iași: Center for Romanian Studies, 1996.

Mehmet Ali (1769–1849)

Mehmet (also Mohammed) Ali was an Albanian officer of the Ottoman army who declared himself leader of Egypt and became regarded as the founder of modern Egypt. Mehmet Ali was born in Kavala in Macedonia to Albanian parents on March 4, 1769. In 1801, he became a commander in Albanian unit with the army that the Ottoman sultan, Selim III, sent to reoccupy Egypt after the French departure. Mehmet took advantage of the conflict between the sultan and the Mamluks, the rulers of Egypt for over 600 years, and elevated himself to the position of governor of Egypt by 1805. On March 1, 1811, he had the Mamluk leaders murdered in Cairo and, soon afterward, had the remaining Mamluks killed.

Mehmet soon established Egypt as a regional power. To secure regular revenue, he nationalized all the land in Egypt and required all producers to sell their goods to the state, which, in turn, resold the goods and kept the surplus. He supported the cultivation of long staple cotton, which increased state revenues and wages for many farmers.

Mehmet Ali established factories to produce weapons and a shipyard to construct a navy. In the 1820s, he sent promising Egyptians to Europe to study European languages, especially French, and established hospitals and schools in Egypt. The students of these schools studied French texts, on topics ranging from sociology and history to military technology, and translated them into Arabic. In 1835, his government founded the first indigenous press in the Arab world.

Mehmet kept all central authority for himself and installed his sons in most key positions. He divided Egypt into 10 provinces responsible for collecting taxes and maintaining order and established a professional bureaucracy, a byproduct of his training program. Mehmet created a modern army, which he first used to assist the Ottoman sultan, Mahmud II (1789–1839), with his conflicts in Arabia and Greece. In 1812, Mehmet's forces defeated the Saudis and secured most of Arabia for the sultan. In 1820, Mehmet Ali invaded the Sudan and conquered that territory the following year. In 1827, he provided a navy and an army to help Mahmud put down the revolt in Greece, but a combined European navy destroyed the Egyptian fleet at Navarino, forcing Mehmet to withdraw his army.

After the defeat at Navarino, Mehmet rebuilt his navy and raised a new army. On October 31, 1831, he invaded Syria, captured Acre on May 27, 1832, and soundly defeated the Ottoman army at the battle of Konya in south-central Anatolia on December 21, 1832. To prevent the complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the European powers brokered the Convention of Kutahya in May 1833, which would grant Crete and the Hejaz to Mehmet if he withdrew his forces from Anatolia. However, Mehmet rejected the convention because it did not establish an independent Egypt with him as its ruler.

In mid-1839, Mehmet renewed the war against the Ottoman Empire. On June 24, 1839, at the battle of Nezib, his forces again soundly defeated the Ottoman army. Soon afterward, the Ottoman fleet defected to Mehmet Ali. Sultan Mahmud II died almost immediately after the battle, and his 16-year old son, Abdul Mecid (1823–1861), succeeded him. The European powers again

intervened and, in the Convention of London of 1840, offered Mehmet Ali hereditary rule of Egypt within the Ottoman Empire if he withdrew his forces from Syrian territory. In the face of European military might, Mehmet agreed to the Convention's terms on November 27, 1840.

After 1843, Mehmet Ali's mind became increasingly clouded. In 1846, he traveled to Constantinople, made peace with the sultan, and secured hereditary rule of Egypt for his family. He personally ruled Egypt until 1848, when senility made further personal governance impossible. Mehmet Ali died in Alexandria on August 2, 1849. His dynasty ruled Egypt and Sudan, in actuality or officially, until the revolution of 1952.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832; Mahmud II (1785–1839); Navarino, Battle of, 1827

Further Reading

Goldschmidt, Arthur, Jr. *Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976–1977.

Vatikiotis, P. J. *The History of Modern Egypt from Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.

Warburg, Gabriel R. *Egypt and the Sudan Studies in History and Politics*. London: F. Cass, 1985.

Metaxas, Ioannis (1871–1941)

Ioannis Metaxas was a Greek army general and dictator of Greece from 1936. Born on the island of Ithaca on April 12, 1871, Metaxas was commissioned in the army on

graduation from the Greek Military Academy in 1890. Following service in the 1897 Greco-Ottoman War, he studied in Berlin. Metaxas served on the Greek General Staff during the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars. He became army chief of staff in 1913.

At the beginning of World War I, Metaxas favored an alliance with the Central Powers. A staunch monarchist and opponent of Eleuthérios Venizélos (1864–1936), he left Greece following the forced abdication of King Constantine (1868–1923) in 1917 and returned with the king three years later. Metaxas entered the Greek Parliament in 1926, and in 1936, he seized power and became dictator, with the justification of preventing a Communist takeover. During his authoritarian rule, the Greeks successfully repelled the Italian invasion that began in October 1940 and indeed went on the offensive the next month, occupying much of Albania. Metaxas died on January 29, 1941, before Germany intervened in Greece.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Constantine I, King of Greece (1868–1923); National Schism (Greece), 1916–1917, Venizélos, Eleuthérios (1864–1936)

Further Reading

Higham, Robin D. S. *The Metaxas Dictatorship: Aspects of Greece, 1936–1940*. Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, 1993.

MacKenzie, Compton. *Wind of Freedom: The History of the Invasion of Greece by the Axis Powers, 1940–1941*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1943.

Papagos, Alexandros. *The Battle of Greece, 1940–1941*. Athens: J. M. Slazikis “Alpha” Editions, 1949.

Vatikiotis, P. J. *Popular Autocracy in Greece, 1936–41: A Political Biography of General Ioannis Metaxas*. London: Cass, 1998.

Michael I, King of Romania (1921–)

Michael I was king of Romania (1927–1930, 1940–1947) and pretender to the throne after 1947. Born in the royal castle at Sinaia on October 25, 1921, to Romania's Crown Prince Carol (1893–1953) and Princess Helen of Greece (1896–1982), Michael succeeded his grandfather Ferdinand I (1865–1927) as king in 1927, bypassing his father, who had renounced his claim to the throne in 1925 in order to pursue a liaison with the socialite Magda Lupescu (1895–1977). This brief regency ended in 1930 with the return of his father, who engineered his own accession as Carol II, pursuing self-indulgent policies and political gestures and ultimately creating a royal dictatorship in 1938 meant to counter the growing influence of defense minister Ion Antonescu (1882–1946) and the fascist Iron Guard. After the Soviet Union's occupation of Bessarabia and the ceding of Transylvania to Hungary, in September 1940, Carol was obliged to abdicate in favor of Michael, then 19 years old. It was Antonescu, however, who held real power in Romania.

Michael and Helen, now effectively wards of the state, spent most of the war years at Sinaia, visiting the capital only for command figurehead appearances with Antonescu. On August 23, 1944, with the Soviets poised for invasion of Romania, Michael and a sympathetic military element managed a coup that deposed Antonescu and a number of ministers, who soon were turned over to the Soviets. In September 1944, Michael traveled to Moscow to sign an armistice with the Allies, ending the war for Romania and paving the way for the Romanian Communists to fully emerge and claim power. By force of will, Michael maintained a presence in

Romania until he was pressured to abdicate and sent into exile in December 1947. He made his home in Switzerland, working with an American brokerage firm and acting as a goodwill ambassador on behalf of Romania after the fall of the regime of Nicolae Ceaușescu (1918–1989).

Gordon E. Hogg

See also: Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946); Carol II, King of Romania (1893–1953); Romania in World War II; Romanian Coup, August 1944

Further Reading

- Hindley, Geoffrey. *The Royal Families of Europe*. New York: Carroll and Graf, 2000.
- Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania, 1866–1947*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
- Treptow, Kurt W., ed. *A History of Romania*. Iași: Center for Romanian Studies, 1996.

Mihailov, Ivan (1896–1990)

The Macedonian revolutionary leader Ivan Mihailov, sometimes known as Vancho, was born in Macedonia during Ottoman rule near Shtip on August 26, 1896. His family supported the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO; VMRO). After studying law in Sofia, he joined the organization. He became an aide to VMRO leader Todor Aleksandrov (1881–1924).

After Aleksandrov's assassination on August 31, 1924, by elements in the Bulgarian military who opposed VMRO, Mihailov assumed control of the organization. Mihailov initiated a ruthless terror campaign in Bulgaria and elsewhere in Europe in pursuit of his goal of an independent Macedonia. Under him, the Petrich region of southwestern Bulgaria became virtually autonomous. From this base, VMRO launched raids into Greece and Yugoslavia.

In an effort to end this situation, Zveno (Link), an organization of Bulgarian military officers, seized power in Sofia on May 19, 1934, and undertook a campaign to cleanse the Petrich region of VMRO. Mihailov fled to Turkey, and later to Italy. Before World War II, VMRO received support from Mussolini's Italy. During the war, Mihailov moved to Zagreb in independent Croatia. There he established contact with the Germans. He declined a German offer in August 1944 to establish an independent Macedonia, recognizing that the Germans had by then lost the war.

After the war, Mihailov settled in Italy. He remained the leader of VMRO, the largely forgotten leader of a largely forgotten organization. Mihailov died in Rome on September 5, 1990. Ironically, a little over a year after his death, Macedonia achieved independence and VMRO revived as a political movement.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Italy in the Balkans during World War II; Military League (Bulgaria); VMRO

Further Reading

Crampton, R. J. *Bulgaria*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Mihailov, Ivan. *Spomeni*. 4 vols. Brussels: Macedonian Cultural Fellowship, 1958–1973.

Tomasevich, Jozo. *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Mihajlović, Dragoljub “Draž” (1893–1946)

Yugoslav army officer and guerrilla leader, born at Ivanjica, Serbia, in 1893, Dragoljub Mihajlović, nicknamed “Draž,” entered the military academy in Belgrade in 1908

but interrupted his studies to serve with distinction in the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars and World War I. Mihajlović rose to the rank of colonel and was, for a time, inspector general of fortifications. When the Germans invaded Yugoslavia in April 1941, he organized resistance to the Axis occupation forces in the mountains of western Serbia.

Mihajlović's Četniks (Chetniks), named after the Serbian guerrillas who had fought the Turks) were mostly pro-monarchist Serbs. Mihajlović was promoted to general in December 1941, and in June 1942, he became minister of war in King Peter II's Yugoslav government-in-exile.

Already reluctant to pursue a vigorous campaign against the Axis occupation forces lest he provoke reprisals against Yugoslav civilians, Mihajlović correctly understood that a rival resistance group, the pro-Communist Partisans led by Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980), posed a greater threat to the restoration of a Serb-dominated monarchy than did the Axis powers, especially as Tito and most of his followers were Croats, the Serbs' traditional rivals for power. Accordingly, Mihajlović and Tito focused on fighting each other rather than the Germans and Italians, with whom they both also collaborated when it suited their purposes.

At first, the Četniks enjoyed Allied support, but Mihajlović was systematically discredited by Communist sympathizers among the British. Pressured by Soviet leader Josef Stalin at Tehran, the Allies agreed to shift their support to Tito. In December 1943, the British halted all aid to the Četniks, and in May 1944, King Peter formed a new government and named Tito as minister of war.

Abandoned by the Allies, the Četniks were soon overpowered, and Mihajlović went into hiding. He was captured by the Communists on March 13, 1946, tried for

collaboration with the Axis powers, and, despite protests by Western governments, executed in Belgrade on July 17, 1946. In March 1948, U.S. president Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) secretly awarded Mihajlović the Legion of Merit for rescuing some 500 Allied airmen and for his role in helping to defeat the Axis powers.

Charles R. Shrader

See also: Četniks; Partisans, Yugoslavia; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslavia in World War II

Further Reading

Karchmar, Lucien. *Draza Mihailović and the Rise of the Cetnik Movement, 1941–1942*. New York: Garland Publishing, 1988.

Lees, Michael. *The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943–1944*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991.

Martin, David. *Patriot or Traitor: The Case of General Mikailovich*. Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

Roberts, W. *Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941–1944*. 2nd ed. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987.

Tomashevich, Jozo. *The Chetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Military League (Bulgaria)

The Military League was a secret organization founded by active and reserve Bulgarian military officers in the aftermath of Bulgaria's defeat in World War I in 1919. They were determined to maintain Bulgaria's nationalist objectives and evade the limitations imposed on the Bulgarian army by the 1919 Treaty of Neuilly.

Although banned by the government of Aleksandŭr Stamboliski (1879–1923), the

Military League received support from Czar Boris III (1894–1943). Members of the league participated in the June 1923 coup that overthrew Stamboliski. They also helped to suppress the September 1923 Communist uprising. Although they supported the post-Stamboliski government of Alexandŭr Tsankov (1879–1958), by the mid-1920s, the Military League had begun to fade. Many of its members became supporters of the Zveno (Link) movement in the 1930s, which seized power in Sofia in 1934.

Zveno was a nonparty elitist organization that acted as a counterweight to IMRO (VMRO), the Macedonian revolutionary party. Having taken power, Zveno disbanded as a formal organization. After Czar Boris ousted the Zveno regime and established his own mild authoritarian regime the next year, many member of Zveno drifted into opposition. During World War II, some of them established loose cooperation with the Communist-led Fatherland Front. Although Zveno members supported the Fatherland Front's takeover of September 9, 1944, they had little impact on the Fatherland Front itself. Zveno then disbanded in 1949. After the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, the movement revived.

The Military League and its successor Zveno represented an effort in Bulgarian politics to establish a nationalist and democratic alternative to the Macedonian and the other right-wing organizations. Because they tended to be elitist, they never succeeded in having a significant impact on the largely egalitarian Bulgarian political scene.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Boris III, Czar of Bulgaria (1894–1943); Stamboliski, Aleksandŭr (1879–1923); VMRO

Further Reading

Bell, John D. *Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian Union, 1899–1923*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Crampton, R. J. *Bulgaria*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Groueff, Stephane. *Crown of Thorns: The Reign of King Boris III of Bulgaria 1918–1943*. Latham, MD: Madison Books, 1987.

Milošević, Slobodan (1941–2006)

Slobodan Milošević was the president of Yugoslavia from July 1997 to October 2000. A Serbian nationalist, he was a controversial figure whose policies were central in the breakup of that country into independent states during the Yugoslav Civil War. Following his military actions in the autonomous Serbian province of Kosovo, Milošević became the first serving head of state to be indicted for crimes against humanity.

Milošević was born to Montenegrin parents on August 20, 1941, in Pozavrac, Serbia. He was educated at Belgrade University and, after receiving his law degree in 1964, entered into business administration, ultimately becoming president of a Belgrade bank. A longtime Communist (he had joined the Communist Party of Yugoslavia at the age of 18), Milošević became the leader of the Belgrade Communist Party in 1984, and in 1987, he took over as Serbian Communist Party leader.

Following a 1987 incident in Kosovo, Milošević carefully nurtured the anti-Albanian sentiments of both Serbs and Montenegrins and orchestrated a long series of pro-Serbian demonstrations starting in July 1988. He was determined to revoke the autonomous status of both Kosovo and Vojvodina provinces—designations that had been

supported by former Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) as a counterbalance to Serbian nationalism. In March 1989, both provinces ceded most of their autonomy to Serbia after many months of fierce street demonstrations by Milošević’s supporters. Milošević won the Serbian presidency on May 8, 1989, and proceeded to further reduce the autonomy given to the provinces by making changes within the Serbian constitution.

In 1991, Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia seceded from Yugoslavia. Milošević sent the Yugoslav army to reclaim the territories and supported ethnic Serb, Croat, and Slovene paramilitary groups in an attempt to reassert Serbian dominion over the region. When Bosnia and Herzegovina also seceded, Milošević-supported Bosnian Serb forces besieged the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, for three years and instituted a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing that culminated in 1995 with the deaths of more than 7,000 Muslim boys and men in the UN-protected “safe haven” of Srebrenica.

Throughout 1991 and 1992, Milošević resisted all attempts by various European nations, the United States, and the United Nations to negotiate peace for the federation. He also continued to thwart any efforts to democratize the Serbian government. In late 1994, he gave into international pressure and ordered the cutoff of military aid to the Bosnian Serb forces, also agreeing to permit international monitors to be deployed along the Serbian border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. In exchange, the UN agreed to ease international sanctions against Yugoslavia. A year later, Milošević met with leaders from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to endorse the Dayton Agreement, bringing an end to the long-running war.

In July 1997, Yugoslavia’s Federal Assembly elected Milošević as the new Yugoslav president, succeeding Zoran Lilić

(1953–). Milošević pursued the federal office because he was banned by the Serbian constitution from serving a third term as Serbian president. Although the federal president has traditionally held a ceremonial role in the government, Milošević retained much of his political power due to his position as leader of Serbia's dominant Socialist Party.

Milošević's role as Balkan peacemaker ended in March 1999, when he instigated another war for the expansion of Serbian nationalism, implementing a policy of forced removal on the majority Albanian population in Kosovo province. His ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo resulted in the deaths of nearly half of the Albanian Kosovar population. Milošević's refusal to accept an internationally brokered peace plan resulted in a three-month North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–led bombing campaign of Yugoslavia and an indictment on crimes against humanity for the Yugoslav president.

After the NATO bombing campaign, dissenters—heavily censored under Milošević's presidency—gained confidence, and protests erupted criticizing his autocratic rule. Opposition parties demanded his resignation, and in light of his waning popularity, Milošević attempted to solidify his power by calling for an early presidential election. His plan backfired when challenger Vojislav Kostunica (1944–) won the poll, but Milošević refused to give up the presidency. Through the Constitutional Court, he attempted to void the results, making a second round of balloting necessary. His actions set off massive public protests, which included the burning of the parliament building, and on October 6, 2000, Milošević stepped down as a result of the popular uprising.

In April 2001, Milošević was arrested by Yugoslav police and charged with



A defiant former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević appears before the United Nations (UN) War Crimes Tribunal on August 30, 2001. In the early- to mid-1980s, Milošević waged an aggressive war of conquest and genocide in Bosnia. In 2002, Milošević was tried by the World Court for war crimes committed during the Yugoslavian Civil War. He died of a heart attack in his cell at the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague, the Netherlands, on March 11, 2006. (AP Photo/Peter Dejong)

embezzlement, abuse of power, and obstruction of justice. Two months later, the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia sent him to The Hague to face charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. By December 2001, he was formally indicted on 29 violations of international law. His trial began on September 26, 2002, and continued for four years, during which time the trial was riddled with controversy and repeatedly interrupted by Milošević's ill

health. During the trial, Milošević served as his own lawyer (until he was deemed medically unfit) and often defended his actions by portraying himself and his country as victims.

Milošević died in his cell at The Hague on March 11, 2006. Medical tests revealed that the cause of death was a heart attack, though Milošević's family accused the tribunal of poisoning the former leader, who in recent years had been plagued by heart and blood-pressure ailments. Two months after his death, in May 2006, the tribunal concluded its investigation into the cause of death and formally determined: "Nothing has been found to support allegations reported in some sections of the media that Milošević had been murdered, in particular by poisoning. The results of an independent investigation by the Dutch authorities demonstrate that such allegations are entirely false."

Richard C. Hall

See also: Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Curtis, Glenn E., ed. *Yugoslavia: A Country Study*. 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992.

Magas, Branka. *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Breakup 1980–1992*. New York: Verso, 1993.

Sell, Louis. *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002.

Mladić, Ratko (1943–)

Ratko Mladić served as commander in chief of the army of the Republika Srpska during the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia, and was

accused of war crimes in his conduct of that war as commander of Bosnian Serb forces.

Mladić was born in Bosnia-Herzegovina on March 12, 1943, during World War II. His father was killed by the Croatian Ustaša during the war. Mladić attended a military high school and then an army military academy. Entering the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) as a career officer, he served as an infantry commander. On the outbreak of the conflict in Croatia in 1991, while holding the rank of colonel, he was appointed to command the Ninth Corps of the JNA in Knin. He was promoted to general-major due to his successes during the war in Croatia, where he established a reputation as an aggressive and capable field commander.

When the Republika Srpska declared its independence from Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992, Mladić was appointed the commander in chief of the republic's mixed army of local militias and former JNA units. He aggressively pursued the war, and was later charged with encouraging and facilitating brutal conduct toward enemy civilians—such as shelling the city of Sarajevo—and the use of UN peacekeepers as "human shields" to prevent NATO air strikes.

Of the war crimes attributed to Mladić, the most publicized was the fall of Srebrenica, which he personally commanded. The city (along with five others) was declared a "safe haven" for Bosnian Muslims by the United Nations in 1993, protected by a small force of UN peacekeepers. Bosnian Serbs protested (with some justification) that the safe havens were used as bases by Bosnian Muslim forces. Over June to July 1995, Srebrenica was overrun—the UN peacekeeping unit failing to prevent the takeover—and some 40,000 Bosnian Muslims were forced to evacuate the city.

Bosnian Serb forces reportedly executed many Muslim men (including 12-year-old boys) after the city was taken, despite promises of safe passage. Although the number killed is disputed, the charges stated it was in the range of 8,000.

He was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) of The Hague on July 24, 1995, along with former Republika Srpska president Radovan Karadžić on multiple counts. These include charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and crimes against civilians, destruction and seizure of property, the use of UN peacekeepers as hostages and the conduct of the siege of Sarajevo. Additional counts were issued that November regarding events at Srebrenica. In June 1996, warrants were issued by the ICTY for the arrest of both men, and Mladić was then replaced as commander of the Republika Srpska's army.

Mladić remained at large for the next 16 years. He probably spent most of this time in Serbia. On May 26, 2011, Serbian authorities arrested him in Lazarevo, Vojvodina, Serbia. This was probably in connection with Serbia's attempt to join the European Union. He subsequently was extradited to The Hague, Netherlands, where as of this writing, he awaited trial on charges of war crimes.

James W. Frusetta

See also: Bosnian War, 1992–1995; Dayton Peace Accords, 1995; Srebrenica Massacre, 1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Cigar, Norman L. *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing."* College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995.

Fogelquist, Alan F. *Handbook of Facts on: The Break-Up of Yugoslavia International Policy and the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina.* Whitmore Lake, MI: AEIOU Publishing, 1993.

Magas, Branka. *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Breakup 1980–1992.* New York: Verso, 1993.

Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. *Yugoslavia, Death of a Nation.* New York: TV Books, 1996.

Montenegro in Balkan Events, 1876–1878

Montenegro played an important role in the turbulent years of 1876–1878, which led to the loss of Ottoman power in much of the Balkan Peninsula. Prince Nikola (1841–1921) took advantage of local unrest in Herzegovina in 1875 to intervene there against Ottoman rule. Initially he gave shelter and support to Herzegovinian rebels. He also sanctioned the attacks of Montenegrin irregulars into Herzegovina. With the expectation of acquiring all Herzegovina, Nikola increased Montenegrin activities.

On June 16, 1876, Nikola signed an alliance agreement with Prince Milan (1854–1901) of Serbia. Two weeks later, Montenegrin and Serbian armies attacked separately into Ottoman territory. Montenegrin forces initially achieved some success against the Ottomans. In September 1877, after a prolonged siege, they took the important town of Nikšić. They also occupied several locations on the Adriatic coast, including Bar, Spič, and Ulcinj.

The Russian victory over the Ottomans in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 confirmed the Montenegrin successes. While the Treaty of Berlin somewhat reduced the territories awarded to Montenegro by the

previous Treaty of San Stefano, it still doubled the size of the small Balkan state. In addition to Nikšić and the Adriatic coast, Montenegro also acquired the important town of Podgorica. Nevertheless, many Montenegrins, including Prince Nikola, were disappointed by the outcome. They had hoped to gain all of Herzegovina.

Regardless, the performance of the Montenegrin army in the fighting against the Ottomans proved to be better than that of their Serbian allies. In the aftermath of the Treaty of Berlin, the international position of Montenegro was enhanced. Prince Nikola could even dream of uniting all of the Serbian people under the House of Petrović-Njegoš.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Berlin, Treaty of, 1878; Nikola I, King of Montenegro (1841–1921); Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878

Further Reading

MacKenzie, David. *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875–1878*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967.

Roberts, Elizabeth. *Realm of the Balkan Mountain: A History of Montenegro*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.

Stevenson, Francis Seymour. *A History of Montenegro*. New York: Arno, 1971.

Montenegro in the Balkan Wars

The First Balkan War, 1912–1913, represented a time of hope and frustration for the tiny Balkan kingdom of Montenegro. Before the war began, Montenegro, under King Nikola (1841–1921) had great expectations of acquiring Ottoman territory in northern Albania and in the sanjak of Novi Pazar. Because of his pan-Serb ambitions, King Nikola especially wanted to take a

medieval Serbian capital, Prizren in Kosovo, and Scutari (Shkodër, Skadar), the largest town in northern Albania.

Unfortunately, Montenegro lacked the military power to realize these aims. Its army was little more than a mass militia consisting of most of the males of military age in the kingdom. It had only a few modern artillery pieces and a small cavalry unit. Due to the chronic instability of the Ottoman border regions, many Montenegrin soldiers had combat experience, but this tended to season them as individuals rather than as an army. During the summer of 1912 Montenegro signed agreements for military cooperation with Bulgaria and Serbia.

Montenegro opened the war against the Ottoman Empire on October 8, with King Nikola's youngest son, Prince Petar (1889–1932), firing the first shot across the Ottoman frontier. The Montenegrins advanced along three axes. Their Eastern Division, consisting of 12,000 men, proceeded into the sanjak of Novi Pazar. The Zeta Division of 15,000 men moved along the eastern shore of Lake Scutari towards the city of Scutari. The Coastal Division, with 8,000 men, pressed along the western shore of the lake to the city. These two forces were unable to meet south of the city due to the strength of Ottoman fortified positions there. Scutari resisted Montenegrin efforts to seize it. Simplistic Montenegrin tactics caused heavy casualties among the attackers. By the time of the December 3 armistice between the Balkan allies and the Ottomans, the situation around Scutari had stalemated. The Montenegrins lacked the strength to break into Scutari; the Ottomans lacked the strength to break the siege.

The armistice ended on January 30, 1913. On February 7, the two Montenegrin divisions attempted a coordinated assault on

Scutari; it failed. Later that month, the Serbs sent 30,000 troops to assist the Montenegrins. By this time, Austria-Hungary and Italy had prevailed upon the other Great Powers to include Scutari in the new Albanian state. Another Montenegrin-Serbian assault on Scutari failed on March 31. Soon afterward, the Serbs, under Austro-Hungarian pressure, withdrew their forces. On April 2, a Great Power fleet appeared off the Montenegrin coast to impose its decision that Scutari should go to Albania. The Montenegrins succeeded in persuading the exhausted defenders to surrender on April 22. Great Power pressure forced Montenegrin troops to abandon Scutari less than two weeks later, on April 5. This ended the First Balkan War for Montenegro. During the brief Second Balkan War, a Montenegrin unit fought alongside the Serbs against Bulgaria in Macedonia.

Despite the poor performance of its army, Montenegro gained half of the sanjak of Novi Pazar and a portion of Kosovo as a result of the Balkan Wars. These gains came at the cost of around 3,000 dead and 7,000 wounded. Another casualty of the Balkan Wars was the power and prestige of King Nikola. The failure of his armies around Scutari demonstrated the fundamental weakness of his rule. The relative success of the Serbian army made unification with Serbia appear to be an attractive alternative to an independent Montenegro.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan League, 1912; Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Balkan War, Second, 1913; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Consequences; Scutari, Siege of, 1912–1913

Further Reading

Djurišić, Mitar. “Operations of the Montenegrin Army during the First Balkan War.”

In *East Central Europe and the Balkan Wars*, edited by Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic, 120–40. Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1987.

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Jowett, Philip S. *Armies of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Oxford: Osprey, 2011.

Roberts, Elizabeth. *Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.

Montenegro in World War I

The only Allied state to lose its independence in World War I, the small Balkan principality of Montenegro (Latinized form of the Serbo-Croat words *Crna Gora*, which means “Black Mountain”) gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire and doubled its territory as a result of the Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878) following the successful 1876–1877 war against the Turks. Led by Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš (prince during 1860–1910 and king during 1910–1918), Montenegro was modernized in the late nineteenth century and became a small but viable European state. In 1905, Nikola I granted a constitutional government with an elected National Assembly. He subsequently led Montenegro in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 in which Montenegro again doubled its territory but failed to realize all of its territorial ambitions.

With the outbreak of World War I, Nikola I supported his son-in-law, King Peter I Karageorgević of Serbia, and tiny Montenegro declared war on Austria-Hungary on August 5, 1914. With a population of just over 436,000 people, Montenegro mobilized some 60,000 troops, who were placed under the command of the Serbian major general Božidar Janković (1849–1920). General

Jankovic deployed the bulk of the Montenegrin army toward Bosnia-Herzegovina and the remainder toward Albania.

The Austro-Hungarian XVI Corps of the Sixth Army invaded Montenegro on October 9, 1914, but the small Montenegrin army, modernized by Nikola I in 1906, fought bravely and repelled the initial Austrian attack. The Montenegrins later covered the retreat of the Serbian army through Albania in November–December 1915 by engaging the Austrians in eastern Herzegovina and the sanjak, winning an important victory at Mojkovac on January 6–7, 1916.

Following the Serbian withdrawal, the Montenegrin army fought on against the Central Powers. On January 8, 1916, 50,000 Austrian and Bosnian troops began an offensive against Montenegro, took Mount Lovćen, and forced the Montenegrins back on their capital of Cetinje, which fell on January 11, 1916. On January 17, the Montenegrin army was forced to surrender to Austro-Hungarian forces after having suffered heavy casualties. King Nikola I went into exile in Italy, and some Montenegrin troops escaped to Corfu where they joined the survivors of the Serbian retreat and subsequently served with the Yugoslav Division of the Serbian army on the Salonika Front during 1917–1918.

King Nikola had long clashed with the “Greater Serbia” ambitions of his son-in-law,

King Peter I Karageorgević (1844–1921), and Serbian prime minister Nicola Pašić (1845–1926). Following the surrender of the Montenegrin army in January 1916, King Nikola compromised his own position by seeking a separate peace with the Central Powers. On October 23, 1918, the Serbian Second Army occupied Montenegro, and on November 26, 1918, King Nikola I was deposed by the Montenegrin National Assembly meeting in Podgorica. Serbia then annexed Montenegro. It became the province of Zeta in the new South Slav Kingdom of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. An unsuccessful uprising of Montenegrin patriots led by Colonel Krsto Popović (1881–1927) began in January 1919 and lasted until 1926.

Charles R. Shrader

See also: Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I; Nikola I, King of Montenegro (1841–1921)

Further Reading

Roberts, Elizabeth. *Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.

Thomas, Nigel, and Dusan Babac. *Armies in the Balkans, 1914–18*. Oxford: Osprey, 2001.

Treadway, John D. *The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908–1914*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1983, 1998.

N

National Schism (Greece), 1916–1917

This political division of Greece during World War I resulted from the opposing positions of the Greek king Constantine I (1868–1923) and Prime Minister Eleuthérios Venizélos (1864–1936) on whether or not Greece should remain neutral (Constantine) or enter the war on the Entente side (Venizélos). When World War I began, many Greeks, the senior Greek generals, and Constantine, married to Wilhelm II's sister Sofia (1870–1932), favored neutrality. However, Venizélos saw an alliance with the Entente as an opportunity to gain new territory.

In January 1915, after Britain offered Greece territory in Asia Minor, Venizélos tried to force a bill through parliament by which Greece would join the Entente. Strong opposition from the king and the army generals forced Venizélos to resign. Venizélos's Liberal Party won the resulting general election in June and selected Venizélos as prime minister. Constantine, however, delayed ratification of his appointment until August.

In December 1915, Venizélos allowed British and French troops to land at Thessaloniki. Many Greeks viewed the landing as a violation of Greek sovereignty. The disagreement between Constantine and Venizélos deepened after the king authorized German and Bulgarian forces to occupy a Greek fort in Macedonia.

In December 1915, Constantine forced Venizélos to resign again and dissolved the parliament. The German-Bulgarian

occupation of eastern Macedonia in May 1916 produced more public outrage against the king. In August, a secret pro-Venizelist military organization with Entente support established a provisional state in Thessaloniki. Toward the end of 1916, France and Britain officially recognized Venizélos's state as the legal government of Greece.

In November 1916, royalists, led by Colonel Ioannis Metaxas (1871–1941), a close aide to Constantine, terrorized Venizelist sympathizers in and around Athens. These attacks led to an armed confrontation between the royalists and French marines. In retaliation, the Venizélos government and the Entente established a naval blockade, seized the Greek navy and demanded the partial disarmament of the royalist forces. After a 106-day blockade, an Entente threat to bombard Athens, and intense negotiations, Constantine left Greece, and his second son Alexander became king.

On May 29, 1917, Venizélos returned to Athens, and a unified Greece declared war on the Central Powers in July. Ten Greek divisions fought valiantly with the Entente forces along the Macedonian Front and pushed the German and Bulgarian forces northward by late September 1918 when Bulgaria left the war. The division contributed to Greece's defeat in the Greco-Turkish War, contributed to the collapse of the second republic and the establishment of the dictatorial Metaxas regime in August 1936, and dominated Greek political and civil life for decades.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Constantine I, King of Greece (1868–1923); Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922; Macedonian Front, 1916–1918; Metaxas, Ioannis (1871–1941); Venizélos, Eleuthérios (1864–1936)

Further Reading

Forster, Edward Seymour. *A Short History of Modern Greece, 1821–1956*. New York: Praeger, 1958.

Koliopoulos, Giannes, and Thanos Veremes. *Greece: The Modern Sequel from 1831 to the Present*. New York: New York University Press, 2002.

Pallis, Alexander Anastasius. *Greece's Anatolian Venture—and after a Survey of the Diplomatic and Political Aspects of the Greek Expedition to Asia Minor (1915–1922)*. London, Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1937.

NATO in the Balkans

Balkan countries such as Bulgaria and Romania served in the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Greece

served in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and rebellious Communist states such as Albania left the Warsaw Pact in 1968. The former Yugoslavia never joined the Warsaw Pact and participated in the Non-Aligned Movement. The end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union's collapse, and Yugoslavia's disintegration into vicious internecine conflicts and separate nation-states ended the Balkans' Cold War security infrastructure.

The subsequent two decades would see NATO gradually expand its presence into the Balkans with some opposition expressed by Russia which considered the Balkans, particularly Serbia, to be a core area of its security interests. Balkan countries besides Greece joining NATO as of early 2012 include Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Slovenia. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia are Balkan countries participating in the NATO-affiliated Partnership for Peace Program.



A convoy of NATO soldiers drives through the Bosnian capital Sarajevo during a patrol, October 1, 1997. (AP Photo/Hidajet Delic)

NATO's Balkan membership seeks to participate in alliance security assistance programs, promote opportunities for security sector reform and professional military development, reorient national defense toward contemporary security challenges such as human trafficking and counterterrorism, and place national defense responsibilities within a collective security infrastructure allowing more optimal use of finite financial resources and reducing the chances of interstate conflict. Some Balkan countries sought to prove their commitment to western security architectures by supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom with Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania contributing forces. Balkan countries participating in NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan as of early 2012 include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey. Some of these Balkan countries soldiers were killed while participating in these military operations.

Contemporary and emerging security concerns confronting NATO in the Balkans include acute financial crises affecting European Union (EU) countries such as Greece that may produce civil unrest and fracture the Eurozone, lingering ethnic and sectarian tensions in former Yugoslav countries requiring the presence of peacekeeping forces, Balkan countries serving as drug and human trafficking transit centers, tension between Russia and Balkan countries that seek to integrate into NATO and the EU, concerns over the future direction of Turkish foreign policy, economic development problems in Kosovo and other Balkan countries, and what role Russia and Turkey might play in supplying energy resources to Balkan countries.

Bert Chapman

See also: Kosovo War, 1998–1999; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995

Further Reading

Nation, R. Craig. "NATO in the Western Balkans: A Force for Stability?" *Southeastern Europe* 35, no. 1 (February 2011): 120–37.

Seroka, Jim. "Security Considerations in the Western Balkans: NATO's Evolution and Expansion." *East European Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 25–38.

U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. *The Balkans after the Independence of Kosovo and on the Eve of NATO Enlargement*. Washington, DC: GPO, 2008. <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS94875>.

U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. *Unfinished Business in Southeast Europe: Opportunities and Challenges in the Western Balkans*. Washington, DC: GPO, 2010. <http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo1335>.

Navarino, Battle of, 1827

The Battle of Navarino Bay on October 20, 1827, was the most important engagement of the Greek War for Independence (1822–1832). With Ottoman and Egyptian forces fully in control of Greece, representatives of the French, British, and Russian governments concluded the Treaty of London. It called on the Ottomans to agree to an armistice and for the Egyptians to withdraw. Should the Ottomans reject an armistice, the three allied powers would come to the aid of the Greeks with their naval forces. In the meantime, the British made a strong but ultimately unsuccessful diplomatic effort to get Egyptian ruler Mehmet Ali (1769–1849) to remove his forces from Greece.

On August 16, the European powers sent a note to the Sublime Porte demanding an armistice. When the Ottomans rejected it

on August 29, the British, French, and Russian governments issued orders to their naval commanders in the Mediterranean to cut off waterborne Ottoman and Egyptian resupply to Greece. In late August 1827, despite warnings from the European governments not to do so, Ali sent a large squadron with reinforcements to Navarino Bay (Pylos) on the west coast of the Peloponnese. On September 8, it arrived and joined Ottoman ships already there. On September 12, a British squadron under Vice Admiral Sir Edward Codrington (1770–1851) arrived off the bay. The French and Russian governments also had dispatched squadrons to Greece.

On September 25, Codrington and French admiral Henry Gauthier de Rigny (1782–1835) met with Ibrahim Pasha (1789–1848), the Egyptian commander in Greece, to discuss a mediation arrangement already accepted by the Greeks. Ibrahim agreed to an armistice while awaiting instructions from the sultan. Leaving a frigate at Navarino Bay to watch the Egyptian and Ottoman ships there, Codrington then withdrew to the British-controlled Ionian island of Zante (Zakynthos).

Ibrahim learned that while he was expected to observe a cease-fire, Greek naval units under British mercenary commanders were continuing operations in the Gulf of Corinth, at Epirus, and at the port of Patras. Then during September 29–30, a Greek steamer warship, the *Karteria*, sank nine Ottoman ships off Salona (Split) in Dalmatia. Codrington sent messages to warn these British officers, who were not under his command, to desist from such operations; this had little effect. Ibrahim duly protested and, when nothing changed, decided to act.

On October 1, Ibrahim ordered ships from Navarino Bay to assist the Ottoman garrison at Patras. Codrington's squadron intercepted these ships at the entrance to the Gulf of

Calydon and forced them to return to Navarino. On the night of October 3–4, Ibrahim personally led another relief effort. Although they managed to avoid detection by the British picket ship at Navarino Bay in the darkness, a strong lee wind prevented his forces from entering the Gulf of Calydon. He was forced to anchor off Papas and wait for the storm to end. This allowed Codrington time to come up with his squadron, and firing warning shots, he forced Ibrahim to return to Navarino Bay.

Ibrahim continued land operations, which included the wholesale burning of Greek villages and fields. The fires were clearly visible from the allied ships. A British landing party reported that the Greek population of Messenia was close to starvation. On October 13, Codrington was joined off Navarino Bay by the French squadron under de Rigny and a Russian squadron.

On October 20, 1827, following futile attempts to contact Ibrahim Pasha, Codrington consulted with the other allied commanders and made the decision to enter Navarino Bay with the combined British, French, and Russian squadrons. The allies had 11 ships of the line and 15 other warships. Codrington flew his flag in the ship of the line *Asia* (84 guns). He also had two 74-gun ships of the line, four frigates, and four brigs. French admiral de Rigny had four 74-gun ships of the line, one frigate, and two schooners. The Russian squadron consisted of four 74-gun ships of the line and four frigates. The Egyptians and Ottomans had 65 or 66 warships in Navarino harbor: three Ottoman ships of the line (2 of 84 guns each and 1 of 76 guns), four Egyptian frigates of 64 guns each, 15 Ottoman frigates of 48 guns each, 18 Ottoman and 8 Egyptian corvettes of 14 to 18 guns each, 4 Ottoman and 8 Egyptian brigs of 19 guns each, and 5–6 Egyptian fire brigs. There

were also some Ottoman transports and smaller craft.

Around noon on October 20, the allied ships sailed in two lines into Navarino Bay. The British and French formed one line, and the Russians formed the other. The Ottomans demanded that Codrington withdraw, but the British admiral replied that he was there to give orders, not receive them. He threatened that if any shots were fired at the allied ships, he would destroy the Egyptian-Ottoman fleet.

The Egyptian-Ottoman ships were lying at anchor in a long crescent-shape formation with their flanks protected by shore batteries. At 2:00 p.m., the allied ships began filing into the bay. They then took up position inside the crescent. The British ships faced the center of the Egyptian-Ottoman line, while the French were on the Ottoman left and the Russians were on the Ottoman right. The shore batteries at Fort Navarino made no effort to contest the allied movement. Still, Codrington's plan appeared highly dangerous, for it invited the Ottomans to surround the allied ships, which, with the prevailing wind out of the southwest, risked being trapped. The plan simply revealed the complete confidence of the allies in their tactical superiority.

Codrington dispatched the frigate *Dartmouth* to an Ottoman ship in position to command the entrance of the bay with an order that it move. The captain of the *Dartmouth* sent a dispatch boat to the Ottoman ship, which then opened musket fire on it, killing an officer and several seamen. Firing immediately became general, with shore batteries also opening up on the allied ships.

The ensuing four-hour engagement, essentially a series of individual gun duels by floating batteries at close range without an overall plan, was really more of a slaughter than a battle. Three-quarters of the ships in the

Egyptian-Ottoman fleet were either destroyed by allied fire or set alight by their own crews to prevent their capture. Only one, the *Sultane*, surrendered. Allied personnel losses were 177 killed and 469 wounded; estimates of the Ottoman and Egyptian killed or wounded were in excess of 4,000 men.

News of the allied victory was received with great popular enthusiasm in virtually all of Europe. The Porte, furious at what had happened, demanded reparations. Recalled to Britain, Codrington was subsequently acquitted on a charge of disobeying orders.

The Battle of Navarino Bay removed any impediment to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and in April 1828, Russia declared war on Turkey. That August, Egypt withdrew from hostilities, virtually ending the war. In the May 1832 Treaty of London, Greece secured its independence. The Battle of Navarino Bay, which made all this possible, is also noteworthy as the last major engagement between ships of the line in the age of fighting sail.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832; Russo-Ottoman War, 1828–1829

Further Reading

Anderson, R. C. *Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559–1853*. Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool, 1952.

James, William M. *The Naval History of Great Britain*. Vol. 6. London: Richard Bentley, 1859.

Ortzen, Len. *Guns at Sea: The World's Great Naval Battles*. London: Cox and Wyman, 1976.

Nedić, Milan (1877–1946)

Serbian general and politician Milan Nedić served as the chief of the general staff of

the Yugoslav army and minister of war of Yugoslavia before World War II and the prime minister of the Nazi-backed puppet government of Serbia during the war. Nedić was born in Grocka near Belgrade, Serbia, on September 7, 1877. After completing the gymnasium and Military Academy in 1895, he received an officer's commission in the Serbian army in 1904. Before World War I, he served as a staff officer and fought in the Balkan Wars. During the war, he served in several positions, retreated with the Serbian army and thousands of civilians from Serbia through Albania to the Greek islands over the winter of 1915–1916, and participated in the allied breakthrough in Macedonia in September 1918. After the war, he continued to rise in position and rank and was promoted to general in 1923. Between 1934 and 1935, he commanded the General Staff of the Yugoslav Royal Army.

In 1939, Nedić became the minister of the army and navy. However, because he disapproved of a potential alliance with Nazi Germany—probably because of his uneasiness with Germany's ally, Fascist Italy, and because of the opposition by some Italian Fascists to the existence of a Yugoslav state—the regent Paul (1893–1976) dismissed Nedić on November 6, 1940. Nedić welcomed the April 1941 coup that deposed the regent's pro-Axis regime and fought against the Germans when they invaded Yugoslavia.

After the Germans occupied Yugoslavia, they divided the country into an “independent” Serbia and Croatia and allowed Bulgaria, Hungary, and Italy to annex other parts of the former kingdom. German Air Force general Heinrich Danckelmann (1889–1947) asked Nedić to lead the government of German-occupied Serbia, and Nedić accepted the offer on August 29, to pacify

Serb resistance. On September 1, 1941, in a radio broadcast, Nedić declared his intention to save the Serbian people. He also spoke against active resistance to the Germans because of the Nazi declaration to execute 50 Serbs for every wounded German soldier and 100 for every soldier killed. His administration promoted anti-Semitism and anti-Communism to convince Serbs that these groups were their enemies.

The Serbian government under Nedić accepted refugees, mostly of Serbian descent, from other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Despite his collaboration, the German occupation authorities had no respect for his authority and caused the deaths of over 300,000 Serbs, mostly from German reprisals in retaliation for Serbian resistance attacks. The worst atrocity was the Kragujevac massacre, in which the Germans murdered at least 2,300 Serbian civilians during October 20–21, 1941. The Nedić regime also aided the Germans in the murder of 14,500 Serbian Jews (90 percent of the Serbian Jews) by August 1942. Yet, Nedić also secretly supported the Četniks, the resistance led by former Yugoslav army Colonel Draža Mihajlović (1893–1946), with money and arms.

On October 4, 1944, Nedić disbanded his government as the Communist Partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980), advanced on Belgrade and, two days later, fled to Kitzbühel, Austria (then part of Germany). On January 1, 1946, the British forces, occupying that part of Austria, handed Nedić over to the new Yugoslav government, headed by Tito. He was charged with treason and imprisoned in Belgrade. On February 5, the newspapers reported that Nedić committed suicide by jumping out of a window of his prison while the guards were not looking.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Četniks; Mihajlović, Dragoljub “Draža” (1892–1946); Serbia in World War II; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslavia in World War II

Further Reading

Cohen, Philip J. *Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996.

Costa, Nicolas J. *Shattered Illusions: Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1998.

Pavlowitch, Stevan K. *The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and Its Problems, 1918–1988*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1988.

Neuilly, Treaty of, 1920

The Treaty of Neuilly between the victorious Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria was signed in the Paris suburb of Neuilly-sur-Seine on November 27, 1919, a product of the Paris Peace Conference. Ostensibly founded on the principle of national self-determination, the treaty was actually the outcome of intense diplomatic pressure on the part of Bulgaria's victorious neighbors, dictated by the extremely complex history of national sovereignty in that part of Europe.

Rival territorial claims in the area dated back at least to the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, which had created the Principality of Bulgaria. However, many Bulgarians remained in territory such as Macedonia, controlled by the Ottoman Empire, or in Serbia and Romania. Bulgaria was the chief victor in the First Balkan War in 1912–1913, securing a significant portion of Macedonia. In the Second Balkan War of 1913, Bulgaria recovered more of Macedonia and secured access to the Aegean Sea in Thrace, but it also yielded more land to Greece and Serbia elsewhere.

In World War I, Bulgaria saw an opportunity to further its claims in Macedonia and to make good its losses in the Second Balkan War. Although most Bulgarians favored joining the Triple Entente because of ties to Russia, Czar Ferdinand (1861–1948) and Premier Vasil Radoslavov (1854–1929) joined the Triple Alliance in October 1915. At the end of the war, the army overthrew Ferdinand, who abdicated in October 1918 and was succeeded by his son Boris III (1894–1943) and a new premier, Aleksandŭr Stamboliski (1879–1923); however, this did not change the fact that Bulgaria was on the losing side. Its Balkan rivals Greece and Serbia had chosen the winning side, and they pressed the conferees in Paris to favor their interests.

As with the other peace treaties, Part I of the Treaty of Neuilly reproduced the 26 articles of the League of Nations Covenant. Part II defined the new Bulgarian frontiers. Article 27-1 required Bulgaria to recognize the “Serb-Croat-Slovene State,” which became Yugoslavia, and its new frontiers. The future Yugoslavia gained part of western Bulgaria and also regained some of the Strumitsa Valley area, which had been ceded to Bulgaria in 1913. Article 27-2 defined the new frontier with Greece, with grievous consequences for Bulgaria since it lost western Thrace to Greece and thus port facilities on the Aegean Sea at Dedeagach (Greek: Alexandroupolis). Articles 27-4 and 27-5 confirmed the Bulgarian frontier with Romania, with the definitive loss of southern Dobrudja (Bulgarian: Dobrudza), which had been part of Bulgaria since 1878 but was ceded in 1913. Article 27-3 delineated the only gains made by Bulgaria; not surprisingly, these minor acquisitions were at the expense of another vanquished power, the Ottoman Empire.

Part III contained the “political clauses.” Article 59 compelled Bulgaria to recognize

the changes in central and southwestern Europe, including the new frontiers of Austria, Hungary, Greece, Poland, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, and the Czecho-Slovak state. As a result of these territorial changes, Bulgaria, which had suffered 100,000 men killed in the war, now lost another 300,000 people.

The “Military Clauses” of Part IV demilitarized Bulgaria, abolished obligatory military service (Article 65) and stipulated that the Bulgarian army “shall be exclusively employed for the maintenance of order within Bulgarian territory and for the control of the frontiers” (Article 66). Article 69 limited the army to 20,000 men, supported by 10,000 policemen and 3,000 frontier guards. Article 78 banned construction of new fortifications in Bulgaria, while Article 81 prohibited manufacture or importation of arms, munitions, and war matériel.

Part VII dealt with reparations. Article 121 stipulated reparation payments in the amount that Bulgaria would be able to pay, \$445 million—a realistic sum, especially as it was subsequently reduced considerably by the Reparation Commission.

The Treaty of Neuilly went into effect on August 9, 1920, and Bulgaria joined the League of Nations on December 16, 1920. The country remained bitterly divided politically. The Macedonian question was particularly vexing and led to a succession of governments in addition to costing Stamboliski his life in 1923.

Antoine Capet

See also: Boris III, Czar of Bulgaria (1894–1943); Bulgaria in World War I; Stamboliski, Aleksandŭr (1879–1923)

Further Reading

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. *The Treaties of Peace, 1919–1923*. Vol. 2, *Containing the Treaties of Neuilly and*

Sèvres, the Treaties between the United States and Germany, Austria and Hungary Respectively. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924.

Crompton, R. J. *A Concise History of Bulgaria*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Genov, Georgi P. *Bulgaria and the Treaty of Neuilly*. Sofia: H. G. Danov, 1935.

MacMillan, Margaret. *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*. New York: Random House, 2002.

Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, and Protocol: Signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine, November 27, 1919. London: HMSO, 1920.

Nikola I, King of Montenegro (1841–1921)

Prince (1860–1910) and then king (1910–1918) of Montenegro, Nikola Mirkov Petrović-Njegoš was born at Njegoš on October 7, 1841, the son of Duke Mirko Petrović-Njegoš (1820–1867) and Anastasia Martinović (1824–1894). He was educated in Trieste and Paris. When his uncle, Prince Danilo Petrović-Njegoš (1826–1860), was assassinated in 1860, Nikola became the ruling prince of Montenegro and embarked on a long process of modernizing his tiny, backward principality. He introduced many administrative, legal, and educational reforms and oversaw the construction of transportation and communications systems. He granted constitutional government in 1905 and subsequently declared himself king on August 28, 1910. Nikola married Milena Vukotić (1847–1923) in 1860. Of their 12 children, five daughters and one son married into European royal families, earning Nikola the sobriquet of “the father-in-law of Europe.”

With the support of his friend, Czar Alexander II of Russia (1818–1881), Nikola

proved an able military leader. Under his leadership, the Montenegrins repelled a Turkish attack in 1862 and conducted a brilliant campaign against the Turks during 1876–1877, thereby winning their independence from the Ottoman Empire while doubling the size of their country. King Nikola also led Montenegro effectively in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 and supported Serbia against the Central Powers in World War I. The small but courageous Montenegrin army covered the retreat of the Serbian army through Albania in November–December 1915 but was forced to surrender to the Austro-Hungarians on January 17, 1916. King Nikola then went into exile in Italy. On November 26, 1918, he was deposed by the Montenegrin National Assembly, and Montenegro was annexed by Serbia, thus becoming the only Allied state to lose its independence in World War I.

King Nikola I transformed Montenegro from a remote Balkan principality into a modern European state and led it effectively in peace and war, only to lose his kingdom to the “Greater Serbia” ambitions of his son-in-law, King Peter I of Serbia (1844–1921), and the rising tide of South Slav nationalism. He died in exile at Cap d’Antibes, France, on March 2, 1921 and was buried at San Remo, Italy. In 1989 his remains were reinterred at Cetinje.

Charles R. Shrader

See also: Montenegro in the Balkan Wars; Montenegro in World War I

Further Reading

Glenny, Misha. *The Balkans: Nationalism War and the Great Powers, 1804–1999*. New York: Viking, 2000.

Nikola I Petrović Njegoš. *Autobiografija; Memoari; Putopisi*. Edited by Dimitrije Jovetić and Branko Bankević. Cetinje, Montenegro: ISRO Obod, 1988.

Roberts, Elizabeth. *Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.

Treadway, John D. *The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908–1914*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1983, 1998.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a mutual defense alliance of nations from Europe and North America. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 by Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal. NATO was organized to defend member nations from the possible aggression of the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe, which formed the Warsaw Treaty Organization six years later. Originating as an anti-Communist alliance during the Cold War, NATO has sought to redefine its role as East-West tensions have eased.

NATO membership expanded in 1952 to include Greece and Turkey. West Germany entered in 1955, and Spain in 1982. U.S. general Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) was appointed the first supreme allied commander in 1950. In addition to a system of collective defense, NATO members pledged to work toward reaching agreement with Warsaw Pact countries on equitable and verifiable arms reduction and to cooperate within the alliance in economic, scientific, and cultural areas.

Differences between the U.S. government and its European allies have sometimes caused problems for the alliance. U.S. arms were necessary at the end of World War II

when European economies were shattered, and the United States assumed leadership of the alliance. As the European nations recovered, however, some envisioned different arrangements. In the 1960s, for example, French president Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970) resisted military integration, withdrawing French forces from NATO and demanding that all allied troops quit French soil.

Europe and the United States have often approached the deployment of arms with different goals. In the 1970s, the U.S. government requested that the European members increase their defense spending. That request was well received but not carried out due to economic recession and the growing antinuclear movement in Europe. The U.S. government in 1985 asked for European cooperation in the development of the space-based laser defense system planned under the Strategic Defense Initiative. France refused outright, and the issue became a source of contention. In 1986, NATO defense ministers endorsed the production of new chemical weapons by the United States, though a minority believed such a move might undermine the Disarmament Conference of 40 nations then at Geneva trying to negotiate a ban on such weapons.

Disarmament too has been a matter needing careful consideration by the different members. Often negotiated by leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, European heads of state responsive to their own constituents have sometimes wanted to proceed faster or slower on the issue of disarmament. Debates over whether to begin with conventional or nuclear weapons have also responded to different geographic locations.

With the 1989 demolition of the Berlin Wall (once described as the “ultimate symbol for NATO’s existence”), many believed

that the United States and Europe might decouple their defense strategies, but it did not happen. Instead, the role of NATO expanded to permit “out-of-area” activity (something that was not permitted during the Persian Gulf War). More responsibility for such internal struggles as that in Yugoslavia had also developed, though not in time to prevent that country’s slow destruction.

As the countries of Eastern Europe broke away from the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991, they experienced new security concerns and petitioned to join NATO. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council was established as a forum for dialogue between those former foes. NATO leaders initially rejected military alliance as premature, endorsing instead a “political approach to security.” By 1995, NATO policy required that applicants demonstrate a commitment to democracy and human rights, a free-market economy, and democratic control of the military.

The first countries to satisfy NATO’s requirements were the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, which were admitted into the organization in March 1999. Five years later, in April 2004, seven former Communist states—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—joined the alliance. Russia also has been admitted to the organization as a junior partner with limited power.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is currently NATO’s highest civilian authority. Each nation has a permanent representative on the council, and those representatives meet at least once a week. The council may also meet at the foreign minister or head of state level. NAC decisions are made by common consent rather than majority vote.

The alliance includes an International Secretariat composed of staff from all the

member nations. The secretary general heads the International Secretariat in addition to serving as head of the council, the Defense Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Committee, and the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society.

NATO's military structure is headed by the Military Committee, which consists of the chiefs of staff or their representatives from all member nations except France. The committee is led by a chair, who is elected for a term of two to three years. The Military Committee makes recommendations on military matters to the NAC and to the Defense Planning Committee. It also gives directions to the three NATO supreme commands: the NATO Allied Command, Europe, in Belgium; the NATO Allied Command, Atlantic, in Norfolk, Virginia; and the NATO Allied Command, Channel, in Northwood, Britain.

As of this writing, NATO had a staff of about 1,200 at its headquarters in Brussels and an international military staff of some 430. It is funded from the military budgets of member nations. The amounts donated are determined through the coordination of military plans between NATO and the member nations. The official languages of the alliance are English and French.

In April 2009, the 28 member states held meetings on both sides of the Rhine in Kehl, Germany, and Strasbourg, France, to commemorate NATO's 60th anniversary. At the summit, French president Nicolas Sarkozy (1955–) announced that France would be rejoining NATO as a full member, 43 years after President de Gaulle withdrew the country from the alliance's military command.

Richard C. Hall

Further Reading

Coffey, Joseph I. *The Future Role of NATO*. Reissue. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1997.

Cornish, Paul. *Partnership in Crisis: The U.S., Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO*. London: Cassell, 1997.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999.

Novi Pazar, Sanjak of

Novi Pazar was a sanjak (administrative district that collectively composed a vilayet, or province, of the Ottoman Empire after 1864) that existed until 1913 and consisted of territory in present-day Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. The city of Novi Pazar was the administrative seat of the sanjak of Novi Pazar.

In the Middle Ages, the region was part of the Serbian state of Raška, with its capital, the city of Ras, located near the present-day city of Novi Pazar. The region later became part of subsequent Serbian states until the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans in the late 1400s. During the centuries of Ottoman rule, the Sanjak was a part of the vilayet of Bosnia until 1878. From 1878 until 1913 and the peace settlement after the First Balkan War, Novi Pazar was part of the vilayet of Kosovo.

Following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, the Congress of Berlin of 1878 allowed the Ottoman Empire to retain territorial sovereignty of the district but authorized Austria-Hungary to establish military garrisons in the district where they remained until 1909. At the start of the First Balkan War in October 1912, Serbian and Montenegrin troops occupied the Sanjak, and Serbia and Montenegro divided the territory as part of the Treaty of London, concluded in May 1913. Over the ensuing decades, many Bosnian and Albanian inhabitants of the sanjak immigrated to Turkey where they established a number of colonies. Over time, many of the Sanjak Bosnians married Turks.

During World War I, Austria-Hungary occupied the sanjak. After 1918, the sanjak became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which, in 1929, became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During World War II, the Italians occupied most of the region as part of Montenegro, although the city of Novi Pazar became part of German-occupied Serbia. After September 1943, the Germans occupied the sanjak. In 1945, Serbia and Montenegro, now socialist republics of postwar Yugoslavia, again divided the Sanjak, according to the 1913 division. As of this writing, the region remained divided between the independent states of Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes


Further Reading

Albertini, Luigi. *The Origins of the War of 1914*. London: Oxford University Press, 1952.

Langer, William L. *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890*. New York: Knopf, 1950.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976–1977.

Singleton, Fred Bernard. *A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.



Obrenović, Milan (1854–1901)

Milan Obrenović (ruled as King Milan II) was a Serbian leader and monarch. He was born in Mărășești, Moldavia, on August 22, 1854, into the ruling Serbian royal family. In 1868, while just 14 years old, he succeeded to the throne as Prince Milan under a three-man regency. Four years later, upon reaching the age of majority, he took the reins of government and began a pronounced tilt toward the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Although he was a keenly intelligent and well-informed leader, Milan's obstinacy and insistence on catering to the Austrians ultimately proved highly problematic. As he attempted to modernize Serbia and take advantage of its natural resources, his government increased taxes, which did not sit well with many Serbs. And his hesitancy to support his kingdom's pan-Slavism or rebellions against the Ottomans made his rule increasingly unpopular. His military loss to the Ottomans in 1876 only compounded his problems. However, his successful bid to achieve full independence for Serbia at the end of the 1877–1878 Russo-Ottoman War burnished his image, at least for a time.

In 1882, Milan was officially crowned King Milan II. Serbia's loss in its war against rival Bulgaria in 1886 added to his political woes, however, as did his continued tilt toward Austria-Hungary, which was not supported by a majority of Serbian political leaders. In 1883, Milan quashed a major peasant revolt in eastern Serbia, making

him a wildly unpopular figure there. In 1886, Milan and his wife, Queen Natalija (1859–1941), announced their separation after years of rumors concerning the king's infidelity. The development outraged many Serbs, and in January 1889, the king promulgated a new, liberal constitution in hopes of regaining his popularity. On March 6, 1889, Milan suddenly abdicated for reasons that are not entirely clear.

This move made Milan's young son, Alexander (1876–1903), king. Milan, meanwhile, went into exile in Paris as a private citizen. In 1892, he renounced his Serbian nationality in hopes that the move would increase support for Alexander's leadership. In 1893, Alexander took complete control of the Serbian government and invited his father to return to Serbia, which he did in January 1894. Milan now became Alexander's principal adviser and confidante, but the return to Serbia of Alexander's exiled mother, Natalija, in the spring of 1895 forced Milan to again leave Serbia.

In 1897, Milan again returned to his homeland, and Alexander promptly appointed him commander in chief of Serbia's army, a position in which Milan particularly excelled. In 1899, Milan was the target of a failed assassination attempt, which had in part been driven by growing frustration with Alexander's increasingly heavy-handed rule. Milan's heretofore good relationship with his son quickly evaporated, however, when Alexander announced his plan to marry Draga Mašin (1864–1903), a union to which Milan was bitterly opposed. Milan left Serbia in 1900,

this time permanently, and finally settled in Vienna, where he died suddenly on February 11, 1901.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also: Obrenović, Miloš (1780–1860); Russo-Ottoman War, 1806–1812; Russo-Ottoman War, 1828–1829; Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878

Further Reading

Cox, John K. *The History of Serbia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002.

Pavlowitch, Stevan K. *Serbia: The History behind the Name*. London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2002.

Obrenović, Miloš (1780–1860)

Miloš Obrenović was a leader of the Serbian war of independence against Ottoman rule and was the first head of an autonomous Serbian state since the fifteenth century. Obrenović was born on March 18, 1780, in the village of Gronja Dobrinja in western Serbia, then under Ottoman authority. His birth name was Teodorović. He later adopted the patronymic of his half-brother. He participated in the first Serbian uprising during 1804–1813. He then led the second Serbian revolt in 1815. Under an agreement with the Ottomans that same year, Serbia gained some autonomy but remained under Ottoman rule. Obrenović regarded the leader of the first Serbian revolt, George Petrović Karageorge (1768–1818) as a rival, and after Karageorge's return to Serbia, in 1817, had him murdered and his head sent to the Ottoman sultan. This began a century of competition and feuding between the two Serbian families. Agreements with the Ottoman sultan in 1830 and 1833 recognized Obrenović as the hereditary prince of Serbia with a defined autonomous territory.

Obrenović's autocratic rule met with much domestic opposition. Tiring of continual revolts, he abdicated on June 15, 1839, in favor of his son Milan, who soon died. Afterward, Miloš's son Mihailo (1823–1868) ruled until his deposition in 1842. The son of Karageorge, Alexander Karageorgević (1806–1885) then became the prince of Serbia. Meanwhile, Miloš lived in the Habsburg Empire and the Romanian principalities. When Alexander Karageorgević was deposed as prince of Serbia in 1858, Miloš Obrenović returned from abroad on December 23, 1858, to rule again as prince of Serbia. He died on September 26, 1860, in Belgrade. Although he had an autocratic and irascible personality, Miloš Obrenović deserves great credit as the founder of the Serbian state.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Karageorge (George Petrović; 1768–1818); Serbian War of Independence, 1804–1817

Further Reading

Judah, Tim. *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.

Petrovich, Michael Boro. *A History of Modern Serbia 1804–1918*. Vol. 1. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.

Stavrianos, L. S. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958.

Odessa, Siege of, 1941

The siege of Odessa, which lasted from August 10 to October 16, 1941, was one of the most substantial military campaigns for the Romanian army against the Soviet Union in World War II. Odessa was the main Black Sea port and a major communication hub of the Soviet Union. When the

Germans asked the Romanian forces to conduct this largely independent action at Odessa, at first the Romanian Fourth Army attempted to seize the city by direct assault. But the initial assault failed, the battle turned into a siege, and it took Romanian forces four separate attempts to finally take the city. The siege of Odessa became an example of positional warfare that was reminiscent of the tactics of World War I, and the victory came at a huge cost to the Romanians.

The Romanian participation was a result of Romania's troubled relationship with the neighboring countries in prior years. Romania declared neutrality at the onset of World War II, but the country's position quickly deteriorated. Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union demanded the return of territories that Romania seized from them during the Russian Revolution. Having no reliable allies, Romania was forced to surrender a third of its territory. Fearing further losses and humiliating concessions, it chose to align itself with Hitler's Germany. The loss of strategic position also led to the abdication of King Carol II (1893–1953) and the eventual establishment of General Antonescu's (1882–1946) dictatorship. When Hitler informed the Romanian dictator on June 11, 1941, of its plans to invade the Soviet Union, Antonescu offered his support for the campaign. The Romanian hopes were to regain Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, previously lost to the Soviet Union in 1940.

The siege of Odessa resulted in a nominal victory for the Romanian forces when the Soviet forces evacuated the city on October 16, 1941. The Romanian losses, however, were staggering. The Romanian forces had almost 100,000 casualties, and some divisions lost almost 80 percent of their men; 340,223 were initially deployed,

of which 17,729 were killed, 63,345 were wounded, and 11,471 were missing in action. By the end of the siege, the losses were greater than the combined losses of the Romanian armies in fighting for their own lands, and the siege turned out to be the bloodiest to date among various sieges of World War II. Comparatively, the Soviet side reported slightly over 41,000 casualties, and the Soviet navy managed to evacuate 350,000 soldiers and civilians from the city.

The siege raised domestic concerns over Romanian participation in Eastern Front campaigns, partially because the lost territories had already been regained and partially because Romanian losses seemed to be much greater than those sustained by their neighbors like Hungary. Antonescu could no longer claim that this was a war of liberation for Romanians. The Soviets, on the other hand, greatly exaggerated their ability to resist and fight with determination and used the battle for Odessa as part of its wider propaganda campaign. The female Soviet sniper Vera Pavlichenko became a widely publicized hero with 180 kills at Odessa, and the city later became one of 15 places to be awarded a "Hero City" status by the Soviet government for its fierce resistance to the "adversary forces."

Following its occupation in October 1941, Odessa became the capital of the Romanian Transnistria Governorate during World War II and witnessed numerous massacres, including the infamous 1941 Odessa massacre. But some historians argue that the conditions of the local population improved in two subsequent years, until the occupation of Odessa was abandoned in the spring of 1944.

Irina Mukhina

See also: Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946); Carol II, King of Romania (1893–1953); Romania in World War II

Further Reading

Axworthy, Mark, Cornel Scafes, and Christian Craciunoiu. *Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1939–1945*. London: Arms and Armour, 1995.

Dallin, Alexander. *Odessa, 1941–1944: A Case Study of Soviet Territory under Foreign Rule*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Filipescu, Mihai T. *The Reluctant Axis: The Romanian Army in Russia, 1941–1944*. Privately published, 2006.

Stahel, David. *Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations in the Balkans and Crete

From its foundation back in the fourteenth century, the Ottoman military had been tasked to provide internal security and public order. The establishment of the *Zabtiye* (later Jandarma [gendarmerie]) organization modeled after Prussian and French examples in 1840 did lessen the burden on the military by taking over ordinary law enforcement duties. The breaking away of an independent Greece in 1829 started a process that the Ottoman administration had little understanding of or the means to counter. The Ottoman administration saw the threat from a traditional perspective and employed traditional methods such as negotiation with traditional local leaders, trying to crush rebellions with military power only.

After the success of the first wave of separatist nationalism, the empire had to face a second wave. The Berlin Peace Treaty recast the Ottoman Balkan possessions in such a way that it was not militarily feasible to defend them against either foreign

aggression or internal insurrection. Except for Romania, all of the newly independent Balkan nations had significant national minorities left within the Ottoman provinces and irredentist plans were quickly hatched to create larger Christian states by swallowing large portions of Ottoman territory. Abdulhamid (1842–1918) and his advisers were unable to create an effective and viable strategy to deal with this second wave of separatism. The counterinsurgency campaigns against separatist nationalist movements were left entirely in the hands of regiment- and battalion-level junior officers, who were on their own without any clear orders and without the cooperation of other government agencies.

Beginning in 1841, turmoil began in Crete with the arrival of instigators from Greece. An Ottoman expeditionary force under the command of Mustafa Naili Pasha (1798–1871), a native Cretan, suppressed the rebellion. The negotiation process and further Ottoman reforms did not satisfy the Greek nationalists, and a well-organized rebellion broke out in 1866. This time the insurgents were well organized and able to mobilize 12,000 personnel. The veteran İsmail Pasha (1830–1895) was assigned once again as the governor and the commander of an expeditionary force of 45,000 men. The insurgency continued on for nearly four years and terminated only after the successful application of counterinsurgency tactics and techniques combined with what might be called today Mustafa Naili Pasha's "hearts and minds" campaign. However, low-level insurgency continued on nonstop on the island, with periodic large-scale rebellions in 1878, 1888, and 1896.

In comparison to Crete where there was only one insurgency group, which was relatively easy to isolate, the Ottoman Balkans, especially Macedonia, were most difficult

to control and govern. There were four states and four major insurgent nationalist organizations that were vying for portions of it. Additionally, the population was far more cosmopolitan and settlements more mixed. At the same time, the irredentist desires of all four states overlapped each other so much that most often the insurgent organizations were fighting each other as they were fighting against the Ottoman military. The introduction of Italian anarchism and Russian nihilism further radicalized the separatist nationalist groups. The Macedonian insurgent organization especially, which carried the title of “Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization” (IMRO, or VMRO), managed to blend militant nationalist ideology with insurgency tactics and techniques so effectively that it could be called the first modern guerrilla organization.

The *Komitacıs* waged relentless terror campaigns including murder, robbery, extortion, kidnapping, and occasionally massacre not only against the state and its functionaries but also against Muslim and Christian populations as well, and sometimes even against their own supporters. For them, terrorism and employing all sorts of violence was a proper tool to gain the support of the population and most importantly to capture European attention and encourage the intervention of the Great Powers. *Komitacıs*, as the first modern guerrillas, made effective use of the military potential of the civilian population. The population provided them with sanctuary, food, intelligence, funding, and recruits. The *Komitacıs* had support bases in neighboring Christian countries and most often had the direct support of the host country’s armed forces in terms of expertise, weapons, and sometimes personnel. Their organizational structures combined the Italian Carbonari cell system with the Russian nihilist dual political front and

armed wing structure. So most often, village notables, teachers, and clergy belonged to the political front, whereas youngsters indoctrinated by them were guerrilla fighters. Of course, not all the *Komitacı* organizations were on an equal footing. The IMRO was the most modern and complex organization, whereas the Greek ones were more traditional and less sophisticated.

The Ottoman officers had to learn how to conduct counterinsurgency operations against these guerrilla organizations by themselves under very adverse conditions. Most of the academy-graduated officers had to spend several rotations and sometimes whole careers in Macedonia fighting against these ideologically motivated, well-equipped, and well-led guerrilla organizations on their own. Their main problem was the lack of government support as well as a lack of doctrinal tactics to combat these unconventional fighters. The administration was more than happy to leave everything to the officers on the scene without providing substantial support unless the situation became completely unmanageable. This was also true for the wider Ottoman public in that ordinary citizens paid limited attention to the problem even in neighboring provinces like Salonika. In a relatively short time, they understood the importance of support by the population and made use of not only the potential of the Muslim population, but also the different Christian groups against each other. For example, Greeks were valuable allies in predominantly Macedonian or Bulgarian regions, whereas Bulgarians were Ottoman allies in Greek-dominated areas.

Thanks to the administration’s efforts to isolate conflict zones from the wider public and because of its distancing itself from insurgency-related problems, the officer corps, in a unique blend of initiative, gained

control of the conflict zones. Consequently, various tactics and techniques were invented, and more or less an unofficial but widely accepted uniform counterinsurgency doctrine was in use after the 1890s. These unofficial counterinsurgency strategies, tactics, and techniques eventually paid off, and most of the Komitaci groups were crushed and lost ground after the failed Ilinden rebellion (August 2–September 8, 1903). As can be expected, this rare blend of freedom and conflict affected the political understanding and consciousness of the Mektebli officers. The Mekteblis saw themselves as the new elite of the empire, and they felt responsible to act in its interest. The constant conflict created channels of information between combatants. The militant nationalism of the guerrillas, the continuous flow of political thoughts, and their way of propaganda and organization greatly inspired the officers. And in the end, they applied what they had learned.

Mesut Uyar

See also: Bulgarian Horrors, 1876; Ilinden Uprising, 1903; Macedonia

Further Reading

Adanır, Fikret. *Die Makedonische Frage: Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1908*. Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1979.

Perry, Duncan M. *The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Liberation Movements, 1893–1903*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988.

Şenışık, Pinar. *The Transformation of Ottoman Crete: Revolts, Politics and Identity in the Late Nineteenth Century*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2011.

Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman dynasty was first established in the thirteenth century in Central Asia in what is today the nation of Turkey. The

Ottoman Empire itself emerged in the fifteenth century, when the Ottomans conquered the eastern territories of the Byzantine Empire. It then expanded to take in Byzantine lands in western Turkey and southeastern Europe.

Unlike most imperial powers, the Ottoman Empire was ruled by one family for seven centuries. Osman I was the first of over 30 members of the Ottoman dynasty to reign. Ottoman rule spanned the thirteenth to twentieth centuries, and the dynasty showed tremendous resiliency over the course of those centuries; it achieved vast expansion and never succumbed to foreign domination or internal threats.

In 1453, the Ottomans conquered Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire. The previously impenetrable Byzantine Empire had become increasingly weak as the aggressive Mongols repeatedly attacked it. Additionally, the Byzantines lacked the kind of powerful dynastic family the Ottomans enjoyed, and consequently, the capital fell fairly easily to the Turks. Led by Mehmet II, the Ottomans renamed Constantinople to Istanbul, and then they worked to rebuild the devastated city.

The Ottoman Empire reached its peak of power, wealth, and influence under the reign of Sultan Suleiman I. Suleiman reigned from 1520 to 1566, and under his leadership, the empire became the most powerful force in the world. Known for his military prowess, he doubled the size of the empire and oversaw its expansion throughout the Balkans and Hungary and as far west as Vienna. He also oversaw an increase in the educational system, the development of the empire's infrastructure, and the dominance of Islam throughout the empire. The period of Suleiman's reign is commonly seen as a renaissance of Ottoman culture and society. However, that period of

expansion and rejuvenation ended with his death in 1566.

Four years after Suleiman's death, his successor, Selim II, invaded the island of Cyprus, sacked the capital of Nicosia, and slaughtered 30,000 Cypriots. European powers, long worried about the increasing aggressiveness of the Ottomans, were alarmed and frightened by that massacre and resolved to bring the Ottoman Empire's expansion under control. They found some success in that pursuit, primarily in the 1571 Battle of Lepanto, which dealt a devastating blow to Ottoman naval power.

However, the empire persisted for another three and a half centuries, albeit with less prestige and strength. The Ottomans became known as ruthless and often cruel conquerors. They imposed crippling taxation on those they conquered. In Greece, they took male children to work for the dynastic family and young girls to work in the sultan's harem. Those and other misdeeds led to rebellions throughout the empire. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries especially, opposition to Ottoman rule spread throughout the empire, and along with poor administration, it contributed to a fundamental weakening of the control held by the Turks throughout the lands they had appropriated.

Perhaps the darkest period of the Ottoman Empire occurred from 1890 to 1915, when the Turks slaughtered more than 1 million Armenians in what came to be known as the Armenian Genocide. Unlike the slaughter of the Jews during the Holocaust several decades later, the Armenian Genocide went largely unnoticed and unremembered. The Turkish government has continued to deny that it occurred at all.

World War I completed the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. After Turkey fought on the losing side of that war, the Ottoman

Empire was disbanded, and in 1923, Turkey became a republic. What remains of the Ottoman Empire, however, is incredible architecture, particularly mosques; the prevalence of Islam throughout Asia and central and Eastern Europe; and a legacy of ethnic and religious conflict throughout the areas that were formerly part of the empire.

Maeve Cowan

See also: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations in the Balkans and Crete; Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars; Ottoman Empire in World War I

Further Reading

Ghazarian, Vatche, ed. *Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: An Anthology of Transformation, 13th–19th Centuries*. Waltham, MA: Mayreni Publishing, 1998.

Goodwin, Jason. *Lords of the Horizons: A History of the Ottoman Empire*. New York: H. Holt, 1999.

Inalcik, Halil, ed. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: 1300–1914*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars

In the First Balkan War of 1912–1913, a loose coalition of the Balkan Christian states—Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia—fought against the Ottoman Empire with the objective of eliminating the five-century-long Ottoman rule in southeastern Europe and replacing it with nationalist states. In the Second Balkan War of 1913, the Ottomans were able to recover a small portion of the territory they lost in the First Balkan War.

Since the end of the seventeenth century, the predations of Austria and Russia had weakened Ottoman rule in southeastern



Ottoman soldiers at Salonika, 1912–1913. The Balkan Wars pitted Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia against the Ottoman Empire in 1912, and then against each other in 1913. (Library of Congress)

Europe. The importation of the ideas of western European nationalism into southeastern Europe at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century further undermined Ottoman control of this region. The Ottoman government in Constantinople failed to meet these challenges effectively during the nineteenth century. During the summer of 1908, however, a group of reformers from the Committee for Union and Progress, known as the Young Turks, seized control of the Ottoman Empire. They immediately announced a program of civil and military reforms intended to maintain the integrity of the empire. The possibility of viable reform in the Ottoman Empire caused alarm among those who maintained designs on its territories. On October 7, 1908, the Austro-Hungarians announced the formal annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an Ottoman territory they had occupied since 1878. In the spring of 1910, the Albanians, hitherto

fore one of the few remaining pillars of support for Ottoman rule in the Balkans, revolted against the Young Turk reforms. Then on September 29, 1911, the Italians declared war with the intention of taking Ottoman North Africa. Finally, in the fall of 1911, the Bulgarians and the Serbs began talks in order to form an anti-Ottoman alliance.

The Bulgarians and Serbs signed their agreement on March 13, 1912. During the spring and summer of 1912, Greece and Montenegro joined the anti-Ottoman coalition. This surrounded Ottoman territories in southeastern Europe with hostile forces. Ironically, by this time, the Young Turk government had fallen in Constantinople. As the threat of war in the Balkans loomed, the Ottoman government rushed to end the war with Italy, signing the Treaty of Ouchy on October 15, 1912. By then, fighting in the Balkans had already begun. On October 8, the tiny kingdom of Montenegro initiated hostilities. Ten days later, the

OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1877



Ottomans declared war on Montenegro's three Balkan allies.

At the onset of the war, the Ottoman forces were in a poor strategic position. Many Ottoman soldiers remained in North Africa awaiting repatriation after the Italian War. Others were in remote Yemen fighting an interminable insurgency. Nazim Pasha (1848–1913) had overall command of the Ottoman forces. The largest group of the Ottoman army in Europe was the Eastern (Thracian) army, which consisted of four corps under the command of Ferik Abdullah Pasha (1846–1937). It faced the Bulgarian army, the largest in the Balkan alliance. The Western (Vardar) army had three corps.

It had the impossible task of defending Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia against the combined armies of Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia.

At the beginning of the war, the Ottomans initiated an offensive in Thrace. They hoped to pin the Bulgarians against their main position in Thrace, the fortress city of Adrianople (Edirne, Odrin). They soon found themselves in retreat. The Ottoman concentration of forces around their other Thracian fortress at Kirkkilise (Lozengrad) failed to stop the Bulgarian advance. While the Bulgarian Second Army surrounded Adrianople, the Bulgarian First and Third Armies pursued the retreating Ottomans and

inflicted another defeat on the Ottomans along a line from Lüle Burgaz to Pınarhisar (Lyule Burgas to Buni Hisar) in central Thrace on October 29–30. The Ottomans retreated in disarray to the Çatalca lines. This was the final Ottoman defensive position before Constantinople. There on November 17–18, the Bulgarians attacked. The Ottoman army, with some assistance from the Ottoman navy firing at the Bulgarians from the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea, rallied to hold the Çatalca lines. This was the first Ottoman victory in the Balkan Wars. To some degree, it restored Ottoman confidence.

Meanwhile in the Western Theater, the Vardar Army, led by Zeki Pasha (1862–1943), suffered a series of defeats against the Greeks and Serbs. The bulk of the Ottoman forces rushed into northern Macedonia to meet the oncoming Serbs. They suffered a rout at Kumanovo on October 23. The Serbs then pushed them further south after engagements at Prilep and Bitola. At the same time, the Greek army advanced to Salonika, entering the city on November 7, a day ahead of the Bulgarians. The Ottoman-fortified towns of Janina in southern Albania and Scutari in northern Albania defied the Greek and Montenegrin armies, respectively, undoubtedly with the support of most of their populations.

After the defeat of both of its European armies, the Ottoman government requested an armistice on November 12. The Bulgarians agreed only after the failure of their assault on the Çatalca positions. When the talks began at Çatalca on November 26, Ottoman control of Europe was limited to the three besieged fortresses of Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari; the Gallipoli Peninsula; and the territory behind the Çatalca lines. Remnants of the Vardar Army also remained active in central Albania. The armistice was

signed on December 3. Negotiations for peace then shifted to London. Nazim Pasha, the Ottoman commander, was the chief Ottoman delegate at the London Peace talks.

At London on January 1, 1913, the Ottomans proposed terms for peace. They accepted the loss of all their European possessions west of the vilayet (province) of Adrianople (Thrace), but they refused to concede Thrace or the Aegean islands. Although this was a reasonable offer, neither the Bulgarians nor the Greeks accepted it. The Bulgarians wanted Adrianople, and the Greeks wanted the islands. The talks stalled. On January 22, the Young Turks, led by Enver Bey (1881–1922), again seized power in Constantinople. Upon their takeover, they shot the failed Ottoman commander Nazim Pasha. The Young Turks opposed the surrender of Adrianople. In an effort to end the war, however, they offered to cede the part of the city on the right bank of the Maritsa River and conceded the disposition of the Aegean Islands to the Great Powers. The Bulgarians unwisely rejected this offer. Because of the stalemate in London, the armistice ended on January 30, 1913.

The Ottomans renewed their military efforts with a well-conceived but poorly executed attempt to relieve Adrianople. On February 7, the army launched an attack from Bulair, the Ottoman position at Gallipoli, coordinated with a landing at Sharkoi on the Sea of Marmara. This offensive was intended to catch the Bulgarians by surprise. These simultaneous attacks failed. Nevertheless, they demonstrated that the Ottoman forces had regained a certain degree of self-confidence after the disasters of the previous autumn. Ultimately the Young Turks' attempts to reinvigorate the Ottoman war effort did not succeed. Janina

surrendered to the Greeks on March 6, Adrianople fell to the Bulgarians on March 26, and Scutari opened to the Montenegrins on April 24.

Their efforts during the renewed fighting had exhausted the Ottomans. On April 7, 1913, even before the fall of Scutari, they proposed a resumption of the armistice. The Bulgarians and Ottomans renewed the armistice at Çatalca on April 15. The other Balkan allies were not involved.

Peace negotiations then resumed in London. The Ottomans signed the Treaty of London on May 30, 1913. With this treaty, they ceded all of their European possessions west of a straight line from Enez (Enos) on the Aegean Sea to Midye (Midia) on the Black Sea. They also surrendered claims to Crete and the Aegean Islands except for Tendos and Imbros, which the Ottomans retained to defend the Straits. Over 500 years of Ottoman rule in Europe had apparently come to an end.

The Balkan alliance soon collapsed because of a dispute between Bulgaria on one hand, and Greece and Serbia on the other, over the division of Macedonia. Fighting erupted on the night of 29–30 June 29–30 when the Bulgarian army attacked Greek and Serbian positions in Macedonia. With the Bulgarian army heavily engaged throughout Macedonia, the Young Turk government in Constantinople seized the opportunity to recover some of the territory surrendered in London. It especially wanted Adrianople, the first Ottoman capital in Europe. On July 12, Enver (now Pasha) ordered the Çatalca Army and the Gallipoli Army to advance toward the Enez–Midye line. On July 22, the combined armies entered Adrianople, encountering no opposition. The small Bulgarian garrison had evacuated the previous day. Some Ottoman units moved further west and briefly

crossed the prewar Bulgarian frontier. Due to fears of Great Power intervention, however, they did not proceed far into Bulgaria.

With the Treaty of Constantinople, signed between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire on September 30, 1913, the Ottomans recovered most of Thrace, including Adrianople. The Treaty of Athens, signed on November 14, ended the war with Greece. Finally, the Ottomans and Serbs confirmed the Treaty of London with the Treaty of Constantinople, signed on March 14, 1914.

The Balkan Wars were a disaster for the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans lost extensive European territories including the Aegean Islands, Albania, Crete, Kosovo, and Macedonia. In the First Balkan War, the Ottomans sustained 340,000 casualties, including at least 50,000 dead. In the Second Balkan War, the army had no combat casualties, but some 4,000 soldiers died of disease. The number of pro-Ottoman civilians living in Europe, mainly Muslims, who died in the Balkan Wars is unknown, but must be significant.

Nevertheless, the Balkan Wars did have some positive consequences for the Ottoman Empire. The experiences and losses of the Balkan Wars provided the Ottoman army with knowledge that led to some success in World War I. They also provided a basis for the establishment of a new political entity based upon a Turkish identity in place of an Ottoman identity in southeastern Europe and Anatolia.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Adrianople, Siege of, 1912–1913; Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Balkan War, Second, 1913; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Consequences; Chataldzha, Battle of, 1912; Constantinople, Treaty of, 1913; Janina, Siege of, 1912–1913; Kumanovo, Battle of, 1912; London, Treaty of, 1913; Lyule Burgas–Buni

Hisar, Battle of, 1912; Scutari, Siege of, 1912–1913

Further Reading

Erickson, Edward J. *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 2, *Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Ottoman Empire in World War I

In terms of troop strength, the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) did not rank among the major belligerents of World War I. It mobilized about 2.8 million men, even fewer than the United States. In relation to its pre-war population of 22 million, however, Turkey raised more men than Russia, and its recruitment ratio of about 13 percent ranked sixth among the major participating nations of the war. The sheer size of the Ottoman Empire, extending as it did from Thrace to the Persian Gulf and from Caucasasia to the Suez Canal, ensured it an important role in the war. Turkey fought on five fronts and sent troops to three more to aid its allies.

The Ottoman Empire entered the war with an army that had been badly mauled in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. Eight of its 36 peacetime divisions were undergoing major reorganization in 1914, and 14 were being rebuilt from scratch after having been largely destroyed. Moreover, a purge conducted in 1913–1914 rid the army of 1,300 older officers who were considered to be a liability; however, as a result, in 1914,

brigadier generals were often found in charge of corps and colonels commanded divisions, a situation that frequently caused problems over the course of the war.

Following decades of German military assistance, Turkey's army in 1914 was closely modeled after that of Germany, with a General Staff as core organization and pool for highly trained general officers. The recruitment system, mobilization procedures, and order of battle also copied the German model. On the other hand, Turkey was largely lacking the material prerequisites for fighting a modern war. As the least industrialized European power, Turkey could not provide its army with modern armaments in sizable quantities and entered the war desperately short of field guns, machine guns, and ammunition. Turkish supply and medical services were woefully inadequate, and motorcars and aircraft were almost completely absent. The Ottoman road and railroad network was pitiful, and moving a division from Thrace to the East could take months.

Considering these shortcomings, the fighting performance of the Turkish soldier was truly astonishing. Poorly clad and ill-fed, Turkish soldiers for the most part endured terrible hardships, marched enormous distances, and fought in the most hostile environments. Turning the Turkish soldier from his defensive positions required massive material and manpower superiority. Significantly, even in defeat, the Ottoman army never experienced large-scale mutinies among the rank and file. Desertion, however, became an increasing problem late in the war.

In 1914, Turkey mobilized 40 regular army divisions that initially formed 13 corps, grouped into four field armies. Corps were composed of three infantry divisions, one artillery regiment, and one cavalry

regiment; divisions had three infantry regiments and one artillery regiment. In addition, there were regular and irregular cavalry regiments partially formed into (reserve) cavalry divisions. There was also the 40,000-strong Jandarma, a paramilitary police force that formed mobile regiments. Designated for rear-area duties, it occasionally served in the front line.

The authorized Turkish army organization increasingly came apart during the war when new field armies were added, fought-out divisions were replaced, depleted formations were consolidated, and ad hoc detachments were created. In November 1918, eight field armies commanded a force of only 25 divisions, almost none of which had been active in 1914.

While the only war plan available in 1914 called for a cordon-style defense of the empire and deployed more than half of the army around Constantinople, in fact Turkey began offensive operations almost from the outset. This was in part to fulfill its obligations to its allies and in part to regain territory lost in recent wars. Minister of War Enver Pasha, however, frequently implemented ever more fantastic offensive schemes that were beyond the operational capabilities of the army and necessitated permanent redeployments, which further wore down the troops. In order to underpin Turkey's standing as a major European power, Enver even sent sizable reinforcements to its European allies that fought with distinction in Romania, Galicia, and Macedonia.

While the potentially most dangerous front for Turkey in any war was Thrace, where the frontier was less than 180 miles from the national capital, its major military effort was in Caucasia. Here, the ill-equipped Third Army engaged in a winter offensive in late 1914. After some initial

success, it was badly mauled by a Russian counteroffensive. Rebuilt in the spring of 1915, it was almost destroyed in the Russian Erzurum offensive early in 1916. Later in the same year, the Second Army, composed almost entirely of Gallipoli veterans, was nearly destroyed in an offensive farther south in the Caucasus. After that, the war in the East ground to a halt. In 1918, however, after the Russian Revolution had resulted in a withdrawal from Caucasia, the Third Army went over to the offensive and penetrated deep into Armenia and Azerbaijan in an effort to incite a "Pan-Turanic" nationalist movement in central Asia.

In European Turkey, the First and Fifth Armies under the able leadership of German general Otto Liman von Sanders (1855–1929) turned back the Entente Gallipoli landing with heavy losses in 1915. Thereafter, however, these two veteran armies were abused as a readily available manpower reserve for other fronts. When the Allies broke out from Salonika in 1918, there was nothing left to prevent them from entering Constantinople.

In Palestine, a coup de main aimed at seizing the Suez Canal in 1914 proved abortive. Afterward, the Sinai-Palestinian Front evolved into a state of protracted, indecisive warfare, aggravated by the rising Arab Revolt. During 1916–1917, a British buildup in this theater progressed, and in 1918, the German-Turkish Yıldırım (thunderbolt) army group finally collapsed under repeated attacks, and British forces seized Jerusalem and Damascus.

In Mesopotamia (Iraq), an Anglo-Indian invasion resulted in Turkish triumph in April 1916 when Major General Charles Townshend (1861–1924) surrendered an entire division to the Ottoman Sixth Army at Kut. Thereafter, this theater of war remained more or less quiet until the British

renewed their advance in 1918. Several Turkish invasions of Persia secured a temporary foothold in this virtual strategic vacuum but on the whole proved insignificant.

On October 30, 1918, the Ottoman Empire signed an armistice with the Entente on board the British battleship *Agamemnon* off the island of Mudros, ending Turkey's participation in the war. According to recent estimates, Turkey lost 770,000 dead and 760,000 wounded in the war, each an astonishing 27 percent of the mobilized total, and about 145,000 captured.

Dierk Walter

See also: Gallipoli, 1915; Kemal, Mustafa (1881–1938)

Further Reading

Emin, Ahmed. *Turkey in the World War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1930.

Erickson, Edward J. *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000.

Fewster, Kevin, Hatice Basarin, and Vesihi Basarin. *Gallipoli: The Turkish Story*. London: Allen and Unwin, 2004.

Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 2, *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Turfan, M. Naim. *The Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse*. New York: Tauris, 2000.

P

Papandreou, George (1888–1968)

Greek politician and prime minister (1944, 1963, 1964–1967) George Papandreou was born in Kalentzi, Achaia, Greece, on February 13, 1888. He graduated from the Law Faculty of the University of Athens in 1911 and briefly pursued postgraduate studies in Germany. He became one of the closest supporters of Prime Minister Eleuthérios Venizélos (1864–1936), who appointed him governor of the Aegean Islands during 1917–1920. Papandreou was elected to Parliament in 1923 and held various ministerial positions during 1924–1935. After abandoning the Liberal Party, he founded his own small Republican Socialist Party in 1935. He was exiled in 1936 during the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas and was imprisoned by the Germans during 1942–1944.

After his escape, Papandreou joined the royalist government and was appointed prime minister in exile in April 1944. He returned to Athens on October 18, 1944, after the German departure. In December 1944, at the beginning of the Greek Civil War, he resigned and was replaced by General Nikolaos Plastiras (1883–1953). During 1946–1952, Papandreou held ministerial positions in several governments. In 1950, he founded the George Papandreou Party, and after joint leadership of the Liberal Party in the late 1950s, he organized a new center-leftist coalition, the Center Union, in 1961.

Securing a narrow victory in the elections of November 1963 over Konstantinos Karamanlis's National Radical Union, Papandreou was appointed prime minister but immediately resigned in an attempt to achieve an absolute majority in the elections of February 1964. He won these elections with an unprecedented 53 percent of the vote and was appointed prime minister. In 1965, he managed to survive an internal crisis that saw his son Andreas Papandreou (1919–1996), a member of his cabinet, accused of belonging to the left-wing organization Aspida. In July 1965, King Constantine II (1940–) dismissed Papandreou as prime minister over clashes regarding control of the Ministry of Defense.

In 1967, a group of young officers, in a coup that came to be known as the Revolution of April 21, 1967, overthrew the government. Papandreou was held under house arrest until his death on November 1, 1968, in Athens.

Lucian N. Leustean

See also: Greek Civil War; Venizélos, Eleuthérios (1864–1936)

Further Reading

Campbell, John, and Philip Sherrard. *Modern Greece*. New York: Praeger, 1968.

Clogg, Richard. *A Concise History of Greece*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Close, David H. *Greece since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society*. Edinburgh: Pearson Education, 2002.

Partisans, Albania

The Partisans, more officially the National Liberation Movement, were the Communist-led resistance organization in Albania during World War II. Before World War II, the Communists never attracted much interest in Albania. They lacked adherents and overall structure. The few Albanian Communists offered no opposition to the Italian occupation in 1939.

After the German attack on Soviet Russia in June 1941, the leader of the Yugoslav Communists, Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) sent agents into Albania to organize resistance there. This was intended to complement the Partisan resistance to foreign occupation and domestic enemies in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav agents managed to organize the Albanian Communists. They recruited new members. On November 8, 1941, the Communist Party formally came into existence. The Yugoslavs appointed Enver Hoxha (1908–1985), a teacher who had studied in Belgium and France, to head the new party. By the spring of 1942, small Partisan bands formed to undertake sporadic attacks on the Italian occupiers and their Albanian collaborators. The Albanian Partisans found an able commander in Mehmet Shehu (1913–1981), a veteran of the International Brigades fighting in the Spanish Civil War.

Two issues caused the Albanian Partisans to adopt a more aggressive profile in 1943. One was the emergence of the nationalist Albanian resistance movement, the Balli Kombetar (BK). The BK represented a challenge to the Communists over the direction of resistance. A meeting between members of the two groups at Mukaj in August 1943 foundered on the question of Kosovo. The Communists looked to resolve this issue

with Tito after the war, while the BK insisted that Kosovo be recognized as a part of the Albanian state.

The other was the withdrawal of Italy from the war on September 8, 1943. In the spring of 1943, the Albanian Communists decided to establish an Albanian National Liberation Army (ANLA) modeled on Tito's forces. A prominent figure in Tito's movement, Svetozar Vukmanović (1912–2000), known as "Tempo," arrived from Macedonia to direct the Albanian Communist military efforts. After the Italian surrender, the Partisans were able to acquire large quantities of Italian arms. Also following the example of the Yugoslav Communists at Bihać the previous year, the Communists convened a national liberation council at Peza near Tirana on September 16, 1943. Communist and non-Communist delegates met there to establish a broad front for resistance against the Germans, who had taken over from the Italians.

By the time of the German occupation, the ANLA and the BK begun to fight each other in a civil war not unlike that between the Četniks and Partisans in Yugoslavia. Beginning in the spring of 1943, the British sent aid and liaison officers to Albania. After the spring of 1944, they focused only on the ANLA. This helped them in their struggles against both the Germans and the BK. The BK increasingly compromised themselves by cooperation with the Germans. When the Germans withdrew from Albania in October 1944, the ANLA attacked their rear guard in Tirana. The ensuing battle of Tirana lasted from October 25 until November 17, 1944. With liberation of Tirana, the ANLA had defeated both its foreign and domestic enemies. This left the Communists in control of Albania.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Albania in World War II; Balli Kombetar; Hoxha, Enver (1908–1985); Partisans, Yugoslavia; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980)

Further Reading

Fischer, Bernd. *Albania at War 1939–1945*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1999.

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. Vol. 2, *Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Vickers, Miranda. *The Albanians, a Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1995.

Partisans, Bulgaria

The World War II Partisan movement in Bulgaria was slow to appear. As in Albania and Yugoslavia, Communists led the Partisan movement and provided most of the active fighters. The Nazi-Soviet Pact deprived Communists everywhere of motivation to act against the Soviet ally. Only after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, did the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) take steps to oppose the Sofia government at its German ally.

The Bulgarian Partisans faced significant obstacles. Economic cooperation with Nazi Germany had benefited Bulgaria's largely agricultural economy. Bulgaria's bloodless occupation of Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia in April 1941 was very popular throughout the country. The Sofia government wisely refrained from participating in the Nazi campaign against the Soviet Union.

After their war began, the Soviets made some attempt to support the Bulgarian Partisans by sending agents into the country by parachute and submarine, but had little success in the remainder of 1941 and through 1942. The German defeat at Stalingrad revived the Bulgarian Partisan movement. The prospect of a Soviet victory grew

throughout 1943. So did the ranks of the Bulgarian Partisans. There were few obvious targets. Much of the Bulgarian army was deployed in the occupied Greek and Yugoslav territories. Few German troops were stationed in Bulgaria. The Partisans mainly sabotaged economic targets and attacked police stations. They also assassinated some political and police officials.

A determined effort by the police during the winter of 1943–1944 inflicted severe losses on the small Partisan bands. During the spring of 1944, however, as Soviet troops swept across southern Ukraine and neared the Balkans, Bulgarian Partisans attracted growing numbers of volunteers. By this time, they also received some British aid. Several British agents reached the Bulgarian Partisans. At least two, Major Mostyn Davies and Major Frank Thompson (1920–1944), died fighting against Bulgarian government forces.

By the summer of 1944, the number of Bulgarian Partisans had grown to as many as 10,000, although the actual number may have been fewer. With the Soviet army occupying Romania since the end of August 1944, an anti-German government came to power in Sofia on September 2. The BCP then, with the assistance of disgruntled army units and partisan bands, ousted the new government and took control on September 9 through the so called "Fatherland Front." The Bulgarian Partisans' participation in the September 9 coup was probably their most significant contribution to the war.

After the war, the activities of the Bulgarian Partisans compared unfavorably with those of the Yugoslav and even the Albanian Partisans. For that reason, the BCP tended to exaggerate both the numbers of Bulgarian Partisans and their activities. Monuments to Partisan actions sprang up throughout the country. Since the end of the

Communist regime in 1989, such tributes have suffered neglect.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bulgaria in World War II; Partisans, Albania; Partisans, Yugoslavia

Further Reading

Miller, Marshall Lee. *Bulgaria during the Second World War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975.

Oren, Nissan. *Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power 1934–1944*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

Stoimenov, Stoyan, et al. *Atlas na partizansko dvizhenie v Bŭlgariya 1941–1944*. Sofia: Bŭlgarskata komunisticheska partiya, 1968.

Partisans, Yugoslavia

The Yugoslav Partisans was a Communist-based resistance movement in Yugoslavia led by Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980). They were the most effective resistance force in Europe to oppose the Germans and their allies during World War II. They remained active in the field during the entire war and participated in the liberation of Yugoslavia along with the Soviet Russian army.

The Partisans began their activities in the immediate aftermath of the German invasion of Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941. Although after the Yugoslav-Soviet split of 1948, the Tito government claimed that Partisan activity began with the invasion of Yugoslavia by Germany and its allies on April 6, 1941, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 26, 1939, initially served to constrain Communist resistance in German-ruled Europe. Tito, the leader of the Partisans, was a real Yugoslav, with a Croatian father and a Slovene mother. He had developed Communist sympathies as an Austro-Hungarian prisoner of war in Russia

during the Russian Civil War. After he returned to the new Yugoslav state, he became a Communist Party official and spent five years in jail because of his political activity.

Tito organized the initial Partisan response to the foreign occupation. In their first real action, the Partisans joined in the spontaneous uprising in Montenegro in July 1941. Initially they cooperated with the other main resistance force in Yugoslavia, the mainly Serbian nationalist Četniks. The harsh German retaliation in October 1941, including the massacre of over 4,500 Serbian men and boys at Kraljevo and Kragujevac, convinced the Četnik leader Dragoljub “Draža” Mihajlović (1893–1946), to avoid antagonizing the occupation armies to prevent further massacres and to preserve his forces in anticipation of an Allied landing in the Balkans later in the war. This left the field open for the Partisans, who saw the atrocities as excellent motivations for recruitment. By the beginning of 1942, the Partisans were fighting against the Četniks, who had begun to obtain support from the Germans and Italians. The Partisans also on occasion made contact with the Germans.

The main focus of Partisan activity was in the mountains of Bosnia. The German-Italian occupiers had assigned Bosnia to the new Independent State of Croatia (NDH—*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*). Fascist Croatian troops (Ustaša) perpetrated massacres against the Serbian populations of Croatia and Bosnia. This helped to provide recruits for Tito’s forces. The Partisans were also active in much of Croatia and Montenegro. Early in the war, Tito sent Partisan agents into Italian-occupied Albania to organize resistance there.

During the early part of the war, the British provided support to both the

Partisans and Četniks, but as the war continued and Četnik activity against the Germans lagged, British aid increasingly focused solely on the Partisans. By December 1943, the British discontinued their aid to the Četniks and focused their efforts exclusively on the Partisans. This was in spite of the fact that the Partisans made no secret of their Communist affiliation. The Partisans benefited from the Italian surrender in September 1943 by seizing much of their equipment and weapons.

The occupation forces and their allies undertook at least seven offensive actions directed against the Partisans. Partisan units always managed to slip away from their attacks and regroup. They concentrated more on maintaining the integrity of their forces rather than on holding territory. Amidst the fighting, the Partisans held a conference in Bihać, Bosnia, in November 1942 that established a so called Anti-Fascist Council. In contrast to the Četniks, who wished to return the old regime after the war, the Partisans advocated social revolution. They attempted to appeal to all the national groups in Yugoslavia. They also welcomed women into their ranks. A year after the Bihać meeting, they established a provisional government in Jajce, Bosnia, which opposed the Četnik-backed royalist government-in-exile of King Peter II (1923–1970).

By the late summer of 1944, the Romanians and Bulgarians had changed sides after the appearance of the Soviet Russian army on their frontiers. The Russians arrived on the Yugoslav frontier in early October 1944. Soviet and Partisan units participated in the liberation of Belgrade on October 20, 1944. The Russians then veered to the north into Hungary. For the remainder of the war, the Partisans fought against the Germans retreating to the north, the Ustaša,

other diehard collaborationist forces, and the remnants of the Četniks. In March 1945, the royalist government-in-exile acknowledged the authority of the Tito regime. After the end of the war in May, Partisan forces near Bleiburg massacred around 70,000 members of NDH units and other collaborationist formations who were trying to flee into Austria.

The Partisans won the war against the forces of the foreign occupation and against the forces of domestic opponents. This left Tito without political rivals at the end of the war. It enabled him to establish his personal rule that ended only with his death in 1980. It also enabled him to withstand the serious challenge of the Yugoslav-Soviet split in 1948.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Četniks; Mihajlović, Dragoljub “Draža” (1892–1946); Partisans, Albania; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslavia, Axis Occupation Forces in World War II; Yugoslavia, Collaborationist Forces in World War II

Further Reading

- Autry, Phyllis. *Tito: A Biography*. London: Longman, 1970.
- Djilas, Milovan. *Wartime*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.
- Lampe, John R. *Yugoslavia as History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Roberts, Walter R. *Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941–1945*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973.

Pavelić, Ante (1889–1959)

Ante Pavelić was born on July 14, 1889, in the village of Bradina in Austrian-ruled Bosnia-Herzegovina. Trained as a lawyer, he became a supporter of Croatian national rights in Austria-Hungary. In 1918, he

denounced Croatia's incorporation into Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, envisioning an independent state instead. He became a leader of the nationalistic Party of Rights and continued advocating Croatian independence even after being elected to the Yugoslav parliament in 1927.

With the proclamation of the royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia in January 1929 and the elimination of all nationalist political parties, Pavelić left the country and founded, with Italian help, the Ustaša movement, which used terrorist acts, including the assassination of Yugoslav king Alexander (1888–1934) in 1934, to undermine Yugoslavia. Shortly after Germany invaded and dismembered Yugoslavia in March 1941, he returned to Croatia from Italy to become *poglavnik* (leader) of the independent fascist Croatia after more reputable Croatian politicians refused to cooperate with the invaders. Independent Croatia was forced to give large amounts of Dalmatian territory to Italy. As a result, Pavelić tilted toward Nazi Germany. A regiment of Croatian army soldiers fought with the Germans on the Eastern Front and was destroyed at Stalingrad. As leader of Croatia, Pavelić held almost absolute power. His regime subjected political rivals, Serbs, and Jews to bloody persecution. He established a notorious concentration camp at Jasenovac. The brutality of the regime increased the resistance of its opponents. Pavelić's forces fought the guerilla Communist-led Partisans and the Serb-dominated Četniks in Bosnia and in the Krajina. This fighting caused many casualties and much suffering. Memories of this conflict helped to fuel the bitter fighting in these regions during the Yugoslav Wars of 1991–1995.

Pavelić managed to hang on until the very end of the war. The Ustaša regime was the last of Hitler's allies to remain in the war. With the collapse of Nazi Germany and

Ustaša Croatia, Pavelić fled first to Austria on May 6, 1945, and then on to Italy. Fearing arrest and extradition to Yugoslavia, he moved to Argentina in 1948, where he found refuge under the Perón regime. He took up writing and unsuccessfully tried to maintain control of the exile Croatian independence movement. In spring 1957, he was severely wounded in an assassination attempt by the Yugoslav secret service in Buenos Aires, only to flee Argentina at the end of the year for Spain when Argentina agreed to extradite him to Yugoslavia. He died from complications of the botched attack in Madrid on December 28, 1959. Pavelić's brutal rule cast a shadow over the concept of Croatian nationalism for years after his death.

Gregory C. Ference

See also: Alexander I, King of Yugoslavia (1888–1934); Četniks; Holocaust in the Balkans; Partisans, Yugoslavia; Ustaša; Yugoslavia, Collaborationist Forces in World War II

Further Reading

Banac, Ivo. *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.

Shepherd, Ben. *Terror in the Balkans: German Armies and Partisan Warfare*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.

Tomasevich, Jozo. *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Plevan, Siege of, 1877

The Russian siege of the Ottoman fortress of Plevan (Plevna) took place in present-day Bulgaria, July 20–December 10, 1877, during the Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878. The Ottoman defense slowed the main Russian advance southward into Bulgaria.

In July 1877, Grand Duke Nicholas (1831–1891) led the Russian army into present-day Bulgaria and occupied the city of Nikopol on July 16. Osman Pasha (1832–1900), leading an army to reinforce the city, then occupied Pleven about 20 miles south of Nikopol and began reinforcing the city for an expected Russian siege.

Russian forces, reinforced with Romanians, began the siege of Pleven on July 19. For the next two weeks, the besieging forces tried to break through the defenses, but the Ottoman defenders repulsed their attacks. By early September, the Russian-Romanian army numbered 100,000 men, and Osman Pasha had about 30,000 men.

A large-scale Russian-Romanian assault on Pleven on September 11 gave the besieging force a section of the fortifications. By October 24, the Russians and Romanians had completely encircled the fortress. Osman wanted to abandon the fortress, but the Ottoman high command refused. With supplies running low, Osman's forces, outnumbered almost five to one, tried to break out during the night of December 9, but failed. After he was wounded, Osman Pasha surrendered. Although Osman was treated honorably, thousands of Ottoman soldiers perished in the winter snows on their way into captivity, and the Bulgarians massacred the wounded Ottoman soldiers left behind in military hospitals.

The siege had held up the main Russian advance into Bulgaria and captured the world's admiration, gaining the Ottomans sympathy at the Congress of Berlin. The fall of Pleven provided reinforcements to the Russian army, which decisively defeated the Ottoman army at the fourth battle of Shipka Pass, January 5–9, 1878, opening the way to Constantinople.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878; San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878; Shipka Pass, Battles of, 1877–1878

Further Reading

Langer, William L. *European Alliances and Alignments 1871–1890*. 2nd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 2, *Reform, Reaction and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Taylor, A. J. P. *The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe, 1848–1918*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954.

Ploesti, Bombing of, 1943–1944

The Ploesti raids were major and costly U.S. air raids against the refineries of Ploesti, Romania. The refineries there supplied almost one-third of Germany's oil requirements before and during World War II. A land invasion of Romania to seize the Ploesti refineries was impractical, so on August 1, 1943, the United States launched a yearlong air campaign to destroy them.

The first air raid on Ploesti was conducted on June 1, 1942, by 13 B-24 bombers of Halverson Detachment, led by Colonel Harry A. "Hurry-Up" Halverson (1895–1978). The mission originated in Fayid, Africa. Twelve planes reached the target and bombed it from high altitude, escaping without loss. Damage to Ploesti was negligible. Three times during that first week in June, the Soviet air force sent small numbers of bombers against Ploesti. The last inflicted some damage, but at the cost of several Soviet planes and airmen. That ended Soviet interest in the refineries. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, President



A U.S. Army Air Forces B-24 bomber flies over a burning oil refinery at Ploesti, Romania, August 1, 1943. (44th Bomb Group Photograph Collection/United States Army Center of Military History)

Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) and Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill (1874–1965) endorsed a plan to bomb Ploesti from North Africa. Planners decided a low-level attack would be safer and more productive than one from the traditional high level. Three U.S. B-24 bomb groups from England were added to the two in Brigadier General Uzal G. Ent's (1900–1948) IX Bomber Command, which was already in North Africa.

After studying the plan (code-named TIDAL WAVE) with his commanders and staff, Ent wrote a note to his superior officer, Major General Lewis H. Brereton, recommending against a low-level mission. Ent did not know that this had already been decided at the highest level. Once informed of this, he began intensive training of the five groups.

On August 1, 1943, 178 B-24s departed for Ploesti. Eleven bombers either aborted

or were lost en route to the target. Unknown to the Allies at the time, the Germans detected and traced the air armada from takeoff all the way to the target. As a result, German air defense fighter squadrons and antiaircraft defenses were fully alerted, the German fighters being particularly effective against the bombers during the return from the mission.

Because of a navigational error, the bomb runs could not all be made as planned. Nonetheless, substantial damage was inflicted on several refineries. Oil production was reduced only in the short term, however. The bombing results did prove that the low-level attack destroyed more of the target area than raids made from high altitudes. However, at this point in the war, the 2,700-mile round-trip raid by unescorted bombers was an epic one. Losses, although heavy, were less than Ent had anticipated.

Ent had told his men that returning from the mission was “secondary.” American losses included 310 men killed and some 130 wounded (including those who crashed or landed in neutral territory). Eighty-eight aircraft returned to base, but only 33 were fit to fly, and Ent had just over half his original complement of airmen. For this raid, five men were awarded the Medal of Honor, three of them posthumously. Ent and several others were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the United States’ second-highest award for heroism.

Ploesti had an impressive and deadly array of antiaircraft guns and fighter planes to defend the area during that August 1, 1943, raid. But following the raid, German general Alfred Gerstenberg (1893–1959), who commanded Ploesti’s defenses during the entire campaign, improved the defenses with additional guns and planes and, as a final touch, smoke pots. These pots were scattered throughout the refinery area and could be lit to cover the targets with smoke, no matter which way the wind was blowing. Gerstenberg was resourceful. He also installed an oil pipeline system, linking all the refineries, so that oil could be diverted from more damaged refineries to those less damaged or undamaged, maintaining optimal output.

Between April 5 and August 19, 1944, the U.S. 15th Air Force made 5,479 high-level sorties in 19 raids against Ploesti, with a loss of 223 aircraft, representing 4.1 percent of the aircraft employed. On June 10, 1944, 46 P-38 fighters made a low-level attack, and 24 were lost. Some 2,829 American airmen were killed or captured during the entire campaign. During the summer of 1944, Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) flew 924 high-level sorties against Ploesti, in which 38 planes (4.1 percent) were lost.

In the raids, the 15th Air Force and the RAF destroyed nearly 1.2 million tons of Ploesti oil production, amounting to 84 tons of oil lost for each ton of bombs dropped. When Soviet troops entered Ploesti on August 30, 1944, they found five refineries producing just 20 percent of normal production.

Uzal W. Ent

See also: Germany in the Balkans during World War II; Romania in World War II

Further Reading

Dugan, James, and Carroll Stewart. *Ploesti: The Great Ground-Air Battle of 1 August 1943*. New York: Random House, 1962.

Newby, Leroy W. *Target Ploesti: View from a Bombsight*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983.

Wolff, Leon. *Low Level Mission*. New York: Berkley Publishing, 1958.

Princip, Gavrilo (1894–1918)

The Bosnian youth who assassinated Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie, Gavrilo Princip was born to an Orthodox Serbian peasant family in the Grahovo Valley in southern Bosnia on July 13, 1894. It was a time of considerable social change. The traditional social institution of the *zadruga*, or extended family, was dissolving, and this disruption affected Princip’s family. After four years of primary school, at age 13, Princip left the Grahovo Valley for Sarajevo, where his older and economically successful brother intended to enroll him in a Habsburg military school. When he reached Sarajevo, however, his brother had changed his mind (supposedly on the advice of a friend who told him not to make Gavrilo “an executioner of his own

people”) and enrolled him in the local Merchants’ School instead. After three years of study there, Princip transferred to a gymnasium.

It was in the gymnasium years that Princip became an ardent Serbian nationalist. In 1911, he joined Young Bosnia, the secret society that hoped to detach Bosnia from Austria and join it with a larger Serb state. In 1912, Princip walked as if on pilgrimage from Sarajevo to Belgrade, kneeling down to kiss the soil when he crossed into Serbia.

During the First Balkan War of 1912, Princip and many other members of Young Bosnia sought to join the Serbian army’s irregular forces, commanded by Major Vojislav Tankosić (1880–1915), a member of the Central Committee of Unity or Death (popularly known as the Black Hand), the principal conspiratorial organization in Serbia. Turned down in Belgrade because of his small stature, Princip finally tracked down Tankosić, who rejected him out of hand with the words, “You are too small and too weak.”

The combination of intense Serbian nationalism and rejection for physical weakness are the most common explanations advanced for Princip’s determination to commit an act of great consequence on behalf of his people. In fact, during his first interrogation after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand (1863–1914), he told the authorities: “People took me for a weakling . . . which I was not.” He and the other conspirators secured their weapons from Tankosić’s organization in Serbia, but whether or not they acted on instructions from Tankosić or any other Serbian official is still in question. Princip was one of seven conspirators who plotted to assassinate the archduke during his visit to Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. He was the only one who actually fired a weapon, a pistol with which he

mortally wounded both the archduke and his wife (although one other conspirator, Nedjelko Cabrinović (1895–1916), earlier that day did throw a hand grenade, which missed its target).

Princip was arrested immediately after the assassination. Tried at Sarajevo on October 28, he was convicted but was spared the death penalty because he was a minor. He received a sentence of 20 years in prison, the maximum permissible. Meanwhile, the Austro-Hungarian government held Serbia responsible for the murders of the archduke and his wife and used them as an excuse for a preventive war against Serbia, which led directly to World War I.

Princip lost an arm to tuberculosis while in prison at Theresienstadt, Austria. He died there, probably of this disease, on April 28, 1918.

Karl Roider

See also: Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I; Sarajevo Assassination, 1914; Serbia in World War I

Further Reading

Cassels, Lavender. *The Archduke and the Assassin: Sarajevo, June 28th 1914*. New York: Stein and Day, 1985.

Dedijer, Vladimir. *The Road to Sarajevo*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966.

Remak, Joachim. *Sarajevo: The Story of a Political Murder*. New York: Criterion, 1959.

Putnik, Radomir (1847–1917)

A stubborn, hard-edged, austere, and difficult man, Radomir Putnik was one of the greatest figures produced by Serbia in his time, responsible for reforms of strategic and tactical doctrine, organization, and training that made the Serbian army a potent

force in Balkan affairs. Serbia's first field marshal (*vojvoda*), he achieved his greatest victory and greatest defeat in World War I.

Putnik was born at Kragujevac on January 24, 1847, the second son of a school-teacher in a family that had returned to Serbia after a sojourn in Hungary. He was eighth of 17 graduates in his class at the Serbian Artillery School and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1866. In the Serbo-Ottoman War of 1876, he first tasted action and defeat, his brigade suffering heavy losses at Kalipolje. He was also imprisoned for 15 days for clashing with a superior over supplies but was eventually pardoned because of his bravery under fire. He also fought in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. In 1881 and again in 1883, he suffered imprisonment for voicing harsh criticisms of superiors. Serbia's disastrous war against Bulgaria during 1885–1886 saw him serving on a divisional staff. Having completed Army Staff College in 1889, he became deputy chief of staff in 1890. During 1886–1887 and again from 1888 to 1895, Putnik taught at the military academy.

Having fallen out with the politicians because of slights to both King Milan and King Alexander and because of his support of the Radical Party, Putnik (1854–1901) retired in 1896. After the assassination of King Alexander (1876–1903) in 1903, he was recalled, promoted to general, and made chief of the General Staff. He served as minister of war during 1904–1905, during 1906–1908, and in 1912.

Putnik had mastered French, Russian, and German so as to keep abreast of contemporary military literature and had written manuals on artillery use and general staff organization and activities. Now he used his leadership positions to reorganize, reequip, and strengthen the army while developing offensive strategic plans to use



Serbian field marshal Radomir Putnik. Born in Kragujevac, Serbia, in 1847, he participated in fighting in 1876 against the Ottoman Empire and 1885 against Bulgaria. (Library of Congress)

against Turkey and defensive plans to deal with the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Bulgaria. The architect of the army's organization and plans, Putnik was, from his teaching days and from maneuvers, thoroughly acquainted with the entire officer corps of the army and the Serbian terrain. Thus, when the First Balkan War began in 1912, he was able to lead his army to a decisive victory over the Turks and was made the first *vojvoda* of the Serbian army, a term equivalent to field marshal bestowed only on one who had won a great victory. In the Second Balkan War in 1913, his troops quickly defeated the Bulgarians.

His failing health, due mainly to acute bronchitis and emphysema exacerbated by

a lifetime of chain smoking, led Putnik to visit the Austrian spa at Gleichenberg in 1914, and he was there when the Austro-Hungarian Empire's Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in late June by Serbian nationalists. Returning to Serbia, he resumed command of the nation's armies as the Austro-Hungarian Empire threatened to declare war. Europe's double alliance system, which posed the Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance, stepped into gear, quickly bringing the continent to the brink of a massive war. As the first fighting of World War I erupted in August, Putnik furiously made plans for Serbia's defense, fearing correctly that the Austro-Hungarians would seize the opportunity to crush tiny Serbia once and for all. He correctly assumed that the Austro-Hungarian Empire's war plans called for an attack in the north, but Serbia got a break when the Austro-Hungarian troops poised on the northern Serbian frontier had to be diverted to the Russian Front to stave off an unexpected Russian offensive.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire did attack, however, launching an offensive against Serbia on August 12. Putnik's planning had placed three Serbian armies in the north and northwest of the country, allowing the Serbians to quickly launch a counterattack against the Austro-Hungarians that drove them back across the Drina River after the four-day Battle of Cer, the first Allied victory of the war. At the urging of his French allies, Putnik moved to the offensive on September 6 but was driven back into Serbia by an Austro-Hungarian offensive that began the following day. Putnik had to conduct a difficult and tenacious fighting retreat to defensive positions southwest of Belgrade. In November, he abandoned the capital after two months of continuous fighting and withdrew to the southward, almost out of ammunition and all but defeated. Late in

November, however, ammunition supplies began arriving through Salonika from France. Taking advantage of the overextension of the Austro-Hungarians, Putnik counterattacked at Kolubra on December 3 and, by December 15, could assure King Peter I (1844–1921) that the only Austro-Hungarians still on Serbian soil were prisoners. It was Putnik's finest hour.

In October 1915, Serbia was again attacked, this time by Bulgarian and German armies as well as by the Austro-Hungarians. Putnik's hopes of receiving assistance from Greece or from an Allied expeditionary force were dashed, and the Serbian army had to defend more than 900 kilometers of the country's border. On October 5, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians struck from the north. Exhausted by an attack of influenza, Putnik was too ill to take part in military operations but oversaw decisions and imbued his subordinates with the will to fight. Overwhelmed in the north, the Serbians were attacked in mid-October from the east by two Bulgarian armies. The Serbian army escaped encirclement and fought to maintain contact with the Allies in Thessaloniki and preserve an escape route through Kosovo and into Albania. By late November, they had been cut off from contact with the Allies, and the only options were surrender or flight.

Putnik's last command was to direct the army to risk the icy passes of the Albanian mountains and break out to the Adriatic. Unable to walk, he was carried by four soldiers over the mountains in a sedan chair, accompanied by the king in an oxcart. It took 11 days to reach the sea. Evacuated with the Serbian government to Corfu, Putnik was dismissed early in 1916 along with the rest of the high command. He died on May 17, 1917, while convalescing in Nice.

Joseph McCarthy

See also: Cer Mountain, Battle of, 1914; Serbia in the Balkan Wars; Serbia in World War I; Serbian Retreat, 1915

Further Reading

Adams, John Clinton. *Flight in Winter*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1942.

Király, Béla K., and Nandor F. Dresziger, eds. *East Central European Society in World War I*. Boulder, CO: Social Science

Monographs; Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1985.

Király, Béla K., and Albert A. Nofi, eds. *East Central European War Leaders*. Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs; Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1988.

Stokesbury, James L. *A Short History of World War II*. New York: Morrow, 1980.

R

Radomir Rebellion, 1918

The Radomir Rebellion was the name of the uprising of disgruntled military units and supporters of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union (BANU) in Bulgaria during September 1918 at the end of World War I. Bulgaria had been at war, with a brief interlude, since October 1912. The entire country was exhausted.

On September 14, 1918, Entente forces launched an attack on Bulgarian positions on the Macedonian Front at Dobro Pole with the intention of knocking Bulgaria out of the war. After two days of heavy fighting, Bulgarian lines collapsed on September 16. Soldiers from the Second Balkan Division and the Third Thracian Division refused orders and surged back toward Sofia in order to punish those in the government they held responsible for the miserable conditions they had experienced for the past three years and for Bulgaria's second military defeat in the past five years.

As a result of the defeat and mutiny, the Bulgarian government decided on September 25 to seek an armistice with the Entente. A Bulgarian delegation signed the agreement on September 29 in Thessaloniki, Greece. Meanwhile, the soldiers crossed the Bulgarian frontier. On September 27, 1918, Raiko Daskalov (1886–1923), a leading member of BANU, the main Bulgarian peasant party, proclaimed a republic in the southwestern Bulgarian town of Radomir. This government became known as the Radomir Republic.

In an effort to allay the growing rebellion, the Sofia government and Czar Ferdinand (1861–1948) released Aleksandŭr Stamboliski (1879–1923) from prison on September 25. The government had detained Stamboliski, the leader of BANU, since 1915 because of his opposition to the war. In Radomir, the rebels appointed Stamboliski prime minister and Daskalov commander in chief of the army. The forces of the new republic advanced toward the capital on September 29, the same day the armistice was signed in Thessaloniki. The Sofia government hastily organized a defense force consisting of military cadets, members of the Macedonian revolutionary organization (VMRO), and a German division newly arrived from the Crimea. When they met on the southwestern outskirts of Sofia on September 30, the pro-government forces prevailed. As many as 2,500 rebels were killed in the battle. Sofia government forces took Radomir on October 2. The rebels melted away. By this time their chief demand, that Bulgaria leave the war, already realized.

On October 3, Czar Ferdinand abdicated in favor of his son, who assumed the Bulgarian throne as Czar Boris III (1894–1943). After the success of BANU in the 1919 elections, Stamboliski became prime minister. Daskalov also served in the government. Macedonian terrorists murdered Stamboliski at his farm near Pazardzhik on June 14, 1923. They assassinated Daskalov in Prague on August 26 of that same year.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bulgaria in World War I; Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918; Ferdinand I, Czar of Bulgaria (1861–1948); Stamboliski, Aleksan-dŭr (1879–1923); VMRO

Further Reading

Bell, John D. *Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian Union, 1899–1923*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Chary, Frederick B. *The History of Bulgaria*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011.

Crampton, R. J. *Bulgaria 1878–1918: A History*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1983.

Romania, Invasion of, 1916

When World War I erupted in August 1914, Romania declared neutrality. Since 1883, Romania had a secret alliance with Austria-Hungary, and King Carol Hohenzollern (1839–1914) was pro-German. Many politicians, however, favored the Entente as a means to achieve Romanian nationalist goals in Austria-Hungary. After the death of King Carol and the succession of this nephew Ferdinand (1865–1927), the country wavered back and forth between the Central Powers and the Entente until the summer of 1916. Then the apparent success of the Russian “Brusilov” offensive against Austro-Hungarian forces convinced the Romanian government that the time was propitious to join the Entente. Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary on August 18, 1916. On the understanding that Entente forces at Salonika would launch attacks to keep the Bulgarians occupied, the Romanian army undertook an offensive into Hungarian-ruled Transylvania, the major objective of Romanian policy. Beginning on August 27, the Romanian First, Second, and North Armies crossed three passes

of the Transylvanian Alps and descended down into Transylvania.

The Romanians seriously miscalculated. By mid-August, the Brusilov Offensive was spent. Also, the Bulgarians preempted the Entente offensive by opening an offensive of their own that enabled them to seize significant territory in southern Macedonia. The Central Powers quickly responded to the Romanian invasion of Transylvania. Both Austro-Hungarian and German troops reinforced the superannuated reserve forces that had guarded the Transylvanian passes and planned a punitive counterattack.

The first stage of the Central Powers’ counterattack began on September 1, when the Bulgarian Third Army under the command of the renowned German general August von Mackensen (1849–1945) and with a contingent of Ottoman troops, crossed into Romanian-held Dobrudja (Romanian: Dobrogea; Bulgarian: Dobrudzha). Von Mackensen intended this attack to draw Romanian forces away from Transylvania. Also, the Bulgarians were eager to recover this territory that they had lost three years earlier in the Second Balkan War. To counter the Bulgarian attack, Russian troops marched into Dobrudja. They, however, were unable to prevent the fall of the fortress city of Turtucaia on September 4. A Romanian cross-Danubian counterattack into Bulgaria on October 2 failed. By the end of October, all the former Bulgarian Dobrudja and much of the pre-Balkan War Romanian Dobrudja was under von Mackensen’s control. The important Romanian Black Sea port of Constanța fell to the Central Powers on October 22.

Meanwhile, the Austro-Hungarian First Army and the German Ninth Army combined under the command of former German chief of general staff Erich von Falkenhayn (1861–1922) began a counteroffensive that

cleared the Romanians from Transylvania by mid-October. The Central Powers forces then proceeded on into Romania. At first determined Romanian resistance held up the Austro-Hungarian and German advance. In mid-November, however, the Central Powers forces broke through the Romanian defenses in three locations and proceeded into the Wallachian plains toward the Romanian capital of Bucharest. Von Mackensen augmented the threat to Bucharest with an attack launched from the Bulgarian Danubian port of Svishtov across the river on November 23. A mixed force of Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians, Germans, and Ottomans quickly established themselves on the north bank of the Danube. The over-extended Romanians lacked the forces to contain this new invasion. The appearance of Central Powers forces behind the Romanian defenders of Wallachia forced a Romanian retreat toward Bucharest. On November 27, a Bulgarian unit crossed the Danube from Ruse and seized the Romanian town of Giurgiu. The three Central Powers forces converged on Bucharest. Brushing aside desperate Romanian attempts to hold the capital, the Central Powers entered Bucharest on December 4. With the help of some British officers, the Romanians succeeded in destroying much of the oil infrastructure around Ploesti before the Central Powers could arrive. By the end of 1916, the Central Powers had overrun the remainder of Wallachia. After the fall of Bucharest, the Romanian government established itself in Iași, Moldavia, near the Russian frontier.

The invasion of Romania was an outstanding success for the Central Powers. They acted quickly and decisively. The Romanians suffered heavy losses in manpower and material. Despite the loss of much territory, including their capitol, the Romanians remained in the war. With the

help of a French military mission, their army would revive in 1917.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Carol I, King of Romania (1839–1914); Dobrudja; Macedonian Front, 1916–1918; Romania in World War I

Further Reading

Barnett, Michael B. *Prelude to Blitzkrieg: The 1916 Austro-German Campaign in Romania*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.

Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania, 1866–1947*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Torrey, Glenn. *Romania and World War I*. Iași: Center for Romanian Studies, 1998.

Torrey, Glenn. *The Romanian Battlefield in World War I*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011.

Romania, Invasion of, 1944

In 1944, the Soviet Union invaded Romania, leading to the surrender of Romania to the Allies and a declaration of war on Germany. Romania became an ally of Germany after the government of Ion Antonescu (1882–1946) signed the Tripartite Pact on November 23, 1940, and invaded the Soviet Union with Germany on June 22, 1941. The invasion of Romania had four major strategic goals: the removal of Romania from the Axis, the end of the supply of oil and food from Romania to Germany, the entrance to the Balkans for the Soviet army, and the maintenance of pressure on the German armies along a broad front.

The Romanian army had suffered huge losses in men and equipment during the Battle of Stalingrad and subsequent fighting in Ukraine as the Soviet Union pushed the German army west. In the spring of 1944, Soviet offensives had pushed elements of German Army Group South and

the twice-reconstituted Third and Fourth Romanian Armies back to the Dniester River, which marked a defensible border for Romania. Having pushed Axis forces out of most of the Ukraine and Crimea, the Soviet army continued its offensive operations into Romania. The Romanian armies were integrated into the German Sixth and Eighth Armies along a defensive line of the Carpathian foothills of northern Romania and the Dniester River. On April 5, 1944, the Third and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts launched the First Jassy-Kishinev Operation in northeastern Romania. The offensive was a major direct continuation of the Ukrainian offensives with the strategic goals mentioned above. The Soviet forces achieved some initial success against poorly equipped Romanian units, but German armored and mobile units managed to hold and counterattack the advancing Soviets. By early June, the Axis armies had reestablished defensive lines approximating those at the beginning of the Soviet offensive. After the failed offensive, the Soviet Union diverted units and supplies from its southern forces to aid the preparation of a major offensive in Belarus.

When Soviet Operation Bagration on June 22, 1944, in Belarus placed enormous strain on the German army, the German command began to strip armored forces from its Romanian front during July 1944. On August 20, 1944, the Second Ukrainian Front, commanded by General Rodion Malinovsky (1898–1967), and the Third Ukrainian Front, commanded by General Fyodor Tolbukhin (1894–1949) launched the Second Jassy-Kishinev Operation with the immediate goal of a double envelopment of the German Sixth Army, commanded by General Maximilian Fretter-Pico (1892–1984), which had been reconstituted after its destruction at Stalingrad. The German and Romanian forces were heavily outnumbered

in armored vehicles, artillery, antitank guns, mobile infantry, and air power. By August 23, 1944, the German Sixth Army was encircled and eliminated as a fighting force after a double envelopment by the Third and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts east of the Prut River. The Romanian Third and Fourth Armies, positioned east and west of the German Sixth Army respectively, were left disorganized and retreating where they could.

With the rapid collapse of Axis forces, Romania's King Michael (1921–) joined a coup by the army and government opponents overthrowing Ion Antonescu on August 23, 1944. The new government rapidly concluded a cease-fire with the Soviet Union and declared that Romania was joining the Allies. The remnants of the Romanian army were integrated under Soviet army command and fought for the remainder of World War II on the side of the Allies. The Romanian army played an important role in allowing the Soviet army to advance rapidly through the Carpathian mountain passes into Hungary and along the Yugoslavian frontier. To the south, Bulgaria ended its war with the Western Allies and declared war on Germany on September 8, 1944.

Brian G. Smith

See also: Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946); Michael I, King of Romania (1921–); Romania in World War II

Further Reading

Axworthy, Mark, Cornel Scafes, and Cristian Craciunoiu. *Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945*. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995.

Erickson, John. *The Road to Berlin: Stalin's War with Germany*. Vol. 2. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.

Glantz, David. *Red Storm over the Balkans: The Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania*,

Spring 1944. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006.

Romania in the Balkan Wars

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Romania, the largest national state in southeastern Europe, had a strong interest in the events south of the Danube. Romanian territorial interests were limited to southern Dobrudja (Romanian: Dobrogea; Bulgarian: Dobrudzha), which the Congress of Berlin in 1878 had assigned to Bulgaria. This territory did not contain a significant Romanian population. Nevertheless, control of southern Dobrudja would extend Romania's Black Sea coast and add productive agricultural land to Romania's economy.

Romania's main interest in the events of the Balkan Wars, however, was to maintain its position as the dominant power in the Balkans. To this end, the Bucharest government concluded an alliance with Austria-Hungary in 1882 but also maintained good relations with the Ottoman Empire and, by the first decade of the twentieth century, developed a warming interaction with Russia. In order to establish a profile in Ottoman-controlled Macedonia, the Romanian government posed as the protector of the Aromani, or Vlachs, a fellow Latin-speaking transhumant people living mainly as shepherds in the uplands of the Balkan Peninsula. The Romanian government funded churches and schools for this group.

In the summer of 1912, when the Balkan League of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia was coming together, the Bulgarian government approached Bucharest. The Bulgarians were eager to reach some kind of accommodation with Romania before beginning a war against the Ottoman Empire, because of the Romanian alliance

with Austria-Hungary and Romanian friendship with the Ottomans. The Romanians refused to undertake any commitments at this point.

The First Balkan War began on 17 October. Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian forces soon achieved unexpected victories against the Ottomans. When the extent of the Bulgarian victories in Thrace became apparent, the Romanians presented their bill. At first, King Carol (1839–1914) and the Romanian government considered the military occupation of Bulgarian Dobrudja. The Austro-Hungarians and Germans, however, advised restraint and gave assurances that the Great Powers would deal with the issue of compensation. The initial Romanian demand for the Danubian port of Silistra (Silistre) was soon supplemented by the stipulation that territorial compensation for Bulgarian conquests in the south should include all of Bulgarian Dobrudja. The Bulgarians, after their victories over the Ottomans, were reluctant to part with any territory. They made a few minor territorial concessions in the vicinity of Silistra. Nevertheless, they considered the Romanian demands to be blackmail.

The impasse in the Romanian dispute with Bulgaria led the Great Powers to intervene. The Russians in particular were eager to lure Romania away from the Triple Alliance while maintaining their close relationship with Bulgaria. Russian foreign minister Sergei Sazonov (1860–1927) convoked a conference of Great Power ambassadors in St. Petersburg to resolve the conflict. The conference first met on March 31, 1913. After several weeks of deliberation, on May 8, it awarded Romania Silistra in compensation for Bulgaria's gains in Macedonia and Thrace. This failed to satisfy Romania. Soon afterward, the Athens and Belgrade governments, who had disputes with Sofia

over Macedonia, approached Bucharest. While no formal arrangement resulted, the continuity of interest among Greece, Serbia, and Romania against Bulgaria was obvious.

The Bulgarian attack on Greek and Serbian positions on the night of June 29–30, 1913 began the Second Balkan War. In response, the Romanian army called for the mobilization of 300,000 men on July 5, 1913. The Bucharest government was determined upon intervention. It declared war on July 10. That same day, 80,000 soldiers of the Romanian Fifth Corps commanded by General Ioan Culcer (1853–1928) crossed the frontier into Bulgarian Dobrudja (Dobrudzha) and, meeting no resistance, occupied a line from Tutrakan on the Danube to Balchik on the Black Sea. This corresponded to the territory the Romanians had demanded from Bulgaria.

Then, on the night of 14–15 July 14–15, the 250,000 men of the Romanian Danube Army commanded by Crown Prince Ferdinand (1865–1927) crossed its namesake river at the Bulgarian cities of Gigen, Nikopol, and Oryahovo. With their armies totally committed in Macedonia fighting against the Greeks and Serbs, the Bulgarians offered no resistance to the Romanian invasion. After landing on Bulgarian soil, the Romanian units regrouped into two elements. One moved in a westerly direction toward Ferdinand (now Montana), which they took on July 18. The other element set off on a southwesterly course toward the Bulgarian capital of Sofia. By July 23, a cavalry unit from this element had arrived on the outskirts of Sofia. With the Bulgarian army away to the southwest, the Romanians were in position to enter the Bulgarian capital. Romanian aviators flew over Sofia and dropped leaflets. On July 25, part of the northern element met the Serbian Second Army at Belogradchik, isolating Vidin, the

largest city in northwestern Bulgaria. Troop movements ceased with the conclusion of an armistice on July 29.

On July 30, negotiations ending the war began in Bucharest, as befitting Romanian interest in maintaining strong influence in southeastern Europe. The Treaty of Bucharest of August 10, 1913, established that Romania had gained its war objectives. Bulgaria ceded southern Dobrudja. Bulgaria's defeat confirmed Romania's dominant position in southeastern Europe.

Romanian intervention in the Second Balkan War proved critical to the success of the anti-Bulgarian coalition. By the time Romanian troops crossed the Danube River, Bulgarian counterattacks against Greek and Serbian forces had stabilized the fighting in Macedonia. This raised the possibility of a decisive Bulgarian offensive against the overextended Greeks and Serbs. The Bulgarian could not, however, counter the Romanian invasion. This, together with the Ottoman invasion of southeastern Bulgaria, ensured the defeat of Bulgaria. While Romania suffered no combat casualties in the war, around 6,000 soldiers died of cholera. Undoubtedly, Romanian soldiers brought the disease with them upon their return home.

After the Second Balkan War, Romania remained dominant in the Balkan Peninsula. Romania's territorial gain in the Second Balkan War proved to be ephemeral. In August 1940, the Bulgarian government, with the tacit approval of Nazi Germany, demanded the return of southern Dobrudja. With the Treaty of Craiova of September 7, 1940, Romania ceded southern Dobrudja back to Bulgaria.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan League, 1912; Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Balkan War, Second, 1913;

Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Consequences

Further Reading

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Hitchens, Keith. *Rumania, 1866–1947*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Jowett, Philip S. *Armies of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Oxford: Osprey, 2011.

Zbucnea, Gheorghe. *România și Războaiele Balcanice 1912–1913*. Bucharest: Albatros, 1999.

Romania in World War I

Romania occupied an important position in the northeastern Balkan region. It extended over 46,000 square miles and had a population of some 9 million people. Romania consisted of three major areas: Wallachia, Moldavia, and Dobrudja (Dobrudzha). While the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia were predominantly ethnic Romanians and practiced Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Dobrudja contained a much more diverse population, including many Muslims. Indeed, in this area, Romanians were in the minority. Romania was rich in grains with abundant arable land, and its oil fields at Ploesti were the largest in Europe.

On August 27, 1916, Romania declared war on the Central Powers. This came as something of a surprise, as Romania had signed a defensive military alliance with Germany in 1883 that had been renewed by Romanian king Carol I in 1913. Carol (1839–1914) was also of the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen line and related to German kaiser Wilhelm II.

At the beginning of World War I, the Romanian government declared its neutrality. The vast majority of King Carol's

cabinet favored such a course, and Premier Ionel Brătianu (1864–1927) justified it on the basis that Romania was bound to support Germany and Austria-Hungary only in the event of a defensive war. More importantly, Romania coveted Transylvania, then part of Hungary and home to 3 million ethnic Romanians. At the same time, however, Romania had fears concerning Russia and maintained pretensions to the Russian province of Bessarabia, which had a large ethnic Romanian population.

The sole rail line connecting Germany and the Ottoman Empire ran through Romania, and Russia pressured Romania to block this route that allowed transit of goods from Germany to the Ottoman Empire. Romania bowed to this demand. It also moved closer to the Entente when, in December 1914, it accepted a loan from Britain to strengthen its military.

Romanian foreign policy clearly favored the Entente. In October 1914, Carol I died. He was succeeded by his nephew, Ferdinand I (1865–1927), who allowed Brătianu to control foreign policy. Throughout 1915, the Romanian premier bargained with the Entente. He demanded simultaneous Allied offensives on the Eastern and Western Fronts to exert maximum pressure on the Central Powers, which came in 1916 with the Somme and the Brusilov offensives. He also asked for, and obtained, stocks of war matériel from the Allies. Most importantly, he secured promises of Romanian territorial aggrandizement, including Transylvania but also the Banat of Temesvar, a rich agricultural region; Bukovina; and southern Galicia. All of these areas had mixed populations. Russia agreed that if Romania entered the war, it would provide 200,000 troops to protect that country from a potential Bulgarian attack from the south. The Western Allies also assured Brătianu of

assistance from a half million Allied troops at Salonika and an expanded effort against Bulgaria. The promise of an Entente offensive against Bulgaria seemed to provide Romania with the security it wanted against a Bulgarian attack. The apparent success of the Brusilov Offensive finally persuaded the Romanians to join the Entente.

On August 17, 1916, Romania officially signed the Treaty of Bucharest with the Triple Entente. Ten days later, the Romanian government declared war on the Central Powers and sent 80 percent of its army in an invasion of Austria-Hungary to secure Transylvania. The Allies were caught off guard by the Romanian attempt to take Transylvania, as they had anticipated that Romania would concentrate its military efforts against Bulgaria.

Bulgarian forces, taking advantage of the weakened Romanian troop deployment along the Danube, then attacked north. The Bulgarians easily deflected a Romanian attempt to counterattack across the Danube. Romania soon found itself fighting on two fronts: combined German and Austro-Hungarian forces to the west and north, and the Bulgarian army to the south. In addition, promised Russian assistance did not materialize. By the time the Romanians joined the Entente, the Russians had exhausted their resources and had started to retreat from the gains they had made under General Brusilov because of German pressure. Finally, the French commander of Allied forces at Salonika, General Maurice Sarrail (1856–1929), failed to support the Romanians by promptly attacking the Bulgarians.

Fighting on two fronts and lacking adequate supplies and reinforcements, the poorly trained and equipped Romanian forces were on the defensive from September to December 1916. British forces, fearing the imminent fall of Romania,

sabotaged the Ploesti oil fields on December 5 and set fire to more than 800,000 tons of oil. The Central Powers occupied the capital of Bucharest on December 6, 1916, and the Romanian army was forced into the northeast corner of the country, across the Serit River, in Moldavia to regroup.

Combined Romanian and Russian forces launched an attack across the Serit River into Moldavia in July 1917, and in the battles of Mărăști, Mărășești, and Oituz they defeated the Central Powers forces, although with high casualty rates. The defensive victories of 1917, together with a French effort to retrain and reequip the Romanian army after the defeats of 1916, somewhat restored Romanian morale. General Alexandru Averescu (1859–1938) was an important figure in the defensive victories in Moldavia. The collapse of the Russian military and the second Russian Revolution in November 1917, however, ended these efforts. In December 1917, almost all Russian troops were withdrawn by the provisional Russian government, forcing Romania to sign an armistice with Germany on December 9, known as the Truce of Focșani.

Romania had no choice but to accept the preliminary surrender terms of March 5, 1918, which ceded Dobrudja to Bulgaria and brought the demobilization of its armed forces. The Treaty of Bucharest signed on May 7, 1918, formally ended Romanian hostilities between Romania and the Central Powers. It provided for the demobilization of 5 of 15 Romanian army divisions and placed manpower restrictions on the remaining 10. It also set limits of the munitions Romania could retain. In addition, Romania was forced to cede Dobrudja to the Central Powers, border regions to Austria-Hungary, and control over the Danube to the Central Powers (including the right to station

warships on the river). This treaty and Romania's catastrophic personnel losses—535,706 in all, 71.4 percent of all Romanians who took up arms, of whom approximately 200,000 were wounded or prisoners and 335,706, 44 percent of the total, were dead—were devastating to the country. The treaty also gave Germany a 90-year lease on the Ploești oil fields and access to its grain production.

Meanwhile amidst the revolutionary turmoil in Russia, the provincial assembly of Bessarabia, the *Sfatul Țării*, looked to Romania for security. On April 5, 1918, it voted to unify with Romania. Just as Romania suffered defeat in the west, it made gains in the east.

Romania was saved by the ultimate Allied victory in the war. On September 29, 1918, Bulgaria was forced to sue for peace. Taking heart from this development and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian war effort, on October 12, Romania reconstituted its government with the formation of a national council. On November 10, 1918, one day before the Allied armistice with Germany took effect, Romania abrogated the Treaty of Bucharest and reentered the war on the Allied side.

In summer 1919, Romanian forces advanced into Hungary to assist with the overthrow of the Communist government of Béla Kun that had seized power in Budapest the previous March. Romanian forces remained in place as occupiers for several months, extracting heavy reparations (or looting) and seeking an advantageous military and territorial position prior to Hungary's eventual conclusion of the Treaty of Trianon with the Allies in June 1920.

Although Allied pressure forced Romania to withdraw its forces from Hungary in late 1919, in practice Romania benefited greatly from the Allied victory. In an effort to strengthen that country against a resurgence

of Austria and Hungary and also to bar Communist Russia from expansion in a southwesterly direction, the conferees at the Paris Peace Conference granted Romania important territorial gains that it had not won on the battlefield. These included the former Hungarian territories of Transylvania; the eastern Banat, including Temesvár (the remainder was awarded to Yugoslavia); and southern Dobruja, first taken from Bulgaria during the Second Balkan War of 1913. The country also obtained the former Austrian province of Bukovina, which contained many Romanians and Ukrainians. This region, like Bessarabia, had declared a desire to be part of Romania. The acquisition of this territory doubled the size of Romania. Many Romanians saw their country as Greater Romania, *România Mare*. The territorial acquisitions, however, also brought complex minority problems that served to weaken the country in the decades that followed.

Laura J. Hilton

See also: Averescu, Alexandru (1859–1938); Bucharest, Treaty of, 1918; Mărășești, Battle of, 1917

Further Reading

Alexandrescu, Vasile. *Romania in World War I: A Synopsis of Military History*. Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1985.

MacMillan, Margaret. *Paris, 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*. New York: Random House, 2002.

Petrescu-Comnène, Nicolae. *The Great War and the Rumanians: Notes and Documents on World War I*. Iași: Center for Romanian Studies, 2000.

Torrey, Glenn E. *Romania and World War I: A Collection of Studies*. Iași, Romania, and Portland, OR: Center for Romanian Studies, 1998.

Torrey, Glenn E. *The Romanian Battlefront in World War I*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011.

Romania in World War II

Romania played an important role in World War II. A major producer of both oil and grain, it had the third-largest military establishment of the European Axis powers, and after it switched sides in August 1944, it became the fourth-largest Allied military presence. Romania entered the war for nationalistic reasons—to maintain its independence and reclaim territories lost in 1940.

Following the Balkan Wars and World War I, Romania secured territories from Hungary and Russia that united most Romanian peoples into a single country for the first time in centuries, a source of great national pride. In the acquisition of Transylvania from Hungary, it also secured a restive Hungarian population. Hungary was bent on the return of that territory. The Soviet Union also sought the return of Bessarabia. To shore up his southern flank, Adolf Hitler put heavy pressure on Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria to join the Axis powers. On May 29, 1940, the Romanian government announced its acceptance of Hitler's plan for "a new European order." Bereft of French and British support, it had no alternative. Under the terms of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union had been awarded Bessarabia. In the wake of the defeat of France, Soviet leader Josef Stalin cashed in his remaining chips. Both Germany and Italy pressured Romania to accede to the Soviet demands of June 28, 1940, to give the Soviet Union Bessarabia and also northern Bukovina, which had not been Soviet territory before.

Hungary also secured German and Italian support for the return of territory lost to Romania following World War I. Under terms of the Second Vienna Award of August 30, 1940, dictated by Germany and Italy to stabilize the political situation between Romania and Hungary, Romania ceded to Hungary north-central Transylvania and other Romanian territory north of Oradea. Also under German pressure, Romania ceded to Bulgaria southern Dobrudja in the September 7, 1940, Treaty of Craiova, thereby restoring the pre-World War I boundary between those two states. Almost overnight, Romania had lost half of its territory and population, greatly reducing its ability to defend itself.

Romania's King Carol II (1893–1953) never had popular support. Married to a Greek princess, he flaunted his long-time love affair with his mistress, Elena "Magda" Lupescu (1895–1977). His government was further destabilized by frequent cabinet turnovers and widespread corruption. National outrage over the loss of Romanian territories to the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria allowed the pro-Fascist, anti-Semitic Iron Guard to force Carol's abdication on September 6, 1940. He fled Bucharest with his mistress and nine train cars loaded with royal booty.

Carol's 19-year-old son, Michael (Mihai; 1921–), replaced him but was an impotent figurehead. Real power rested in the recently appointed prime minister and World War I military hero General Ion Antonescu (1882–1946), who proclaimed himself *conducător* (leader). Intensely nationalistic, Antonescu managed to maintain significant independence within the Nazi sphere. In October 1940, the first of 500,000 German "advisers" arrived in Romania, ostensibly to protect Ploesti, the site of Europe's second-largest oil fields. Romania



Green-shirted young fascists, Romania's Iron Guard, stand side-by-side with traditionally-dressed men in the Place de Minai Viteazu in Bucharest, December 10, 1940. (Keystone/Getty Images)

proved an important source of natural (nonsynthetic) oil for Germany; it also supplied virtually all of Fascist Italy's oil during the war.

On November 23, Romania officially joined the Axis powers. Antonescu declined to participate in the subjugation of Yugoslavia in April 1941, but he readily assisted with the invasion of the Soviet Union in order to reclaim Romania's lost territories to the east. When the invasion began on June 22, 1941, he called for a "holy war" against Bolshevism. On July 2–3, Army Group Antonescu, composed of Romanian and German troops, crossed the Prut River. By midmonth, Romania again owned Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Most Romanians, including frontline troops, believed their war was over.

It was not. Antonescu agreed to send Romanian troops to capture the Soviet Black Sea port of Odessa. In return, Hitler granted

Romania all the territory between Bessarabia and the Black Sea, including Odessa, the "Russian Marseille." After taking Odessa at horrendous cost, increasingly demoralized Romanian soldiers fought in the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the southern USSR. Romania furnished more troops to the war against the Soviet Union than all other German satellites combined. Antonescu vainly hoped this effort would be rewarded with the return of Transylvania, since Hungary provided far less support for Hitler's war. On June 12, 1942, American bombers based in North Africa struck Ploesti. Over the next two years, no single raid did exceptional damage, but the cumulative effect significantly diminished the flow of oil to Germany.

In an effort to take Stalingrad, Hitler stripped the flanks on either side of the beleaguered city of German forces and substituted the much less well-equipped,

motivated, and trained Romanian Third Army to the north, and Fourth Army to the south. On November 18, a Soviet counter-offensive smashed through the Romanian Third Army. Two days later, the Fourth Army suffered the same fate. Both armies were effectively destroyed. Those Romanian soldiers who sought safety in Stalingrad perished there with their German allies. Stalingrad was a Romanian as well as a German catastrophe. Surviving Romanian forces joined the general retreats of 1943. By the spring of 1944, the Red Army had retaken the Crimea and was on the border of prewar Romania.

After the Stalingrad disaster, the Romanians increasingly sought a way out of the war. The government began unofficial contacts with the Allies in Ankara. These made little headway because of American and British insistence that the Romanians would have to deal with the Soviets.

The wartime anti-Semitic government sanctioned the killing of Jews. More than 40,000 Soviet Jews reportedly were killed near Odessa alone, yet about half of Romania's Jews, mainly in the areas of Wallachia and Moldavia, survived the war. Antonescu protected many to utilize their experience in industrial and economic management. Additionally, a long-standing tradition of corruption among Romanian officials made buying fake identity papers and passports relatively simple.

Throughout 1942, Antonescu was under considerable pressure from other Romanian political leaders to withdraw the nation's troops from the Soviet Union, but he refused to do so. He pointed out that the army was more than 900 miles deep inside Soviet territory and that the Germans controlled the lines of communication and would surely wreak vengeance on Romania and occupy the country. As the military situation

deteriorated in 1943 following the Soviet victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, Antonescu authorized peace feelers, but these foundered on the Anglo-American insistence on unconditional surrender. On August 23, 1944, with Soviet forces having crossed the eastern border, young King Michael ordered the arrest of Antonescu and announced that Romania was withdrawing from the Axis alliance. Even Romanians were caught by surprise. Antonescu was later tried by the Soviets and was executed in June 1945.

Romania turned on its former allies in hopes of securing cobelligerent status, as Italy had been accorded, and maintaining its independence after the war. But such hopes proved illusory. On October 9, 1944, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill (1874–1965) and Soviet premier Josef Stalin (1879–1953) agreed that the USSR would have 90 percent “predominance” in postwar Romania.

In February 1945, surrounded by Soviet tanks, King Michael had little choice but to create an essentially Communist government. That government forced him to abdicate in December 1947, although Stalin and U.S. president Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) both decorated him for personal courage in overthrowing Antonescu. Trapped between major powers, Romania had tried to hold on to its land, people, and independence by allying itself first with one side and then with the other. Instead, it became a Communist puppet state. Of all its lost territories, only Transylvania was returned to Romania after the war.

Gerald D. Swick

See also: Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946); Carol II, King of Romania (1893–1953); Holocaust in the Balkans; Michael I, King of Romania (1921–); Ploesti, Bombing of, 1943–1944;

Romania, Invasion of, 1944; Romanian Coup, August 1944; Second Vienna Award, Stalin-grad, Battle of, 1942–1943; Vienna Award, Second

Further Reading

Axworthy, Mark, Cornel Scafes, and Christian Craciunoiu. *Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945*. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995.

Butler, Rupert. *Hitler's Jackals*. Barnsley, UK: Leo Cooper, 1998.

Ceausescu, Ilie, Florin Constantiniu, and Mihail E. Ionescu. *A Turning Point in World War II: 23 August 1944 in Romania*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.

Goralski, Robert, and Russell W. Freeburg. *Oil and War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat*. New York: William Morrow, 1987.

Hazard, Elizabeth W. *Cold War Crucible: United States Foreign Policy and the Conflict in Romania, 1943–1953*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Ioanid, Radu. *Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940–1944*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000.

Romanian Campaign in Hungary, 1919

Romania entered World War I on August 27, 1916, mesmerized by Entente promises of Austro-Hungarian territories including Bukovina, Temesvar, and Transylvania. The Central Powers' invasion of Romania in the fall of 1916 dimmed these expectations, and the surrender of Romania to the Central Powers with the Treaty of Bucharest of 1918 ended them. The collapse of Austria-Hungary in October 1918 revived Romanian hopes. Romania reentered the war on

November 9 on the side of the Entente. The Romanians acted quickly to occupy the Austro-Hungarian lands promised to them by the Entente.

In March 1919, a Communist government under Béla Kun (1886–1938?) took power in Hungary. The Romanian army advanced against Kun's forces with the approval of the Allied powers, then meeting in Paris. By April 30, the Romanians, meeting little resistance, reached the Tisza River. In July, however, the Hungarians counterattacked and threw the Romanians back from the river. The Romanians responded with a renewal of their offense. They crossed the Tisza on August 1, 1919, and two days later entered Budapest. That same day, Béla Kun resigned. Within days, the Romanians had occupied all of Hungary except for some areas around Lake Balaton.

While in Hungary, the Romanians availed themselves to large quantities of Hungarian property, including food, machinery and railroad rolling stock. With Kun and the Communist government gone, the Entente ceased to support the Romanian presence in Hungary. The Romanians' conduct in Hungary caused the Entente Powers to pressure them to leave. Beginning in mid-November 1919, the Romanian army began to evacuate Hungary and gradually returned to the line established by the Treaty of Trianon in March 1920. The campaign in Hungary cost the Romanians around 11,600 casualties, and any chance for a peaceful relationship with that country.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Romania in World War I; Trianon, Treaty of, 1920

Further Reading

Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania, 1866–1947*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Torrey, Glenn. *The Romanian Battlefield in World War I*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011.

Torrey, Glenn. "The Romanian Intervention in Hungary, 1919." In Glenn E. Torrey, *Romania and World War I*. Iași: Center for Romanian Studies, 1998.

Romanian Campaign in Hungary, 1944–1945

This campaign by the Romanian army, alongside the Soviet army, in Hungary after the Romanian king Michael I (1921–) overthrew the pro-Nazi regime of Ion Antonescu (1882–1946) in August 1944 and declared war on the Axis powers.

On August 23, 1944, King Michael I deposed Antonescu's government and, soon afterward, declared war on the Axis powers as the Soviet army advanced on the Moldavian front. Michael then placed the Romanian army, numbering a million men, on the Allied side to defend Romania. These actions split the Romanian army in two, with units that still supported Germany and those that supported the new government.

On August 24, German troops attempted to seize Bucharest, Romania's capital. However, Romanian forces stopped the Germans at the city's defenses. Romanian units then forced the German garrisons at the Ploesti oilfields to retreat to Hungary. The coup accelerated the Soviet army's advance into Romania but did not prevent the Soviet army from capturing about 130,000 Romanian soldiers who were taken to the Soviet Union, where many perished in prison camps. Michael signed an armistice on September 12, 1944, in which he announced Romania's unconditional surrender to the Soviet Union and occupation by the Soviet army.

Romania's declaration of war on Germany almost immediately led to border

clashes between Hungarian and Romanian troops. In early September, Soviet and Romanian forces entered Transylvania and captured several small towns as they advanced toward the Mureș River and Cluj, the historical capital of Transylvania. On October 11, Soviet and Romanian forces captured Cluj after a monthlong battle against the Hungarians and the German Eighth Army. Between September 14 and 17, the Hungarian army fought the Romanians in the battle of Păuliș. The Hungarians made some initial gains, but the Romanians soon stopped the Hungarian advance. Soon afterward, a combined Romanian-Soviet counterattack overwhelmed the Hungarians, who retreated back to Hungarian territory on September 21.

In late October 1944, the advancing Soviet army with Romanian units advanced toward the Hungarian capital, Budapest, defended by Hungarians and Germans. On November 7, Soviet and Romanian troops entered the city's eastern suburbs. By December 29, the Soviets and Romanians had completely encircled the city, and the battle for the city turned into a siege. With the city in ruins, the remaining defenders surrendered to the Soviets on February 15, 1945. The Romanian army ended the war fighting alongside the Soviet army against the Germans in Transylvania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Czechoslovakia.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946); Iron Guard; Michael I, King of Romania (1921–); Romania, Invasion of, 1944; Romania in World War II

Further Reading

Case, Holly. *Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.

Ceausescu, Ilie, Florin Constantiniu, and Mihail E. Ionescu. *A Turning Point in World War II: 23 August 1944 in Romania*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1985.

Georgescu, Vlad, ed. *Romania 40 Years (1944–1984)*. New York: Praeger, 1985.

Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania, 1866–1947*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Romanian Coup, August 1944

On August 23, 1944, King Michael (1921–) of Romania ordered the arrest of Prime Minister Ion Antonescu (1882–1946), the fascist dictator (*conductător*) of Romania since September 5, 1940. The timing of the coup was forced by the rapid successful invasion of Romania by the Soviet army, which had begun on August 20, 1944. King Michael immediately named as interim prime minister Constantin Sanatescu (1885–1947), a trusted general who had been conspiring with King Michael and others against Antonescu. The new Romanian government immediately sought to end the war with the Soviet Union and switched Romania to the side of the Allies.

After more than a decade of unstable governments and international crises, General Ion Antonescu took over the dictatorial power of King Carol II (1893–1953) on September 5, 1940. Taking the title of *conductător* (leader), Antonescu forced the abdication of King Carol II to his son, King Michael, who remained as monarch the symbolic leader of the military and head of state with powers to appoint the prime minister. Under Antonescu, Romania signed the Tripartite Pact of the Axis powers on November 23, 1940, and joined in Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. By late 1943, the war was going poorly for Germany and numerous

Romanian political opposition groups, important military leaders, and even Antonescu were seeking a way to extricate Romania from the war. The National Democratic Bloc was formed on June 20, 1944, a political conspiracy and alliance dedicated to the removal of Antonescu and an end to war with the Allies. The conspiracy consisted of King Michael and his advisors, royalist military leaders such as General Constantin Sanatescu, head of the Royal Military House and commander of the Romanian Fourth Army since March 1943, and the leaders of several opposition parties including Iuliu Maniu (1873–1953) of the National Peasants' Party, Gheorghe Bratianu (1889–1953) of the National Liberal Party, Constantin Titel Petrescu (1888–1957) of the Social Democratic Party, and Lucretiu Pătrășcanu (1900–1954) of the Communist Party. During June and July 1944, Germany weakened its forces in Romania, causing those hostile to Antonescu to become by early August more confident in their ability to remove his regime without interference from Germany.

On August 20, 1944, the Soviet Union launched an offensive invading Romania that quickly overwhelmed the weakened German and Romanian armies. With reports of a military collapse in progress, the conspiracy met on August 21 and set August 26, 1944, as the date to seize control of the government from Antonescu and from the German forces in Romania. With the Soviet army advancing rapidly in the direction of Bucharest, the capital of Romania, Antonescu met with King Michael in his palace on August 23, 1944. Antonescu declared his intentions to negotiate with Germany for release of Romania from its treaty with the Axis and to seek protection and guarantees from the Western Allies against Soviet

occupation. With neither possibility being even remotely realistic, King Michael ordered his palace guard to arrest Antonescu. Later that evening, King Michael broadcast to the country that Antonescu had been removed, that all fighting with the Allies was to cease, and he had named General Constantin Sanarescu the interim prime minister.

There was no organized domestic resistance to the removal of Antonescu and the political leaders of the National Democratic Bloc were given government ministerial positions. Any threat of Germany countering the coup ended after a few days of failed efforts to take control of the capital (August 24–August 28) by the German Luftwaffe General Alfred Gerstenberg (1893–1959) commanding a motorized detachment of approximately 2,000 men (as well as anti-aircraft guns) from the Fifth Flak Division based in Ploesti. Attempts to reinforce Gerstenberg's force with the Brandenburg parachute battalion (stationed in occupied Yugoslavia) from August 24 to August 26 failed completely. By August 31, 1944, the Soviet army had entered Bucharest.

Pressured by the Allies and with German forces attempting to seize Bucharest, the new government declared war on Germany on August 24, 1944, the day after the coup. By August 31, 1944, the Soviet army and Romanian army had eliminated all German resistance in Romania. Ion Antonescu had been in the custody of the Communist elements of the conspiracy before being given to the Red Army on August 30, which then transferred him to Moscow. Antonescu was later returned to Romania to stand trial and was executed on June 1, 1946.

Brian G. Smith

See also: Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946); Michael I, King of Romania (1921–); Romania, Invasion of, 1944; Romania in World War II

Further Reading

Axworthy, Mark, Cornel Scafes, and Cristian Craciunoiu. *Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945*. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995.

Erickson, John. *The Road to Berlin: Stalin's War with Germany*. Vol. 2. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. Vol. 2, *Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Romanian Peasant Uprising

The peasant uprising of 1907 was one of the most violent uprisings in Romanian history. The uprising, which started in February in northern Moldavia and later spread throughout the country, lasted until mid-April and was a result of long-standing dissatisfaction with the inability of the government to improve the position of peasants. The peasant population increased during the nineteenth century, but the plots that were subdivided through inheritance were too small to support them. The position of peasants deteriorated further when the rents on property rose sharply by the end of the nineteenth century. Most peasants owned no land, did not benefit from the export of crops that they produced, and had no real voting power.

Prior to the peasant uprising of 1907, there were several peasant revolts and several attempts at reform, all of which failed to achieve the desired results because of their inefficiency and economic and financial difficulties of the state. Several factors worsened the situation of peasants. The population increase did not go hand in hand with mechanization of agriculture or use of new techniques and fertilizers. Instead, the

peasants continued to rely on wooden plows and oxen. Inheritance laws in place supported the equal division of land among all the children, and as a result, many children were left with tiny plots insufficient to feed the young families. Buying additional or new land was not easy to achieve, since the money lending conditions were not favorable and resulted in greater indebtedness. Taxes became increasingly burdensome after Romanian independence and into the early twentieth century, and even those peasants who managed to acquire land from previous Turkish landowners had to make excruciatingly high payments. The government attempted to implement limited measures concerning agricultural contracts; for example, it allowed the sale of state-owned property to landless peasants in 1891, but these were ineffective measures in practice. The Jewish question also generally came up in the context of rural social problems, though the evidence on the role of anti-Semitism and xenophobia in the uprising is inconclusive.

All of economic and social factors were the main reasons of the peasant uprising of 1907. The revolt was triggered by a refusal of one landlord to renew peasants' land leases. Fearing loss of work and livelihood, peasants started to act violently, and the revolt spread. Several landlords were killed and their property destroyed in the following weeks. Dimitrie Sturdza's (1833–1914) government declared the state of emergency on March 19, 1907, in hopes of containing the revolt, and it used military force to crush the revolt with brutality in the following month. Some 11,000 peasants were killed in the uprising, and an equal number of peasants were arrested. The precise numbers are still debatable because all records were intentionally destroyed by the government. Even though some laws were

passed to pacify the peasants after the revolt—for example, to establish a rural bank to aid peasants in purchasing land—most reforms were insufficient and were brought to a complete halt by the onset of World War I. Presumably, the uprising demonstrated that the peasant situation and land distribution had to be of primary importance for the Romanian government. But because the reforms were delayed, the economic transformation failed to take off prior to 1914. Consequently, the revolt did not produce lasting results.

Irina Mukhina

See also: Aversecu, Alexandru (1859–1938); Carol I, King of Romania (1839–1914); Romania in the Balkan Wars

References

- Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania, 1866–1947*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
- Jelavich, Charles, and Barbara Jelavich. *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011.
- Palairat, Michael R. *The Balkan Economies c. 1800–1914: Evolution without Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Treptow, Kurt W., ed. *A History of Romania*. Iași: Center for Romanian Studies, 1996.

Russo-Ottoman War, 1806–1812

The Russo-Ottoman War of 1806–1812 began with the Russian invasion of Moldavia in December 1806. Even though the war was fought for control of the Danube River, which was the psychological and strategic barrier between the two empires, the course of the war as a whole reflects contemporary developments unfolding in Europe at that time.

Prior to 1806, French diplomacy had been gaining superiority over the coalition in Istanbul. However, the existing Ottoman neutrality that enabled Russian warships to pass freely through the straits was crucial for the ascendancy of the coalition in the Mediterranean. This was the main motivation behind the ineffective British expeditions to the straits and to Egypt in 1807. On the other hand in the Balkans, the Russian army had steadily improved. With the help of the Serbs, they took Walachia and Moldavia in the course of a six-week campaign.

The condition of the Ottoman army was deplorable. The Ottoman expeditionary forces were a kind of horde, being little more than a conglomeration of mercenary troops provided by the local magnates. Moreover, the fragmentation of the Ottoman army was worsened by rebellions in the capital in 1807 and 1808. More than 100,000 Ottoman soldiers were mobilized on paper. Nevertheless the only effective Ottoman resistance against the Russian forces came from the local levies. The Russian advances threatened not only the Ottoman territorial integrity but also the semiautonomous positions of the local Ottoman notables.

Even so, the Russian army was not in especially good condition, either. The Sublime Porte was not able to find men to mobilize, but the relatively small Russian army under the command of General Ivan I. Michelson (1740–1807) was suffering, like the Ottomans, from epidemics, insufficient medical facilities, and hunger. As a result, by the end of 1807, the lines between the Ottoman and Russian forces had stabilized. But in 1809, Russia once more went on the offensive with the aim of achieving their ultimate goal of crossing the Danube. In this operation, the Ottomans abandoned Ruse (Ruscuk), Nicopolis (Nigbolu), and

Sistova to the Russian forces under the command of Count Mikhail Kamensky (1738–1809). Still, the losses incurred proved too great, even for so large an empire as Russia.

The regions controlled by the disloyal or volatile notables were among the primary targets of the Russian forces. In the spring of 1811, General Mikhail Kutuzov (1745–1813), who had been promoted to the command of the Moldavian army on the Danube, took the stage. This development, which seems to have been a precaution against the incoming French army, changed the theater of war dramatically. This time the Ottomans went on the offensive, attacking Ruscuk in order to cut off Russian access to the Danube in what proved to be the largest confrontation of the entire war. Nevertheless, at the end of 1811, General Kutuzov, under pressure from Czar Alexander I (1777–1825), crossed the Danube and directly attacked the Ottoman forces. By October 25, 1811, a cease-fire had been agreed upon, and in the following year, a treaty was signed in Bucharest. With the enactment of the treaty, however, the Sublime Porte lost control over the Pruth River.

Fatih Yeşil

See also: Russo-Ottoman War, 1828–1829; Serbian War of Independence, 1804–1817

Further Reading

Aksan, Virginia H. *Ottoman Wars 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged*. London: Pearson Longman, 2007.

Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Alexander Ivanovich. *Russo-Turkish War of 1806–1812*. Edited and translated by A. Mikaberidze. West Chester: The Nafziger Collection, 2002.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 2, *Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey*

1808–1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Russo-Ottoman War, 1828–1829

During the Greek Revolt (1821–1826), the European Powers had forced the Ottoman government to recognize the Greek privileges. Russia was also determined to enforce the unfinished stipulations of the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), especially those about Serbia and the Danubian Principalities. Upon the denial of their demands by Sultan Mahmud II (1785–1839), the combined French, British, and Russian fleet destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian navy at Navarino in 1827. As a consequence of the persistent unwillingness of Sultan Mahmud II to negotiate peace, Czar Nicholas (1796–1855) declared war on April 14, 1828. In fact, both sides had valid reasons to avoid a military confrontation. Following the abolition of Janissary Corps in June 1826 and the sinking of its fleet at Navarino, the Ottoman government was rebuilding its army and navy. On the other hand, the czar was afraid of an alliance between his enemy and other European Powers.

Nevertheless, the war broke out in May 1828 when the Russians advanced into the Danubian Principalities in the West and the Caucasian mountains in the East. On April 25, 1828, the VI and VII Corps of the Russian Second Army crossed the Prut River into Moldavia, while in Caucasus, General Ivan F. Paskevich (1782–1856) marched with his troops on Kars. Shortly thereafter, a Russian amphibious operation captured the Ottoman Black Sea fortresses at Anapa and Poti. Transported by boats of local Cossacks on the northern Danube, the Russians first crossed the Danube at Satunovo in early May. The Ottoman

commander Agha Huseyin Pasha (1776–1849) left Istanbul with his army in late May and reached Shumla, the Ottoman headquarters on the Danube front, by early June. A bitter rivalry between Husrev, the commander in chief of the newly established Ottoman central army (*Asakir-i Mansure*) and Grand Vizier Mehmed Selim (1771–1831) kept the two best commanders of Ottoman troops close to the sultan in Constantinople. With Kars surrendered at the end of June, the Ottoman operational base in the Eastern Front was cut in two.

The next target was the semiautonomous principality of Akhaltsikhe. The Ottoman Eastern Army could not prevent Paskevich and retreated to the fortress. After bombings and street fightings between August 13 and 16, Akhaltsikhe capitulated. Ardahan, Beyazid, Diyadin, and Eleshkirt fell consequently. On the Danube front, Russians found Bucharest devastated after occupying it in mid-May 1828. The Ottomans in the Balkan theater remained in their fortresses and avoided battle in the open field. They limited operations to attacks on isolated units and on Russian supply lines. In fact, the Russian war command was not in favor of an immediate Balkan mountain crossing and a decisive offensive to Istanbul until their reserves arrived. The initial Russian plan was to defeat the main Ottoman forces at Shumla and take the fortresses of Ibrail, Silistra (Silistre), and Varna by siege.

Czar Nicholas I joined the invading army in early June. The siege of Ibrail began a week later. In spite of the use of heavy siege artillery, the Ottoman garrison resisted 43 days and surrendered on June 23 after Machin had capitulated. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Danube fleet lost 13 gunboats to Russian flotilla fire and was forced to retire to Ruschuk. Shortly thereafter, the Ottoman fortresses such as Hirsova, İsakchi, Tulcea,

and Kostence capitulated. In surrendering the fortifications, the Ottomans supplied their enemy with much-needed stores. Afterward, the main Russian army proceeded against Varna via Bazarcik. The Ottoman garrison in Varna repulsed the first Russian assault. On July 20, the czar marched at the head of his entire army on the road to Shumla, which was a well-fortified and well-supplied fortress. The attacking Russians lost many men and horses due to hunger, exhaustion, and Ottoman counter attacks.

The czar subsequently left the theater of war for Odessa. In autumn, the arrival of reinforcements allowed the Russians to invest the northern side of the fortress. The Russian fleet reached Varna the first week of August and captured two Ottoman ships when a third sunk. On September 28, the Ottoman relief force sent from Shumla forced a Russian withdrawal at the battle of Kurttepe. On October 10, however, the Russians captured Varna, but they were not able to force the surrender of Silistra (Silistre). Due to Ottoman assaults and cold weather, the Russians lost 2,000 of 25,000 men and lifted the siege in November. In the winter break of the war, Ottomans made attacks on forces left at the garrisons. The Russians, on the other hand, burnt the Ottoman Danubean flotilla and captured Suzebolu in the south of Burgas.

In the spring of 1829, the second scene of the war begun and the Russian forces sieged Silistre once again. Instead of remaining at defense, Grand Vizier Reshid Mehmed Pasha (1780–1839) had surprisingly decided to march with his main army out of Shumla and attack the avant-garde of the Russian center barring the route to Varna and Silistra. They clashed at Eski-Arnautlar, where the Russians inflicted heavy losses on the Ottomans. The new Russian field

commander, General Hans Karl von Diebitsch (1785–1831), moved from Silistra to Pravadi. Reshid Pasha intended to mount another flank attack to cut off the Russian forces at Varna and then head north to relieve the besieged forces of Silistra. Summoning the Russian troops from Varna to Kozluca, Diebitsch barred the Grand Vizier's passage on the Pravadi road back to Shumla and closed the pass of Kulevcha. The Ottoman soldiers, charging impetuously at first, soon dispersed following a Russian artillery barrage and turned the battle into a rout.

However, the new Turkish commander's willingness to give battle played into Russian hands. A six-week siege of Silistra resulted in the capitulation of the garrison on June 18. The Russians decided on July 13, 1829, to bypass Shumla, cross the Balkan mountain range and aim for Edirne. At the same time, the Russian navy captured Burgas. Aydos fell by July 26. But weakness in the Russian forces and logistical system cut the offensive short just as they captured Edirne mid-August 1829.

On the Eastern Front, Russian and Ottoman troops confronted before the surrender of Erzurum. Attacking the weak center of the Ottoman army, Russians cut the front into two. Finally, on July 27, 1829, the Ottoman headquarters on the eastern front, Erzurum, capitulated without a fight. Then Paskevich defeated the Ottoman forces around Gumushane and took the fortress. There, however, Paskevich's regular and militia forces were defeated at Bayburt by the local Laz militia. The well-defended and naturally fortified Trabzon remained out of Paskevich's successful captures, such as Batumi and Sivas. General Diebitsch was within a day's march or two of Edirne in the west when the Ottoman grand vizier proposed an armistice. Following the retreat of

Ottoman forces, Edirne capitulated on August 20 without a fight.

The Ottomans admitted defeat in mid-August by acquiescing to the Treaty of London (1827) and the Convention of Akkirman (1826). However, only after an additional show of force by Diebitsch, the Treaty of Adrianople was signed by the two sides on September 14, 1829. By this treaty, the Prut remained the European Russo-Ottoman frontier, but Russian acquired all the islands of the very mouth of the Danube. Many of the great fortresses of the Ottomans on the lower Danube, including Ibrail, Tulcea, Isakchi, Machin and Kostence, were to be destroyed. Thus the Ottoman first line of defense became the Balkan Mountains rather than the Danube itself. In Caucasus, the border ran along the edges of the pashaliks of Akhaltzikhe, Trabzon, Kars and Erzurum.

Other treaty stipulations forced the Ottoman recognition of the Treaty of London (July 6, 1827) laying out the settlement of the Greek question, as well as of the independence of Wallachia and Moldavia, although the fictive connection of those Principalities to the Ottomans was maintained. Serbia's freedom was also guaranteed. With the agreement of March 22, 1829, ensuring the enforcement of the stipulations of the London Treaty, Greek independence was guaranteed, six districts were left to Serbians, the privileges of Principalities had changed. Again by this treaty, the Russian merchant ships acquired freedom of trade in the Black Sea and passage through the Straits. These gains cost the Russians 140,000 men and 50,000 horses during this war, mainly due to epidemics and famine.

Gültekin Yıldız

See also: Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832; Navarino, Battle of, 1827

Further Reading

Aksan, Virginia H. *Ottoman Wars 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged*. London: Pearson Longman, 2007.

Allen, W. E. D., and Paul Muratoff. *Caucasian Battlefields: a History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828–1921*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953.

Bitis, Alexander. *Russia and the Eastern Question: Army, Government, and Society 1815–1833*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Yıldız, Gültekin. *Neferin Adı Yok: Zorunlu Askerliğe Geçiş Sürecinde Osmanlı Devleti'nde Siyaset, Ordu ve Toplum (1826–1839)*. Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2009.

Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878

The last of a series of conflicts between the Russian and Ottoman Empires resulted from Russian expansionism and Ottoman decline. These conflicts were part of a continuing crisis in which Balkan instability growing out of the decline of the Ottoman Empire threatened the peace of Europe. They grew out of Russia's drive to secure her southern borders and dominate the Balkans. In addition, the Russians sought to regain losses they had sustained in the Crimean War of 1853–1856. The Porte's decline and ethnic tensions in her Balkan provinces fueled Russian ambitions.

The immediate cause of the 1877–1878 war was the Russian desire to aid the Balkan rebellions of 1875 and 1876 against Ottoman rule. The crisis erupted in 1875 with scattered peasant rebellions in Bulgaria—the poorest and most exploited of the Ottoman Empire's Balkan possessions—and was fanned with an ill-considered attack by Serbia against the Ottomans in Bosnia in the summer and early fall of 1876, which the Ottomans swiftly crushed. Despite

Serbia's defeat, the revolts in Bulgaria intensified throughout the rest of 1876 and into 1877. Turkish forces carried out wholesale massacres that inflamed public opinion throughout Europe and Great Britain and led to growing demands in Russian Slavophil and Nationalist circles for Czar Alexander II (1818–1881) and his advisers to act.

On April 24, 1877, after several months of diplomatic maneuvering in which the Russians gained the acquiescence of Germany and Austria-Hungary and the active support of Romania, Russia formally declared war on Turkey. The Russian plan called for a force of 250,000 men to push through Romania, cross the Danube upstream of the main Turkish forces, pass through the Balkan Mountains, and seize Adrianople before advancing on the Ottoman capital at Constantinople. They also launched a diversionary offensive in the Caucasus to prevent the Turks from reinforcing their Balkan armies with troops from Asia Minor. A quick victory was vital. A prolonged war meant intervention by the other European powers and a strain on Russia's economy.

The Russian campaign was unexpectedly held up by the stubborn Turkish defense of Plevna (Pleven) in west central Bulgaria. Plevna's strategic importance lay in its locations at the crossroads linking Bulgaria's vital roadways. Continuing Ottoman possession of the city constituted a grave threat to Russian supply and communication lines. Three times—twice in July and once in September 1877—the Russians assaulted Plevna only to be repulsed with heavy losses and forced to lay a siege to it. At the same time, the Russian army crossed the Ottoman border in eastern Anatolia and captured Ardahan, Bayazid, Kars, and Erzurum.

In late November 1877, after a five-month-long siege, Plevna surrendered to

the Russian army, which crossed the Balkan Mountains and occupied Sofia on January 4, 1878 and Adrianople (Edirne) on January 20. It now lay in a position to directly threaten Constantinople, and Russian advance to the Ottoman capital provoked a British response. Britain intervened pressuring the Russians to negotiate a truce with the Turks. The Russians accepted a cease-fire on January 31 but continued advancing toward Constantinople. The British responded by sending a naval task force to the Sea of Marmara. Although incensed by Britain's action, Russia was alarmed by the British presence around Constantinople and, to avoid a pan-European conflict, chose to seek armistice with the Turks. The Russian army halted at San Stefano, just a few miles from Constantinople.

Over the next few weeks, Russian and Ottoman diplomats conducted negotiations that resulted in the Treaty of San Stefano of March 3, 1878. The treaty established an independent "Greater Bulgaria," which the Russians envisioned as a satellite state through which they could control the Balkans. Bosnia-Herzegovina was granted autonomy. Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro received independence and enlarged at the expense of Ottoman territorial losses.

Alarmed by the expansion of Russian power implicit in the San Stefano pact, the European powers, led by Britain and Germany, convened the Congress of Berlin and forced Russia to accept modifications in the treaty. The resulting Treaty of Berlin gave Russia southern Bessarabia, Batumi, Ardahan, and Kars as well as a vast war indemnity (some 800 million French francs) that the Porte was required to pay in the ensuing years. It also broke up Greater Bulgaria into a smaller independent state, placed Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austrian protectorate, and recognized the independence of Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro.

Russian ambitions were thwarted, but the Berlin agreement left many issues, particularly Slavic nationalism and Austrian and Russian ambitions in the region, unresolved. The war had a profound impact on the Ottoman Empire, which lost 8 percent of its most productive territory and some 20 percent of its total population. The war also significantly altered the demographics of the Ottoman state since most of the Orthodox Christian population was lost. The Ottoman economy was saddled with heavy reparations.

Walter F. Bell

See also: Berlin, Treaty of 1878; Plevna, Siege of, 1877; San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878

Further Reading

Drury, Ian, and Raffael Ruggeri. *The Russo-Turkish War 1877*. Oxford: Osprey, 1994.

Faruqi, Suraiya, ed. *The Cambridge History of Turkey: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839*. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

O'Connor, M. P. "The Vision of Soldiers: Britain, France, Germany, and the United States Observe the Russo-Turkish War." *War in History* 4, no. 3 (July 1997): 264–95.

Seton-Watson, R. W. *Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question*. New York: Macmillan, 1935.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 2, *Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

S

Saint-Germain, Treaty of, 1919

The Treaty of Saint-Germain established peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria. Signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, in the suburbs of Paris, on September 10, 1919, this treaty was the product of the Paris Peace Conference, as were the other treaties that complemented the Treaty of Versailles with Germany. The Treaty of Saint-Germain took effect on July 16, 1920. Another treaty was signed at Trianon with Hungary. Together, these two treaties provided for the breakup of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary and undertook to settle the considerable problems that resulted from the dissolution of the old Habsburg Empire. Some decisions were also no doubt affected by the continuing conflict with what the Allied Supreme Council called the “Maximalist Government of Russia” (that is, the Bolshevik government), such as when the council forced the government of the new state of Poland to accept a settlement of the Teschen dispute imposed by the Allies. In theory, Austria was made liable for reparations, but no money was ever paid, as once more the Allies were haunted by the specter of Bolshevik Revolution if the population was left destitute.

The drafters of the treaty with Austria had to reconcile impossible objectives. They were caught between the principle of “self-determination of peoples” championed by U.S. president Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924), which sought to redraw the map of Europe along lines of clear nationality, and

the territorial ambitions of the victors, notably Italy. The conferees at Paris had decided on the creation of two new states in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (South Slavia), the territory of which was in large part formed by land taken from the Dual Monarchy. In drawing the frontiers of the new states, where there was no clear line of nationality, the dispute was to be settled in plebiscites. The old Austro-Hungarian monarchy dissolved into Austria and Hungary, but its lands also went to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Italy, Poland, and Romania.

The new Austria constituted the area populated by the German-speaking inhabitants of the prewar Austria-Hungary. Altogether, Austria lost about three-quarters of the former Austrian territory in the Dual Monarchy, excluding Hungarian territory. Except for the confiscation of Germany’s colonies, this was the most severe amputation of territory resulting from the conference.

Romania gained Bukovina, which had been annexed by Austria in 1775 and incorporated into Galicia. The conferees at Paris did not take into account claims on Bukovina by Ukrainians to the north and Romanians to the south.

Italy gained Istria, the Trento, and the whole of Friul, given to Austria in 1815, and it received Trieste on the Dalmatian coast. All of these were Italian-speaking regions. Italy also gained the South Tyrol, promised to it by the secret Treaty of London of 1915, even though this clearly violated the principle of “self-determination

of peoples” given that the area indisputably had a German-speaking population of some 240,000. The South Tyrol included the strategically vital Brenner Pass.

Italy also claimed the port of Fiume (Croat: Rijeka), which was not part of the London agreement. This had been a matter of great dispute at the Paris Peace Conference; indeed, Italian diplomats left the conference for a time over it. No compromise was reached over Fiume, which had been part of the old Kingdom of Hungary.

The region of Galicia, with the old city of Cracow, annexed by Austria after the first Partition of Poland in 1772 and claimed by Polish and Ukrainian nationalists in the nineteenth century, was entrusted to the Allied powers, who eventually (1923) assigned it to Poland over vehement Ukrainian opposition, most notably in the city of Lwow (Ukrainian: Lviv; German: Lemberg).

Czechoslovakia (or Czecho-Slovakia, as it was then often called) did not coincide precisely with the areas peopled by Czechs and Slovaks. Northern Bohemia, where the frontier with Germany was drawn, included a substantial German-speaking minority, the Sudeten Germans. Many had settled in the Kingdom of Bohemia in the seventeenth century, following the Thirty Years’ War. Altogether, an estimated 3.5 million German speakers were included in Czechoslovakia. This infringement of the principle of self-determination had been implemented on French insistence, with the argument that the mountains of the Sudetenland provided the only natural defensive barrier against German invasion. Human geography clearly conflicted with physical geography, but for security reasons, physical considerations prevailed.

The new “Serb-Croat-Slovene State,” which was to become Yugoslavia, was mainly formed from areas taken from

Hungary; however, under the Treaty of Saint-Germain, Austria lost some Dalmatian territory to it. The major bone of contention was over southern Carinthia, the future of which was to be decided by plebiscite. A first plebiscite, in October 1920, favored Austria, and a second was canceled, with the whole area remaining Austrian.

The frontier with Hungary was also complex. Austria gained some territory that had been part of the former Kingdom of Hungary, notably the Burgenland, but Hungary’s protests were partially successful. The Allies accepted that the future of the Burgenland should be decided by a plebiscite, which was held in December 1921 and resulted in the main towns in the east, including Sopron, remaining under Hungarian control, while the rural areas to the west went to Austria.

The major immediate problem, however, was the future of the province of Teschen (Polish: Cieszyn; Czech: Těšín), which formed part of Silesia and had been a Habsburg possession since 1526. It was disputed between the Czechs (it had been part of the Kingdom of Bohemia in 1335) and the Poles (who made up almost 55 percent of the prewar population). The Allied Supreme Council therefore deferred the question for subsequent decision, but due to skirmishes between the two nations in 1919, the council decided to organize a plebiscite. This was never held, as the council, preoccupied over Poland’s difficulties with Bolshevik Russia, imposed a partition in July 1920 that left many Poles in the rich industrial portion given to Czechoslovakia, but no Czechs in the predominantly agrarian area awarded to Poland.

Technically, settlement of the Teschen question was omitted from the Treaty of Saint-Germain. The victors’ embarrassment over this dispute between two important

potential allies against German and Russian expansionism, which prevented them from incorporating the area into the treaty, nonetheless demonstrated the limits on their ability to redefine the map of the old disputed areas in central and eastern Europe so as to reconcile their own stated principle of “self-determination of peoples,” the expectations of the nationalities liberated from the Habsburg yoke, and security considerations, namely the need to contain Bolshevik expansion and prevent a resurgence of German power.

Austria itself was disarmed, with its forces limited to 30,000 armed men. Article 88 of the treaty expressly prohibited union with Germany, which many Austrians favored (the so-called Anschluss), without the unanimous consent of the League of Nations. The Allies had managed to dismember and disarm the former Habsburg Empire, but the Treaty of Saint-Germain probably created at least as many problems as it resolved.

Antoine Capet

See also: Little Entente

Further Reading

Almond, Nina, and Ralph Haswell Lutz, eds. *The Treaty of St. Germain: A Documentary History of Its Territorial and Political Clauses, with a Survey of the Documents of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference*. Hoover War Library Publications, No. 5. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1935.

MacMillan, Margaret. *Paris, 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*. New York: Random House, 2002.

Stadler, Karl. *The Birth of the Austrian Republic, 1918–1921*. Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1966.

Swanson, John C. *The Remnants of the Habsburg Monarchy: The Shaping of Modern*

Austria and Hungary, 1918–1922. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2001.

The Treaties of Peace, 1919–1923. Vol. 1, *Containing the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye and the Treaty of Trianon*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924.

The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria. Together with other Treaties, Agreements, &c., signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 1919; and Declarations, Treaties, and other Documents Relevant Thereto, Signed at Paris, December 5 and 8, 1919, and July 16, 1920, and at Sèvres, August 10, 1920. London: HMSO, 1921.

Sakarya River, Battle of, 1921

Sakarya River was a major battle of the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922, known as *National Struggle* in the Turkish historiography and as *Asia Minor Catastrophe* in the Greek historiography. It was one of the longest battles in the Near East and lasted for about 22 days (August 23–September 13).

The Greeks had undertaken offensive action to eliminate the Turkish nationalist forces in the center of Anatolia. The Greek offensive came to a halt, and Turkish forces took the offensive initiative after this battle. In summer 1921, Greek forces commenced their attack with a great deal of encouragement by the British upon the Ankara government to have the latter recognize the Sèvres treaty of August 1920. Greeks took their offensive positions in the west bank of the Sakarya River against the Turks, who were expecting them in the east bank. Both sides fought fiercely, and during one of the bloodiest moments of the battle, Mustafa Kemal Pasha uttered his famous phrase: “No defense of line, but defense of ground, and that ground is the entire homeland!”

The battle came to end on September 13 with the retreat of Greek forces. The Greeks lost the offensive initiative, and both sides prepared for a final showdown. Eventually in August–September 1922, Turkish forces drove the Greek armies out of Anatolia. Greek- and Turkish-speaking Christians followed them. With the retreat of the Greek army came the end of 4,000 years of Hellenic civilization in Asia Minor.

Bestami S. Bilgic

See also: Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922; Kemal, Mustafa (1881–1938)

Further Reading

Mango, Andrew. *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey*. Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2000.

Pope, Nicole, and Hugh Pope. *Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After*. London: John Murray, 1997.

Salonika

Salonika (Greek: Thessaloníki; Bulgarian: Solun; Turkish: Selânik) is the largest city in the northern Aegean Sea littoral. It is a major port and serves as an outlet for much Balkan commerce. Since ancient times, Salonika has been an important center of urban development in southeastern Europe. It was a significant city in the Roman and Byzantine Empires, falling to the Ottomans in 1430. In modern Balkan history, a number of important events have occurred in and around Salonika.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Salonika was capital of the Ottoman province (vilayet) of Selânik. It had a varied population consisting of Albanians, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Turks, and others. Ladino-speaking Sephardic Jews constituted the largest single group among the city's inhabitants. Geographically often considered

part of Macedonia, Salonika became the object of national aspirations of the emerging Balkan states. The Bulgarian/Macedonian revolutionary organization IMRO (VMRO) was founded in Salonika in 1893 by associates of the local Bulgarian high school. The Committee for Union and Progress (Young Turks), determined to modernize the Ottoman Empire, originated there. One of the most important Young Turks, who went on to establish the modern Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1883–1938), was born in Salonika.

Salonika became the objective of both the Bulgarian and Greek armies during the First Balkan War. The Greeks arrived on November 8, 1912. The Ottoman authorities promptly surrendered to them. The Bulgarians reached Salonika the next day. As no formal agreement existed between the two Balkan allies over the disposal of Ottoman territories, contingents from both armies established an uneasy condominium over the city. The disposition of Salonika became a major point of dispute between the Bulgarians and Greeks. The Bulgarians made strong efforts to attract the Jewish population to their cause. Salonika became a major cause of the outbreak of the Second Balkan War on June 29, 1913. In the ensuing fighting, the Greeks annihilated the isolated Bulgarian military presence in the city and assumed direct control.

During World War I, Salonika, again became a focus of controversy and conflict. At the end of September 1915, a combined Central Powers force of two Austro-Hungarian armies, two Bulgarian armies, and one German army launched an overwhelming attack upon Serbia. The Entente sought a way to send support to beleaguered Serbia. They accepted the invitation of Greek prime minister Eleuthérios Venizélos (1864–1936) to utilize the port of Salonika



Allied troops landing in Salonika from the Dardanelles. After their withdrawal from Serbia, the Allies reinforced the British army fighting in the Balkans under General Sarrail. (Reynolds and Taylor, *Collier's Photographic History of the European War*, 1916)

to land supplies and troops. These would then move up the Vardar River valley to assist the Serbs. Two subsequent events made this impossible. First, Venizélos resigned as prime minister on October 5, 1915. This made the British and French Entente troops, who had begun to arrive that very day, unwanted guests in neutral Greek Salonika. Second, the Bulgarians, moving southwesterly, cut off access to the Serbs. They were forced to retreat across the Albanian Alps to the Adriatic Sea. The Bulgarians then pushed the British and French troops back into Greek territory. Forbidden by the Germans to cross the Greek frontier, the Bulgarians established strong defenses that effectively blockaded the Entente forces in and around Salonika. This

Macedonian Front remained relatively static until the last months of the war.

Venizélos arrived into this uneasy situation in Salonika on October 9, 1916. He then established a pro-Entente provisional Greek government there. This engendered a conflict with the neutralist royal government in Athens that became known as the “National Schism.” Greece remained a divided country until the Entente compelled King Constantine (1868–1923) to abdicate on June 11, 1917, in favor of his son Alexander (1893–1920). The new Greek government subsequently declared war on the Central Powers on June 27, 1917. Greek forces then joined the Entente along the Macedonian Front. Soon after the end of the political crisis, a fire destroyed much of the city on August 18, 1917. Salonika served as the main base for the Entente offensive that broke through the Macedonian Front at Dobro Pole in September 1918 and brought about the end of World War I in southeastern Europe. After the failure of Greece’s Anatolian venture, many Greek-speaking refugees from Anatolia and Thrace flooded into Salonika.

During World War II, German forces occupied Salonika, while Bulgarians took control of most of the hinterland. In March 1943, the Germans began to deport the Jewish population of Salonika to Auschwitz. Bulgarian troops assisted with collecting Jews in the hinterland. The Germans sent 45,000 to the death camps. Slightly over 1,000 returned at the end of the war.

The Greek Civil War caused more refugees to seek shelter in Salonika. The Communist rebels were active in the areas to the north of the city. The situation finally stabilized in 1949 with the defeat of the Communists. The victorious royal government often conflated the Communists with the Slavic Bulgarian and Macedonian peoples to the north. This led to efforts to Hellenize the

Slavic populations of northern Greece. After the collapse of Yugoslavia and the proclamation of Macedonian independence on September 8, 1991, the Greek government adopted a hostile attitude toward the new state. In part this was based upon concerns that the Macedonian government harbored claims to the Greek part of historic Macedonia and the city of Salonika. While the Macedonian government in Skoplje had raised no such claims, as of this writing, relations between the two states remained remote.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Constantine I, King of Greece (1868–1923); Greece in the Balkan Wars; Greek Civil War; Holocaust in the Balkans; Macedonian Front, 1916–1918; National Schism (Greece), 1916–1917; Venizélos, Eleuthérios (1864–1936); VMRO; Young Turks

Further Reading

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Palmer, Alan. *The Gardeners of Salonika*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.

Mazower, Mark. *Salonika, City of Ghosts*. New York: Vintage, 2006.

Stavrianos, L. S. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958.

San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878

The Treaty of San Stefano ended the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. Signed on March 3, 1878, the treaty was highly favorable to Russia. It called for the creation of the autonomous principality of Bulgaria, whose territory would extend from the Danube River to the Aegean Sea. Under Article 7, a prince elected by the people but approved by the sultan would rule over

Bulgaria, while Article 8 called for the Ottoman evacuation of Bulgaria and deployment of Russian forces for two years. Russia also compelled Turks to cede territory to Montenegro and recognize its independence. Serbia received the cities of Niš and Leskovac and was granted independence as well. The Porte was also forced to grant autonomy to Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austrian and Russian supervision and to recognize the independence of Romania. In the Caucasus, the Ottoman Empire lost Ardahan, Artvin, Batum, Kars, Olti, and Beyazit to Russia. The Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were declared open to all neutral ships in war and peacetime (Article 24).

The treaty, so advantageous to Russia, was rejected by the Great Powers, notably Austria and Britain, who were concerned about the spread of Russian authority into the Balkan Peninsula mainly through the establishment of a large Bulgaria. The other Balkan states also resented the creation of a large Bulgaria in their midst. As tensions between the Great Powers escalated, the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) negotiated a new agreement at the Congress of Berlin in June 1878 that was far less generous to the Russians. Most profoundly affected by the abrogation of the San Stefano treaty were Bulgarian nationalists. They had seen their maximum claims for a Bulgarian state realized at San Stefano, only to suffer extreme disappointment at Berlin. The Berlin agreement trisected their national state. In its stead was an autonomous Bulgarian principality, a self-governing Ottoman province, Eastern Rumelia, under a Christian governor. The remainder of San Stefano Bulgaria, Macedonia, returned to direct Ottoman rule. Thereafter, every Bulgarian government adopted policies designed to realize the reestablishment of the San Stefano frontiers.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Berlin, Treaty of, 1878

Further Reading

Crampton, R. J. *Bulgaria 1878–1918*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1983.

Gleeny, Misha. *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804–1999*. New York: Viking, 1999.

Macfie, A. L. *The Eastern Question 1774–1923*. London: Longman, 1989.

Sarajevo, Siege of, 1992–1995

The siege of Sarajevo, a city in Bosnia, began in April 1992, as the Yugoslav army sought to prevent the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Though Sarajevo was only one of many Yugoslavian cities to be destroyed during that country's dismemberment, the siege was tragic because of the dedication its population had once shown to peaceful coexistence and because of the heroic defense that its citizens maintained.

The breakup of Yugoslavia began with declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. Elections held in Bosnia in December 1990 had resulted in the three national communities (Serb, Croat, and Bosniak Muslim) gaining seats in rough proportion to their populations. In a referendum on independence held in early 1992, nearly two-thirds of the Bosnia electorate cast a vote; almost all voted for independence.

After Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence in March 1992, a new, smaller Yugoslavia was formed consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. The Yugoslav army, supported by militias of Bosnia Serbs, began to move into position around the city of Sarajevo. When Bosnia's independence was recognized by the United States and the European Community on April 6, Serb

paramilitary forces immediately began firing on Sarajevo, and the bombardment of the city by heavy artillery began soon thereafter.

Thousands of people were killed and wounded and many buildings were destroyed. The Serbs deliberately attacked monuments and institutions associated with the Muslim culture. Thus they shelled and burned to the ground the university library containing thousands of irreplaceable manuscripts and gutted mosques and other cultural centers. The animals of the Sarajevo Zoo starved to death.

In June 1992, UN peacekeeping forces arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but their presence did not halt the fighting. The people of Sarajevo showed amazing courage during the siege, which continued for nearly two more years until it was formally ended by the Serbs in February 1994. In spite of the Serbs' public announcement that the siege was over, attacks on Sarajevo continued through 1995. In August 1995, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declared that if the Serbs did not halt their attacks on Sarajevo and other UN-protected areas, Bosnian Serb positions would be attacked by NATO forces. When Serb forces kept up their artillery shelling of the city, NATO planes bombed the Serbians. The NATO bombing halted in September, when Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed to a peace plan, the Dayton Agreement (1995), which was signed in December in Dayton, Ohio.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bosnian War, 1992–1995; Srebrenica Massacre, 1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995

Further Reading

Di Giovanni, Janine. *The Quick and the Dead: Under Siege in Sarajevo*. London: Phoenix House, 1995.

Filipović, Zlata. *Zlata's Diary: A Child's Life in Wartime Sarajevo*. New York: Penguin, 2006.

Gjeltén, Tom. *Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspaper under Siege*. New York: HarperCollins, 1995.

Macek, Ivana. *War Within: Everyday Life in Sarajevo under Siege*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.

Sarajevo Assassination, 1914

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (1863–1914) on June 28, 1914, was the spark that eventually set off World War I. Franz Ferdinand was disliked by many in the Austrian government, but they were quick to exploit his death to try to defuse a situation that threatened to dismember the empire. The Austrians' failure to do so without a war resulted in the destruction of the empire they attempted to save.

Franz Ferdinand became heir to the Habsburg throne through a number of tragedies that eliminated other members of the family. He was not trained as a ruler but, like other archdukes, had a military background. He was married to Countess Sophie Chotek (1868–1914), who was not sufficiently royal to be married to a Habsburg. She was forced to accept a lower station at all official functions in Austria. Franz Ferdinand was a devoted husband and father, although that side of his personality was largely hidden from the public.

Franz Ferdinand prepared to succeed his uncle Franz Joseph I (1830–1916) by studying the Austro-Hungarian Empire's problems. He recognized the growing disaffection of the Slavic minorities in the southern part of the empire and the dangers posed by Magyar obstruction in the Hungarian part of the empire. Since he did not come to power, what his actual policies would have been are not known.

Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie Chotek (1868–1914) attended army maneuvers in Bosnia and Herzegovina in June 1914. Their visit to Sarajevo during that trip was highly publicized, and Franz Ferdinand was targeted for assassination by members of the Black Hand organization, a terrorist group composed of radical Serb nationalists. Black Hand members—led by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević (1876–1917), also known as Apis—were pledged to destabilize the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire in order to incorporate their Serb population into a greater Serbia. Members had brutally murdered the reigning king of Serbia in 1903. Franz Ferdinand posed a threat to the Black Hand, since his goal of strengthening the Austro-Hungarian Empire was contrary to the Serbs' desires. An international crisis would also help Apis in his battle against the existing Serbian government for control of Serbia.

A group of youthful revolutionaries from Bosnia were armed and trained by the Black Hand and then sent to Sarajevo. They lined the parade route used by Franz Ferdinand and his wife. On the morning of June 28, 1914, one conspirator threw his bomb at their car, but it bounced off and exploded near another car. The motorcade continued to city hall, where the group had lunch. During the return trip, Franz Ferdinand wanted to visit the wounded in the hospital, but the drivers were confused about the route. When the archduke's car turned the wrong way, it was right in front of Gavrilo Princip, another conspirator. He shot Franz Ferdinand and Sophie, and they both died soon afterward.

The Austrian government used the death of Franz Ferdinand as an excuse to send an ultimatum to Serbia, designed to cripple that state's ability to cause trouble. When the Serbs refused to comply, Austria



The suspected assassin of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Gavrilo Princip, is hustled into custody in Sarajevo in 1914. (The Illustrated London News Picture Library)

declared war. Both countries called on their allies for help, which led to the outbreak of World War I as Russia intervened on behalf of Serbia and Germany assisted Austria. Eventually, most of the world's major powers became embroiled in the war due to further webs of alliance. Princip was captured and imprisoned during the war, and the Black Hand was destroyed when Dimitrijević was shot on trumped-up charges.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I; Black Hand; Dimitrijević, Dragutin (1876–1917); Princip, Gavrilo (1894–1918)

Further Reading

Brook-Shepherd, Gordon. *Archduke of Sarajevo: The Romance and Tragedy of Franz Ferdinand of Austria*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1984.

Cassels, Lavender. *The Archduke and the Assassin: Sarajevo, June 28th 1914*. New York: Stein and Day, 1985.

Feuerlicht, Roberta Strauss. *The Desperate Act: The Assassination of Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.

Sarkoy and Bolayir, Battles of, 1913

Sarkoy (Şarköy; Sarkoi) and Bolayir (Bolayır; Bulair) were two battles in the First Balkan War between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. The unexpected and humiliating defeats suffered at the hands of Balkan nations turned the politics of the empire upside down. The disillusioned officer members of Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) under the leadership Lieutenant Colonel Enver Pasha (1881–1922) launched a raid, the so-called Raid on the Sublime Porte of January 23, 1913, into the offices of the prime ministry and forced the government to resign. The new grand vizier and minister of war, Mahmud Şevket

Pasha (1856–1913), increased the efficiency and influence of the military by immediately assigning capable young officers to the nerve centers of the large army staffs.

In addition to the coup d'état, the armistice between December 3, 1912, and February 3, 1913, gave the Ottoman military much needed rest and recovery time. All available resources were mobilized, and training became the main activity. The arrival of fresh troops, ever increasing public support, and the reverses of the Bulgarians in front of the Chataldzha (Çatalca) Line as well as the heroic defenses of Edirne (Adrianople), Yanya (Janina) and İşkodra (Scutari) increased morale and confidence. Even the enormous toll of the epidemics, including typhus and cholera, did not affect the positive atmosphere.

The Ottoman General Staff took the initiative and displayed its offensive tendency by planning the Sarkoy amphibious operation against the Fourth Bulgarian Army in an attempt to save Edirne by hitting the concentrated Bulgarian forces in front of Chataldzha from behind. The plan was not only ambitious and innovative, but it also demonstrated state-of-the-art staff work involving the technical details of a combined army and navy operation. Regrettably, a series of unfortunate incidents and developments like weather, technical failures, and communication and coordination problems handicapped the operation. The Bulgarians offered determined resistance to both operations. The first leg of the operation, the frontal assault of the Müretteb (provisional) Corps on the neck of the Gallipoli Peninsula, died under the fire of well-entrenched Bulgarian infantry supported by massive coordinated artillery and machine gun fire on February 8, 1913.

Nevertheless, the Sarkoy amphibious landing succeeded in establishing beachheads against which recently reinforced

Bulgarian divisions launched uncoordinated but effective assaults forcing termination of the operation two days later on February 10. The Ottoman units managed to break off contact and embark on ships with light casualties, showing a rare combination of leadership, discipline and courage.

Meanwhile at Bolayir on the Gallipoli Peninsula, a strong Ottoman force attacked the Bulgarians of the Seventh Rila Division. The heavily outnumbered Bulgarians repulsed repeated Ottoman attempts to drive them off the peninsula. The Ottomans suffered huge losses. Among the Ottoman officers participating in the Bulair operation was Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938), who would distinguish himself two years later in the same location fighting in the opposite direction.

Mesut Uyar

See also: Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Chataldzha, Battle of, 1912; Enver Pasha (1882–1922); Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

- Erickson, Edward J. *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.
- Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Hikmet, Süer, *TSK Tarihi Balkan Harbi (1912–1913): Şark Ordusu İkinci Çatalca Muharebesi ve Şarköy Çıkarması*. Vol. 2, section 2, book 2, 2nd printing. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1993.
- Hüsni, Ersü. *1912–1913 Balkan Harbinde Şarköy Çıkarması ve Bulayır Muharebeleri*. Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1938.

Savov, Mihail (1857–1928)

Bulgarian lieutenant general Mihail Savov was born on November 14, 1857, in Stara

Zagora. He was educated in Constantinople, Sofia, and at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy in St. Petersburg. After the establishment of the Bulgarian principality in 1878, he served in the Eastern Rumelian forces.

Following the unification of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia in 1885, Savov began Bulgarian service. That same year, he fought in the 1885 Bulgarian-Serbian war as a captain. He distinguished himself in the Battle of Slivnitsa. After the war he rose rapidly in the military establishment. In 1887, he was adjutant to the newly enthroned Prince Ferdinand. From 1891 to 1894 and again from 1903 to 1907, he served as minister of war. Allegations of corruption resulted in him leaving the army in 1908. Nevertheless he was appointed deputy commander in chief of the Bulgarian army at the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1912.

In this capacity, Savov directed the army for Czar Ferdinand, the constitutional commander in chief. He made two controversial decisions. On November 16, 1912, he ordered the exhausted and overextended Bulgarian forces to assault the Ottoman defensive lines at Chataldzha, 20 miles outside Constantinople. The attack failed with heavy losses. Then on the night of June 29–30, on the authority of Czar Ferdinand, he ordered local attacks on Serbian troops in Macedonia. These, and attacks on Greek troops, began the Second Balkan War.

The Bulgarian government sacked Savov for this order. He subsequently commanded the Bulgarian Fourth and Fifth Armies on the southern front. Because of his notoriety, he did not obtain another command. He reluctantly sat out World War I in France and then Austria. After the war, he served as Bulgarian minister to France from 1920 to 1923. He died there in Saint-Vallier-de-

Thiery on August 19, 1928, and was subsequently buried in Sofia.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan War, Second, 1913; Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars; Chataldzha, Battle of, 1912; Kalimantsi, Battle of, 1913

Further Reading

Azimov, Dimităr. *Bŭlgarski visshi voenachal-nitsi prez Balkanskata i Pŭrvata svetovna voina*. Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 2000.

Nedev, Svetozar. *Komandvatneto na Bŭlgarskata voinska prez voinite za natsionalno obedinenie 1885, 1912, 1913, 1915, 1918*. Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1993.

Scutari, Siege of, 1912–1913

The siege of Scutari (Albanian: Shkodër; Serb: Skadar; Turkish: İşkodra) was a prolonged engagement during the First Balkan War, 1912–1913, between besieging Montenegrin and Serbian forces and Ottoman forces within the city of Scutari. Scutari was the fortified seat of the Ottoman vilayet of the same name. The population of the city and the hinterland was overwhelmingly Albanian. Scutari was the northern counterpart of Janina, a fortified city on a lake. Lake Scutari lay to the northwest of the city. Scutari was also the main objective of the Montenegrin army during the First Balkan War. Control of Scutari would give the Montenegrins a dominant position in northern Albania. At the beginning of the war, the Scutari Corps of around 13,600 men under the leadership of Hasan Riza Bey commanded the Ottoman forces.

Beginning on October 9, 1912, two Montenegrin forces advanced on Scutari. The 15,000-man Zeta Division, under the command of Crown Prince Danilo (1871–1939),

moved around the eastern shore of Lake Scutari. The 8,000 soldiers of the Coastal Division, led by Brigadier Mitar Martinović (1870–1954), moved along the western shore of the lake. The Zeta Division attacked the Ottoman fortifications on October 24 and again on October 28 with no success. A significant problem was the failure of the Coastal Division to participate in the attacks. The Montenegrins then settled into a siege.

On November 18, the Serbian Third Army reached the Adriatic Sea at Alessio (Albanian: Lezhë; Serb: Lješ). They then assisted their Montenegrin allies around Scutari with troops and artillery. During the armistice, Scutari remained quiet. During this time, on January 30, 1913, the Ottoman commander Hasan Riza Bey (1871–1913), was murdered in mysterious circumstances. Esat Pasha Toptani (1863–1920), an Albanian nationalist, succeeded him. Soon after the end of the armistice, the Montenegrins and Serbs undertook an assault on the Ottoman positions. During the fighting, from February 6 to February 9, 1913, they failed to make significant gains. In the wake of the defeat, the Serbs sent additional troops and artillery to Scutari. Another attack on 30–31 March 30–31 failed.

Meanwhile in London, the Austro-Hungarians and Italians had insisted that Scutari become a part of the newly independent Albanian state. The other Great Powers agreed. A Great Power fleet including Austro-Hungarian, British, French, German, and Italian vessels arrived on April 2 off the short Montenegrin coast to enforce this decision. The Serbs withdrew their forces eight days later. By this time, however, the Ottomans were exhausted. After three days of negotiations, the Ottoman commander Esat Pasha Toptani then surrendered to the Montenegrins on April 22. The Montenegrins entered the city on April 24, only to

leave under Great Power pressure on May 5. The Montenegrins occupied the city for less than two weeks. With the fall of Scutari, fighting in the First Balkan War was concluded.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Albania in the Balkan Wars; Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Montenegro in the Balkan Wars; Serbia in the Balkan Wars

Further Reading

Durham, M. Edith. *The Struggle for Scutari (Turk, Slav, Albanian)*. London: Edward Arnold, 1914.

Erickson, Edward J. *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913*. Westport, CT: 2003.

Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Selim III (1761–1808)

Ottoman sultan Selim III, the son of Mustafa III (1717–1774), was born in Constantinople on December 24, 1761. He ascended to the Ottoman throne on April 7, 1789. As a crown prince, he enjoyed unconventional freedom and a distinctive education, and it is likely that his acquaintance with the world around the Ottoman Empire and his future political agenda (the *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* or “New Order”) were the product of these formative years.

Selim’s enthronement coincided with the war of 1788–1792 against the Habsburg-Russian coalition. However, the war did not prevent Selim from putting his political agenda into action. On the contrary, the disastrous defeats suffered by the Ottomans, especially at the hands of the Russian army, were frequently referenced in the contemporary Ottoman political literature as a means

of legitimizing the New Order. The ultimate aim of the New Order was the creation of a centralized and well-disciplined army, which was expected not only to return the Ottomans to their glory days of old, but also to bring the unruly governors into line.

To achieve this goal, Selim III, initially only in the capital, formed New Order regiments that were drilled by the European noncommissioned officers as well as establishing the first modern military school, the Imperial School of Military Engineering. For efficiency's sake, these regiments were to be set up in Anatolia through the local magnates called *a'yâns*. The increase in the number of the troops, however, created problems that could not be solved by the existing Ottoman economic system. The foundation of the new treasuries, like the so called New Revenue, the Grain Treasury and the Shipyard Treasury, to finance the central army and navy resulted in devaluation and the deterioration of buying power.

Besides the economic problems, the establishment of a rival army to the Janissaries was another source of disturbance. Catastrophic developments in the Ottoman diplomacy further aggravated Selim's situation. In 1798, the unexpected invasion of Egypt by France, the traditional ally of the empire, pushed the Porte to ally with Russia and Britain. This impossible alliance between London, St. Petersburg, and Istanbul did not last long, however, with the Russian invasion of the principalities of Walachia and Moldavia in 1806 and the British expedition to Istanbul and Egypt in 1807 ultimately determining the fate of Selim III and his advisers.

A rebellion in the capital led by the artisans and the Janissaries in May 1807 resulted in the overthrow of the sultan and his advisers, who were declared as being responsible for the financial and diplomatic instability. After his overthrow, Selim III,

an accomplished poet and a master composer of classical Ottoman music, turned to his personal interests. There was, however, one final attempt to restore Selim III to the throne, led by Alemdar Mustafa Pasha (1765–1808), a powerful *a'yân* and future grand vizier who provided a safe haven for the surviving advisers of the former sultan. But with his rescuers at the very gate of the palace on July 28, 1808, Selim was condemned to death by the order of Mustafa IV (1779–1808), who soon afterward was deposed in his turn by his successor Mahmud II (1789–1839).

Fatih Yeşil

See also: Russo-Ottoman War, 1806–1812; Serbian War of Independence, 1804–1817

Further Reading

Cleveland, William. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013.

Shaw, Stanford J. *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789–1807*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Shaw, Stanford J. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 1, *The Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280–1808*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Serbia, Invasions of, 1914

The Austro-Hungarians followed their declaration of war upon Serbia on July 28, 1914, with what would be the first of three attempts in 1914 to overrun the country they deemed responsible for the Sarajevo assassination. The initial invasion began on August 12, 1914.

Austro-Hungarian forces numbering around 460,000 men were led by General Oskar Potiorek (1853–1933), the official

who had bungled the security arrangements for Franz Ferdinand (1863–1914) in Sarajevo. Serbian troops, numbering 400,000, were battle hardened by their experiences in the two Balkan Wars and were motivated by defending their homeland. Their commander was the veteran field marshal (*Vojvoda*) Radomir Putnik (1847–1917), who had led the Serbs to victory in the Balkan Wars.

Austro-Hungarian troops crossed the Sava River at Šabac and Drina River from eastern Bosnia and advanced toward a ridge north of the Jadar River called Mount Cer. There on August 16, the Serbs counterattacked and, in a four-day battle, drove the Austro-Hungarians back to their own territories. They had all left Serbia by August 24. The Battle of Mt. Cer was the first Entente victory of World War I. Buoyed by their success, the Serbs briefly invaded Bosnia, only to be forced back by logistical difficulties and spirited Austro-Hungarian resistance.

Potiorek attempted a second invasion across the Drina on September 8, 1914. After fierce fighting and heavy losses on both sides, the Austro-Hungarians managed to secure a foothold on Serbian territory. The campaign then stagnated into trench warfare. With the Austro-Hungarians taking huge casualties on the Eastern Front against the Russians and the Serbs still rebuilding after the Balkan Wars, neither could gather the resources to break the stalemate.

Potiorek launched his third invasion of Serbia on November 5, 1914. Austro-Hungarian troops thrust across the Drina toward the town of Valjevo. This forced the Serbian army to evacuate both Valjevo and Belgrade. The government had already left Belgrade and established itself to the south at Niš at the beginning of the war. Austro-Hungarian troops entered Valjevo on November 15 and Belgrade on November 30.

Putnik rallied his forces for a counterattack on December 3 along the Kolubara River. The overextended Austro-Hungarians collapsed. Most of their units retreated north towards the Sava. The Serbs reentered Belgrade on December 15 in triumph. By that time, all of the Austro-Hungarians had returned to their own territory.

In 1914, the Serbs achieved three great victories against the Austro-Hungarians. These came at a heavy cost. The Serbs lost 22,000 dead, 91,000 wounded, and 19,000 missing. The Austro-Hungarian invaders also paid a heavy price for their failures. They lost 28,000 dead and 122,000 wounded. Both sides realized at the end of 1914 that the war was far from over.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I; Putnik, Radomir (1847–1917); Serbia, Invasion of, 1915; Serbia in World War I

Further Reading

- Fryer, C. E. J. *The Destruction of Serbia in 1915*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1997.
- Mitrović, Andrej. *Serbia's Great War, 1914–1918*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007.
- Petrovich, Michael Boro. *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804–1918*. Vol. 1. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.

Serbia, Invasions of, 1915

The fighting between Austria-Hungary and Serbia in 1914 had left both sides exhausted. At the beginning of 1915, neither Austria-Hungary nor Serbia was capable of further offensive action. By this time, the Austro-Hungarians were heavily engaged on the Eastern Front attempting to contain a

Russian advance. The Serbs, although victorious against the three Austro-Hungarian invasions of the autumn of 1914, had yet to recover from the human and material losses incurred during the Balkan Wars. By the beginning of 1915, they were experiencing a logistical crisis. Also, epidemic diseases like cholera and typhus plagued the entire country. Even so, they expanded the war and stretched their limited resources further. With the collapse of order in Albania after the withdrawal of William of Wied (1876–1945) from the country in September 1914, the Serbs increased their presence in the north of the country.

During the spring and summer of 1915, other countries became involved in the Austro-Serb conflict. In order to aid their Austro-Hungarian ally and to establish a land connection to their Ottoman ally the Germans decided to intervene. To do this, they approached Bulgaria and offered Macedonia, which the Serbs had taken during the Balkan Wars. On September 6, 1915, the Bulgarians signed an alliance agreement that obligated them to participate in an attack on Serbia, together with Austria-Hungary and Germany. On October 6, 1915, one Austro-Hungarian and one German army crossed the Danube and the Sava Rivers to invade Serbia. Two Bulgarian armies seeking revenge for the loss of the Second Balkan War advanced into Serbia from the east on October 14.

At the beginning of 1915, the British and French sought a means to increase logistical support to the Serbs. While they approached Bulgaria seeking a conduit to Serbia and an ally against the Ottoman Empire, they could not provide sufficient incentive for Bulgaria to join the Entente. Serbia refused to part with Bulgaria's main objective, Macedonia. The Central Powers, however, could offer Bulgaria the immediate occupation of

Macedonia. The Entente could not. The most direct route to the Serbs, however, went through the Greek port of Salonika and up the Vardar River valley. On invitation of the Greek prime minister Eleuthérios Venizélos (1864–1936), British and French troops began to arrive in Salonika on October 7, 1915. Meanwhile, the Venizelos government fell, rendering the Entente arrival unwelcome.

Nevertheless, British and French units moved up the Vardar in an attempt to aid the beleaguered Serbs. The invasions from the north and east forced the Serbian army into the southwestern part of the country. The Bulgarians entered Skopje on October 22. They blocked the Entente forces and forced them back down the Vardar valley and into Greek territory. With Austro-Hungarian and German pressure easing from the north due to logistical difficulties, the Serbs attempted to make a stand against the Bulgarians on the historic battlefield of Kosovo Polje, but were unable to withstand the Bulgarians. After their defeat at Kosovo Polje, the remnants of the Serbian army crossed over the frontier into Albania to seek help from the Entente in Adriatic ports.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I; Bulgaria in World War I; Putnik, Radomir (1847–1917); Serbia, Invasions of, 1914; Serbia in World War I

Further Reading

Fryer, C. E. J. *The Destruction of Serbia in 1915*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1997.

Mitrović, Andrej. *Serbia's Great War, 1914–1918*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007.

Petrovich, Michael Boro. *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804–1918*. Vol. 1. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.

Serbia and the Balkan Wars

The origins of Serbian participation in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 lie in the Berlin settlement of 1878. In the Berlin settlement, the Great Powers recognized Serbian independence from the Ottoman Empire and granted to Serbia Ottoman territory around the city of Niš. Nevertheless, for many nationalist Serbs, the settlement was a disappointment. The Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the sanjak of Novi Pazar blocked Serbian expectations of expansion to the Adriatic Sea. The continued Ottoman presence in Kosovo and Macedonia thwarted Serbian hopes of obtaining these regions. After 1878, because Ottoman rule was considerably weaker than Austro-Hungarian occupation, Serbian nationalist hopes focused on Kosovo and Macedonia. Serbia's only nationalist rival for Kosovo was tiny Montenegro. In Macedonia, however, Bulgarian and Greek national aspirations conflicted with those of the Serbs. Attempts by the Balkan states to create an alliance directed against the Ottomans foundered on the problem of Macedonia.

Russian military defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and diplomatic defeat in the Bosnian Crisis in 1908 caused the St. Petersburg government to urge in Belgrade and Sofia the conclusion of a Balkan Alliance. This coincided with the realization of governments of the two Balkan states that they had to cooperate for any chance of success against the Ottomans. Consequently, Bulgaria and Serbia signed a treaty of alliance on March 13, 1912, in Sofia. According to a secret part of the treaty, in the event of any division of Ottoman territory, the Bulgarians were to obtain Thrace, the Serbs northern Albania. Macedonia was to be

divided into a Bulgarian zone and a contested zone, whose disposition would be left to the Russian tsar to arbitrate. Further arrangements between Bulgaria and Serbia provided for Serbian troops to operate in Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania and Bulgarian soldiers to move into Thrace. The Serbs then signed a treaty of alliance with Montenegro in Lucerne Switzerland on September 27, 1912. No formal written arrangement existed between Serbia and Greece.

The mobilized strength of the Serbian army was 230,000 men, organized into 10 infantry divisions and one cavalry division. In preparation for war, the Serbs divided their forces into four groups. The Serbian First Army was concentrated in southern Serbia. This force and the Serbian Second Army, located in western Bulgaria, were to march into Macedonia from the north and east, respectively. The Serbian Third Army was poised to march into Kosovo from western Serbia. Two smaller detachments, the Ibor Army and the Javor Brigade were in northwestern Serbia positioned to invade the sanjak of Novi Pazar. The chief of staff of the Serbian forces was General Radomir Putnik (1847–1917).

The Serbian First Army invaded Ottoman territory on October 19. On October 23, the Ottoman Vardar Army attacked the Serbs at Kumanovo. The resulting battle ended after two days in a Serbian victory. This was the largest Serbian battle of the First Balkan War. Because of this success, General Putnik received the title *Vojvoda* (field marshal). After taking Skoplje without any opposition, the victorious Serbs pursued the Ottomans down the Vardar valley. They smashed the Ottomans again at Prilep and at Bitola (Monastir). With the fall of Bitola on November 19, most of Macedonia was in Serbian hands.



Serbian soldiers inspect a row of cannons during the Balkan Wars, October 1912. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Meanwhile at the end of October, the Serbian Second Army, after having advanced into southeastern Macedonia, prepared to travel to Thrace to assist the Bulgarian Second Army with the siege of Adrianople. In the northwest, the detachments waited until the Belgrade government determined that the Austro-Hungarians would not oppose the Serbian occupation of the sanjak of Novi Pazar. When this became clear, the Serbian forces seized the sanjak.

The Serbian Third Army invaded Kosovo, where it met only light resistance mainly from Albanian irregulars. Having passed through the site of the historic 1389 battle, the Serbian Third Army proceeded on into northern Albania. Advance units of the Third Army reached the Adriatic at Leshë (Lesh) (Alessio) on November 17 and Durrës (Durazzo) on November 28. They linked up with Montenegrin forces besieging Scutari

(Shkodër). As the Serbs advanced, an Albanian council in Vlorë (Valona) proclaimed Albanian independence on November 28. The Serbian presence in Albania provoked immediate Austro-Hungarian and Italian opposition. Both powers saw it as a challenge to their control of the Adriatic and the new state of Albania.

By the time of the signing of the armistice on December 3, the Serbs gained all their initial objectives. They also had rendered aid to their Bulgarian and Montenegrin allies. Austro-Hungarian opposition to the Serbian presence in Albania made it problematic and increased Serbian determination to retain its conquests in Macedonia. On January 13, 1913, the Belgrade government formally requested in Sofia revision of the March 1912 treaty. The Bulgarians ignored this request.

After the renewal of the war on January 30, 1913, Serbian forces were in action

around Adrianople and Scutari. The Serbian Second Army participated in the final assault on the Ottoman fortress on March 26. At Scutari, the Serbs responded to a Montenegrin request for additional troops by sending around 30,000 additional soldiers. The Ottoman defenders continued to thwart all Montenegrin and Serbian attacks. Because of Great Power pressure, the Serbs withdrew their troops from Scutari on April 10. Some Serbian forces remained in northern Albania, however.

By this time, the dispute with Bulgaria was becoming serious. The Serbian confluence of interest with Greece was increasingly obvious. The Bulgarians and Greeks had not concluded any formal agreement over the division of Ottoman territory, mainly because the Bulgarians expected that their army would take all the territory they wanted without any need to make concessions to their ally. On May 5, 1913, the Greeks and Serbs concluded an alliance directed against Bulgaria. In this arrangement, they divided Macedonia between them. In a subsequent agreement later that month, they also divided Albania into zones of influence.

On May 26, 1913, the Serbs again requested a revision of the March 1912 treaty. Again, the Bulgarians refused. They relied upon Russian support. When the Treaty of London ending the Balkan War was signed on May 30, both sides were preparing for renewed conflict. The Russians vacillated on the issue of arbitration. Before the Russian czar could exercise his arbitration powers, Bulgarian troops attacked Greek and Serbian positions in Macedonia on the night of June 29–30, sparking the Second Balkan War.

The Serbs responded immediately with vigorous counterattacks against their erstwhile allies. They fielded around

300,000 soldiers under the command of *Vojvoda* Putnik. The Serbs lined up along the Bulgarian frontier, with the First and Third Armies in Macedonia. A Montenegrin division joined the Serbs. Almost 50,000 Serbian troops remained in and around Albania. The Serbs achieved success at the battle of Bregalnitsa in southeastern Macedonia. They forced the Bulgarians to retreat toward their old frontiers. By mid-July, Serbian pressure had forced the Bulgarians back to the old frontiers all along the line. On July 18, however, Serbian attacks failed against the Bulgarian defenders at Kalimantsi. This had little effect on the outcome of the war. When the Ottomans and Romanians intervened in the war against Bulgaria, the Bulgarians had to request an armistice. Initial talks began at Niš on July 20 and soon moved to Bucharest.

The Treaty of Bucharest, signed on August 10, confirmed the Serbian success in the Balkan Wars. Serbia obtained Kosovo and both zones of Macedonia as delineated in the March 1912 treaty. They also divided the sanjak of Novi Pazar with Montenegro. Their defeat of Bulgaria gave the Serbs a strong position in southeastern Europe. It also established Serbia as the dominant Serb state in its rivalry with Montenegro, which became a Serbian satellite. It bestowed tremendous prestige for Serbia among the South Slavic peoples of the Habsburg Empire. Finally this victory left Serbia as Russia's only viable ally in the Balkans.

The Serbian victory, however, came at a heavy cost. Serbian casualties for the Balkan Wars were at least 36,550 dead and 55,000, although they may have been somewhat higher. The intense fighting against the Bulgarians in the Second Balkan War probably accounted for heavier losses than the fighting against the Ottomans in the First Balkan War. Also, Serbian troops returning from Balkan battlefields brought home with

them epidemic diseases such as cholera, which would spread among the civilian population.

The Treaty of Bucharest did not end the fighting in southeastern Europe for the Serbs. Serbian troops continued to be active in northern Albania. This aggrieved the Austro-Hungarians, who presented an ultimatum in Belgrade on October 18, 1913, demanding that the Serbs evacuate northern Albania. The Serbian government agreed to comply with this demand. Nevertheless, Serbian troops lingered in northeastern Albania. Friction between Belgrade and Vienna increased. The political and territorial gains incurred in these wars increased the appetites of Serb nationalists for further expansion at the expense of the Habsburg Empire and increased Austro-Hungarian suspicions of their Balkan neighbor.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan League, 1912; Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Balkan War, Second, 1913; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Consequences; Kalimantsi, Battle of, 1913; Kumanovo, Battle of, 1912

Further Reading

Hall, Richard C. *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1996.

Helmreich, E. C. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938.

Jowett, Philip S. *Armies of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Oxford: Osprey, 2011.

Petrovich, Michael Boro. *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804–1914*. Vol. 2. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.


Serbia in World War I

On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, beginning what some have

called the Third Balkan War and leading directly into World War I. Austro-Hungarian antagonism toward Serbia had been building since 1903 when a disgruntled group of Serbian army officers and political figures assassinated King Alexander I Obrenović (1876–1903) and replaced him with Peter I (1844–1921) of the rival Karageorgević family. Alexander had pursued policies of friendship toward Austria; Peter, and especially his powerful prime minister, Nicola Pašić (1845–1926), did not.

In 1908, this dislike grew into hostility when Austria-Hungary annexed the province of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which the Austrians had occupied since 1878. Bosnia-Herzegovina had a large Serbian population, and many Serbs regarded it as belonging to a greater Serbian polity. The Serbian government and people reacted strongly against the annexation, and protests continued for some time. The annexation grew into a diplomatic crisis, resolved only when the Serb ally, Russia—faced with threats from Germany—advised the Serbs to temper their protests.

Following this disappointment, Serbia focused its attention southeastward. In 1912, a coalition of Serbian, Montenegrin, Greek, and Bulgarian forces attacked the Ottoman Empire and defeated its forces in the First Balkan War. In a dispute over the spoils, Bulgaria attacked Serbia in 1913 and suffered defeat in the Second Balkan War. Both wars brought considerable gains for Serbia, increasing its land area by 79 percent and its population by 55 percent. However, they also resulted in 30,000 soldiers killed and 45,000 wounded and absorbed considerable quantities of supplies and ammunition that the Serbs needed in 1914. Perhaps most important, while the two Balkan wars gave the Serbian government and people considerable confidence and pride, they also



increased Austrian suspicion and resentment toward Serbia, with one Austrian officer terming the Serbian capital “a nest of vipers.”

When Archduke Franz Ferdinand (1863–1914) fell victim to assassination in Sarajevo, the Austrian government assumed that the Serbian government was behind it. This assumption led to the July Crisis of 1914, the ultimatum of July 23, and the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia on July 28. The debate about the role of the Serbian government in the assassination is ongoing, but the evidence indicates that whereas the young conspirators gained weapons and training from Serbian official sources, the government itself played no role in instigating the murder and had even warned the Austrian government that an attempt might be made on the archduke’s life.

In fall 1914, the Serbs and Austrians fought several battles along their common

border. Although the Austro-Hungarian army as a whole was substantially larger, the outbreak of war with Russia compelled the Dual Monarchy to send most of its forces against that country, and this meant that the two armies on the Balkan Front were closely matched. Austro-Hungarian forces briefly occupied Belgrade. On August 25–26, the Serbian army, led by the indomitable *Vojvoda* (General) Radomir Putnik (1847–1917) defeated the invaders at the battle of Cer Mountain. The Austro-Hungarians had to return across their borders. They invaded two more times that year and even briefly occupied Belgrade, but the Serbian army forced them to evacuate the Serbian capital; by the end of December, the lines largely followed the original borders.

Between the end of the fighting in 1914 and the German-Austrian-Bulgarian invasion of October 1915, Serbia suffered a

dreadful contagion of typhus, which killed an estimated 150,000 people during the first six months of 1915, weakened many more, and brought on other diseases that persisted throughout the war. Only with the occupation of western Serbia by Austro-Hungarian forces later that year was the typhus epidemic brought under control.

The Central Powers offensive against Serbia in October 1915 demonstrated the effectiveness of combined forces under a unified command. Led by German field marshal August von Mackensen (1849–1945), an Austro-German army crossed the Sava and Danube on October 6, drawing the Serbian forces northward. When these forces had committed themselves, the Bulgarians, seeking redress for the Second Balkan War, struck from the east and south, intending to close a huge trap around the Serbs. A number of Serbs were able to escape, withdrawing to their legendary ground of Kosovo Pole, the site of the great apotheosis of the Serbian people in 1389. There the military and civilian leaders decided not to surrender to the Central Powers, but to escape to the Allied base established at Salonika in Greece. When the Bulgarians severed that avenue of retreat, the Serbs turned westward into Albania, where they hoped to reach the Adriatic coast and be rescued by Allied ships.

The retreat to the coast was one of the great tales of suffering in the war. Accompanied by large numbers of civilians and animals, possessing little food, suffering from cold and exposure, and harassed by vengeful Albanians who resented Serbian treatment of their fellows in Kosovo in 1912–1913, the retreating Serbs finally reached the Albanian port at Durrës (Durazzo). From there, French ships transported them to the island of Corfu and to Tunisia. Of the 300,000 soldiers who withstood the initial attack by the

forces of the Central Powers, about 120,000 were rescued. Of this number, 11,000 on Corfu died of disease, malnutrition, or exposure sustained on the retreat.

Serbia was divided into two zones of occupation, one under Austrian and the other under Bulgarian administration. In neither zone did the occupiers treat the Serbs gently, but the Austrians were at least eager to restore the agricultural productivity of Serbia in order to feed their own armies and populations. Austrian officials brought the epidemics under control and introduced agricultural improvements so that by 1917, agricultural production had reached prewar levels. Still, ever higher requisitions, inflation, shortages, and forced labor in 1918 made survival difficult for the Serbian people. In 1917, Bulgarian troops brutally suppressed an uprising around the town of Toplica.

Together with their troops, Serbian political leaders had escaped to Corfu and continued to function as a government. Serbian war aims called for the creation of a Greater Serbia by joining together Serbia proper, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro. However, in 1917, Serbia's great patron, Russia, collapsed in revolution, so the Serbian leaders, particularly Pašić, decided to approach the Yugoslav Committee, a group of South Slavic political activists from the Habsburg monarchy favored by the British and French governments, to discuss the future of the Balkans. The result was the Pact of Corfu (July 1917), a vaguely worded declaration calling for the political unity of the Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs under the Karageorgević dynasty. That would be the founding document of the future Yugoslavia, although it left out many details that would generate rancor and ill will for years to come.

In 1918, the Serbs had their opportunity for revenge against their conquerors. After

refitting, retraining, and resupplying on Corfu and in Tunisia, the Serbian army was transferred to Salonika, in 1916, where it joined a multinational Allied force. On September 15, 1918, this force together with French troops, numbering 29 divisions, launched a crushing offensive against the Bulgarians. The next day, they broke through the Bulgarian lines at Dobro Pole. Bulgaria, which had lost its German advisers and effective German divisions to the Western Front, sued for an armistice, which was concluded on September 30. This opened a clear road for the Serbian forces not only to return to their homeland, but to establish the power on the ground that would lead to the creation of the new Yugoslavia, proclaimed by Prince Regent Alexander on December 1, 1918.

Karl Roeder

See also: Alexander I, King of Yugoslavia (1888–1934); Cer Mountain, Battle of, 1914; Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918; Macedonian Front, 1916–1918; Putnik, Radomir (1847–1917); Serbia, Invasions of, 1914; Serbia, Invasions of, 1915

Further Reading

- Banac, Ivo. *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984; reprinted, 1989.
- Fryer, C. E. J. *The Destruction of Serbia in 1915*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1997.
- Judah, Tim. *The Serbs*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.
- Mitrović, Andrej. *Serbia's Great War, 1914–1918*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007.

Serbian Retreat, 1915

The invasion of Serbia in October 1915 by Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and German

forces rapidly overwhelmed the exhausted and undermanned Serbian army. After the Serbs failed to stop the Bulgarians at the historic Kosovo Polje battlefield, they retreated into Albania. At the end of November, in wintery conditions, the remnants of the Serbian army, accompanied by civilians and even some Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, departed from Serbian territory and began its trek across the northern Albanian Alps toward the Adriatic Sea. The Serbs set out from Peć and Prizren in three columns. This was a real *anabasis*.

The northern column, acting as a rear guard, delayed its departure from Peć until December 7. It contained the largest contingent of Serbian troops. It had the responsibility to act as a rear guard against an attack by the Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Germans. The northern column retreated through Montenegrin territory. The aged King Peter (1844–1921) and the ailing Field Marshall (*Vojvoda*) Radomir Putnik (1847–1917) had to be carried during the retreat. The northern column began to reach Scutari on December 15. The survivors of this arduous trek continued to trickle in for four days.

The central and southern columns both left Prizren. The central column headed straight across northern Albania. It had the shortest route to the sea, but encountered some resistance from hostile Albanians. The central column reached Scutari. The southern column was the first to depart and the last to arrive at the coast. It left on November 25 and moved south all the way to Elbasan. Along the way it had to contend with Albanian resistance and a Bulgarian attack near Debar. The southern column then turned northwesterly and passing through Tirana, reached the sea at Durrës (Durazzo) and Vlorë (Valona) on December 21.

For those who survived to reach the sea, the ordeal was not over. As many as 70,000 Serbian soldiers died in passage, but the total number of Serbian dead is unknown. The Italians had little interest in aiding the Serbs, whom they regarded as potential rivals for Adriatic domination. Finally, the British and French assisted their Italian allies in evacuating the surviving Serbs from the northern and central columns from Shëngjin (San Giovanni di Medua) and those from the southern column from Durrës and Vlorë. The evacuations took place under threat of Austro-Hungarian naval action. They began in January and continued until April. Most of the Serbs initially went to the Greek island of Corfu, where they could recover from their ordeal. From Corfu most went on to Tunisia and other locations in French North Africa. From there, many of the Serbian troops after rest and recover were sent to Salonika, where they formed a contingent of around 150,000 troops that would participate in the decisive battle of Dobro Pole in September 1918. This break through the Bulgarian lines enabled the Serbs finally to return to their homeland three years after their retreat.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I; Bulgaria in World War I; Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918; Putnik, Radomir (1847–1917); Serbia, Invasion of 1915; Serbia in World War I

Further Reading

- Adams, John C. *Flight in Winter*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1942.
- Fryer, C. E. J. *The Destruction of Serbia in 1915*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1997.
- Mitrović, Andrej. *Serbia's Great War, 1914–1918*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007.

Petrovich, Michael Boro. *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804–1918*. Vol. 1. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.

Serbian War of Independence, 1804–1817

The Serbian War of Independence was a two-phase conflict with two different leaders directed against the Ottoman Empire. The first phase of the Serbian revolt had its origins in Serbian loyalty to the Ottoman governor (Pasha) of Belgrade, Hadji Mustapha Şinik-oglu (1733–1801). Hadji Mustapha maintained a benevolent attitude toward the Serbs, allowing them to collect their own taxes and to form a militia under the leadership of their *knezes*. The *knez* was the chief or patriarch of an extended family or clan. Hadji Mustapha's support of the Orthodox Serbs gained him the somewhat awkward title "Mother of the Serbs." His mild rule and friendliness toward the Serbs antagonized many Muslims, who perceived that their privileges were being undermined. The conservative Janissaries of the region particularly resented his policies. By the eighteenth century, the Janissaries, once among the elite of the Ottoman army, had evolved into a privileged semi-military caste determined to maintain their special privileges and status. In 1801, the Janissaries assassinated Hadji Mustapha and attempted to disarm the Serbs. In February 1804, the Janissaries, fearing a Serbian uprising, executed a number of Serbian leaders.

In response, the surviving Serbs organized resistance. Fighting erupted in February 1804 between armed Serbian bands and Ottoman soldiers. The Serbian revolt originated not as a gesture of nationalism aimed at the sultan in Constantinople, but as a peasant revolt directed against the misrule

of the Janissaries in Belgrade. At the beginning of 1804, the Janissaries and other Muslim authorities in the Pashalik of Belgrade attempted to quash the discontent by murdering the leading *knezes*. This sparked the Serbian revolt.

One *knez* who escaped the massacre, George Petrović (1768–1817), known as Karageorge (Black George) because of his swarthy appearance, emerged as the leader of the revolt. Karageorge was a swine merchant from Topola. Karageorge obtained external support especially from Serbs living in neighboring Austria. Many Serbian veterans of the Austrian army joined his forces. The Austrian government, however, preoccupied with Napoleon, remained aloof. After negotiations with representatives of the sultan failed, Karageorge turned to Russia for assistance. Initially, they also preferred to remain apart. Fighting erupted in February 1804 between armed Serbian bands and Ottoman soldiers. Karageorge and his subordinates defeated at least four Ottoman armies sent to dispose of him. In December 1806, he captured Belgrade.

After his success in overrunning the Pashalik of Belgrade, he assumed the position of hereditary *knez* in 1808. His position was never secure. Many other *knezes* resented his attempt to establish a superior position. Loyalties in liberated Serbia remained clanish and local. On Russian advice some Serbian leaders organized a “Governing Council,” but Karageorge felt no inclination to accept any limitation on his authority.

Karageorge continued to contact the Austrians and French to secure aid. The Napoleonic Wars, however, commanded the full attention of the western Europeans. After the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806–1812, Czar Alexander of Russia (1777–1825) offered some support men and material to the Serbs. Some negotiations

with the Austrians also took place. In 1807, the Russians concluded a formal alliance with the Serbs. In 1810, a Russian force briefly entered Serbia to help the Serbs. Even before Napoleon led his *Grande Armée* to Moscow in 1812, however, Russia attention to the Balkans faltered. The conclusion of peace between the Ottomans and Russians with the Treaty of Bucharest of May 1812 ended Russian intervention on behalf of the Serbs. By 1813, the Serbs were exhausted and bereft of outside help. The revolt fizzled and Karageorge fled to Austria. Ottoman troops reoccupied Serbia including Belgrade that same year.

Serbia did not remain quiet for long. The second phase of the war of independence began in early 1815. Initially a *knez* who was a rival of Karageorge, Miloš Obrenović (1780–1860) collaborated with the restored Ottoman regime. Having gained a political profile, he successfully maneuvered between the Ottoman authorities and the dissident Serbs. He maintained credibility with the other *knezes* by defeating an Ottoman force at Dublje in northwestern Serbia, and he maintained his channels with the Ottomans by treating his captives well. By an Ottoman edict of December 1815, he achieved recognition as the chief *knez* of the pashalik of Belgrade. Under his regime, Serbs were permitted to retain their arms and to have their own assembly (*skupština*).

The somewhat murky murder of the recently returned Karageorge in 1817 confirmed Obrenović more or less domestically as the Serbian leader. Under him, the Serbs gradually obtained increased privileges. In 1830, the Ottomans recognized Obrenović as hereditary prince of autonomous Serbia. By 1833, he had established fixed borders for his state. Serbia was well on its way to formal independence.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Karageorge (George Petrović; 1762–1818), Obrenović, Miloš (1780–1860); Russo-Ottoman War, 1806–1812

Further Reading

Judah, Tim. *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.

Petrovich, Michael Boro. *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804–1918*. Vol. 1. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.

Stavrianos, L. S. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958.

Serbo-Ottoman War, 1876

Serbia and Montenegro had irredentist claims on various parts of Ottoman Balkan provinces and played instrumental roles in rebellions and public disorders of Serbs and Christian Albanians against Ottoman local authorities. Therefore, when the wide-scale rebellions were started in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria in 1875, the Serbian and Montenegrin leadership saw the time ripe for gaining more territory from the Ottoman Empire. They gave an ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire for some concessions and, upon its rejection, declared war on July 1–2, 1876. The ensuing wars and rebellions that erupted one after another, including the Russo-Ottoman War, continued up until 1878.

One of the first academically trained officers, Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha (1807–1883; also known as Abdi) was appointed as the overall commander of the Ottoman forces that were mobilized and concentrated near Vidin, Niš, Novi Pazar, Scutari, and Herzegovina. Smaller Ottoman forces fought against Montenegrins from Albania against both Serbs and Montenegrins from Herzegovina. In comparison, the Serbian forces were divided into two groups: the northern one

under the command of Prince Milan (1854–1901) consisted of Novibazar, Ibar, and Timok divisions; and the southern army under the Russian general Mikhail Grigorievich Chernyayev's (1828–1898) command. Due to mountains, broken terrain, and general lack of transportation, Montenegrin forces were not able to concentrate and instead fought unconventional mountain warfare throughout the war.

On both sides there were regular as well irregular and volunteer units. Most noticeably, the Serbs lacked cavalry and the Montenegrins professional officers. Within the Ottoman officer corps, there was bitter infighting between military academy graduates (Mektepli) and those who had risen from the ranks (Alaylı). Similarly, diversity of weapons and problematic logistical support plagued both sides.

Skirmishes and small battles on the Montenegro front did not result in a clear winner. Additionally, Montenegrin and Ottoman local commanders suffered difficulty to control tribal warriors who paid more attention to their tribal grievances and looting than the political cause and overall military campaign plans.

General Chernyayev, who achieved his fame fighting colonial wars, had little understanding of the rules and dynamics of conventional warfare and clearly underestimated opposing Ottoman forces. He mounted attacks in three-pronged targeting Ottoman concentrations in Vidin, Nish, and Novi Pazar. He was defeated in detail, and Ottoman forces pursued retreating Serbian troops into the Principality of Serbia. After the battle of Zajecar (July 2–3, 1876), the road to Belgrade was opened to Ottomans. With the timely intervention of the Great Powers, the Ottoman invasion stopped short of its final target. The cease-fire allowed the Serbs to replenish their deficits in arms, munitions, officers

(with the induction of Russian volunteers), and fortifications.

Chernyayev relaunched an attack on September 25, 1876. Abdülkerim Pasha defeated Serbian attack columns and immediately attacked Chernyayev's headquarters at Cunis. This caused panic throughout the Serbian forces, and the Serbs called out to Russia for help. In response, Russia gave an ultimatum, which forced the Ottoman Empire to an armistice with Serbia and Montenegro on October 31, 1876. The tumultuous situation in the Balkans, however, would continue. The Balkans would become the main theater of the Russo-Ottoman War that erupted in 1877.

Ahmet Özcan

See also: Bosnian Revolt, 1876; Bulgarian Horrors, 1876; Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878.

Further Reading

MacKenzie, David. *The Lion of Tashkent: The Career of General M. G. Cherniaev*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974.

MacKenzie, David. *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875–1878*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976.

Petrovich, Michael Boro. *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804–1918*. 2 vols. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.

Sèvres, Treaty of, 1920

The Treaty of Sèvres among 13 Allied powers (most notably France, Great Britain, and Italy) and Turkey was signed in August 1920. Although the Armistice of Mudros ended World War I hostilities with the Ottoman Empire in October 1918, the Treaty of Sèvres took another 20 months to conclude. As with many other treaties that ended the war, its terms were presented by

the winners to the losers without negotiation. Unlike many other treaties, few of its terms were ever implemented. In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne superseded most of the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, and it was thus the shortest-lived of the treaties ending the war.

Although the Allies (specifically France and Great Britain) did not envision the destruction of the Ottoman Empire in 1914, the Treaty of Sèvres confirmed what had become an established fact. The Ottoman Empire was officially dissolved, and the new state of Turkey appeared in its place. The sultan remained in power, but the provisions of the treaty made him a virtual prisoner to the interests of the victorious nations. Consistent with realities on the ground, Sèvres removed all predominantly Arabic-speaking regions from Turkish control. The region of the Hejaz (in what is now Saudi Arabia) was made an independent kingdom and named a signatory to the treaty.

The creation of an Arabian state notwithstanding, the treaty denied independence to much of the Middle East, which passed under French and British control as mandates. While nominally free of foreign rule, Arabia was in reality under British suzerainty. Palestine and Mesopotamia became British mandates, while Syria and Lebanon became French mandates. The mandates were supposed to lead to eventual independence under the supervision of the League of Nations. The United States, displeased at what it saw as the furtherance of European imperialism in the region, and never itself at war with the Ottoman Empire, declined to participate in the treaty negotiations. Nevertheless, U.S. president Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) secured the right to determine the borders of the new state of Armenia.

The treaty was an immediate disappointment to Arab leaders. The British had made grandiose promises of independence during the war to Arab leaders such as Sharif Husayn. In return for staging rebellions in the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire, the British had promised Husayn and other Arab leaders that they would support the creation of independent Arab states. The Treaty of Sèvres fell far short of those guarantees. Instead, it upheld the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 wherein Britain and France agreed to divide former Ottoman territories among themselves, though the treaty added the cloak of the mandate system. The treaty also reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration of 1917 in which Great Britain stated that it viewed with favor the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Nevertheless, the Great Powers took no definitive steps in that direction.

The treaty did not deal with the humiliations of the Capitulations, which had been solidified between the states of western Europe and the Ottoman Empire since the sixteenth century. These involved unequal trade terms between the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire and granted the right of extraterritoriality to foreign nationals. Under the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Capitulations were effectively continued in relation to the new state of Turkey.

In addition, the treaty made the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles an international waterway. This provision existed mostly to prevent the Russian Bolshevik regime from claiming ownership of the straits. Armenia, the scene of a genocide during the war, was made independent, and Kurdistan received significant autonomy within the new Turkish state. Great Britain landed a force under General George Milne to guarantee the neutrality of the straits and ensure control of Constantinople.

The real humiliation for Turkey lay in the settlement of its European and Anatolian boundaries. Greece acquired all of European Turkey except the immediate area around Constantinople, which came under international control. The Greeks were also awarded the city of Smyrna, several Aegean islands, and large parts of western Anatolia. These areas were to remain under Greek control for five years, after which the Greeks were to conduct a plebiscite. Britain and France presumed that this vote would result in the annexation of these areas to the Kingdom of Greece. Finally, Ottoman finances were placed not in Turkish hands but under the supervision of British, French, and Italian financiers.

The principal architect of the treaty, British prime minister David Lloyd George (1863–1945), regarded it as the triumph of Romantic Hellenism and Christendom. He seems to have immediately recognized, however, that Great Britain could not enforce these terms. The Greeks were already showing an appetite for more of Anatolia than the treaty permitted, and Britain was facing intense domestic pressures to demobilize.

Most importantly, Turkish nationalists were showing determination to resist many of the terms laid out in the treaty. Brilliantly led by Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938), the hero of Gallipoli, the nationalists planned to overturn Sèvres. Most nationalists understood that reviving the Ottoman Empire and recapturing the lost Arab lands could not, and should not, be accomplished. They bristled, however, at any ethnically Turkish lands falling under foreign control. Thus, Kemal set out to regain all Anatolian and Armenian lands for Turkey.

Only Greece decided to meet Kemal with military force. The Greeks had 150,000 troops in Turkey, and Greek premier

Eleuthérios Venizélos (1864–1936) was determined to use them to crush Kemal's nationalists. Kemal, however, carried out a brilliant military campaign in the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922. He recaptured Smyrna and its hinterland, and then turned north to move on Constantinople. The Italians, who had come to view Greece as a more immediate rival than Turkey, agreed to withdraw their occupation troops after a defeat at Kemal's hands in Central Anatolia. The Italian decision led the British and French also to quit Turkey. Within only two years, the Treaty of Sèvres had been superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923.

Michael S. Neiberg

See also: Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922; Kemal, Mustafa (1881–1938); Lausanne, Treaty of, 1923

Further Reading

Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*. New York: Holt, 1989.

Helmreich, Paul. *From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919–1920*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974.

Macfie, A. L. *The End of the Ottoman Empire, 1918–1923*. London: Longman, 1998.

MacMillan, Margaret. *Paris, 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*. New York: Random House, 2002.

Shipka Pass, Battles of, 1877–1878

After an easy advance, light casualties, receiving enthusiastic support from the Bulgarians and the apparent passivity of the Ottoman main forces in Şumnu (Shumen) and Vidin, the Russian command decided

to change its original plan. According to this change, the Southern Group was ordered to reach the Balkan passes as soon as possible. The speed of the Russian advance caught the Balkan Corps off guard. Its units, which were supposed to be guarding the Balkan passes, were not yet in their assigned positions, leaving only weak forward elements in place. So, while the high command in Constantinople and commander in chief Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha (1807/9–1883) were trying to formulate a workable solution to stop the Russian advance, the Russian Southern Group, under the able command of General Iosif Gurko (1828–1901), easily captured the weakly defended and seemingly unimportant Hainboğazı defile on July 14, 1877. This allowed the group to advance immediately through the mountains toward the main pass at Shipka (Şipka). As he advanced, Gurko repulsed two uncoordinated and timid Ottoman counter-attacks. The Shipka Pass defensive system was built against a northern assault not against an assault coming from its rear. Thereupon a hopeless defense was crushed in a single day and Shipka Pass fell on July 19, opening the door to the straits.

Ongoing combat operations against Montenegro were suspended and two divisions, under the command of Süleyman Hüsnü Pasha (1838–1892), were ordered to redeploy in order to fill the gaps in the Balkan passes. Süleyman Pasha reached the region on July 23 after a 20-day journey caused mainly by a shortage of coal. He prepared slowly and leisurely for the main assault, giving Russian defenders ample time to consolidate their gains and dig into a defense but also to predict his avenues of approach and objective, which was none other than via Shipka Pass. The main assault was launched on August 21. The Ottoman

troops launched repeated attacks against Russian positions. Rough terrain, intense Russian artillery and small-arms fire, poor coordination at the brigade level, and lack of effective fire support were instrumental in the waste of tactical opportunities. Süleyman Pasha, who was dangerously overconfident about the superiority of his own tactical views, ignored the realities on the ground and continued on operations against Shipka, albeit on a smaller scale. The Balkan Corps remained stuck in front of Shipka until the assignment of Süleyman Pasha as the new commander in chief of the Balkan front on September 26.

Mesut Uyar

See also: Bulgarian Horrors, 1876; Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878; San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878; Süleyman Hüsnü Pasha (1838–1892)

Further Reading

Keçecizade İzzet Fuad. *Kaçırılan Fırsatlar: 1877 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı Hakkında Eleştiriler ve Askeri Düşünceler*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1997.

Schem, A. J. *An Illustrated History of the Conflict between Russia and Turkey with a Review of the Eastern Question*. New York: H. S. Goodspeed & Co., 1878.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 2, *Reform Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Skanderbeg SS Division

The Skanderbeg SS Division was a light infantry (Mountain) unit of the Waffen SS, established in March 1944 and consisting of mainly ethnic Albanians from Nazi-occupied Albania. Officially known as the

21. *Waffen Gebirgs-Division der SS “Skanderbeg”* (albanische Nr. 1), it was named after George Kastrioti Skanderbeg (1405–1468), the national hero of Albania, who resisted the Ottomans from 1443 until his death in 1468.

In April 1939, Italy occupied Albania, and, almost exactly two years later, the Germans occupied Yugoslavia. During 1942 and 1943, both the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS wanted to use local manpower to maintain order and fight Yugoslav Partisan and Communist Albanian resistance in the region. At the same time, the pro-Nazi government of Albania wanted to form its own army that would help establish a “greater Albania,” consisting of prewar Albania, Kosovo, and Western Macedonia. In September 1943, the Germans occupied Albania after Italy surrendered.

In 1943, many Albanians from Kosovo and the Sanjak region joined the 13th Waffen SS Mountain Division (the *Handschar* [Croatian] division) as Battalion I/2 (later I/28). They received their initial training in southern France and Neuhammer, Germany. Given the relative success of the SS Handschar Division, *SS Reichsführer* Heinrich Himmler (1900–1945) in February 1944 authorized the formation of a parallel unit of suitable Albanians. Xhafer Deva (1904–1978), an Albanian official in the pro-Nazi Albanian government, helped recruit 11,400 Albanians from whom about 6,000 were actually inducted into the Waffen SS. In mid-April 1944, Battalion I/2 of the Handschar SS Division transferred from Bosnia to Kosovo to become a part of the newly created SS Skanderbeg Division.

The Skanderbeg Division, numbering about 6,000–6,500 men instead of a normal division strength (10,000–20,000) and commanded by *SS-Standartenführer* August Schmidhuber (1901–1947), was operational

from February to November 1944. The division arm patch consisted of a black double-headed eagle on a red background. The recruits wore the white traditional Albanian highlander cap (*qeleshe*), and later the SS issued gray headgear in the same style, with the *Totenkopf* sewn on the front and a collar tab with the Skanderbeg helmet.

The division fought Communist partisans, led by Enver Hoxha, in Albania and Yugoslavia toward the end of the war. Members of the division, attached to a regular Wehrmacht unit, conducted anti-Partisan operations or terrorized the local non-Albanian population in the areas of Greater Albania not part of pre-1939 Albania. In May 1944, a portion of the division helped guard mines in western Kosovo and helped the Germans round up 281 Jews for deportation. The division participated in the battle of Debar in present-day western Macedonia, August 18–27, 1944, but failed to capture the city. The division also aided the German army in its orderly withdrawal from the Balkans in October and November 1944.

Overall, the division, with a serious lack of instructors, Albanian officers and non-commissioned officers was very poorly led. Problems, such as insubordination, poor discipline, and looting and violence against unarmed civilians, especially Serbs and suspected Communist Albanians, plagued the unit. The Albanians often refused to fight or to take orders, and the Germans had to disarm several battalions and imprison a number of Albanian officers. Many recruits deserted with their new weapons and boots, and, by October 1944, the division had dwindled to about 3,500. Overall, the division never became a significant combat force.

SS-Brigadeführer Schmidhuber was captured in 1945 and turned over to Yugoslav authorities. In February 1947, a Yugoslav military tribunal tried him on charges of

participating in massacres, deportations, and atrocities against civilians and sentenced him to death by hanging. He was executed on February 27, 1947.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Albania in World War II; Handschar SS Division

Further Reading

Bishop, Chris. *Waffen-SS Divisions, 1939–45*. London: Amber Books, 2007.

Blandford, Edmund L. *Hitler's Second Army: The Waffen SS*. Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International, 1994.

Fischer, Bernd J. *Albania at War, 1939–1945*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1999.

Williamson, Gordon. *Waffen-SS Handbook, 1933–1945*. Stroud, UK: Sutton Publishing, Ltd., 2005.

Slivnitsa, Battle of, 1885

The Battle of Slivnitsa was the main battle of the Bulgarian-Serb War, fought near the Bulgarian town of Slivnitsa during November 17–19, 1885. On November 13, 1885, the Serbian king, Milan Obrenović (1854–1901), declared war on Bulgaria after Bulgarian nationalists in Eastern Rumelia declared its unification with Bulgaria on September 18, 1885. The Serbian army crossed the northwest border of Bulgaria in three columns, intending to converge on Sofia, the Bulgarian capital. The Serbians ran into stiff resistance in the mountains, giving Alexander von Battenberg (1857–1893), Prince of Bulgaria, time to deploy his main forces into prepared defenses at Slivnitsa, 22 miles northwest of Sofia. The three Serbian center divisions halted near Slivnitsa on November 16 to recover from the fierce fighting in the Dragoman Pass.

On the evening of November 16, Alexander arrived at Slivnitsa to find his army in three miles of trenches along a ridge in front of the village. Steep mountainous terrain lay on the right flank while the easier Visker Hills towards Breznik, southwest of Slivnitsa, protected the Bulgarian left flank. Around 10:00 a.m. the next morning, Alexander ordered three battalions to advance on the right, surprising the Serbians who eventually rallied and pushed them back. The main Serbian attack occurred against the Bulgarian center, but the Bulgarians forced the Serbians back. Bulgarian reinforcements recaptured the heights on the right and drove the Serbs back to the road.

At daybreak, November 18, the Serbians attacked the Bulgarian left flank, but Bulgarian reinforcements again arrived just in time to prevent a breakthrough. The Bulgarians repulsed further attacks in the center, causing heavy Serbian casualties. The next day, two Serbian divisions attacked near Karnul (now called Delyan) near Bresnik in an attempt to join up with the Morava division. The arrival of new Bulgarian troops from Sofia held the Morava division in the Visker Hills, and the flanking move failed. Alexander now ordered a counterattack which pushed the Serbians back on both flanks. Nightfall prevented a complete collapse of the Serbian lines.

On November 20, the defeated Serbian army began to retreat back to Serbia, ending the battle. The Bulgarians suffered 1,800 casualties from the battle, and the Serbians, 2,100 casualties.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria (1857–1893); Bulgarian-Serb War, 1885; Obrenović, Milan (1854–1901)

Further Reading

Jelavich, Charles. *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879–1886*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958.

Jelavich, Charles, and Barbara Jelavich. *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.

Pavlowitch, Stevan K. *A History of the Balkans, 1804–1945*. London: Longman, 1999.

Slovene War, 1991

The Slovene War of 1991, also known as the Ten Days War, was a short conflict that began the disintegration of Yugoslavia and established the first independent Slovene state. After the election of the overtly nationalistic Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006) as president of the Yugoslav Federal Republic of Serbia in 1990 using federal monies, many Slovenes began to consider disassociation from Yugoslavia. As citizens of the wealthiest of the six federal Yugoslav republics, the Slovenes had little desire to fund Serbian nationalist aspirations. A referendum on December 23, 1990, demonstrated that the majority of Slovenes favored independence. While the leaders of Ljubljana government, including President Milan Kučan (1941–), hoped to avoid armed conflict with the federal state, they took measures to strengthen the Territorial Defense (TO) forces at their disposal. These TOs were established as a part of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) strategy to repel a foreign invasion by small units trained in guerilla tactics. Because Slovenia, unlike much of the rest of Yugoslavia, was relatively ethnically homogeneous, these forces could be relied



A Slovenian frontier guard patrols in front of the new sign of the “Republika Slovenija” at the Yugoslavian-Austrian frontier station of Spielfeld-Sentilj, June 26, 1991. (AP Photo/Gepa)

upon to support the Ljubljana government against the federal government in Belgrade. In particular the Slovene defense minister, Janez Janša (1958–), prepared the Slovene TO for the pending conflict with the JNA. He procured arms and promoted the JNA’s own guerrilla tactics for use against the JNA. Because Yugoslavia had maintained almost universal male military obligation, Janša could draw upon a large contingent of Slovene males with military training.

Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991. The Slovene TO immediately acted to establish control of Slovenia’s borders and main airport. The next day, June 26, the JNS responded by

sending units into Slovenia to reassert federal authority. That same day, the Slovene TO shot down two JNA helicopters. The fighting between the TO and the JNA escalated over the course of the next five days. In many instances, the TO successfully employed guerilla tactics to disrupt JNA movements and concentrations. The TO also surrounded JNA bases within Slovenia.

Meanwhile efforts to resolve the crisis with diplomacy emerged in several European capitals. In response, the Slovene government announced a unilateral cease-fire on July 2. The JNA accepted the cease-fire the next day. By that time, the Slovene TO had managed to assert control over most of the frontier crossing and to overwhelm most of the JNA installations within Slovenia. After both sides agreed to a cease-fire, the JNA withdrew its forces from Slovenian territory. Most of its equipment remained in Slovenia. Quickly thereafter, representatives of the Yugoslav federal government, Croatia, Slovenia, and the European Community met on the Adriatic Coast of Croatia. There on July 7, they signed the so-called Brioni (Bjrijuni) accord. This ended the efforts to the JNA to prevent Slovene independence. The attendees agreed that Slovenia and Croatia could separate from federal Yugoslavia.

The Slovene War demonstrated the determination of the Slovenian people to achieve national independence for the first time in their history. It also showed the effectiveness of the small-unit guerilla tactics of the Slovene TO. The Slovenes demonstrated high morale at all times. Not so their JNA opponents. The JNA leadership, itself mostly Serbian and Montenegrin, failed to meet the challenge of the Slovene TO. Many JNA soldiers of Bosniak, Croatian, Kosovar, and Macedonian origin had little interest in

fighting for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or for the nationalist leadership of Serbia. Nevertheless, some Slovene soldiers did fight and die for the JNA. Among the Slovene JNA casualties was one of the helicopter pilots shot down on June 26. The Slovene TO forces lost 18 killed and 182 wounded. The JNA suffered 44 killed and 146 wounded. Some civilians also lost their lives in the conflict. Probably the most significant casualty of the war was the JNA itself. This brief conflict indicated that the conscript-based JNA was not effective in a national context. After the Slovene War of 1991, the JNA ceased to be an effective federal force. Those who remained in the JNA were for the most part committed to the Serbian nationalist cause.

The relatively quick and easy Slovene victory also demonstrated that the nationalist Serbian leadership was willing to allow territories without significant Serbian populations to leave Yugoslavia. At the same time, this increased their determination to retain areas of mixed population with strong Serbian elements, such as Bosnia and the Krajina region of Croatia. In this way, the Slovene independence made the efforts of the Bosnians and Croats to separate themselves from Yugoslavia more difficult.

In the aftermath of the war, the European Community recognized Slovene independence on January 15, 1992. Slovenia joined the United Nations in May of the same year. In 2004, Slovenia joined the EU and NATO.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Brioni Agreement; JNA (Yugoslav People's Army); Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes

Further Reading

Magas, Branka. *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Breakup, 1980–1992*. New York: Verso, 1993.

Rogel, Carole. *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998.

Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. New York: TV Books, 1996.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. *Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995*. 2 vols. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002–2003.

Smyrna, Destruction of, 1922

The destruction of Smyrna is also known as the Great Smyrna Fire (September 13–17, 1922). Smyrna (İzmir) was a cosmopolitan city since ancient times, and during the time of the fire, the influx of immigrants from the inner parts of Anatolia had swelled its population to turn it into a large Christian metropolis. The city had been under Greek occupation in the period 1919–1922.

The Greek army's advance into Anatolia, which had begun with its occupation of Smyrna on May 15, 1919, came to a decisive end with the Turkish victories at the Battle of Sakarya in August and September 1921 and of Dumlupınar in August 1922. As the Greek forces withdrew after this defeat, they retreated all the way to Smyrna while setting fire to some towns and villages along the way. The inhabitants of Smyrna were afraid that the city might share the same fate as several localities in western Anatolia that were burned down by the Greek army; but the Greek forces did not attempt at starting a fire in Smyrna, where a large Christian population still lived. When the Turkish army entered the city, the Greek forces had already left on September 9, 1922. After the recapture of the city by the Turks, there was some pillaging and some other events of violence, which

increased the nervousness among the populace.

The fire started on September 13 and lasted until September 17. The first fire broke out in the Armenian quarter, which was soon joined by other fires in and around the same quarter. With the help of the windy weather, fire spread to a large area including the Greek and European quarters. While Muslim and Jewish quarters were not harmed, quarters inhabited by Greeks and the Armenians suffered considerable damage. The fire destroyed a large part of the city, caused many deaths, and forced many more to leave the city.

Responsibility for the fire has been a hotly contested topic. Diplomatic sources are not in unanimous in this regard. Greeks and Armenians argue that the fire was deliberately started by the Turks, while Turkish sources insist that either the Armenians or the Greeks were responsible.

Ahmet Özcan

See also: Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922; Sakarya River, Battle of, 1921

Further Reading

Böke, Pelin. *İzmir 1919–1922*. Istanbul: Tanımlıklar, 2006.

Lowry, Heath. “Turkish History: On Whose Sources Will It Be Based? A Case Study on the Burning of Izmir.” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi* 9 (1988).

Milton, Giles. *Paradise Lost Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of a Christian City in the Islamic World*. New York: Basic Books, 2008.

Srebrenica Massacre, 1995

The Srebrenica Massacre was the worst massacre on European soil since the Holocaust. Srebrenica is located near the Drina River in eastern Bosnia. After the collapse of Yugoslavia and outbreak of civil

war in 1992, this predominantly Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) town successfully defended itself against the advance of the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) in the spring of 1992. The Serbs conducted a wide-scale ethnic cleansing of the region, expelling Bosniaks and increasing the Serbian population. Besieged by the BSA, Srebrenica was isolated from Bosniak-controlled territories to the west and was dependent on humanitarian aid provided by the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Nevertheless, the Bosniaks, under command of Naser Oric, successfully repelled the Serbian forces throughout 1992 and early 1993. In the spring of 1993, the United Nations declared Srebrenica a “safe area,” along with five other Bosnian Muslim cities (Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zepa) then under siege at the hands of the Bosnian Serbs.

Despite its new status, Srebrenica was never properly defended by UNPROFOR and constantly suffered extreme privation as the Serbs tested the UN resolves by blocking aid convoys. Of over UN 30,000 troops requested for Bosnian Muslim “safe areas,” only 7,600 were forthcoming, of which 750 Dutch troops were deployed at Srebrenica. The UN troops were lightly armed and operated under stringent mandate that made them powerless to successfully engage either of the conflicting sides.

By 1995, after almost three years of resistance, Srebrenica became a symbol of Bosniak resistance, only further increasing the city’s importance. In July 1995, encouraged by UN vacillation over whether or not to maintain the safe areas, the BSA forces under the command of General Ratko Mladić (1942–) launched a major campaign to capture Srebrenica. The UNPROFOR troops failed to stop the BSA offensive because of a lack of support further up the UN chain of command. As the Serbian forces overran

the enclave, over 15,000 Bosniaks fled into the woods while many sought shelter at the UNPROFOR base at nearby Potocari, where the members of the Dutch peacekeepers sheltered about 8,000 Bosnian Muslims. The Serb forces overrun the UN base and, after separating women from men, began a methodical killing of the Bosnian Muslims. It is impossible to arrive at precise numbers of the killed, but best estimates point to between 7,000 and 8,000 men killed.

The Srebrenica Massacre became the worst single war crime of the entire Bosnian conflict and the worst case of mass murder in Europe since the end of World War II. It also stands as a symbol of the failure by the international community, and especially the United Nations, to prevent mass murders. The massacre resulted in the indictment of numerous Serbian commanders, including Mladić, as war criminals by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at The Hague.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Bosnian War, 1992–1995; Mladić, Ratko (1943–); UNPROFOR; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995

Further Reading

Cigar, Norman. *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing."* College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995.

Honig, Jan Willem and Norbert Both, *Srebrenica, Record of a War Crime.* New York: Penguin, 1996.

Rohde, David. *A Safe Area, Srebrenica: Europe's Worst Massacre since the Second World War.* London: Pocket Books, 1997.

Stalingrad, Battle of, 1942–1943

Some hold that the Battle of Stalingrad, one of the epic battles of World War II, was the turning point on the Eastern Front. The

Battle of Stalingrad, the first large encirclement of a German army in the war, gave the Soviets a psychological lift and the military initiative. Sharing in the German defeat were several allied forces, especially those of the Romanians.

In spring 1942, Adolf Hitler placed major emphasis in the summer campaign on the southern portion of the German-Soviet Front in Operation Blau (Blue). Hitler sent General Fedor von Bock's (1880–1945) Army Group South east from around Kursk to secure Voronezh, which fell to the Germans on July 6. Hitler then reorganized his southern forces into Army Groups A and B. General Siegmund W. List (1880–1971) had command of the southern formation, Army Group A; General Maximilian von Weichs (1881–1954) commanded the northern formation, Army Group B.

Hitler's original plan called for Army Groups A and B to cooperate in a great effort to secure the Don and Donets Valleys and capture the cities of Rostov and Stalingrad. The two army groups could then move southeast to capture the oil fields that were so important to the Red Army. On July 13, Hitler ordered a change of plans, demanding the simultaneous capture of Stalingrad—a major industrial center and key crossing point on the Volga River—and the Caucasus. Dividing the effort placed further strains on already inadequate German resources, especially on logistical support. This also meant that inevitably a gap would appear between the two German army groups, enabling most Soviet troops caught in the Don River bend to escape eastward. Meanwhile, on July 23, Army Group A captured Rostov. It then crossed the Don River and advanced deep into the Caucasus, reaching to within 70 miles of the Caspian Sea.

Hitler now intervened again, slowing the advance of General Friedrich Paulus's

(1890–1957) Sixth Army of Army Group B toward Stalingrad when he detached General Hermann Hoth's (1885–1971) Fourth Panzer Army to join Army Group A to help secure the Caucasus oil fields. Nonetheless, the Sixth Army reached the Volga north of Stalingrad on August 23.

The great city of Stalingrad curved for some 20 miles along the high western bank of the Volga River. Hitler's original intent was merely to control the river by gunfire and to destroy the city's arms factories, notably the Tractor, Red October, and Barricades works; but now he demanded a full occupation of the Soviet dictator's name-sake city.

To meet the German thrust toward Stalingrad, on July 12, 1942, the Soviet General Staff had formed the Stalingrad Front. It consisted of the Sixty-second, Sixty-third, and Sixty-fourth Armies. The Twenty-first Army and the Eighth Air Army were also integrated into the Stalingrad Front. General Vasily Chuikov (1900–1982), a protégé of Marshal Georgii Zhukov (1896–1974), commanded the Sixty-second Army, which was holding on the west bank of the Volga. Josef Stalin, meanwhile, rushed reinforcements and supplies to Stalingrad.

Angry over the slow progress of the Sixth Army into Stalingrad, Hitler on August 11, ordered Hoth's Fourth Army from the Caucasus north to that place, leaving a badly depleted Army Group A holding a 500-mile front and stalling the southernmost drive. Hitler also ordered his sole strategic reserve in the area, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's (1887–1973) Eleventh Army, north to Leningrad.

Such wide-ranging shifts of German resources took a terrible toll on men but especially on equipment. They also consumed precious fuel and stretched the German lines far beyond what was reasonable or

safe. German army High Command chief of staff General Franz Halder (1884–1972) and other German generals grew more and more alarmed. They pointed out to Hitler that the German army in Russia now had to maintain a front of more than 2,000 miles. Between the two armies of Army Group B, a sole division held a 240-mile gap. North of Stalingrad, Romanian troops protected the single railroad bringing supplies to the Sixth Army. The possibilities open to the Soviets were enormous, provided they had the resources available. Hitler claimed they did not. Halder continued warning Hitler and tried to get him to break off the battle for Stalingrad. This time, Hitler sacked Halder. He also relieved List, and from a distance of 1,200 miles, Hitler took personal command of Army Group A, which was nominally under General Paul L. E. von Kleist (1881–1954). The irony is that the Germans might have taken Stalingrad in July had Hitler not diverted Hoth south to assist Kleist.

Beginning on August 24, a costly battle of attrition raged over Stalingrad. Luftwaffe carpet bombing at the end of August killed some 40,000 people, but it also turned the city into defensive bastions of ruined buildings and rubble. Stalin refused to allow the evacuation of the civilian population, believing that this would force the defenders, especially local militia forces, to fight more tenaciously.

The ruined city posed a formidable obstacle. Germany's strength lay in maneuver warfare, but Hitler compelled the Sixth Army to engage the Soviet strength of static defense. Stalin ordered the city held at all costs, and Soviet forces resisted doggedly. To make things as difficult as possible for German artillery and aviation, Chuikov ordered his troops to keep within 50 yards of the Germans. Zhukov, who had just been

appointed deputy supreme commander—second in authority only to Stalin—arrived at Stalingrad on August 29, to take overall charge of operations.

Meanwhile, Hitler became obsessed with Stalingrad, and he wore down his army in repeated attempts to capture that symbol of defiance. Taking Stalingrad was unnecessary from a military point of view; the 16th Panzer Division at Rynok controlled the Volga with its guns, closing it to north-south shipping. But Hitler insisted the city itself be physically taken.

For a month, the Sixth Army pressed slowly forward, but casualties in the battle of attrition were enormous on both sides, with advances measured in yards. The battle disintegrated into a block-by-block, house-by-house—even room-by-room—struggle for survival.

General Paulus has been blamed for refusing to disobey Hitler's order to stand firm and extracting his army before it was too late, but his and Hitler's greatest failing lay in not anticipating the Soviet encirclement. Nor did Paulus possess mobile tank reserve to counter such a Soviet effort and keep open a supply corridor. The Romanians posted on the northern flank warned of the danger of Soviet bridgeheads over the Don, and asked to eliminate them. The Germans refused permission. Romanian dictator General Ion Antonescu (1882–1946) warned Hitler about the perilous position of the Romanian forces, to no avail.

While he fed the cauldron of Stalingrad with only sufficient troops absolutely necessary to hold the city, Zhukov patiently assembled 1 million men in four fronts (army groups) for a great double envelopment. This deep movement, Operation Uranus, began on November 19 and was timed to coincide with the frosts that would make Soviet cross-country tank maneuvers

possible against Axis infantry. For the northern pincer, the Soviets assembled 3,500 guns and heavy mortars to blast a hole for three tank and two cavalry corps and a dozen infantry divisions. They encountered eight Romanian infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions of the Romanian Third Army. The Romanians fought bravely, but their 37 mm guns and light Skoda tanks were no match for the Soviet T-34s. The southern Soviet prong of two corps, one mechanized and the other cavalry, broke through on November 20, against five Romanian infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions of the Romanian Fourth Army. Both Romanian army formations were destroyed in the Red Army breakthrough.

By November 23, the forces of Operation Uranus had encircled the Sixth Army and had driven some units of the Fourth Army into the pocket. Hitler now ordered Manstein from the Leningrad Front and gave him a new formation—Army Group Don, drawn from Army Group A—with instructions to rectify the situation.

Hitler forbade any withdrawal, convinced that the Sixth Army could be resupplied from the air. Reichsmarschall (Reich Marshal) Hermann Goering (1893–1946) is usually blamed for assuring Hitler that this could be done, but responsibility is more properly shared among Goering, chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe General Hans Jeschonnek (1899–1943), and Hitler. Hitler was no doubt misled by Luftwaffe success the previous winter in supplying by parachute drops 5,000 German troops surrounded at Kholm near Moscow and 100,000 men at Demyansk.

The decision that Stalingrad could be supplied by air was taken at a time when the Soviets enjoyed air superiority. By November 20, the second day of Uranus, the

Soviets committed between 1,350 and 1,414 combat aircraft (depending on the source) to Stalingrad. Meanwhile, General Wolfram F. Von Richtofen's (1895–1945) Luftflotte 4, flying in support of the Sixth Army, had 732 combat aircraft, of which only 402 were operational. The Soviets used their air superiority to attack German army positions and for bombing raids on the main Ju-52 base at Zverevo, where they destroyed a substantial number of German transport aircraft. Worsening weather impeded the relief effort, and much of the Luftwaffe's airlift capability was redeployed to resupply Axis troops in North Africa after Allied landings there in early November.

A fair appraisal of air transport available, even in the best weather conditions, was that the Luftwaffe could only bring in one-tenth of the Sixth Army's requirements. By the last week in December, the Luftwaffe delivered only an average 129 tons of supplies a day, condemning the German forces in the pocket to slow starvation and death. Then, on January 16, 1943, the Soviets took Pitomnik, the principal airfield within the Stalingrad pocket. Its loss was the death blow to the airlift operation. During the last days of the battle, supplies were dropped only by parachute, and many of the supplies fell into Soviet hands.

Hitler still refused to authorize any attempt by the Sixth Army to escape. He would allow only a linking up of a relief force. None of the hard-won territory was to be surrendered, but it was simply impossible for the Sixth Army to link up with a relief force and not surrender territory in the process. Paulus favored a breakout, but he was not prepared to gamble either his army or his career. Manstein's force of three understrength panzer divisions managed to reach within 35 miles of Sixth Army positions, and he urged a *fait accompli*, forcing Hitler to accept it. However,

Paulus replied with a pessimistic assessment of his army's ability to close the short distance to reach Manstein's relief force. There was insufficient fuel, the horses had mostly been eaten, and it would take weeks to prepare. The relieving forces would have to come closer. A linkup could succeed only if the Sixth Army pushed from the other side against the Soviets, but this could not be done without shrinking the Stalingrad pocket, which Hitler forbade.

In mid-December, the Volga froze, allowing the Soviets to use vehicles to cross the ice. During the next seven weeks, Zhukov sent 35,000 vehicles across the river along with 122 mm howitzers to blast the German defensive works. By then, seven Soviet armies surrounded the Sixth Army, and breakout was impossible. Even in this hopeless situation, Paulus refused to disobey Hitler and order a surrender. He himself surrendered on January 31 (he maintained he had been "taken by surprise"), but he refused to order his men to do the same. The last German units capitulated on February 2.

There may have been 294,000 men trapped at Stalingrad, including *Hiwis* (Soviet auxiliaries working with the Germans) and Romanians. Of only 91,000 men (including 22 generals) taken prisoner by the Soviets, fewer than 5,000 survived the war and Soviet captivity. The last Germans taken prisoner at Stalingrad were not released until 1955. Including casualties in Allied units and the rescue attempts, Axis forces lost upward of half a million men. The Stalingrad campaign may have cost the Soviets 1.1 million casualties, more than 485,000 dead.

The effect of the Battle of Stalingrad on the German war effort has been hotly debated. It is frequently seen as the turning point in the European theater of war, the decisive defeat from which the Wehrmacht could never recover; but militarily,

Stalingrad was not irredeemable. The German front lines had been largely recreated in the time the remnants of the Sixth Army surrendered. Stalingrad was more important for its psychological than its military value. If any single battle denied Germany victory, it was Kursk, still six months and several German successes away. For the Romanians, the Battle of Stalingrad was an unmitigated disaster. Two entire armies were destroyed. The Romanians lost around 140,000 men. The losses in manpower and equipment amounted to around half of that available to Romania's army. This made Stalingrad an even greater disaster for the Romanians than for the Germans.

Eva-Maria Stolberg and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946); Romania in World War II

Further Reading

Axworthy, Mark, Cornel Scafes, and Cristian Craciunoiu. *Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945*. London: Arms and Armour, 1995.

Beevor, Antony. *Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942–1943*. New York: Viking, 1998.

Hayward, Joel S. A. *Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East, 1942–1943*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998.

Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941–1945. Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1961.

Seaton, Albert. *The Russo-German War, 1941–1945*. New York: Praeger, 1971.

Stamboliski, Aleksandŭr (1879–1923)

Bulgarian prime minister, born on March 1, 1879, in the village of Slavovitsa, near

Pazardzhik in west central Bulgaria, Aleksandŭr Stamboliski was educated in Bulgaria and Germany. Stamboliski involved himself in peasant politics from an early age, and after the turn of the century, he became a leader in the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (BANU), the most important Bulgarian peasant political party. He was elected to the Bulgarian parliament (Subranie) in 1908 and there became the party leader three years later.

Stamboliski was a strong adversary of Bulgarian irredentism. He opposed the policies that led to the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 and Bulgarian participation in these wars, arguing that peasants were the victims of such policies and had little to gain from a Greater Bulgaria. In a stormy audience with Czar Ferdinand on the eve of Bulgaria's entry into World War I, Stamboliski warned the czar that he was risking the future of the monarchy in the upcoming struggle. Stamboliski subsequently was imprisoned, only obtaining release as Bulgaria collapsed and unrest spread especially among war-weary peasant soldiers in September 1918.

Bulgarian authorities apparently hoped that Stamboliski would allay some of the turmoil. Although not initially involved in the disorders, Stamboliski served as president of the ephemeral Radomir Republic, which loyal Bulgarian and German forces suppressed in October. In 1919, Stamboliski became prime minister and established a heavy-handed government that sought to bring to justice those politicians whose policies had led to Bulgaria's defeats in the Balkan Wars and World War I. At the same time, he pursued policies of reconciliation with Bulgaria's neighbors. On March 23, 1923, Stamboliski signed the convention of Nish with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia). With this agreement, Stamboliski promised

to suppress the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO, or VMRO), which was then carrying out operations against Yugoslavia from Bulgarian territory. IMRO members as well as other opponents of Stamboliski's foreign and domestic policies murdered him on June 14, 1923, at his farm in Slavovitsa, cutting off the hand that had signed the Nish treaty. Stamboliski had been a forceful advocate of the political and economic rights of the Bulgarian peasantry, the vast majority of the population.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bulgaria in World War I; Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918

Further Reading

Bell, John D. *Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian National Union, 1899–1923*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Crampton, R. J. *A Short History of Modern Bulgaria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Petkov, Nikola (Nikola Dimitrov). *Aleksandar Stambolijski, njegova lichnost i ideje*. Beograd, Yugoslavia: Radenkovich, 1933.

Stepanović, Stepa (1856–1929)

One of the leading military figures in the history of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Serbia, Stepa Stepanović was born on March 11, 1856, near Belgrade. He joined the Serbian army as a cadet in 1874 and became an artillery officer.

Stepanović rose to prominence through his command of the Serbian Second Army during the First Balkan War of 1912–1913. Initially the Second Army advanced into eastern Macedonia from Bulgarian territory. It was to cut off any Ottoman retreat down the Vardar River valley. In response to a

Bulgarian request at the end of October, however, the Serbian Second Army moved into Thrace to augment the Bulgarian Second Army in its siege of the Ottoman fortress city of Adrianople (Odrin, Erdine). There the Serbs deployed on the western perimeter. The Serbian Second Army joined the Bulgarians in the final assault on the city on March 26, 1913. After helping to take the city, Stepanović and his army returned to Serbia. He continued to command the Serbian Second Army through the Second Balkan War, fighting against his erstwhile allies in eastern Serbia and northwestern Bulgaria.

During World War I, Stepanović and his Second Army gained the first Entente victory of the war when he defeated the initial Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia during 15–29 August 15–29, 1914 at the Battle of Cer Mountain. For this success, he gained the rank of *Vojvoda* (Field Marshal). Still leading the Second Army, he subsequently participated in a victory against Austro-Hungarian invasions at the battle of Kolubara on December 4, 1914.

Stepanović continued to command the Serbian Second Army on the Macedonian Front from 1916 to 1918 and participated in the decisive Franco-Serbian victory over the Bulgarians at Dobro Pole in September 1918. He died in Čačak, Yugoslavia, on April 29, 1929.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Adrianople, Siege of, 1912–1913; Cer Mountain, Battle of, 1914; Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918; Serbia in World War I

Further Reading

Alimpić, Milovoje. *Solunski front*. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavacki zavod, 1967.

Mitrović, Andrej. *Serbia's Great War, 1914–1918*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007.

Skoko, Savo, and Petar Opachich. *Vojvoda Stepa Stepanovich u ratovima Srbije 1876–1918*. 2 vols. Belgrade: Beogradski izdavacko-graficki zavod, 1984.

Storm, Operation, 1995

Operation Storm was a rapidly successful offensive launched by the military forces of the Republic of Croatia on August 4, 1995, against the Republic of Serbian Krajina. The success of the offensive ended the Serbian attempt to establish an independent region within Croatia based on the Serbian ethnicity along the border with Bosnia.

The United Nations brokered a cease-fire in January 1992 between the Republic of Croatia and Serbia, which controlled the remaining core of the old Yugoslavia's military, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). The fighting during 1991 established the ethnically Serbian regions within Croatia as the Republic of Serbian Krajina, mainly the eastern-center and far eastern areas of Croatia. These Serbian-controlled regions failed to gain international recognition. Serbian forces ethnically cleansed approximately 85,000 Croats from the region forces by the end of 1991. The UN forces (UNPROFOR) monitored the cease-fire between Croatia and the JNA. Serbian Krajina officials, however, did not agree to this arrangement until April 6, 1993.

Both sides regularly violated the provisions of the cease-fire. These violations included incursions by the Croatian military and destruction of Serbian villages in UN-protected areas. Between 1992 and 1995, the Republic of Croatia managed to obtain modern weaponry for its military in the face of a poorly enforced UN arms embargo. Croatia's military also received training from the United States starting in September

of 1994. The Republic of Serbian Krajina military was armed with equipment left behind by the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia in May 1992.

On August 4, 1995, the Republic of Croatia launched Operation Storm, a rapid offensive to seize control of Serbian Krajina. The offensive opened with the Croatian Air Force targeting the Krajina Serb communication systems. With coordinating artillery, approximately 100,000 troops of the Croatian army attacked along an approximately 700-kilometer front with a strategic focus on retaking the city of Knin (southwestern Croatia). General Zvonimir Červenko (1926–2001) commanded the Croatian army. The Serbian Krajina forces had poor equipment, were far fewer in number, and were poorly organized. Milan Martić (1954–), the internationally unrecognized president of Serbian Krajina in 1995, ordered the evacuation of Serbian civilians to villages bordering the Serbian held areas of Bosnia on August 4. Many of the Serbian Krajina soldiers fled the region at the start of the offensive. 10,000 United Nations troops were also present in the Krajina region. Many UN posts came under fire during the offensive. The United Nations negotiated the withdrawal of disarmed Serbian Krajina soldiers who had been fighting in surrounded pockets on August 8. Most organized Serbian resistance in the Krajina region was over by August 9.

The completely successful military offensive lasted less than four days, but ethnic cleansing operations continued for months resulting in about 200,000 ethnic Serbs fleeing the Krajina region of Croatia. Some Krajina Serb refugees stayed in northern Bosnia, but most eventually settled in the Vojvodina or Kosovo regions of Serbia. Many of the Serbian refugees joined in ethnic cleansing activities after arriving at the

Banja Luka area of northern Bosnia and the Vojvodina region of northern Serbia. The Croatian offensive was also coordinated with an offensive by the Bosnian government against Serb held and other areas in Bosnia. Bosnian army soldiers from the region surrounding the neighboring city of Bihać also entered the Krajina region in the following months to join in the looting and destruction of property held by Serbs.

Operation Storm was a successful military offensive that reclaimed the Krajina region of Croatia for the Republic of Croatia. After Operation Storm, the only major area still held by separatist Serbian forces was the Slavonia region of eastern Croatia. Unlike the Krajina region, the Slavonia region remained supported by the JNA and would be the subject of negotiated talks during the final stages of the Yugoslav Wars.

Operation Storm was also the military basis for a successful ethnic cleansing operation. Croatian army general Ivan Čermak (1949–), who was in command of a corps assaulting Knin, was charged with war crimes but acquitted in 2011 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Croatian army general Ante Gotovina (1955–), a top commander of Operation Storm, and Mladen Markač (1955–), the commander of special police during Operation Storm, were found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2011. The verdict was overturned on appeal on November 16, 2012, when the court declared in a 3–2 vote that the defendants had not engaged in a conspiracy to commit a joint criminal enterprise. Other Croatian commanders and politicians were indicted by the Tribunal but died before a trial could be held. Milan Martić was found guilty of a joint criminal enterprise involving war crimes and crimes against humanity

by the Tribunal and sentenced to 35 years in prison on June 12, 2007.

Brian G. Smith

See also: Croat Forces, 1991–1995; Croat War, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes

Further Reading

“Croatia: Impunity for Abuses Committed during Operation Storm and the Denial of the Right of Refugees to Return to the Krajina.” *Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Report* 8, no. 13 (August 1996).

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Russian and European Analysis. *Balkan Battlefields: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1991–1995*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002. 2 vols.

Weiss, Thomas, and Don Hubert. *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001.

Zanic, Ivo, and Branka Magas, eds. *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991–1995*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001.

Süleyman Hüsni Pasha (1838–1892)

Süleyman Hüsni Pasha was an Ottoman pasha who was active in such important events in the late Ottoman period as the deposition of Sultan Abdulaziz (1830–1876), passage to a constitutional monarchy, and declaration of the constitution, and who led military operations in the Balkans in 1876–1878.

Süleyman was born in Constantinople in 1838. He is best known in Turkey as the “Hero of Shipka” and as one of the pioneers of Turkish nationalism. He graduated from the military high school and military college and commissioned as an infantry officer in

1860. Except during his service at the military academy, he fought against rebels, bandits, or tribal warriors in nearly every corner of the empire from Balkan provinces of Serbia, Herzegovina and Montenegro to Crete, Yemen, and Asir. He was promoted to the rank of brigadier general while working as a lecturer at the Military College. One year later, he was appointed as the superintendent of the military academy and other military schools (1873). He was instrumental in launching important military educational reforms such as enrolling cadets from Christian groups, introducing new regulations and academic curricula that were formulated according to latest French military models.

Süleyman joined a conspiracy to dethrone Sultan Abdülaziz. Under the leadership of Hüseyin Avni Pasha (1820–1876), the conspirators persuaded theology students and common people to riot in front of the grand vizier's offices. After the tension increased, Süleyman Pasha ordered the cadet battalion and several other military units to occupy the palace. The conspirators dethroned the sultan on May 30, 1876. The new sultan Abdulhamid II was understandable highly uncomfortable with the key figures of the coup d'état. He assigned Süleyman Pasha to the Montenegro border to fight against Serbian and Montenegrin military and rebels. Süleyman Pasha first organized a successful defense against the conventional and unconventional attackers and repulsed them to Montenegro.

Due to his recently gained fame, Süleyman was assigned as the Balkan Corps commander immediately after the first phase of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. His main task was to recapture Shipka (Şipka) Pass, which was a key passage in the midst of Bulgaria. He was deeply resentful of being under the command of the German-born Mehmed Ali Pasha (Ludwig Karl

Friedrich Detroit; (1827–1878), who was junior in rank and status. Süleyman Pasha reached the Balkan ridges with his two veteran divisions of the Montenegrin Campaign on July 23, 1877. He wasted an excellent opportunity at Eski Zağra because of discord with his subordinates.

Süleyman Pasha launched his long-awaited assault on August 21, two days after conducting a reconnaissance. His battle-hardened divisions launched repeated attacks through rugged mountainous terrain under terrible Russian artillery fire for four days and nights. It was an impossible mission under the conditions. The Balkan Corps lost one-fourth of its combat strength. Süleyman Pasha refused to accept the futility of a continuation of assaults against Shipka. His immense self-esteem and hatred of Mehmed Ali Pasha prevented him from joining forces with Mehmed Ali Pasha in order to make use of the opportunities created by the defenders of Pleven (Plevne), who attracted an important percentage of the Russian army.

The Balkan Corps remained stuck in front of Shipka until the assignment of Süleyman Pasha as the new Serdar of the Balkan front on September 26. As the new commander of the Balkan front, Süleyman Pasha finally understood the importance of relieving Pleven and destroying the main Russian army. However, his two archenemies, Rauf Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha, were the commanders of two important corps which he had no control. Out of frustration, Süleyman Pasha launched several limited attacks in the direction of Pleven. Some of them, like the battle of Elena on December 4, actually achieved their planned objectives, but these local successes failed to relieve Pleven because of a lack of support (which was compounded by a lack of knowledge about enemy vulnerabilities).

The fall of Pleven released the Russian army. Süleyman Pasha tried his best to

conduct a fighting retreat with nearly seven brigades, but he managed only to delay the Russian onslaught for a few days. Most of his units were encircled or disintegrated at some stage of the withdrawal. Then he decided to regroup in the safety of the Rodope Mountains, which turned out to be fatal because it decreased the number of possible forces available for the defense of Adrianople (Edirne). One Russian column managed to bypass the retreating Ottoman force and captured Edirne on January 20, 1878, even as the Ottoman peace delegation was trying to come to terms with their Russian counterparts. After the end of war, he was court-martialed, stripped off his rank and medals, and exiled to Baghdad, where he died in exile in 1892.

Ahmet Özcan

See also: Bulgarian Horrors, 1876; Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878; San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878

Further Reading

- İ. Halil Sedes. *1877–1878 Osmanlı-Rus ve Romen Savaşı*. Vol. 3 and Vol. 8. Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1937, 1940.
- Keçecizade İzzet Fuad. *Kaçırılan Fırsatlar: 1877 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı Hakkında Eleştiriler ve Askeri Düşünceler*, (ed.) Rasim Süerdem. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1997.
- Schem, A. J. *An Illustrated History of the Conflict between Russia and Turkey with a Review of the Eastern Question*. New York: H. S. Goodspeed & Co, 1878.

T

Tepelene, Ali Pasha (1744–1822)

Ali Pasha Tepelene was known as the “lion of Janina” for the daring and ruthlessness with which he extended his control over much of Albania and Greece during the early nineteenth century. As the pasha, or provincial governor, of Janina, he ruled as an agent of the Ottoman Empire, but he conducted himself as an independent power and was recognized as such by European heads of state. He is regarded by Albanians as a great patriot and nationalist.

Ali was born in 1744 at Tepelene in southern Albania. His father, Veli, though poor, was the governor of Tepelene but was murdered when Ali was 14. His mother, Khamco, organized a band of brigands to restore the family’s fortunes. An excellent shot and absolutely fearless, Ali soon became the leader of these brigands operating in this mountainous area.

At this time, Albania and Greece were both part of the Ottoman Empire, but the Ottoman sultan often governed through loyal local rulers. Once recognized by the sultan, such men were given the title of pasha, and the territories assigned to them were known as pashaliks. Ali continued to gain experience by performing services for the pasha of Negroponte and then the pasha of Delvino, whose daughter he married in 1768.

Banditry was extremely common in the area, and Ali came to the favorable attention of the sultan because of his knowledge of the police system. In the 1760s, the Ottomans

had arranged a policing network that drew its agents from the ranks of the bandits themselves. It required skillful handling to maintain discipline among this police force and suppress its ties with relatives who still remained outlaws. Ali was named a commander in this system in 1787 and performed well in this ambiguous role. During 1793–1794 and again during 1803–1804, he was given the responsibility of routing out particularly well-entrenched leaders and assisted in a siege against a powerful clan of Albanians who were defying the power of Constantinople. The sultan, in turn, showed his appreciation for Ali’s help. In the 1780s, Ali had received the pashalik of Trikkala from Sultan Abdulhamid I (1725–1789) and then, through his own wiles and violence, obtained the pashalik of Janina (present-day Ioannina, Greece) in 1788.

From this point forward, Ali extended his authority over ever-increasing numbers of townships and people, often appointing his sons, Veli and Mukhtar, to govern them on his behalf. Ali’s pashalik and the order within it were maintained through his own ruthlessness and cunning. Yet he also engaged in considerable construction in both Epirus (present-day northwestern Greece) and Albania, building roads and draining marshes. Moreover, the eradication of bandits in his realm, though sometimes accomplished with great cruelty, was appreciated by merchants who could engage more freely in trade on peaceful roads and increase the wealth of the area (and that of Ali).

Janina remained the center of Ali's pashalik and of his court life. Though it retained a certain wildness, Janina became the foremost center of Greek culture during this period. Ali himself, though he spoke Albanian, Greek, and some Turkish, was illiterate, but he recruited Greek scholars and founded Greek schools in his capital. Throughout this period, European travelers were frequent guests at Ali's cultured court, and he became celebrated for the hospitality he extended to these people, who often recorded their impressions in their memoirs. His most famous visitor was the poet Lord Byron, who left his memories of the encounter as a canto in *Childe Harold*. Even the liberated Greeks would look back on Ali's court with respect.

In addition to entertaining individual travelers from other parts of Europe, Ali became a skilled diplomat and manipulated other European rulers to gain greater leverage with the sultan. He was treated as an independent sovereign by the heads of Britain and France. His army defeated that of Emperor Napoleon I at Berat in 1809, though Napoleon returned two years later and succeeded in gaining the access to the Ionian Islands that he had been denied earlier. As the Napoleonic Wars grew in scale, the potential usefulness of Ali's forces were appreciated by both the Russians and the British; the latter entered into an official alliance with Ali in 1814.

More important than his dealings with Europe, however, was Ali's role within the Ottoman Empire. In the early nineteenth century, the empire had entered a phase of decline that was greatly hastened by the actions of such independent despots as Ali. For years, a succession of sultans had appreciated the assistance received from Ali and had let him do much as he wished. By 1810, Ali's rule extended to most of the

Peloponnesus, central Greece, western Macedonia, and southern Albania. Though he was appointed viceroy of Rumelia (the Ottoman term for most of the Balkans), the nineteenth-century sultans became increasingly dissatisfied with Ali's independent spirit and his frequent failure to carry out orders. As Ali hastened the economic development of his territories, he also infected his subjects with the desire for independence from the empire that would lead to more pronounced Albanian nationalism later in the century.

In the meantime, many people throughout Greece were already planning an independence war. Though Ali did not participate directly in these efforts, his own activities divided the attention of the sultan. By 1819, Sultan Mahmud II (1789–1839) had lost patience with Ali and was conspiring to be rid of him. In the following year, when Ali had one of his own enemies murdered in the city of Constantinople, the sultan ordered that he be deposed. When Ali refused to comply, Ottoman troops were sent against him and remained thus occupied as the Greeks elsewhere on the peninsula initiated their independence efforts.

Ali was finally assassinated by the sultan's agents on February 5, 1822. After his death, he was decapitated and his head carried back to Constantinople for display.

Karen Mead

See also: Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832

Further Reading

Faroghi, Suraiya, et al. *Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Fleming, K. E. *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Plomer, William Charles Franklyn. *Ali the Lion: Ali of Tebeleni, Pasha of Jannina: 1741–1822*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1970.

Young, Antonia, ed. *Albania*. Santa Barbara CA: ABC-CLIO, 1997.

Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980)

Yugoslav Communist leader, major figure in the Yugoslav resistance during World War II, and leader of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito was born on May 7, 1892, into a peasant family in the village of Kumrovec in Croatia on the border with Slovenia (then part of Austria), Josip Broz was one of 15 children of a Croat blacksmith and a Slovene mother. Much of his early life remains obscure. With little formal education, he became a metal-worker and machinist. Active in the Social-Democratic Party, he was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian army in 1913. He fought in World War I and rose to the rank of sergeant, commanding a platoon in a Croat regiment before being captured in 1915 on the Russian Front.

While in the camp, Broz became fluent in Russian. Released following the March 1917 Revolution, he made his way to Petrograd, where he joined the Bolsheviks but was imprisoned until the Bolsheviks took power in October 1917. He fought on the Communist side in the Russian Civil War but returned to Croatia in 1920 and helped organize the Yugoslav Communist Party (YPJ). Rising rapidly in responsibility and position, he became a member of the YPJ Politburo and Central Committee. It was at this time that he took the pseudonym of “Tito” to conceal his identity. He was imprisoned from 1929 to 1934. In 1937, Stalin appointed Tito to head the YPJ as its secretary-general. Tito knew little of communist ideology, but Stalin was interested in loyalty.



Josip Broz Tito, an accomplished guerrilla leader, led Yugoslavia out of World War II and reorganized the country to follow his iron-fisted, communist rule—even while he moved the nation away from total Soviet domination. (Library of Congress)

Following the German invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Tito took command of the Communist Partisan resistance movement with the twin goals of fighting the Axis occupiers and then seizing power in Yugoslavia once the Allies had won. Tito and the Partisans did not hesitate to attack German garrisons, sparking retaliation and the execution of many more innocent hostages than Germans slain. Tito's Partisans became archrivals of the Serb-dominated Četniks (Chetniks) led by General Draža Mihajlović (1893–1946), minister of war in the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London. The Četniks eschewed the types of attacks undertaken by the Partisans, rightly

fearing German reprisals. In a controversial decision that had far-reaching repercussions for the future of Yugoslavia, in 1943, the British government, which headed the Allied effort to assist the Yugoslav resistance, shifted all support to the Partisans.

By the end of the war, the Partisans had grown to a force of 800,000 people and had in fact liberated most of Yugoslavia themselves, placing Tito in a strong bargaining position with Stalin. Tito attempted to annex the southern provinces of Austria, moving Yugoslav forces into Carinthia, but was prevented in this design by the timely arrival of the British V Corps and was convinced to quit Austrian territory in mid-May 1945.

Tito extracted vengeance on the Croats, many of whom had been loyal to the Axis, as had many Slovenes. Perhaps 100,000 people who had sided with the Axis occupiers were executed by the Partisans without trial within weeks of the war's end. The majority of German prisoners taken in the war also perished in the long March of Hate across Yugoslavia.

With the support of the Red Army, Tito formed the National Front and consolidated his power. Although superficially there appeared to be a coalition government in Yugoslavia, Tito dominated. In the November 1945 elections for a constituent assembly, the National Front headed by the Partisans won 96 percent of the vote. The assembly promptly deposed Peter II (1923–1970) and proclaimed a republic. Yugoslavia's new constitution was modeled on that of the Soviet Union. Tito elaborated the twin ideas of national self-determination for Yugoslavia's nationalities and a strong, centralized Communist Party organization that would be the sole political expression of each national group's will. Under Tito, Yugoslavia became a federal republic, a

beneficial change for a country that had suffered severely from rivalries among its various peoples. Tito also nationalized the economy and built it on the Soviet model.

Following the war, Tito had General Mihajlović and some other leading Četniks put on trial under trumped-up charges of collaboration with the Germans. Despite vigorous Western protests, they were executed in July 1946. Equally destructive of European goodwill was the sentencing of Archbishop Aloysius Stepinac (1898–1960) to life imprisonment for his anticommunist role during the war.

For 35 years, Tito held Yugoslavia together by ruling as a despot. In a departure from his past record of sharing hardships with his men, once in power he developed a taste for a luxurious lifestyle. He muzzled dissent, but repression and fear of outside powers, chiefly the Soviet Union, solidified his rule.

In 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the international Communist movement. The break sprang in large part from Tito's desire to form under his leadership a Balkan confederation of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. There were also differences with Moscow over Yugoslav support for the Communist side in the Greek Civil War, as Moscow lived up to its bargain with Winston Churchill during the war not to contest British control in Greece.

The break with Moscow and fears of a Russian invasion led Tito to build up a large military establishment. In this he was assisted by the West, chiefly the United States. By the time of Tito's death in 1980, the Yugoslav standing army and reserves totaled 2 million men. To protect his freedom of movement, Tito also joined Yugoslavia to the Non-Aligned Movement, and in the 1960s, he became a leader of this group along with Gamal Abdel Nasser

(1918–1970) of Egypt and Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) of India.

Before the break, Tito was as doctrinaire as Stalin. After the schism, Tito became more flexible. He allowed peasants to withdraw from cooperative farms and halted the compulsory delivery of crops. He decentralized industry by permitting the establishment of workers' councils with a say in running the factories. He permitted citizens more rights in the courts and limited freedom of speech, and he opened cultural ties with the West and released Archbishop Stepinac (although he was not restored to authority). In 1949, Tito even wrote an article in the influential American journal *Foreign Affairs* titled "Different Paths to Socialism," giving birth to polycentralism.

By 1954, however, reform had ended. Tito reacted sharply to Milován Djilas's (1911–1995) proposal to establish a more liberal socialist movement in the country that would in effect turn Yugoslavia into a two-party state. Djilas's book, *The New Class* (1957), charged that a new class of bureaucrats exploited the masses as much as or more than their predecessors. Djilas was condemned to prison. Meanwhile, financial problems multiplied. By the end of the 1970s, inflation was surging, Yugoslavia's foreign debt was up dramatically, its goods could not compete in the world marketplace, and there were dramatic economic differences between the prosperous north and impoverished south that threatened to break up the state.

As long as Tito lived, Yugoslavia held together. In 1974, Tito had set up a complicated collective leadership. The constitution of that year provided for an association of equals that helped to minimize the power of Serbia, diminish Yugoslavia's ethnic and religious hatreds and rivalries, and keep the lid on nationalism. There was a multiethnic, eight-man State Presidency representing the

six republics and two autonomous regions. Each of the six republics had virtual veto power over federal decision-making. Djilas claimed that Tito deliberately set things up so that after his death, no one would ever possess as much power as he did.

Tito died in Ljubljana on May 4, 1980. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, with the end of the threat of Soviet invasion, and with the discrediting of communism, the federal system that Tito had put together came apart in bloodshed and war.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Partisans, Yugoslavia; Trieste Dispute; Yugoslavia in World War II; Yugoslav-Soviet Split

Further Reading

Djilas, Milován. *Tito*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980.

Pavlowitch, Steven K. *Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator: A Reassessment*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1992.

Roberts, Walter R. *Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941–1945*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973.

West, Richard. *Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia*. New York: Carroll and Graf, 1994.

Transnistrian War

The Transnistrian War was a conflict on the northeastern frontier of the Balkans between the forces of the Republic of Moldova and the breakaway region of Transnistria. It lasted from 1990 until a cease-fire on July 21, 1992. The origins of the war lie in the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic before 1918 had been the province of Bessarabia as a part of imperial Russia and then a part of Greater Romania from 1918 to 1940 and

again from 1941 to 1944. Soviet authorities attached a thin strip of land on the east bank of the Dniester River to the Moldavian SSR. The Moldavian SSR declared its independence as the Republic of Moldova on August 27, 1991. This raised concerns in the largely Russian and Ukrainian populations living in the area on the east bank of the Dniester River that the new republic might seek a union with Romania. Pro-Russian elements proclaimed a Transnistrian Republic in Tiraspol on September 2, 1990.

Fighting began when Moldovan government forces attempted to cross the Dniester River into Transnistria to enforce the rule of the government in Chis on November 2, 1990. These efforts proved unsuccessful. Fighting intensified in 1992. Transnistrian forces received aid from Russia and Ukraine as well as from Cossack organizations. The Russian army's Fourteenth Army, under the command of General Alexander Lebed (1950–2002), was stationed in Transnistria. It provided valuable support to the Transnistrian forces. Moldova obtained some military assistance from Romania. After some heavy fighting along the river, the Russian government of Boris Yeltsin (1931–2007) arranged a cease fire on July 21, 1992; as of this writing, it remained in effect. Around 1,000 people died in the conflict. The government of Transnistria has obtained little international recognition beyond Russia. It is widely accused of engaging in a number of illegal activities including smuggling and money laundering.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bessarabia; Cold War in the Balkans

Further Reading

Herd, Graeme P., and Jennifer D. P. Moroney. *Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc*. London: Routledge, 2003.

King, Charles. *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia and the Politics of Culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.

Panici, Andrei. "Romanian Nationalism in the Republic of Moldova." *Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 2 no. 2 (January 2003): 37–55.

Trianon, Treaty of, 1920

The Treaty of Trianon between the Allied powers and Hungary at the end of World War I confirmed the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well as new frontiers in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the Paris Peace Conference began in January 1919, the peace treaty with Hungary was not signed until mid-1920 because of internal upheaval in Hungary.

On October 16, 1918, the Hungarian government declared an end to the dual system of government with Austria, with only a personal union remaining between the states. On October 31, Count Mihály Károlyi's (1875–1955) "bloodless bourgeois revolution" created an independent Hungary, ending the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Prime Minister Károlyi, aware of demands for self-determination by the various ethnic groups, proposed transforming Hungary into a confederation and creating an "Eastern Switzerland" in the Danube region. Both Britain and the United States supported the plan, but ethnic groups within Hungary sought to join the new states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, while Romanians in eastern Hungary wanted to be part of Romania. These aspirations doomed Károlyi's plan to preserve the territorial integrity of Hungary.

On November 3, 1918, Austro-Hungarian forces had signed an armistice at Padova, officially ending hostilities with Italy. Unwilling to accept this arrangement,

French general Louis Franchet d'Esperey (1856–1942), commander of Allied forces in the Balkans, forced the Károlyi government on November 13 to sign a military convention in Belgrade that defined the demarcation line in southern Hungary. This document allowed French troops to occupy part of Transylvania, while portions of Baranya came under French and Serbian occupation. The French government, under pressure from leaders of the new Czechoslovak government abroad, broke the terms of the Belgrade Convention and authorized the Czech occupation of Slovakia.

Prime Minister Károlyi continued to base his foreign policy on the application to Hungary of U.S. president Woodrow Wilson's (1856–1924) Fourteen Points. Until February 1918, Wilson supported the conclusion of a group of experts who opposed the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as an economic unit. Wilson changed his mind when he became convinced that preserving the Dual Monarchy would likely lead to continued German dominance in the region. Wilson was also under pressure from Czech leaders and the British media.

In early 1919, the Allied Supreme War Council in Paris authorized successor states to occupy Hungarian territory. Czech, Romanian, and Serbian (Yugoslav) forces violated even these arrangements by advancing beyond the set demarcation lines. When he learned of the Allied decision, Prime Minister Károlyi resigned in protest on March 20, 1919. The next day, the Communists came to power in Hungary and established the Hungarian Soviet Republic, which then went to war to recover Slovakia but was in turn defeated by Romanian forces, leading to its collapse.

Only after the departure of the Romanian army from Budapest and the stabilization of the political situation under the

conservative rule of Admiral Miklós Horthy could the Hungarian delegation travel to Paris in January 1920 to receive the peace treaty conditions offered by the Allied powers to Hungary. These arrangements were draconian. Instead of proposing democratic and federative changes for Hungary, the peace treaty created successor states in the Danube region. Hungary lost as much as two-thirds of its territory to these new states. Romania gained Transylvania, part of the Hungarian Plain east of Oradea, and the eastern Banat. Czechoslovakia secured Slovakia and Carpathian Rus'. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians (Yugoslavia) gained Croatia, Slavonia, the Bačka, and the western Banat. Austria secured Burgenland, already ceded in the Treaty of Saint-Germain. The only exception was Sopron/Ödenburg, where local inhabitants attacked Austrian troops when they entered the city. Under direction of the Allied powers, a plebiscite was held in December 1921 in Sopron and the immediate surrounding area. As a result of the vote, this small part of the Burgenland remained part of Hungary. As far as Hungary was concerned, this was the only instance where the Allies allowed a plebiscite to be held.

Hungary was left essentially an agricultural state of only 8 million people; 3 million other Hungarians were forced to live under foreign sovereignty, chiefly those in Transylvania. Hungary was deprived of access to the sea as well as the majority of its former natural resources. Its army was set at a maximum of 35,000 men.

The peace treaty signed in the Trianon Palace in Versailles on June 4, 1920, confirmed these provisions. Blocks of Hungarians living along the frontiers were cut off from Hungary by this artificial separation. Virtually the entire population of what

remained of Hungary regarded the Treaty of Trianon as manifestly unfair, and agitation for revision began immediately. Promise of return of some of its former territories formed the basis of the subsequent co-operation of Hungary with Adolf Hitler's Germany.

Anna Boros

See also: Yugoslavia, Axis Occupation Forces in World War II

Further Reading

Király, Béla B., Peter Pastor, and Ivan Sanders, eds. *Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking: A Case Study on Trianon*. New York: Social Science Monographs, Brooklyn College Press, 1982.

Macartney, Carlile Aylmer. *Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences, 1919–1937*. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Ormos, Mária. *From Padua to the Trianon, 1918–1920*. Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1990.

Trieste Dispute

Trieste is an Italian city at the northern head of the Adriatic Sea near the border with Yugoslavia (now Slovenia and Croatia), whose sovereignty was hotly contested between Italy and Yugoslavia. Securing Trieste from the Austro-Hungarian Empire was one of the main objectives of Italian intervention in World War I, which explains the emotion bound with its name among many Italians. Mainly surrounded by hills that have limited its size, Trieste became important when it was occupied at the end of World War II by the Yugoslav Partisans, led by veteran Communist Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980). Meanwhile, the British and Americans pushed the 2nd New Zealand Armored Division to Trieste to prevent

Yugoslavia from securing full control of the city's important harbor. Some observers saw in this development the first sign of the forthcoming Cold War.

The Yugoslav occupation elicited violence against the majority Italian population and against non-Communist Slovenians, but an agreement brokered between the British and Tito's representatives on August 8, 1945, restored at least partial order. The former Italian territory now under Yugoslav control was divided into two areas by the Morgan Line. The British and Americans occupied the western zone, comprising Trieste Harbor, and the Yugoslavs controlled the eastern territory, which contained important strategic natural resources such as mercury, bauxite, and coal.

Trieste straddled two worlds: the Eastern Communist bloc and the Western democratic bloc. Certainly, the Soviet Union supported Communist Yugoslavia's claims on the region. For their part, the Allies actually encouraged Tito in the sense that they assisted him economically and diplomatically following his 1948 break with the Soviet Union.

The Yugoslavs reinforced their troop presence in the area, and in 1951, the Italians deployed the first groups of former partisans in a covert stay-behind organization known as "O," which later would be integrated into the Gladio organization under the control of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In the Paris Peace Treaty signed on February 10, 1947, between Italy and the Allies, Yugoslavia secured the Istrian Peninsula, forcing some 250,000 Italians to abandon the area and find refuge in Italy. The Trieste area was designated a Free Territory under the administration of the United Nations. Meanwhile, Yugoslavs killed perhaps 10,000 Italians in the *foibe* (karstic

sinkholes), which were effective natural cemeteries.

Because neither Italy nor Yugoslavia could agree on a governor for Trieste, the area was divided into area “A” (from Duino to Trieste) and area “B” (Capodistria to Cittanova). On several occasions, the Italian population of Trieste protested against the Allied occupation, resulting in civilian fatalities when British troops overreacted to the demonstrations. At the same time, Yugoslavia continued to threaten the annexation of area “B.”

According to some historians, the Italian government mounted covert paramilitary operations in Istria that were designed to discourage Yugoslavia’s aspirations and plans regarding annexation. The Trieste crisis also played an important role in Italian domestic politics because it fueled Italian right-wing movements. Several youth organizations volunteered to mount strong protests against Tito and the Allied occupation of the city.

Finally, an agreement was signed in London on May 10, 1954, stipulating that Istria was to be administered by Yugoslavia and Trieste by Italy, with mutual respect of minority rights. This led to the Anglo-American withdrawal of troops from Trieste, which now passed to Italian sovereignty. On December 10, 1975, Italy and Yugoslavia signed the Osimo Treaty that finalized the border permanently with only a few slight modifications.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia after the Velvet Revolution of 1989–1990 did not change the Trieste situation. In June 1991, war broke out in the former Yugoslav territories, which led to the end of the Yugoslav federal state, as Croatia and Slovenia gained their independence. Both declared that they would respect the Yugoslav state’s legacy and would therefore honor the Osimo

Treaty. Italian foreign minister Emilio Colombo expressed Italy’s satisfaction with this decision.

Alessandro Massignani

See also: Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslav-Soviet Split

Further Reading

Brogi, Alessandro. *A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944–1958*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

De Leonardis, Massimo. *La diplomazia “Atlantica” e la soluzione del problema di Trieste (1952–1954)*. [Atlantic Diplomacy and the Resolution of the Trieste Problem (1952–1954).] Naples, Italy: Esi, 1992.

Rabel, Roberto G. *Between East and West: Trieste, the United States and the Cold War, 1941–1954*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988.

Truman Doctrine

On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) addressed a joint session of Congress and solemnly stated: “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.” With that, President Truman committed the United States to what became known as the containment doctrine, according to which the United States would take all necessary measures to prevent the spread of Communism and of the Soviet Union and its subjugation of the free world. The sources of this policy were

much more humble, and it was originated in the announcement of Great Britain, in February 1947, that it no longer would be able to provide the financial support it used to provide to Greece and Turkey. The meaning of such an act, Washington feared, would be the fall of these countries under Communist influence, and mainly Greece, whose pro-Western government was fighting at that time Communist guerillas in the northern part of the country.

The eastern basin of the Mediterranean, which included the Near East and Middle East, was historically under British influence. The area was important to the British Empire after World War II, but now it gained additional importance in light of the developing Cold War. Soviet presence in the Near East or in North Africa could jeopardize the ability of the Western powers to launch strategic air attacks on the Soviet Union from bases in the region, in case of a war. The defense of the region was placed in the hands of the British, and it relied on the British military bases in the area, the biggest of which was in Egypt, and in the supply of military aid to Greece and Turkey. British power was declining, however, and at the same time, Soviet activity aiming to undermine Western influence in the region seemed to increase. Such was the Soviet demand from the Turkish government to change the rules governing ship movements through the Dardanelles and to take part, along with other Black Sea powers, in the defense of the straits. American interpretation of the Soviet demand was that it intended to build a base in Turkey, to take it over, and then to gain control over Greece, and from there of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. The event by itself was of minor importance in the sense that the Soviet demand was made in the form of a diplomatic note and was not supported by

any military action, explicit or implicit. The problem was, from the American point of view, that there seemed to be a power vacuum in the region as a result of British weakening. Britain was providing military aid to Turkey, but the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) thought that, because of its strategic importance, and in order to increase its ability to meet the Soviet pressure, the United States should increase its economic and military aid to Turkey. However, as long as the British continued to provide the military assistance, the administration would provide only economic aid.

The American attitude toward the situation in Turkey was not dissociated with the situation in Greece, and with the difficulties Britain was facing in its ability to meet the growing needs in the part of the Mediterranean. Greece, like Turkey, was considered as a barrier between the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean. However, the Greek government had to deal with armed Communist guerrillas acting in the country. The struggle in the country was not necessarily one inspired by the Soviet Union, but it was the result of a struggle between rigid right-wingers who sought to restore monarchy while failing to deal with the country's grave economic situation, and left-wing party republicans who were affected by the economic upheaval. For the United States, though, the political affiliation of the rebels was enough to convince it to move against them. Either with Soviet assistance or not, the United States would not tolerate the establishment of a Communist government in Athens, and the Truman administration was ready to provide assistance to the Greek government in its struggle against the Communists.

The decisive moment came with the British announcement in February 1947 that they would be unable to continue their

support to Greece and Turkey. The dire economic situation of the British made the burden of providing military aid to those countries too heavy, and the government announced that the Truman administration would pull its armed forces from Greece and stop its aid to Greece and Turkey almost immediately. It was obvious to the Department of State that with the British inability to contain the Russians, the United States should do that. However, when preparing the draft legislation for providing military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, Undersecretary Dean Acheson (1893–1971) found it difficult to justify the assistance request for Turkey, and it did need funds for relief or recovery since it had never been under a direct threat from the Kremlin. To make things more difficult, conciliatory messages were coming from Moscow, reducing the incentive in Congress to take measures against the Soviet Union. Truman and his aides, determined to provide Turkey and Greece military and economic aid, had to find a way to “sell” such an aid to Congress.

In a meeting with the heads of Congress, Acheson described in dark lights the implications of Soviet dominance of the region and the worldwide consequences of such Soviet achievement. In response, the Republican senator Arthur Vandenberg (1884–1951) told Truman that if the president would present his request to Congress in that manner, the Senate would support his request. And so, the request from a joint session of Congress for \$400 million for aid to Turkey and Greece was presented in terms of a struggle “between alternate ways of life.” It marked the emergence of the Truman Doctrine, which meant decision to resist aggressive communism throughout the world.

David Tal

See also: Cold War in the Balkans; Greek Civil War

Further Reading

Kuniholm, Bruce R. *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980

Leffler, Melvin. *Preponderance of Power*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992

Tsolakoglou, Georgios (1886–1948)

Georgios Tsolakoglou was a Greek military officer and collaborationist with the German occupation. Born in April 1886 in Rentia, Greece, Tsolakoglou pursued a career in the Greek military. He participated in the Balkan Wars, World War I, the Greek expeditionary force in Ukraine during the Russian Civil War, and the Asia Minor Campaign. In World War II he commanded the Third Army Corps of the Army of Western Macedonia, which first fought to repel the Italian invasion of October 1940. During the Greek counteroffensive, he seized Korçë in southern Albania on November 22, 1940.

When the Germans invaded Greece on April 6, 1941, and captured Thessaloniki three days later, Tsolakoglou's force was caught between the Italians and the Germans. Recognizing that his position was hopeless, he surrendered the entire Greek army to the German invaders of Greece at Larissa on April 21, 1941. Because of German insistence, he surrendered to the Italians on 23 April. These surrenders occurred without the sanction of the Greek government.

On April 29, 1941, the Germans appointed Tsolakoglou to be the prime minister of the collaborationist government in

Athens. In this respect he was similar to Henri Pétain (1856–1951) in France and Milan Nedić (1877–1946) in Serbia. Tsolakoglou proved to be an incompetent ruler who garnered little popular support. The poor condition of the Greek economy caused the Germans to replace him with a civilian economics expert, Konstantinos Logothetopoulos (1878–1961) on December 2, 1942. After the war, a Special Collaborators Court arrested Tsolakoglou, tried him, and sentenced him to death. Eventually his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He died in prison on May 22, 1948.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Greco-Italian War, 1940–1941; Greece in World War II; Nedić, Milan (1877–1946)

Further Reading

Glenny, Misha. *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804–1999*. New York: Viking, 1999.

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. Vol. 2, *Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Mazower, Mark. *Inside Hitler's Greece*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993.

Tudjman, Franjo (1922–1999)

Yugoslav military officer and first president of the Republic of Croatia (1990–1999), Franjo Tudjman was born in Veliko, Trgovišće, in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (now Croatia) on May 14, 1922. He attended secondary school in Zagreb and graduated from the Military Academy in Belgrade in 1957. He served in the Partisan movement during World War II.

Tudjman worked in the Yugoslav Ministry of National Defense during 1945–1961, becoming one of the youngest generals in

the Yugoslav army in 1960. He left active military service the next year and began a new career as head of the Institute for the History of the Labor Movement of Croatia (1961–1967). During 1963–1967, he was also an associate professor of history at Zagreb University, where he earned a doctorate in political science in 1965.

Tudjman was a member of the Socialist Republic of Croatia's parliament during 1965–1969. After participating in the nationalist Croatian Spring movement, he was imprisoned for two years beginning in October 1972. He was again imprisoned during 1981–1984 for his political activities aimed at Croatian independence.

In 1989, Tudjman became one of the founding members of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). After the HDZ won the first democratic elections in 1990, he joined the parliament, which designated him president of the new Republic of Croatia. In 1991, Tudjman led his country to full independence from Yugoslavia and in the subsequent war with Serbia, which lasted until 1995 and claimed thousands of lives. His policies emphasizing Croatian nationalism did little to reassure the Serbian minority, who constituted around 12 percent of the population within Croatia's borders, mainly in the Krajina region. When the country declared independence, the Serbs attempted to secede. A Serbian government formed in Knin. Croatian sovereignty was not restored there until 1995. Nevertheless, in 1991, he secretly met with Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006) in Karadjordjevo to discuss a partition of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbian-controlled Yugoslavia. After the fighting began in Bosnia in 1992, this plan was abandoned.

After the fall of Vukovar in November 1991, fighting in Croatia died down until 1995. Tudjman secured military help



Franjo Tudjman was a Croatian nationalist who was elected president of Croatia in 1990 and led the republic to independence from the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav federation. (Embassy of the Republic of Croatia)

from the United States. During Operation Storm, his retrained and reequipped forces expelled much of the Serbian population from Croatia.

Tudjman was reelected president in direct elections in 1992 and 1997. His regime was

characterized by both significant human rights abuses and political repression. In 1995 he signed the Dayton Agreement, but refused to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal. As president of Croatia, he refused to distance himself from émigré Croats with Ustaša connections. He also embarrassed himself by publishing a book that questioned the extent of the Holocaust. Tudjman died on December 10, 1999, in Zagreb. Tudjman deservedly shares much of the odium for the breakup of Yugoslavia with Milošević.

Lucian N. Leustean

See also: Bosnian War, 1992–1995; Milošević, Slobodan (1941–2006); Vukovar, Siege of, 1991; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Goldstein, Ivo. *Croatia: A History*. Translated by Nikolina Jovanovic. London: Hurst, 1999.

Rogel, Carole. *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998.

Tanner, Marcus. *Croatia: A Nation Forged in War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001.



UNPROFOR

The United Nations Security Council (Resolution 743-1992) created the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for the former Yugoslavia as a peacekeeping force on February 21, 1992, and ordered it to deploy on April 7, 1992 (Resolution 749-1992) with an operational mandate in five of the republics of the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia). UNPROFOR lasted until March 31, 1995, when the United Nations restructured its peacekeeping operations in the regions of the former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR consisted of nearly 39,000 military personnel from 42 countries with supporting staff. The headquarters was located in Zagreb, Croatia.

The Security Council established the original mandate to provide monitoring in protected areas of Croatia of cease-fire agreements between the government of Croatia, the Serbian minority in the Krajina region of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia National Army (JNA). This mandate was mostly consistent with the traditional requirements for UN interventions into conflict zones: the monitoring of established cease-fire agreements with all parties to the conflict agreeing to the intervention. UNPROFOR forces were first deployed to Croatia in large numbers within three UN Protected Areas with strong Serbian ethnic presence: western Slavonia, eastern Slavonia, and the Krajina region. Observers also went to the Former Yugoslavian

Republic of Macedonia. New protected areas were later established on June 30, 1992, in areas of Croatia controlled by the JNA, the mission goal being facilitating the removal of the JNA from Croatia.

On June 8, 1992, the UN Security Council expanded UNPROFOR's mandate to include security for the Sarajevo Airport in Bosnia and Herzegovina in response to the increasing violence between Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. UNPROFOR was tasked with securing the safety of humanitarian supplies being brought into Bosnia. On September 14, 1992, UNPROFOR's mandate was expanded again to protecting humanitarian convoys throughout Bosnia, also establishing infantry battalions throughout Bosnia to support the mission. Endangered humanitarian relief efforts due to heavy ongoing fighting and ethnic cleansing, notably around the city of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia, led to the UN Security Council on April 16, 1993, demanding Srebrenica be treated as a "safe area" to be demilitarized by all parties, with UNPROFOR to oversee the demilitarization. On May 6, UNPROFOR's mandate expanded to include additional "safe areas," including Sarajevo, Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde, and Bihać. It could use military force in these places to enforce the demilitarization against all parties other than the Bosnian government. Despite some humanitarian successes, insufficient ground forces and inconsistent support from air power hampered UNPROFOR's ability to carry out the expanded mandates. UNPROFOR regularly

faced deliberate attacks from all parties in the conflict, failed to prevent attacks on the Bosnian “safe areas” (usually by Bosnian Serb forces), failed to prevent ethnic cleansing atrocities, and regularly failed to influence the parties to honor the many broken cease-fire agreements.

UNPROFOR represented a shift in policy by the United Nations after the end of the Cold War. The post–Cold War missions became increasingly multilateral, showed a willingness by the Security Council to engage in coercive peace enforcement, and were openly concerned with humanitarian goals. The original peacekeeping mission of UNPROFOR was approved by all involved governments but not all parties to the conflict, remaining consistent with Cold War–era interventions. That mission expanded to a mandate of peace enforcement and vague directives to protect safe areas, to enforce demilitarization, and to protect humanitarian convoys throughout an active conflict zone. The capabilities and procedures developed by the United Nations throughout the Cold War were inadequate to the missions assigned to UNPROFOR. Although achieving some significant humanitarian successes such as maintaining the Sarajevo airport, the inadequacy combined with failures in Somalia and Rwanda during the 1990s forced the United Nations to examine its policies and procedures regarding intervention.

Brian G. Smith

See also: Sarajevo, Siege of, 1992–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. London: M. E. Sharpe, 2000.

Doyle, Michael, and Nicholas Sambanis. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.

Weiss, Thomas, and Don Hubert. *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001.

Ustaša

The Ustaša (literally, “rebels”) was an extreme right-wing Croat nationalist movement that fought for the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia prior to and during World War II. Following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, the Croat nationalists were disappointed to see their dreams of an independent Croatia crushed with the establishment of a new multiethnic state, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Croat radical nationalism eventually expressed itself in the creation of the Ustaša, which employed terrorist means in order to achieve its nationalist ambitions of an independent state. The start of World War II provided the Ustaša with an opportunity to try to establish an independent Croatia. In 1941, the Ustaša came to power with the support of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and formed a fascist puppet state in Croatia. Governed by Ante Pavelić (1889–1959), Croatia incorporated Bosnia and Herzegovina and had a significant Serb population. The Ustaša pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing against Jews, Roma, Muslims, and Serbs in territories under its control. It established a network of concentration camps, the largest of which was Jasenovac (about 60 miles south of the Croatian capital of Zagreb) that became as notorious in the Balkans as Auschwitz was in Nazi-occupied Poland. Implemented with merciless brutality, the Ustaša’s

extermination policies were responsible for the deaths of more than 500,000 Serbs, 20,000 Roma, most of the country's Jews, and untold thousands of political opponents. Well over 150,000 Serbs fled or were deported from Croatia, and as many as 200,000 Orthodox Christian Serbs were forced, often at gunpoint, to convert to Roman Catholicism.

Yugoslavian resistance to the Germans and their supporters, the Croatian Ustaša and Serbian general Milan Nedić's (1877–1946) government, centered on two factions. Colonel Dragoljub “Draža” Mihajlović (1893–1946), who strongly supported restoration of the monarchy, set up the Četniks (named for Serb guerrillas who had fought the Turks); while Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980), leader of the Yugoslav Communist Party since 1937, headed the second resistance group, the Partisans, which were particularly active in Montenegro, Serbia, and Bosnia. After failing to develop a cooperative approach against the Germans and Ustaša, Tito and Mihajlović turned against each other. Ultimately, the Partisans gained an upper hand, and by the end of the war, their numbers swelled to over half a million men.

After the war, Tito Partisans exacted vengeance on their opponents, including the Ustaša and Četniks. Within weeks of the war's end, the Partisans had executed without trial up to a quarter of a million people who had sided with the Germans, most of them Croats. However, many of the Ustaša leaders were able to flee to safety in South America. Pavelić himself fled to Argentina, where he reorganized the Ustaša in exile. He was, however, wounded in an assassination attempt in Madrid in 1957, and died two years later from his injuries.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Croatian War; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980)

Further Reading

Muñoz, Antonio J. *For Croatia and Christ: The Croatian Army in World War II, 1941–1945*. Bayside, NY: Europa Books, 2004.

Ramet, Sabrina P. *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.

Zimmermann, Warren. *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers*. New York: Times Books, 1996.



Vance-Owen Plan, 1993

The Vance-Owen peace plan was devised by Cyrus Vance (1917–2002), the United Nations (UN) peace envoy, and Lord David Owen (1938–), the European Union (EU) mediator. It was presented in January 1993, some nine months after the start of the conflict in Bosnia. The plan was guided by a desire to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multiethnic unitary state by formalizing the internal distribution of territories on the basis of ethnicity with regard to both the geographical and the historical contexts.

This goal was to be achieved by instituting 10 provinces (usually referred to as “cantons”), each with substantially devolved powers. This geographical solution could hardly be described as neat, given the historically diverse and intermingled distribution of the three communities—Serb, Croat, and Muslim. Three of these provinces were to be mainly Muslim, three mainly Serb, and two mainly Croat; in the center-west it proved difficult to characterize the proposed 10th province as other than mixed Muslim-Croat, and in the case of Sarajevo itself (province 7), all three of the ethnic groups were to share power. Sarajevo was also to be the seat of a weakened central government for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Of the parties to be convinced, only the Croats could accept the cartography with readiness, as it offered them scarcely less than their highest expectation. The mainly Muslim Bosnian government could support neither a diminution of their central powers

nor what in their eyes involved ethnic manipulation; but they eventually accepted it under international pressure, with the expectation that the Serbs would not agree to it in any case. This left the Serbian government in Belgrade to be persuaded to put pressure upon the Bosnian Serbs to accept. Serbian president Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006) was himself under pressure from a new round of proposed international economic sanctions, but he was prepared to put the plan to the Bosnian Serbs in return for certain clarifying assurances. These assurances related to (1) the potentially Croat-controlled Posavina Corridor that linked the Serbs of Banja Luka and the northwest with Serbia “proper”; (2) the control of territories already taken and “Serbianized” by the Bosnian Serbs but that would now be returned to Croat/Muslim administration; and (3) the question of whether the collective presidency proposed under the Vance-Owen Plan would operate on the basis of majority voting or consensus. Having been assured of the role of the UN forces in relation to the first two points and of the principle of consensus (which could effectively imply a veto) in relation to the last, Milošević felt able to sell the plan to the Bosnian Serbs as one that they could manipulate toward the formation of a unified Serb state on Bosnian territory. After protracted pressure, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić (1945–) was persuaded in an environment of ultimatum at Athens on May 2, 1993, to agree to the plan, with his proviso that it be ratified by the Bosnian Serb parliament in Pale.

This was the closest that the Vance-Owen Plan came to fruition. Cyrus Vance himself felt able at this point to effect his previous indication that he would retire, and David Owen affirmed his faith in Milošević to prevail at Pale; in fact, however, the Bosnian Serb parliament voted by almost 5 to 1 in favor of a referendum, and the plan was effectively dead, as a referendum would undoubtedly have resulted in the plan's rejection.

Owen himself was later to complain of the change in, and lack of, support that he received from the new administration of the United States. The Vance-Owen Plan had been well intended in the context of a search for a multiethnic solution, but the price of failure was bound to be high in leaving a potentially worse situation than had previously been in place; the plan had now firmly implanted on all sides the notion of territoriality and preemptive gain. Furthermore, if only temporarily, it reopened the conflict between Croats and Muslims and undermined the influence that the Belgrade government had hitherto held over the Bosnian Serbs. A plan designed for peace had (unintentionally) escalated the war.

John J. Horton

See also: Bosnian War, 1992–1995; Dayton Peace Accords, 1995; Kosovo War, 1998–1999; NATO in the Balkans; Srebrenica Massacre, 1995; Vance-Owen Plan, 1993; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Friedman, Francine. *The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

Woodward, Susan L. *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995.

Vaphiadis, Markos (1906–1992)

Markos Vaphiadis was a leader of the Communist insurgents during the Greek Civil War, 1945–1949. He was born into a Greek community in Ezurum in Ottoman Anatolia. His family came to Greece in 1922 as a part of the population exchange between Greece and Turkey. While living in Thessaloniki, he became involved in Communist activities. These brought him various periods of imprisonment and internal exile during the interwar period.

After the German and Italian occupation of Greece, Vaphiadis became a leader in the Communist resistance movement, the Greek Peoples' Liberation Army (ELAS). He was active in Macedonia. After the German withdrawal in the fall of 1944, Macedonia became his power base. During the Greek Civil War, he led military efforts of the Communist Party in the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE). He received shelter and supplies from Tito's Yugoslavia.

Disagreement over tactics led to his ouster in 1948. Vaphiadis wanted to continue fighting with guerilla tactics while the rest of the Communist leadership advocated a direct military confrontation with the American-supported Royalist forces by establishing an area of direct control in northern Greece. Vaphiadis also faced accusations of Titoism after the Yugoslav-Soviet split of 1948.

Soon after the Yugoslav-Soviet split, Tito ended his support from the DSE. This ended in defeat for the Communists. Vaphiadis also faced accusations of Titoism after the split. He went into exile in Moscow in 1950. He later returned to Greece and died in Athens on February 23, 1992.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Cold War in the Balkans; Greek Civil War; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslav-Soviet Split

Further Reading

Glenny, Mischa. *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804–1999*. New York: Viking, 2000.

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. Vol. 2, *Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Tarnstrom, Ronald. *Balkan Battles*. Lindsbrog, KS: Trogen, 1998.

Venizélos, Eleuthérios (1864–1936)

Greek political leader and premier Eleuthérios Kyriakos Venizélos was born on August 23, 1864, at Mournies, Crete. He studied law at Athens and returned to practice in Crete. Elected to the Cretan Chamber of Deputies, he was active in the Cretan revolt against the Turks during 1896–1897 and in the movement to unite Crete with mainland Greece. In 1909, Venizélos went to Athens to advise the reformist Military League and instantly became a popular political figure. As leader of the new Liberal Party, Venizélos became premier of Greece for the first time in October 1910. Although republican in his sentiments, he advocated a moderate approach in dealing with the Greek monarchy. Venizélos instituted numerous reforms and successfully guided Greece through the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, winning substantial gains in territory and population.

With the outbreak of World War I, the Greek government was divided. Venizélos strongly favored the Allied side, but King Constantine I and the Greek army high command were pro-German and insisted on a policy of neutrality. The resulting conflict



Eleuthérios Venizélos was prime minister of Greece sporadically throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century. The prime minister and King Constantine I disagreed over wartime allegiances, prompting Venizélos, backed by France and Britain, to force the king into exile in 1917. Venizélos proceeded to lend the support of the Greek Army to the Allied Powers in World War I. (Library of Congress)

between king and prime minister brought on a national constitutional crisis, the so-called National Schism. Despite royal opposition, Venizélos attempted to co-operate with the Allies. In March 1915, he offered to send Greek troops to aid the Allies in the Dardanelles. The offer was rescinded unconstitutionally by the king, and Venizélos resigned.

Venizélos returned as premier in August 1915. In September, he mobilized the Greek army and invited the Allies to establish a base at Salonika for the support of Serbia. As a result, he was forced from office by the king on October 5, 1915, the

day that British and French forces landed at Salonika. Venizélos subsequently fled to Crete on September 25, 1916, and went on to Salonika where, on October 9, he established a revolutionary provisional government that provided some 23,000 Greek troops to fight alongside the Allies on the Salonika Front. Under heavy pressure from the Allies, King Constantine (1868–1923) was forced to abdicate and went into exile on January 12, 1917, leaving the crown to his son, Prince Alexander (1893–1920). On June 27, 1917, the Greek government, once again led by Venizélos, formally declared war on the Central Powers.

Venizélos represented Greece effectively at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, but he was defeated in the November 1920 elections. King Constantine I returned to the throne in December 1920 but was forced to abdicate a second time after Greece lost the Greco-Turkish War of 1921–1922. Venizélos represented Greece at the Lausanne Peace Conference (1922–1923) and became prime minister again for a short time in 1924. He began a final term as prime minister in May 1928, but growing royalist opposition and the worldwide depression forced him to resign in September 1932. Venizélos's reputation as a statesman suffered from his involvement in antiroyalist coup attempts in 1933 and 1935, and he was forced into exile in Paris, where he died on March 18, 1936.

Charles R. Shrader

See also: Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922; Greece in the Balkan Wars; Greece in World War I; Greek Military Coup, 1909; National Schism (Greece), 1916–1917

Further Reading

Alastos, Doros. *Venizelos: Patriot, Statesman, Revolutionary*. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1978.

Leon, George. *Greece and the Great Powers, 1914–1917*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1974.

Leontaritis, George B. *Greece and the First World War: From Neutrality to Intervention, 1917–1918*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940.

Prevelakis, Pandelis. *The Cretan*. Translated by Peter Mackridge and Abbot Rick. Minneapolis, MN: Nostos, 1991.

Vienna Award, Second

The Second Vienna Award was an arbitration of a major land dispute during World War II between Hungary and Romania caused by Hungary demanding the return of the region of Transylvania, which it had lost in the Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920) after World War I. Germany and Italy arbitrated the dispute and announced on August 30, 1940, that approximately 40 percent of the disputed parts of Transylvania (43,104 square kilometers out of a total disputed 103,093 square kilometers, including the major cities of Cluj, Oradea, and Targu-Mures) would be transferred to Hungary from Romania.

The primary foreign policy goal of the Kingdom of Hungary between World War I and World War II was reversing the land and population lost due to the Treaty of Trianon. Hungary's close ties with Italy and Germany were rewarded with the First Vienna Award on November 2, 1938, which transferred southern regions of Slovakia to Hungary. Hungary began pressing for the transfer of much of Transylvania from Romania to Hungary in the summer of 1940, particularly focusing on contiguous land connecting Hungary to pockets of people who were ethnically Hungarian and the ethnically Szekler region. The Szeklers are a Transylvanian ethnicity sometimes

considered synonymous with Hungarian. Ethnic identities and relative population sizes in the Transylvania region were disputed at the time and remain so in the twenty-first century. Romania expressed the desire to begin any negotiations to resolve the irredentist issues with population exchanges as the possible solution, forcing populations to move but with little land to be transferred.

After the Soviet Union successfully pressured Romania into giving up Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina on June 27, 1940, the government of Hungary decided the time was right to press its territorial claims. By late June and early July, Hungary and Romania were mobilizing and redeploying military forces along their border and Hungary was seeking commitments of military supplies from Italy. During July, Germany repeatedly applied strong diplomatic pressure on Romania to make territorial concessions to both Hungary and Bulgaria. Germany expressed to Romania that its interests in the Balkans were stability and economic trade, but that the post-World War I territorial changes when Romania had aligned itself against Germany needed to be undone. Germany was also concerned that a Romanian-Hungarian war would lead to a Soviet intervention designed to seize the Ploesști oil fields from Romania. Direct negotiations from August 16, 1940, to August 24 in Turnu-Severin in Romania failed to resolve the dispute between Romania and Hungary.

With negotiations appearing to be leading nowhere, the Hungarian military began issuing orders on August 23 preparing for an invasion of Romania on August 28. The Hungarian Third Army was mobilized and joined the Hungarian First and Second Armies on the border of Romania. The Romanians deployed 20 divisions in

Transylvania, mostly along the border with Hungary. At the same time, the Romanian government was simultaneously concerned about intervention from the Soviet Union if Hungary invaded. On August 26, Germany began military redeployments designed to seize the Ploesști oil fields if the Soviet Union invaded Romania as a response to a Hungarian-Romanian war. On August 26 and 27, Germany made arrangements with the governments of Hungary and Romania to diplomatically intervene in the dispute at a meeting in Vienna. On August 29, German minister for foreign affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893–1946) and Italian minister for foreign affairs Count Galeazzo Ciano (1903–1944) met separately with the delegations from Romania and Hungary, which included the Romanian minister for foreign affairs Mihail Manoilescu (1891–1950), the Hungarian minister for foreign affairs Count István Csáky (1894–1941), and Hungarian prime minister Pál Teleki (1879–1941).

The Romanian and Hungarian delegations had expected a negotiation, but instead were presented with an ultimatum by Ribbentrop and Ciano that they unconditionally accept an arbitration of the dispute. Germany had already decided, based on Hitler's territorial decisions for resolving the border changes on August 27 at Berchtesgaden, on the results of the German-Italian arbitration. On the afternoon of August 30 in the Belvedere Palace, the Second Vienna Award was announced, transferring about 43,000 kilometers of Transylvania to Hungary and allowing residents of Transylvania six months within which to decide which citizenship they desired.

The Hungarian military occupied northern Transylvania on August 31, 1940. The loss of territory to the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and finally the large region from Transylvania led to the collapse of the

Romanian government on September 6, 1940. Ion Antonescu (1882–1946) became prime minister, and King Carol II (1893–1953) abdicated in favor of his young son Michael (1921–). Although Hungary and Romania both joined the Axis powers, the two countries remained hostile toward one another during World War II. Ethnic violence and civic disruption was widespread throughout Transylvania during the period, Hungary viewed the transfer of land as incomplete, and Romanian nationalism erupted causing a reversal of territorial losses to be the central foreign policy goal of the country. Romania declared the award invalid in diplomatic messages to Italy and Germany on September 15, 1941, and the award was voided on September 12, 1944, by the Allied governments and the original borders restored by the 1947 Treaty of Paris.

Brian G. Smith

See also: Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946); Carol II, King of Romania (1893–1953); Michael I, King of Romania (1921–); Romania in World War II

Further Reading

Balogh, Beni. *The Second Vienna Award and the Hungarian-Romanian Relations, 1940–1944*. Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications, 2011.

Case, Holly. *Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. Vol. 2, *Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Vladimirescu, Tudor (1780–1821)

Tudor Vladimirescu was a Romanian revolutionary leader. He was born on June 7, 1780 in Vladimir, Otenia, Wallachia, then under

Ottoman suzerainty. He came from a family of well-off peasants. In 1806, he joined the Russian army and participated in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806–1812. Here he gained valuable military training. During some of this time he commanded local Wallachian troops called *Pandurs*.

Vladimirescu's role in the events of 1821 in Wallachia was conflicted. He issued a proclamation on February 4 calling for the election of native ruler but assuring the Ottoman authorities of his loyalty. This set off a peasant uprising largely directed initially against the Greek (*Phanariot*) land-owners and their supporters. Soon thereafter, Alexander Ypsilantis (1792–1828) invaded Ottoman-controlled Moldavia from Russia with the intention of provoking an anti-Ottoman uprising among the Phanariots and ultimately among the Greeks.

The goals of Vladimirescu and Ypsilantis were ultimately incompatible. Both forces converged on Bucharest. In the face of an expected Ottoman invasion, the two leaders made some efforts to cooperate, but achieved little. Both withdrew from Bucharest when Ottoman troops appeared in Wallachia in May. Vladimirescu remained in contact with the Ottomans. Ypsilantis lured him into a trap, and executed him at Târgoviște on June 7, 1821. Vladimirescu's mainly peasant forces disbanded soon thereafter.

Despite his limitations, Vladimirescu often receives credit as an early champion of armed Romanian nationalism. During the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939, a unit of Romanian volunteers fighting in the International Brigades bore his name. During World War II, the Soviets named a division of Romanian prisoners of war fighting for the Red Army after him. They used this organization as a means to subvert the Romanian forces still loyal to the Axis.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832; Russo-Ottoman War, 1806–1812; Ypsilantis, Alexander

Further Reading

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. Vol. 1, *Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Stavrianos, L. S. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958.

VMRO

VMRO, *Vŭtreshna Makedonska Revolyutsionna Organizatsiya*, in English, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), which was founded in Salonika in 1893 to promote Macedonian independence from the Ottoman Empire and exists at the present time as a political movement in the independent state of Macedonia. The founders of VMRO wanted to promote revolutionary activity directed at Ottoman authority. Whether they sought affiliation with Bulgaria or wanted some kind of autonomy, however, remains unclear. Most of them were affiliated with the Bulgarian high school in Salonika and acknowledged some kind of Bulgarian identity. They also seem to have wanted to promote unrest in the Ottoman vilayet (province) of Adrianople (Thrace).

Revolutionary activity began several years after the founding of the organization. VMRO groups known as chetas began to engage in attacks on Ottoman officials in Macedonia and to fight with Greek- and Serbian-sponsored bands. Finding the VMRO to be resistant to direction, the Bulgarian government in Sofia established its own organization, the Macedonian Supreme Committee, known as Supremists. This organization had close ties to the Bulgarian military.

The Supremists became intertwined to some degree with VMRO.

In 1903, members of VMRO undertook a campaign directed against Ottoman rule in Macedonia. This was known as the Ilinden (St. Elijah's Day, August 19) uprising. Earlier that summer, the onset of the uprising, the leader of VMRO, Gotse Delchev (1872–1903) was killed. Nevertheless the uprising, which began on August 2, initially succeeded in ousting the Ottomans in much of Macedonia and establishing an administration in the town of Krushevo. At the same time, other VMRO elements acted in the Adrianople vilayet to set up the Stradzha Republic. Neither of these formations was able to withstand Ottoman counterattacks. By the end of August, Ottoman control resumed at the cost of almost 5,000 lives, the destruction of many homes and villages, and 30,000 refugees.

The failure of the Ilinden Uprising forced the members of VMRO to regroup. Most of them cooperated with the Bulgarian military during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. They undertook missions behind Ottoman lines. During the First Balkan War, Ottoman civilians accused VMRO bands of atrocities. During the Second Balkan War, Greek and Serbian civilians made similar accusations. The division sanctioned by the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 of most of Macedonia between Greece and Serbia and the flight of thousands of Macedonian refugees to Bulgaria strengthened the position of VMRO within Bulgaria. VMRO bands operated with Bulgarian support in Greek and Serbian Macedonia after the Treaty of Bucharest. During World War I, VMRO bands cooperated with the Bulgarian army. With the sanction of the Sofia government, they established authority in parts of Serbian Macedonia and carried out occupation duties in Serbia itself. In 1917, VMRO

bands participated in defeating the Toplica rebellion in Serbia.

After Bulgaria's defeat in World War I and loss of Macedonia, VMRO reverted to its prewar activities of sending armed bands into Greek and Yugoslav (Serbian) Macedonia to commit acts of terror. By this time, the hopes of gaining Thrace were more or less abandoned. During this time, VMRO played an important role in Bulgarian politics. In June 1923, VMRO elements participated in the overthrow and murder of the Bulgarian peasant party leader Aleksandŭr Stamboliski (1879–1923). At the same time VMRO assumed control of southwestern Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia).

Factionalism within the organization resulted in the assassination of a number of VMRO leaders, including Todor Alexandrov (1881–1924), and the assumption of authority of Ivan Mihailov (1896–1990). Lawlessness and drug trafficking became pervasive in VMRO-controlled southwestern Bulgaria. Mihailov steered VMRO to the right in European politics. He established contacts with the Croatian Ustaša and cooperated in the assassination of Yugoslav king Alexander (1888–1934) in Marseilles. That same year, a coup in Sofia brought to power a group of civilian and military figures who were determined stabilize the Bulgarian government and to end VMRO's rule in southwestern Bulgaria. The Bulgarian army reestablished control of the central government and caused many VMRO operatives to flee abroad.

The German and Italian invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece in the spring of 1941 brought about the Bulgarian occupation of most of Macedonia. At that time, many VMRO adherents supported the return of Bulgarian rule to Macedonia. The German defeat in Soviet Russia and the appearance in the late summer of 1944 of the Red

Army in Romania and Bulgaria signaled the end of German hegemony in the Balkans and the end of Bulgarian rule in Macedonia. Understanding that the war was lost, Mihailov refused a German offer at this late date to establish an independent Macedonia.

After World War II, the Communist regimes in Bulgaria and in the Federal Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as the royalist government in Greece, all viewed VMRO in a negative context. Gradually the FYR of Macedonia acknowledged early VMRO activities as leading to the development of a "Macedonian" identity and state. During much of the Cold War, Skoplje and Sofia argued over the "Macedonian" or Bulgarian identity of VMRO, and the meaning of its pre–World War I actions. Both sides agreed that the post–World War I VMRO had moved towards fascism.

The end of Communist rule in southeastern Europe brought about the revival of VMRO in both Bulgaria and Macedonia. In Bulgaria, the modern VMRO presents itself as a cultural organization and advocates union with Macedonia. In Macedonia, a new political party assumed the name VMRO in 1990. It has adopted a pro-European policy.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Origins; Ilinden Uprising, 1903; Mihailov, Ivan (1896–1990); Military League (Bulgaria)

Further Reading

Crampton, R. J. *Bulgaria*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Mihailov, Ivan. *Spomeni*. 4 vols. Brussels: Macedonian Cultural Fellowship, 1958–1973.

Perry, Duncan. *The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Revolutionary Movements, 1893–1903*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988.

Tomasevich, Jozo. *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Vukovar, Siege of, 1991

The siege of Vukovar was one of the first major battles in the Yugoslav Wars of 1991–1995. This Serbian-Croatian battle in this eastern-border Croatian city on the Danube lasted from May 1991 until Croatian forces surrendered on November 18, 1991.

Serbian forces operating as the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) under the command of General Života Panić (1933–2003) as well as Serbian militia forces made three unsuccessful attempts to capture this heavily fortified city between approximately September 14 and 25, between September 30 and October 27, and between October 29 and November 18 before finally capturing Vukovar. Croat forces, under the command of General Mile Dedaković (1951–) were heavily outnumbered. Nevertheless, casualties were heavy on both sides, with the Croats suffering nearly 1,500 military casualties, 1,131 civilian fatalities and 2,600 missing civilians, and the Serbs losing 1,180 men. After the fall of the city, Serbian militia units cooperating with the JNA committed war crimes. The most notorious of these was the massacre of 264 patients at the Vukovar hospital.

The capture of Vukovar proved to be a pyrrhic victory for the Serbs. Along with their high casualties, it forced them to reduce their

political and military expectations to more realistic levels. Despite their military losses, the Croats' relatively effective defense of Vukovar strengthened their political will and gave them the time to create a military force capable of defending their country against Serbian aggression. Vukovar also demonstrated Serbian military vulnerabilities and operational deficiencies in areas such as urban operations, degraded Serbia's will to continue fighting the Croats, and gained greater international support and sympathy for the Croats.

The largely ruined city remained in Serbian hands long after the end of the fighting. Only in 1998 did the Serbs return it to Croatian control.

Bert Chapman

See also: Croat War, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995

Further Reading

Cigar, Norman. "War Termination and Croatia's War of Independence: Deciding When to Stop." *Journal of Croatian Studies* 32 (November 1991): 111–31.

Sebetovsky, Mario. "The Battle of Vukovar: The Military Battle That Saved Croatia." Master of Military Studies thesis. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 2002. <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA407751>.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. *Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995*. 2 vols. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002–2003.



Warsaw Pact

With the multilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, signed on May 14, 1955, in Warsaw, the Soviet Union institutionalized its East European alliance system. The Warsaw Treaty was identical to bilateral treaties concluded from 1945 to 1949 between the Soviet Union and its East European satellite states to assure Moscow continued military presence on their territory. The Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia pledged to defend each other if one or more of the members were attacked.

The Warsaw Pact was created as a political instrument in Nikita Khrushchev's (1894–1971) Cold War policy in Europe. The immediate trigger was the admission of West Germany into NATO on May 5, 1955, and the Austrian State Treaty of May 15, 1955, that provided for Austrian neutrality and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria. The creation of the Warsaw Pact sent important signals to both Eastern Europe and the West. On the one hand, the Soviet Union made clear to its satellite states that Austria's neutral status would not be granted to them. On the other hand, Khrushchev allured the West with a standing offer to disband the Warsaw Pact simultaneously with NATO contingent on East-West agreement on a new collective security system in Europe.

As the highest alliance body, a Political Consultative Committee (PCC) was

established, consisting of the member states' party leaders. The PCC met almost annually in one of the capitals of the Warsaw Pact states. On the military side, a Unified Command and a Joint Staff were created to organize the actual defense of the Warsaw Treaty states. Marshal Ivan G. Konev (1897–1973) was appointed as the first supreme commander of the Warsaw Pact's Joint Armed Forces.

In the early years, the Warsaw Pact served primarily as a Soviet propaganda tool in East-West diplomacy. Khrushchev used the PCC to publicize his disarmament, disengagement, and peace offensives and to accord to them a multilateral umbrella. The first concrete military step was the admission of the East German army into the Unified Command, but only the 1958–1961 Berlin Crisis led to a systematic militarization of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet general staff and the Warsaw Pact Unified Command prepared Eastern European armies for a possible military conflict in Central Europe. In 1961, the Soviets replaced the defensive strategy of Josef Stalin with an offensive strategy providing for a deep thrust into Western Europe. In the early 1960s, the Warsaw Pact began to conduct joint military exercises to prepare for fighting a nuclear war in Europe. The new strategy remained in place until 1987, and the militarization of the Warsaw Pact even accelerated in the years of Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982).

Behind a facade of unity, growing differences existed within the Eastern alliance.



Soviet leaders sit at a conference table in the Parliament building in Warsaw, Poland, May 14, 1955, to draft a treaty that will establish a unified military command to rival NATO. From left to right: Soviet marshal Ivan Konev, supreme commander of the alliance; Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet foreign minister; Premier Nikolai Bulganin; and defense minister Georgi Zhukov. (AP Photo)

Following Khrushchev's campaign of de-Stalinization, Poles and Hungarians in the fall of 1956 demanded a reform of the Warsaw Pact to reduce overwhelming Soviet dominance within the alliance. Polish generals in a memorandum desired to model the Warsaw Pact more after NATO, while Hungary's new Communist Party leader Imre Nagy declared his country's neutrality and planned to leave the Warsaw Pact. In November 1956, the Soviet army invaded Hungary and crushed the resistance in two weeks.

In 1958, Romania demanded the withdrawal from its territory of all Soviet troops and military advisers. To cover Soviet embarrassment, Khrushchev called this a unilateral troop reduction contributing to

greater European security. At the height of the Berlin Crisis, the Warsaw Pact's weakest and strategically least important country, Albania, stopped supporting the pact in 1962 and formally withdrew from the alliance in 1968.

The Warsaw Pact was kept in the dark when Khrushchev provoked the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. Only after the crisis was resolved, Eastern European leaders learned in a secret meeting that a nuclear war had been narrowly avoided. Romania reacted promptly to Moscow's non-consultation in such a serious matter. In 1963, the Romanian government gave secret assurances to the United States that it would remain neutral in the event of a confrontation between the superpowers. In the

same year, Romanian and Polish opposition prevented Khrushchev's plan to admit Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact.

In the mid-1960s, the Warsaw Pact—like NATO—went through a major crisis. The 1965 PCC meeting, invoked by East Germany, demonstrated profound disagreements among Warsaw Pact allies on matters such as the German question, nuclear sharing and nonproliferation, and the Sino-Soviet split. In early 1966, Brezhnev proposed a Soviet plan to reform and institutionalize the Warsaw Pact. Resistance by Moscow's allies prevented the implementation of the scheme for more than three years.

In 1968, the Czechoslovak crisis intervened and threatened the cohesion of the alliance. While the Soviet Union tried to intimidate the liberal Czechoslovak government led by Alexander Dubček (1921–1992) with multilateral Warsaw Pact military maneuvers, the invading forces on August 20, 1968, were mostly from the Soviet Union, with token Polish, Hungarian, and East German, but no Romanian troops. Romania denounced the invasion as a violation of international law and demanded the withdrawal of all Soviet troops and military advisers from its territory. It also refused to allow Soviet forces to cross or conduct exercises on its territory.

The consolidation that resulted from the PCC session in Budapest in March 1969 transformed the Warsaw Pact into a more consultative organization. It established a committee of defense ministers, a military council, and a committee on technology. With these three new joint bodies, the Warsaw Pact finally became a genuine military alliance.

In 1976, previous informal gatherings of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers were institutionalized into a committee of ministers of foreign affairs. In the 1970s, consultations within Warsaw Pact bodies

primarily dealt with the CSCE process. Despite detente, however, preparations for a deep offensive thrust into Western Europe accelerated and intensified in numerous military exercises. In 1979, a statute on the command of the alliance in wartime was finally accepted by all but Romania after yearlong controversy.

In 1980–1981, the Solidarity crisis in Poland heralded the end of Moscow's domination of Eastern Europe. Yet, it did not pose a serious threat to the Warsaw Pact's integrity. At first, Moscow was tempted to threaten the opposition with military exercises and, eventually, military intervention. To avoid the high political costs, Moscow in the end trusted that the loyal Polish military would suppress the opposition on their own. The imposition of martial law by General Wojciech Jaruzelski (1923–2014) was a major success for Moscow, as it demonstrated that the Moscow-educated Polish generals protected the interests of the Warsaw Pact even against their own people.

During the Second Cold War in the 1980s, internal disputes within the Warsaw Pact increased. Romania demanded cuts in nuclear and conventional forces as well as in national defense budgets. It also called for the dissolution of both Cold War alliances and for the withdrawal of both U.S. and Soviet forces from Europe.

The issue of an appropriate Warsaw Pact response to NATO's 1983 deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles, matching Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles aimed at Western European targets, proved to be most divisive for the Eastern alliance. In 1983, Germany, Hungary, and Romania engaged in a "damage control" exercise to maintain their ties with the West that they had established during the era of detente.

At the time of the Warsaw Pact's 30th anniversary in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev

(1931–) became the new Soviet leader. He improved the role of Warsaw Pact consultations on the desired nuclear and conventional cuts in the Eastern alliance. At the PCC meeting in Berlin in May 1987, Gorbachev changed the Warsaw Pact military doctrine from offensive to defensive. The Eastern European states did not object to the reduction of the alliance's military functions. In the late 1980s, East Germany, Bulgaria, and—in a reversal of earlier continuing opposition—even Romania proposed to strengthen the Warsaw Pact by improving its intra-bloc political consultative role.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, East and West at first saw merit in keeping both Cold War alliances in place. In January and February 1991, however, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria declared that they would withdraw all support by July 1 of that year. The Warsaw Pact came to an end on March 31, 1991, and was officially dissolved at a meeting in Prague on July 1, 1991.

Christian Nuenlist

See also: Cold War in the Balkans, World War II peace Settlement in the Balkans

Further Reading

Jones, Christopher D. *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact*. Brooklyn, NY: Praeger, 1981.

Holden, Gerard. *The Warsaw Pact: The WTO and Soviet Security Policy*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.

Mastny, Vojtech, and Malcolm Byrne, eds. *The Warsaw Pact: A History in Documents*. Budapest: Central European Press, 2005.

World War II Peace Settlement in the Balkans

The end of World War II in the Balkans left huge casualties and tremendous destruction

in all of the Balkan countries. All had suffered foreign invasion, all had endured aerial bombardment, and all had confronted partisan warfare. The Soviets replaced the Germans and Italians as the dominant force in the region. The parameters of the postwar settlement began to become apparent as early September 1943 when the Italians withdrew from the war. This rendered Italian claims to Albania, and Greek and Yugoslav territories, void. A further clarification occurred a year later, when Soviet forces invaded Romania in August 1944 and crossed the Danube into Bulgaria the next month. Soon afterward, the Soviets established pro-Russian regimes in Bucharest and Sofia.

The October 1944 meeting between British prime minister Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965) and the Soviet dictator Joseph V. Stalin (1879–1953) established that the Soviets would dominate the Balkans. Churchill agreed that in return for British predominance in Greece, they could have primary influence in Bulgaria and Romania and would evenly share influence in Yugoslavia. Given the apparent strength of the Communist-led Partisan movement in Yugoslavia, there was little likelihood that the British would be able to establish themselves there after the war. Albania received no consideration in this agreement. The presence of Soviet forces on Bulgarian and Romanian soil and the triumph of the Yugoslav Partisans, with Soviet assistance, and of the Albanian Partisans, with Yugoslav Partisan assistance, ensured that Soviet Russia would exercise dominant influence in the Balkans after the war. Only Greece, where British troops landed and fended off an effort by the Communist-led EAM-ELAS movement to take power in 1944, remained outside the sphere of Soviet economic and political influence.

The end of the war brought important changes to the Balkans. Compared to the settlement of World War I in the region, the territorial arrangements were relatively slight. The Treaty of Paris of February 10, 1947, established postwar borders. As a result, Albania obtained the island of Sazan (Saseno) in the Bay of Vlërë from Italy. This settlement also confirmed Romania's cession of southern Dobrudja (Dobruzhia) at the Treaty of Craiova of 1940 to Bulgaria. Greece obtained the Dodecanese Islands from Italy. Also confirmed therein were Romania's western frontiers. This invalidated the division of Transylvania with Hungary that had occurred in the Second Vienna Award of 1940. The Treaty of Paris also sanctioned the Soviet takeover of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, first taken from Romania in June 1940. Finally, the settlement awarded to Yugoslavia former Italian territories in Istria and western Slovenia, the Adriatic ports of Rijeka (Fiume) and Zadar (Zara), and the Adriatic islands of Cres (Cherso), Lošinj (Lusino), and Lastovo (Lagosta). The fate of the Adriatic port of Trieste remained undecided for the time being.

The end of the war in southeastern Europe caused significant ethnic changes there. The Germans murdered most Ashkenazi Jewish populations of Transylvania and Yugoslavia. They also exterminated most of the Sephardic Jewish populations of Greece and Yugoslavia. While the Bulgarians assisted the Germans in the Bulgarian-occupied areas of Greece and Yugoslavia, they preserved the Jewish populations of Bulgaria itself. The Romanians acted against the Jews of Bessarabia and Bukovina, while they permitted most of the Jews of Moldavia and Wallachia to survive. Many of the Bulgarian and Romanian Jews who survived left their native countries for Palestine even

before the war ended. The Germans also murdered significant, but unknown, numbers of Roma who lived in the Balkans. After the war, a number of population changes occurred. Most of the German inhabitants of Soviet Bessarabia (Moldovian SSR) and of Yugoslav Vojvodina were expelled. Germans from Hungary and Romania who were not deported to the Soviet Union fled to the western occupied zones of Austria and Germany. The anti-Soviet Russian refugee populations of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia either fled or faced deportation by Communist authorities. The Italians of Istria moved to Italy. Some Albanians moved out of Epirus to Albania, and some Bulgarians moved from western Thrace to Bulgaria during the Greek Civil War.

Because Albania was the least developed in the fighting, Albania sustained the least physical damage during the war. The Italian invasion and the Partisan struggle were not greatly destructive. Bulgaria underwent some Allied bombing, but overall did not suffer much damage from military activity, either. The Bulgarian Partisans operated from remote areas, and the Soviet invasion was unopposed. Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia, however, were arenas of extensive combat. The German and Italian invasion of 1941, and the British and Greek opposition to it, caused considerable physical damage, as did the Greek resistance struggle against foreign occupation. An Allied bombing campaign targeted the area around the Romanian oil fields and oil-processing facilities at Ploesti, causing considerable damage there. The Soviet invasion and the subsequent campaign against the Germans and Hungarians in Transylvania also brought destruction. Of all the Balkan countries, Yugoslavia suffered the most physical damage during World War II. The Germans inflicted heavy damage on

Belgrade when they bombed the Yugoslav capital on Easter Sunday 1941. The multi-sided warfare among the occupiers and the resisters also ruined much of the infrastructure, especially in Bosnia. Finally, the Soviet invasion of October 1944 brought heavy combat and much destruction to Belgrade and northeastern Yugoslavia. Fighting continued in Croatia until the final days of the war.

Any reckoning of the effects of World War II on the Balkans must recognize that the human and material losses of the Balkan Wars and World War I occurred only a scant 20 years previously. This narrow period of relative peace in the region was insufficient to allow recovery from those damages.

Only after 1945 did the Balkans begin to revive after the wars of the first half of the twentieth century.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Albania in World War II; Bulgaria in World War II; Greece in World War II; Romania in World War II; Yugoslavia in World War II

Further Reading

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. Vol. 2, *Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. *The East European Revolution*. New York: Praeger, 1951.

Stavrianos, L. S. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York: Rinehart, 1958.



Young Turks

The Young Turks were a coalition of groups that brought about the fall of Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II in 1909. Initially welcomed for their democratic aspirations and modernizing goals for the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks did not fare well in the destructive geopolitics of World War I and presided over the disintegration of the Ottoman state and rise of Turkish nationalism.

In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating because of the failure of the ruling sultans to stem the tide of decay and the rise of ethnic nationalism inside their nation to which the stronger Western powers responded by creating new states and annexing Ottoman territory into their own empires. In response, the so-called Tanzimat reforms were instituted by the Ottoman sultans in the mid-nineteenth century, which resulted in the modernization of many parts of the government of the Ottoman Empire. Hundreds of government officials were trained in Western methods and concepts, but some became dissatisfied with the pace of reform. They believed the Tanzimat reformers were not interested in real change, but in accumulating power in their own hands. Some of those men organized the Young Ottoman organization. The Young Ottomans promoted constitutionalism and parliamentary government. Many worked in such agencies as the Bureau of Translation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where they had constant contact with Western institutions and publications.

When Abdulhamid II became ruler in 1876, he first approved and then suspended a new constitution. In response to the authoritarian rule of Abdulhamid II after 1876, the Young Ottomans involved themselves in plots to reform the government. Many of the principal civilian leaders were exiled to Paris once their plans were uncovered by government agents. Those young men formed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889 and the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization around 1902. (The CUP was the first to adopt the name Young Turks, after the name of a journal produced by one of its members. Later, the name became loosely identified with other factions advocating the overthrow of Abdulhamid II.) Both the CUP and the league called for the military and moral strengthening of the Ottoman Empire, equal rights for all ethnic and religious groups, and the restoration of the Constitution of 1876 that Abdulhamid had set aside. The CUP favored a strong central government, however, while the league preferred a more decentralized government and European assistance.

Spurred on by the revolutionary publications of the exiles, the CUP steadily gained members in Turkey. It included not only teachers and students, but also bureaucrats, army officers, and members of the Muslim clergy. Chapters were formed in the major cities of Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. An attempt to overthrow the Turkish government in 1895 failed, and Abdulhamid

dispersed the revolutionaries to remote parts of the empire such as Macedonia, believing that the revolutionary spirit would fade. However, Abdulhamid's move only increased their revolutionary fervor. Next, Abdulhamid offered amnesty and high positions to exiles to get them to return and work with the government.

Still, the CUP continued to add followers. The new secular schools instituted under the Tanzimat reforms produced thousands of educated bureaucrats, officers, and intellectuals who came from the lower classes and resented restrictions placed on them. Many were strong patriots who believed that if the sultan's corrupt regime were swept away, they could build a stronger country. The growing strength of reformers and the increasing attacks of nationalistic minorities caused the government to become more and more repressive. By the beginning of the twentieth century, followers of the CUP were increasingly convinced that only radical change would save Turkey.

The initiative for the Young Turk revolution came from military officers within the Ottoman Empire, especially those of the Third Army Corps in Macedonia. Led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), they formed the Ottoman Liberty Society in 1906. In 1907, the group agreed to merge with the CUP, a key development that brought the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization and the CUP together to work toward mutual goals. Events in 1908 spurred them to action. Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Bulgaria and Crete declared their independence from Ottoman rule. On July 3, the Third Corps launched a revolt that quickly spread to other military units throughout the empire. Unable to rely on his troops, Abdulhamid restored the Constitution of 1876 and

reconvened the parliament, hoping to undercut the rebellion, but his rule lasted only another year.

The Young Turks took charge of the government and began to introduce numerous and diverse reform programs, though by 1911, the CUP's political agenda was contested by liberal, conservative, and nationalistic forces internally. In 1913, the CUP gained effective control, thanks in part to rigged elections and in part to the chaos of the Balkan Wars. By the time it consolidated its power, not only had it lost the Balkans (and therefore most of the empire's Christians), but its ideals of a multinational Ottomanism had faded somewhat to be replaced by a preference for congressional representatives who were ethnic Turks and members of the CUP.

The new CUP leadership included Enver Pasha as war minister, Djemal Pasha (1872–1922) as naval minister, and Talaat Pasha (1874–1921) as interior minister. Those men carried out many reforms of the provincial administrations, which led to greater centralization. They also secularized the legal system and provided a better system of elementary school education, especially for girls. The Young Turks are hailed for those modernizing programs. The CUP government also made Turkish the language of administration and instruction, however, which alienated the large number of Arabs in the empire.

With the onslaught of World War I, the Young Turks chose to ally with Germany, though in their admiration for the German military, they overestimated its effectiveness. They also wished to reconquer Egypt from the British and the Caucasus Mountains from Russia, which made alliance with Germany logical. The Young Turks began to fear that the Armenians (Christians living in eastern Anatolia) would support the

Russians, though they had shown no sign of disloyalty to the Ottoman government since the overthrow of Abdulhamid II. Acting with German assistance, the Young Turks ordered the deportation of the Armenians from the Ottoman state. When the Armenians resisted, the Ottoman army unleashed local Turkish and Kurdish brigands, who killed an estimated 1 million during the Armenian Genocide and scattered the rest.

Their genocidal persecution of the Armenians did not endear the Young Turks to the Arabs. Though theoretically united by Islam, many Arabs were suspicious of the way the Young Turks combined religion with nationalism. More damage was done, however, by the former naval minister, Djemal, as he and his troops rested in Syria during 1915 to reorganize an attack on the British and the Suez Canal. Jemal's treatment of the Syrians was so cruel and arbitrary that he inspired them to join in the British-sponsored Arab Uprising, led by the Hussein clan from Mecca. That revolt forced Djemal to withdraw from Syria, ceding control of the entire region south of Anatolia to the French and the British.

By late 1918, military defeat appeared imminent, and the CUP leaders resigned from government in October, just a month before the Armistice of Mudros ended the war. In spite of their misfortunes and their mistakes, however, the Young Turks are regarded by Turkish people as having led an important phase in the regeneration of the nation. Their transformation from Ottoman to Turkish nationalism and their ideas about Islam allowed for subsequent rulers to progress more rapidly. Arguing that religion should be a matter of conscience and that the legal aspects of Islam should be surrendered to secular legislation, they called for a split between Islam and the state. That idea became the foundation

for the policy of secularization later adopted by the Turkish republic under Atatürk.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Kemal, Mustafa (1881–1938)

Further Reading

Ahmad, Feroz. *The Young Turks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. London: Routledge, 1999.

Hanioglu, M. Sukru. *The Young Turks in Opposition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 2, *Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Ypsilantis, Alexander (1792–1828)

Alexander Ypsilantis was born on December 12, 1792, in the Phanar district of Constantinople, to a Greek family long prominent in Ottoman administration. The family fled to St. Petersburg, Russia, in 1805 when his father, the Prince (Voivode) of the Ottoman-controlled Danubian principality of Wallachia, was about to be arrested by Ottoman authorities for supporting the Serbian revolt. Under royal patronage, he received a commission upon graduating from the Household Cavalry of the Imperial Guards in 1810.

Ypsilantis served bravely in the Russian cavalry during the Napoleonic Wars starting with the French invasion of Russia. By July 1813, he had risen to the rank of colonel, and while participating in the Battle of Dresden (August 1813), he lost his right

arm, which ended his fighting career. During the Congress of Vienna, he served as one of Czar Alexander I's (1777–1825) adjutants, becoming his aide-de-camp in 1816. The following year, he was promoted to major general.

In April 1820, Ypsilantis was elected and took the leadership of *Filiki Etairia* (Society of Friends), a secret organization in Odessa plotting to overthrow Ottoman rule and establish an independent Greece. In March 1821, Ypsilantis and other Greek officers in Russian service crossed the Pruth River into the Danubian principality of Moldavia to begin the liberation of Greece. He hoped his revolt would be supported by Russia and the Orthodox Bulgarians, Romanians, and Serbs. Instead, the Russians condemned him and relieved him of his rank.

Czar Alexander I viewed Ypsilantis's actions as against the Holy Alliance, while most Balkan Orthodox Christians largely ignored him. He was unable to maintain cooperation with the Romanian peasant leader Tudor Vladimirescu (1780–1821) and denounced him as a traitor because of the Romanian's willingness to compromise with the Ottomans. Ypsilantis lost a series of humiliating battles by mid-June and fled to Austria, where he was imprisoned for seven years before being released in 1827 through the intervention of Czar Nicholas I (1796–1855). He died in Vienna on January 31, 1828.

Gregory C. Ference

See also: Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832; Serbian War of Independence, 1804–1818; Vladimirescu, Tudor (1780–1821)

Further Reading

Dakin, Douglas. *The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821–1833*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.

Prousis, Theophilis C. *Russian Society and the Greek Revolution*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994.

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia itself did not exist until after World War I, and the region, which makes up part of the Balkan Peninsula, was long dominated by foreign empires. Several distinct cultural and ethnic groups have inhabited the Balkans for hundreds of years and continue to influence the social and political fortunes of the region today.

The social and political landscape of the Balkan Peninsula was dramatically altered by the rise of the Turkish Ottoman Empire, which superseded the crumbling Byzantine Empire in the east and aggressively expanded westward into the European continent. At the Battle of Kosovo (1389), Serb forces were defeated by Turkish troops, and for the next three centuries, Serbia remained a vassal state to the Turkish Empire. Although it was a military loss, the Battle of Kosovo became a fundamental event in the formation of Serbian national identity. After their victory in Kosovo, the Ottomans continued their military campaign in the Balkans and annexed Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro by 1499. The Turk conquest dramatically altered the Slavs' established social systems by destroying the power of the local nobility. In the regions of Bosnia and what is modern-day Albania, the social structure was less drastically affected since many inhabitants converted to Islam, which won the favor of their Ottoman rulers.

As the Ottoman Empire fell into decline in the seventeenth century, the Habsburg Austro-Hungarian Empire expanded its influence in the Balkans. By the early nineteenth century, Ottoman control of the

Balkans was practically nonexistent, and the vacuum that was created by the ebb of Turkish power opened the door for the growth of nationalism among the Balkans' ethnic groups. The Balkan Slavs created their sense of national identity by drawing on their history and ancient folklore as well as their religious heritage. However, realization of nationalist ambitions required dependence on the aid of foreign powers, since the Balkan groups were not powerful enough to establish independence on their own. A nominal Croatian state was created with permission by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1868, and Serbia and Montenegro were granted independence by the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) at the conclusion of the Russo-Ottoman War. Nationalism had the negative effect of stirring up ethnic rivalries, often in the form of territorial disputes among the various Balkan groups. Particularly at a loss were the region's Muslims, who had long depended on the Ottoman social and economic infrastructure to protect their religion and way of life.

The emerging Balkan states cooperated long enough to drive out what little remained of the Ottoman presence in Europe in the first of the Balkan Wars in 1912. By 1913, unity had collapsed, and the second of the Balkan Wars broke out as Serbia, Romania, and Greece fought over the spoils of their victory against the Turks. The contentious nationalism of the Balkans soon became the tinderbox that lit the fuse of World War I with the assassination in June 1914 of the Austro-Hungarian archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Bosnian Serb nationalist.

The downfall of both the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires by the end of the war opened the door for the realization of Balkan nationalistic desires. On December 1, 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs,

Croats, and Slovenes was officially established under the leadership of the Serbian king Peter Karageorgević (1844–1921). Although a unified Slavic state was never the initial goal of the various Balkan ethnic groups, most political leaders realized that unification was their best option, at least for the moment. Those hopes proved overly optimistic, however. Over the protests of both Croats and Slovenes, the 1921 Yugoslavian constitution created a centralized government that was predominantly under Serbian control. Over the next several years, non-Serbian groups grew increasingly bitter and disenchanted with the government. In 1929, King Alexander I (1888–1934), Peter's son successor, responded to the growing discontent by abrogating the constitution, forming a dictatorship, and renaming the country the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (the Kingdom of Southern Slavs). His actions did little to allay non-Serb fears, and between 1929 and 1939, tensions grew among the nation's ethnic groups, which led to the 1934 assassination of Alexander by the Ustaša, a Croatian fascist organization.

When World War II broke out, Yugoslavia tried to remain neutral, but the regents who ruled in the name of Prince Paul gave in to German pressure in 1941 and formed an alliance with Adolf Hitler. The alliance prompted widespread popular discontent and public protest, and a contingent of military officers moved quickly to overthrow the regency. In April 1941, Germany responded by invading Yugoslavia. The country was occupied by German, Italian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian forces, along with the Ustaša.

Two rival resistance groups rose up to oppose the Nazi occupation: the Četniks, Serbian nationalists; and the Partisans, a Communist group led by a Croatian-Slovene named Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980). While

both groups fought the Nazis, they ultimately had different ideas for the reconstitution of the Yugoslav state. The Četniks sought a resumption of Serbian dominance while the Partisans wanted to establish a Communist federation divided along ethnic lines. Although both sides committed atrocities during the war, the Partisans secured the support of the Allies and gained control of the country when the war ended.

Under Tito, the country was organized as a federation with six republics loosely divided along ethnic lines: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Yugoslavia was established as a Communist state, and more liberal political organizations were suppressed. The government moved rapidly to introduce nationalization and other instruments of Communist control, but over time, it developed a less centralized model that included workers' councils that managed individual enterprises. Yugoslavia gradually adopted an independent line that initially alienated the Yugoslav leadership from the rest of the Communist bloc. Eventually, Tito's regime was able to forge a middle way, which often had strained relations with both the East and the West. Not surprisingly, Tito was a key player in the formation of the nonaligned movement.

The death of Tito in 1980 revealed the cracks in the Yugoslav political system. He was replaced by a collective presidency made up of representatives from each of the republics. However, the nation's economic problems, which included a huge foreign debt, began to cause difficulties, and the new government proved weak. Both problems facilitated a revival of the ethnic and religious rivalries that were suppressed under Tito. A nationalist movement in Serbia gained control of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and Slobodan

Milošević (1941–2006), an extreme nationalist, gained power in Serbia. Milošević instituted severe measures to support his nationalist cause. Those measures included press censorship and the reversal of autonomy for the Kosovo and Vojvodina regions, which had populations that were predominantly Albanian and Hungarian, respectively.

Milošević tried to increase the centralization of power and to revive the concept of a greater Serbia at the same time that Croatian and Slovenian leaders sought increased decentralization. As it became clear that Milošević was intent on increasing Serbian authority, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991. Despite a constitutional provision that allowed for the secession of republics, the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav army actively opposed the withdrawal of Croatia and Slovenia. The independence of Slovenia was conceded after a 10-day war that the Yugoslav forces lost. However, the Serb minority in Croatia joined forces with the Yugoslav army to gain control of vast territory there.

Yugoslavia had a similar response when Bosnia and Herzegovina seceded the following year. With their campaign of ethnic cleansing, the Serbs succeeded in killing or forcing out much of the Muslim and Croatian populations of large parts of Bosnia. The United Nations imposed international sanctions against Yugoslavia for its actions. Around the same time, Macedonia also seceded without much of a struggle from Belgrade because its Serbian population was small. The Yugoslav government reconstituted the country as a two-republic federation that now included only the dominant Serbia and smaller Montenegro. International sanctions against Yugoslavia were eased in 1995 after Milošević blockaded

the Serbian forces in Bosnia and signed the Dayton Agreement (1995), which returned large territories to Bosnia and Croatia; however, there was continued Serbian resistance to the peace plan from within those two countries. Milošević had been forced to act in part because of the devastation the sanctions had brought to Yugoslavia with inflation running at unheard-of rates and the state under the threat of disintegration.

By early 1998, however, Milošević had renewed his campaign for a greater Serbia by turning his attention to the predominantly ethnic Albanian region of Kosovo. Though the Serb-controlled Yugoslav army was sent into the province ostensibly to root out members of the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army, the military campaign led to numerous civilian deaths, as hundreds of thousands of villagers fled to the mountains and forests for safety. Milošević's refusal to sign an internationally brokered peace agreement in March 1999 precipitated a North Atlantic Treaty Organization air campaign to crush Serbia's military strength and a Serbian offensive to drive out Kosovo's Albanian population. Milošević attempted to extend his hold over the country by calling early elections in September 2000; however, he was surprised by the public's election of Vojislav Kostunica (1944–). Milošević initially refused to concede defeat and attempted to void a portion of the ballots. His actions incited massive protests, which saw demonstrators take over the Federal Assembly building while the police stood by; hours later, Milošević agreed to step down. Shortly after Milošević's defeat at the polls, the European Union and the United States lifted sanctions against Yugoslavia, which had been in place since 1998. On February 5, 2003, the Yugoslav Parliament proclaimed the creation of the

new state community of Serbia and Montenegro.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Cold War in the Balkans; Dayton Peace Accords; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslavia in World War II

Further Reading

Clissold, Stephen, ed. *A Short History of Yugoslavia: From Early Times to 1966*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.

Dedijer, Vladimir, et al. *History of Yugoslavia*. Translated by Kordija Kveder. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974.

Magas, Branka. *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Breakup 1980–1992*. New York: Verso, 1993.

Yugoslavia, Axis Occupation Forces in World War II

On April 6, 1941, German, Hungarian, and Italian units attacked Yugoslavia. These included the German Second and 12th Armies, eight Hungarian brigades, and the Italian Second and Ninth Armies. The invaders crossed Yugoslavia's borders with Germany (Austria), Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Confronted with overwhelming force, the Yugoslav armed forces disintegrated within a week.

In the aftermath of the Yugoslav defeat, the Germans and their allies divided the country. Germany annexed northern Slovenia, while Italy annexed southern Slovenia and Dalmatia and attached Kosovo to its Albanian possession. Hungary took a part of eastern Slovenia, and Bačka, a part of Croatia. Bulgaria, which did not participate in the actual invasion, annexed Macedonia. Nominally independent states emerged in Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Germany and its

three allies maintained military forces on these territories throughout the course of the war. These soon came under attack from indigenous resistance organizations, including but not limited to the Serbian-oriented Četniks and the Communist-oriented Partisans. Bulgarian, German, Hungarian and Italian forces spent much of their time and effort in operations directed against this resistance.

Bulgaria

The Bulgarians considered Macedonia to be a “liberated” part of Bulgaria. In the aftermath of the Yugoslav defeat, the Bulgarian Fifth Army occupied Macedonia. It established its headquarters in Skoplje. The Bulgarians encountered no resistance. Bulgarian police and special units also were assigned to Macedonia. This amounted to around 40,000 men. At the beginning of 1942, the Germans requested additional Bulgarian troops be sent to Yugoslavia so that German occupation forces could be transferred to the Eastern Front. The Bulgarian First Army deployed to southern Serbia and established its headquarters at Niš. The Bulgarians undertook stringent anti-Partisan actions in this region. In 1943, Bulgarian units also participated in anti-Partisan operations in Bosnia and Montenegro, together with German, Italians, and some Četnik formations. On September 9, 1944, the Bulgarians changed sides and began joint activities with the Red Army, sweeping through Macedonia up through Serbia and into Hungary.

Germany

The largest number of foreign soldiers on Yugoslav territory came from Germany. German forces occupied Serbia, Vojvodina, the northeastern portion of independent Croatia (NDA), and northern Slovenia. Initially the Germans had hoped to leave the

occupation of Yugoslavia to allied and collaborationist forces. The development of resistance in the summer of 1941 made this impossible. Especially important for the Germans was control of the vital Vienna-Salonika railroad, and some important mining locations.

With most of its best units committed to the Eastern Front, the Germans relied upon second-rate units, made up of older personnel, and locally raised units. Chief among the latter was the SS Prinz Eugen Division. Increased resistance activity forced the Germans to increase the quality and size of their occupation forces. They collected several formations in Army Group E, the former Twelfth Army, commanded by Luftwaffe general Alexander Löhr (1885–1947), an erstwhile Austro-Hungarian and Austrian officer. The formations in this command undertook seven anti-Partisan offensives from 1942 to 1944. Partisan activities and the Allied landings in Sicily caused the Germans to further increase their troop levels in Yugoslavia because of concerns that the Allies might attempt to cross the Adriatic. Army Group F under the command of Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs (1881–1954) formed with its headquarters in Belgrade in August 1943. The Second Panzer Army from the Eastern Front strengthened this formation. It had responsibility for all German forces in Yugoslavia. Army Group E assumed control of Greece.

The defections of Romania and Bulgaria in August and September and the entry of the Red Army into these countries made the German position in the western Balkans untenable. Army Group E began to withdraw from Greece. The German formations slowly retreated to the north under pressure from the Partisans and the Red Army. Army Group E ended up in Austria. Army Group F was dissolved in March 1945. Its remnants

combined with Army Group E. All these German formations surrendered in Austria in May 1945.

Hungary

On April 11, five days after the German and Italian attack, the Third Hungarian Army moved into Yugoslavia, meeting some resistance. The Hungarians annexed eastern Slovenia Prekmurje parts of Croatia, Medjimurje, Baranja, and Bačka. The Hungarian army committed some atrocities against the Jewish and Serbian populations of the latter two regions. At Novi Sad during January 1942, the Hungarians murdered around 3,000 or 4,000 Jews and Serbs and threw their bodies into the Danube. Hungarian control of these regions ended in the fall of 1944, when Partisan and Red Army forces ejected the retreating Germans. Hungarian possession of eastern Slovenia ended only in May 1945.

Italy

The Italian occupation of Yugoslavia was complicated. They annexed Dalmatia and southern Slovenia directly. They annexed most of Kosovo and western Macedonia to their Albanian possession. They also established an independent Montenegro. Finally, they maintained forces in southeastern Croatia (NDH). This complex arrangement required a considerable commitment of Italian forces, amounting to 24 Divisions, divided between the Second Army headquartered in Sušak, Dalmatia and the Ninth Army headquartered in Tirana, Albania. The Italian forces in Croatia and Montenegro soon found themselves confronted with strong Partisan activities. The Italians established close relations with local Četnik units and participated with their Bulgarian and German allies in anti-Partisan actions. They also engaged in a dispute with the

Bulgarians over the border of western Macedonia. On September 8, 1943, Italy surrendered to the Allies. This left the Italian forces in Yugoslavia in disarray. Some fled to Italy, some joined the Partisans, but many surrendered to or were captured by the Germans. The Germans shot some of these unfortunates and sent most of the others to Germany as slave laborers.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Četniks; Partisans, Yugoslavia; Yugoslavia, Collaborationist Forces in World War II; Yugoslavia in World War II

Further Reading

Pavlowitch, Stavan K. *Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

Thomas, N., and K. Mikulan. *Axis Forces in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945*. Oxford: Osprey, 1995.

Tomasevich, Jozo. *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Yugoslavia, Collaborationist Forces in World War II

The collapse of Yugoslavia during the German-Italian invasion of April 1941 resulted in a confusing number of local forces who assisted the occupiers. This collaboration took place across all ethnic and physical borders of the former Yugoslav state. The armed components of collaborationist movements provided varying degrees of military assistance to the Bulgarian, German, Hungarian, and Italian occupiers.

Croatia

By far the largest component of the collaborationist forces in Yugoslavia came from

Croatia. There in April 1941, the Germans and Italians, failing to secure help from prewar Croatian politicians in setting up an independent Croatian state (NDH), which included prewar Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. To run this state, the occupiers turned to the exiled leaders of the Croatian fascist movement, the Ustaša (Insurgents). The leader of the NDH was Ante Pavelić (1889–1959). The Germans and Italians divided the NDH into three zones. The Italians annexed much of Dalmatia, including Kotor to comprise Zone 1. The Italians maintained garrisons in southwestern Croatia. This was Zone 2. The Germans occupied the north-eastern part of the NDH for Zone 3.

The NDH contributed two military formations to the Nazi cause. The first was the regular armed forces, under the command of the former Austro-Hungarian officer Slavko Kvaternik (1878–1947). They consisted of a regular army, of around 55,000 men, an air arm, a navy and a labor service. There was also a national police force. The Croat army mainly fought against Partisan units in Bosnia and Četnik bands in the Serbian areas of Croatia, the old Austro-Hungarian military frontier. The Croatian armed forces, however, were the only collaborationist forces from Yugoslavia to serve outside the territory of the former Yugoslav state. Some Croatian airmen participated in the campaign against Soviet Russia from 1941 to 1944. Discouraged by the Italians from operating in the Adriatic Sea, the Croats established a small naval force in the Sea of Azov. After the Italian surrender, the Croatian navy deployed to the Adriatic Sea. Also in May 1942, the 369th Regiment of Croatian infantry deployed with Army Group South to Soviet Russia. After participating in several major operations and earning German praise for

its fighting abilities, it was destroyed at Stalingrad.

In addition to the regular Croatian armed forces, there were also Ustaša units. These were the Croatian counterpart of the Nazi German SS (*Schutzstaffel*). Like the SS, the Ustaša units were ideological. They mainly took part in actions against Četnik and Partisan guerillas. They employed brutal methods and perpetrated many atrocities during these actions. On November 21, 1944, the Croatian regular armed forces and the Ustaša formations combined into the Croatian Armed Forces under the formal command of Pavelić. The Croats fought alongside the Nazis until the very end of World War II. At the end of the war, the victorious Partisans executed many of the Croat survivors at Bleiburg. Many others served terms of terms of imprisonment in Yugoslavia. Pavelić escaped to Argentina. Wounded in an assassination attempt there in 1957, he died in Spain in 1959.

Serbia

After the rapid defeat of the Royal Yugoslav Army in April 1941, the Germans established a quasi-independent Serbian state with frontiers roughly corresponding to Serbia's pre-1912 borders. A number of Serbian military formations rose to collaborate with the German occupation. Foremost among these were the Serbian State Guard. The commander of this unit, Milan Nedić (1877–1946), a former Serbian and Yugoslav officer, attempted to act as the Serbian Pétain. The Serbian State Guard served as a national police force. After Nedić organized it in March 1942, it established connections with Draža Mihajlović's (1896–1946) Četniks. The State Guard and the Četniks operated more or less together and cooperated in actions directed against the Partisans. The

remnants of this formation retreated to the northwest during the fall of 1944. Many surrendered to British forces in Austria at the end of the war. Nedić died in prison in mysterious circumstances after the war.

Another important Serbian collaborationist formation was the Serbian Volunteer Command. Serbian politician Dimitrije Lojotić (1891–1945), the leader of the fascist *Zbor* (assembly) movement, formed this armed organization on September 15, 1941. Under the nominal command of General Nedić, this formation of around 7,000 men engaged in anti-Partisan actions in Serbia. In the fall of 1944, it retreated to Slovenia. At the end of the war, some members of this unit succeeded in remaining in Italy, others returned to a difficult fate in Tito's Yugoslavia.

A somewhat unusual formation in Serbia that collaborated with the Germans actually consisted of mainly Russians. This was the Russian Defense Corps. Anti-Soviet Russians exiles living in Yugoslavia formed this unit on September 12, 1941. It comprised a Cossack cavalry regiment and four infantry regiments. Eventually some younger Russian exiles and Soviet POWs joined. It mainly engaged in anti-Partisan actions in Serbia and later in Bosnia. In the fall of 1944, it joined the retreat to the northwest. In May 1945, the remnants of this formation surrendered to the British in Austria.

By far the most important force that fought as well as collaborated with the occupiers was the Četniks. The original purpose of the Četniks, organized by Royal Yugoslav Army colonel Dragoljub "Draža" Mihajlović (1893–1946), was resistance to the German occupation. The rapid gain in power by Josip Broz Tito's (1892–1980) Partisans, however, forced the Četniks to cooperate at times with the occupation forces. They received arms and ammunition from the Germans and Italians and participated

in operations against the Partisans. Usually this was done by local commanders.

Slovenia

After the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Germans and Italians divided Slovenia between themselves, with Hungary receiving a small portion. Slovene formations began operating in the Italian section as a Slovene Legion in the spring of 1941. These operated as a local gendarmerie. Two Slovene formations gradually came into being. The Slovene "Blues" were affiliated with the Četniks. This was the largest pro-Četnik organization outside of the areas of Serbian population, but never had more than 500 men. The Blue command maintained contact with the Italians.

The other important Slovene formation was affiliated with the pro-war Slovene People's Party. The Italians together with this party organized Village Guard units in 1942. They came to be known as White Guards, and numbered around 2,500 men. These were strongly Catholic and anti-Communist. After the Italian collapse in September 1943, the Partisans launched an offensive that inflicted serious damage on the Blues and the Whites. The remaining Slovenes joined together as the Slovene Defense Legion. Led by former Austro-Hungarian and Royal Yugoslav officer General Leon Rupnik (1880–1946), the Slovene Defense Legion functioned as German auxiliaries. At the end of the war, many members retreated to Austria. Those returned by the British to Yugoslavia suffered the same fate at the hands of the Partisans as other German collaborators. Tito's government executed Rupnik after the war.

Other Formations

Separatist Montenegrins (Greens) organized a small unit of Voluntary Anti-Communist Militia under Italian control in August 1941.

These later adopted the name Nationalist Army of Montenegro and Herzegovina. Never amounting to more than 5,000 men, this formation generally cooperated with the Italians and much larger Montenegrin Četnik units against the Partisans. They continued this cooperation under the Germans after the Italian withdrawal and retreated north in the fall of 1944. The British handed most of them over to the Partisans in May 1945.

The Germans organized three SS divisions from Yugoslav nationals. The first of these was SS Volunteer Mountain Division Prinz Eugen, formed in March 1942. It was composed of ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsch*) from Yugoslavia, with others from Hungary and Romania. It mainly participated in anti-Partisan actions in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.

The Germans also organized a Bosniak SS division, the 13th Waffen SS Mountain Division "Handschar" in February 1943. Named after a Bosnian sword, this was the first non-Germanic SS unit. Members mutinied during training in France in September 1943. It then was sent to Bosnia and Croatia in 1944 for anti-Partisan operations. It retreated north in 1944 and fought in Hungary and northern Yugoslavia.

Another German formation that consisted of Yugoslav nationals was the 21st Waffen Mountain Division SS Skanderbeg. Named for the fifteenth-century Albanian hero, this formation was made up of mainly Kosovo Albanians. Desperate for military manpower, the Germans established this unit in April 1944. It achieved notoriety for its actions against the Serbian civilian population of Kosovo. Always ill-disciplined and not effective militarily, the Skanderbeg Division was disbanded on November 1, 1944. Remnants continued to fight as the Skanderbeg Regiment (*Kampfgruppe*) in

Yugoslavia. By January 1945, the survivors were incorporated into the Prinz Eugen Division.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Četniks; Greens (Montenegro); Lojotić, Dimitrije, Mihajlović, Dragoljub "Draža" (1893–1946); Nedić, Milan (1877–1946); Partisans, Yugoslavia; Yugoslavia in World War II

Further Reading

Cohen, Philip J. *Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996.

Müller, Rolf-Dieter. *The Unknown Eastern Front: The Wehrmacht and Hitler's Foreign Soldiers*. London: I. B. Taurus, 2012.


Pavlowitch, Stavan K. *Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

Thomas, N., and K. Mikulan. *Axis Forces in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945*. Oxford: Osprey, 1995.

Tomasevich, Jozo. *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Yugoslavia, Invasion of, 1941

On December 13, 1940, Adolf Hitler issued orders for the conquest of Greece (Operation Marita) to succor the Italians in Albania and protect Germany's southern flank during the planned invasion of the Soviet Union. Use of the Belgrade-Nis-Salonika railroad line was essential for German operations in Greece, and thus the cooperation of Yugoslavia was needed. Accordingly, Hitler pressured Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact on March 25, 1941. This move precipitated a bloodless military coup in Belgrade on March 26–27. Prince Regent Paul



Upon capturing the city, German occupation forces hoist the swastika flag at the city hall in Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, April 16, 1941. (AP Photo)

(1893–1976) fled to Greece, 17-year-old King Peter II (1923–1970) took the throne, and the Yugoslav air force's General Dušan Simović (1882–1962) formed a new government. Although Simović assured Hitler that Yugoslavia would remain friendly, the Führer was enraged by the coup, and on March 27, he issued Directive No. 25 ordering the German conquest of Yugoslavia, which assigned supporting roles in the operation to both Italy and Hungary.

The German High Command quickly prepared plans for the operation and began to assemble the necessary forces. The latter included General Maximilian von Weich's (1881–1954) Second Army, then in Austria and southwest Hungary (11 divisions in four corps); Lieutenant General Georg-Hans

Reinhardt's (1887–1963) XLI Panzer Corps, near Timisoara, Romania (1 Schutzstaffel [SS] motorized infantry division, plus one infantry and one panzer regiment); and General Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist's (1881–1954) First Panzer Group (five divisions in two corps), assembling in Bulgaria for the planned invasion of Greece. Luftwaffe assets assigned to the operation included some 1,148 aircraft of the Fourth Air Fleet in Austria, the VIII Air Corps in Bulgaria, and the X Air Corps on Sicily.

The weak Yugoslav army was no match for the Germans. Mobilized on March 29, it totaled fewer than 1 million men in 35 divisions, other troops under three army groups, one independent field army headquarters, and the Coastal Defense Command. The Yugoslavs had few modern tanks and little artillery and relied on animal transport. Most Yugoslav war matériel had been obtained from Germany, and there were few reserves of ammunition or other supplies. The Yugoslav air force had some 459 military aircraft, its airfields were vulnerable, and it lacked spares and other equipment. The Yugoslav navy consisted of one old training cruiser, four modern destroyers, four submarines, two river monitors, and 16 old motor torpedo boats. Its ships were manned largely by Croats. Politically unreliable, the navy would play no role in the coming campaign.

After only 10 days for planning and preparations, the Germans began their assault on April 6, 1941, with a massive air attack on Belgrade that killed some 17,000 civilians, destroyed much of the Yugoslav air force, and cut communications between the Yugoslav Supreme Command and its units in the field. The same day, Field Marshal Siegmund Wilhelm List's (1880–1971) Twelfth Army launched Operation Marita. The German XL Panzer Corps took Skopje on

April 7, thereby cutting off the Yugoslav line of retreat toward Salonika, and the Twelfth Army continued into Greece.

Plans for Operation No. 25 called for a three-pronged attack aimed at Belgrade. The First Panzer Group attacked from Bulgaria on April 8 on the Niš-Kragujevac-Belgrade axis, overcame stiff resistance by the Yugoslav Fifth Army, and took Niš on April 9. At the same time, the XLI Panzer Corps attacked from Romania and plowed through the Yugoslav Sixth Army. Using bridges over the Danube, Drava, and Sava Rivers seized by the Second Army between April 1 and 7, the XLVI Panzer Corps attacked toward Belgrade on April 10, routing the Yugoslav Fourth and Second Armies and reaching Novi Sad on April 11. That same day, Zagreb fell to the LI Infantry Corps, aided by the 14th Panzer Division detached from the XLVI Panzer Corps. Meanwhile, the XLIX Mountain Corps forced the surrender of Yugoslav forces in Slovenia, and the Italian Second Army attacked from Trieste down the Yugoslav coast, meeting little resistance.

On the evening of April 12, the three converging German corps surrounded Belgrade, and the next morning, German forces entered Belgrade unopposed. The Second Army then assumed responsibility for all operations in Yugoslavia and acted to prevent the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces into the Serbian mountains. General von Weich's two pursuit groups moved toward Sarajevo from Zagreb and from Belgrade via Užice. On April 14, the Yugoslav government was evacuated to Greece, and negotiations for an armistice began. Sarajevo fell the next day, and on April 17, Yugoslavia surrendered unconditionally at Belgrade. The armistice went into effect on April 18, ending a 12-day campaign in which the Germans had only 558 casualties, including 151 killed. Yugoslavia was

then annexed or occupied by the victorious Axis powers, except for Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which formed the pro-Axis Independent State of Croatia.

Charles R. Shrader

See also: Yugoslavia, Axis Occupation Forces in World War II; Yugoslavia in World War II

Further Reading

Barefield, Michael R. *Overwhelming Force, Indecisive Victory: The German Invasion of Yugoslavia, 1941*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.

Jukic, Ilija. *The Fall of Yugoslavia*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974.

Littlefield, Frank. *Germany and Yugoslavia, 1933–1941: The German Conquest of Yugoslavia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Shores, Christopher, Brian Cull, and Nicola Malizia. *Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete, 1940–41*. London: Grub Street, 1999.

U.S. Department of the Army. *The German Campaign in the Balkans (Spring 1941)*. Department of the Army Pamphlet 20–260. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1953.

Yugoslavia in World War II

During World War II, Yugoslavia was the setting for Europe's greatest resistance struggle but also a bloody civil war. A country of some 16 million people in 1941, Yugoslavia was one of the new states formed at the end of World War I. Serbia, which had been on the winning Allied side in the war, was its nucleus, with the addition of territories from the defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire. Unfortunately, the new state consisted of nationalities that had been on

YUGOSLAVIA, 1945



opposing sides in the war and had strong religious, linguistic, and cultural differences. The nation began as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but in 1929, it was renamed Yugoslavia, the “land of the South Slavs.” The country was held together not so much by common ties as by outside pressures and by the fact that its peoples believed they had a better chance of surviving together rather than separately.

The Serbs were the largest single nationality in Yugoslavia, and their king, Alexander, became head of the new state. Many non-Serbs complained of being second-class citizens, and in 1934, King Alexander was assassinated by a Macedonian terrorist in the service of the Croat Ustaša nationalist

organization while on a state visit to France. In September 1939, World War II began, and Yugoslavian leaders declared the country neutral. They hoped to keep their state out of the war, although Serb sentiment at least was heavily pro-Allied. Serbs also dominated the army officer corps. In late 1940, to counter Russian moves and to solidify his flanks before attacking the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa, German leader Adolf Hitler forced the Balkan states to join the Axis alliance.

Prince Paul (1893–1976), regent for the young King Peter II (1923–1970), tried to stall for time, but in March 1941, following a meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, he concluded that resistance was futile

and might lead to the extermination of the Yugoslav state. On March 25, Yugoslav leaders traveled to Berlin to sign the Tripartite Pact. In taking this step, they hoped they were preserving their country's independence; however, Serbian public opinion was sharply opposed to the Axis alliance. This opposition found expression in nationwide demonstrations that prompted a coup on March 27 by Yugoslav air force officers, headed by General Dušan Simović (1882–1962). He ended the regency and formed a new government under Peter II. Although the new government assured the Germans that there would be no immediate change of course in Yugoslav foreign policy, Hitler interpreted the coup as a personal affront and planned a military reprisal. Code-named Operation Retribution, the reprisal began on April 6 and included heavy air strikes against the Yugoslav capital of Belgrade.

This Axis operation also involved troops from Italy and Hungary (Hungarian premier Pál Teleki (1879–1941) committed suicide rather than dishonor himself by participating in such an act), for a total of 52 Axis divisions. These units easily defeated Yugoslav regular forces, overrunning the country in only 11 days. The Yugoslav government leaders and King Peter fled to London, arriving there in mid-June. Despite the poor performance of their armed forces, Yugoslav leaders found themselves acclaimed as heroes for having resisted Hitler. Soon, they had established a government-in-exile.

Defeated, Yugoslavia was now partitioned among the Axis states. Slovenia was divided between Germany and Italy; Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were combined into the independent state of Croatia under the direction of the Fascist Ustaša government of Ante Pavelić (1889–1959); Italian forces occupied the Dalmatian coast and

Montenegro; Albania annexed the Kosovo region and Macedonia; Bulgaria received Macedonia east of the Vardar River; Hungary took the Bachka and Baranya regions; and Serbia and the Banat fell under German military control.

All ethnic Croats among the 300,000 Yugoslav prisoners of war taken in the invasion were freed, and by August 1941, the Germans had established a Serb collaborationist government under General Milan Nedić (1877–1946). In Croatia, meanwhile, the fascist Ustaša began the mass murder of minorities and forced Serbs to convert to Catholicism from Orthodox Christianity. In 1941, these Croatian fascists killed at least 200,000 Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, most of them at the Jasenovac concentration camp.

Yugoslav resistance to the Germans began immediately. Centered in the Serbs, it was divided in two factions. Colonel Dragoljub “Draža” Mihajlović (1893–1946) retreated with a small force to the mountains and set up the Četniks (named for Serb guerrillas who had fought the Turks). The Četniks began receiving assistance from the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in June 1941. Mihajlović hoped to build up his strength, avoiding reprisals by the Germans against the civilian population, and at the opportune time lead an uprising against the Germans. He strongly supported restoration of the monarchy.

Josip Broz (Tito) (1892–1980), leader of the Yugoslav Communist Party since 1937, headed the second major resistance group. Known as the Partisans, the group favored immediate attacks on the Germans regardless of the cost to the civilian population in German reprisals. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht redeployed all but four of its divisions from Yugoslavia. Tito capitalized on this situation, and the

Partisans were particularly active in Montenegro, Serbia, and Bosnia. By autumn 1941, Tito's Partisans numbered 50,000 people and contested the Germans for control of much of the countryside. In contrast to Mihajlović, Tito stressed a pan-Yugoslav platform after the war, stressing participation of all ethnic groups and establishment of a federated Yugoslav state.

Tito and Mihajlović met on two separate occasions in September and October 1941 but failed to develop a cooperative approach against the Germans. Hostilities between these two groups began in November 1941 when Četniks attacked the Partisan base at Užice. Moreover, the Četniks often collaborated with Italian troops and the Nedić government in attempts to rid Serb and Montenegrin areas of Partisan influence. An agreement with German forces concluded on November 11 allowed the Četniks freedom of movement in return for taking action against the Partisans.

The Partisans' strength continued to grow. During 1942, their numbers reached 100,000 people, and by 1943, they had swelled to 250,000. By the end of the war, Tito claimed nearly 800,000 followers. So effective were their activities that the Germans recalled their 113th Division from the Eastern Front and the 342nd Division from France to help contain the Partisans. In addition, the Bulgarians maintained 8 divisions and the Italians 17 divisions on Yugoslav territory. The Yugoslav resistance is thus credited with tying down a large number of Axis troops who would otherwise have been available for deployment elsewhere.

German forces mounted at least six major anti-Partisan operations between 1941 and 1944, yet the chief consequence of these sweeps was to force Tito to abandon any fixed base of operations. German reprisals against civilians, sometimes at the rate of

20 civilians killed for every dead German, usually generated still greater Partisan support. By 1943, both the Nedić government in Serbia and the Ustaša government in Croatia were unstable, and Tito's strength had grown to the point where he transformed the Partisans into the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. Also in 1943, Tito created a shadow Yugoslav provisional government known as the Anti-Fascist Council for the Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). Located in Bosnia, the AVNOJ established a network of district committees in Partisan-controlled areas of Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

The British continued to support Mihajlović and his Četniks until December 1943, when, falsely convinced by a Communist agent that the Serb-dominated Četnik resistance group was not fighting the Germans, Winston L. S. Churchill's government decided to channel all its aid to the Partisans. On November 29, 1943, the AVNOJ created the Yugoslav National Liberation Committee as a shadow government. It banned King Peter from returning to Yugoslavia and announced its intent to create a postwar federated state.

When Italian troops surrendered in Yugoslavia on September 8, 1943, Tito's force seized the Italian arms depots. Faced with surprisingly successful resistance movements in the hills of Serbia and Bosnia, the Germans launched a number of operations, two of the largest coming in 1943, in an increasingly frustrated and futile attempt to crush the Partisan movement. Accounts of Partisan survival and heroism in the midst of these assaults assumed mythic dimensions in postwar Yugoslavia.

When the Germans pulled out many of their troops, the Partisans, largely recruited from the peasantry, already held most of the countryside and the main lines of

communication. In a coordinated effort on October 20, 1944, the Soviet army and Partisan forces moved into Belgrade. On March 7, 1945, Tito's provisional government formally declared itself the legitimate leadership of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. For Yugoslavia, the toll of World War II had been heavy. By its end, an estimated 1.7 million Yugoslavs had been killed, both in combat and in atrocities committed by and against civilians.

At the end of the war, Yugoslavia attempted to annex Italian Istria and Trieste and the southern provinces of Austria. Tito's forces moved into Carinthia and tried to take it by coup de main. The speedy advance of the British V Corps prevented this, but there was a tense standoff. In mid-May 1945, the threat of force finally convinced the Yugoslavs to leave Austria. Clearly, Tito had hoped to seize any area where there was a blood tie to any ethnic group in Yugoslavia, including Carinthia, Istria, and Slovenia.

Tito did exact vengeance on the Croats, many of whom had been loyal to the Germans, as had many Slovenes. Within weeks of the war's end, the Partisans executed without trial up to a quarter of a million people who had sided with the Germans, most of them Croats. In addition, the majority of German prisoners taken in the war perished in a long "march of hate" across Yugoslavia. German soldiers captured in Yugoslavia worked as slave laborers; 60 percent of them were dead within a year. Also, despite protests by Western governments, the new Yugoslav government tried and executed General Mihajlović.

The fact that the Yugoslav resistance had fought so well against the Germans and that it had liberated most of the country placed Tito in a strong position to demand and secure a Red Army withdrawal from those parts of Yugoslavia it occupied. In 1948, however,

Yugoslavia was expelled from the international Communist movement.

Neville Panthaki and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Četniks; Mihajlović, Dragoljub "Draža" (1893–1946); Partisans, Yugoslavia; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslavia, Axis Occupation Forces in World War II; Yugoslavia, Collaborationist Forces in World War II; Yugoslavia, Invasion of, 1941

Further Reading

Clissold, S. *Whirlwind: An Account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949.

Cohen, Philip J. *Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996.

Djilas, Milovan. *Wartime*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980.

Roberts, Walter R. *Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941–1945*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973.

Tomasevich, Jozo. *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Trew, Simon. *Britain, Mihailović, and the Chetniks, 1941–1942*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

Yugoslav Military Coup

Yugoslav military officers led a coup that overthrew the Yugoslav regent, Prince Paul Karageorgević (1893–1976), on March 27, 1941, and replaced him with his young cousin, 17-year old King Peter II Karageorgević (1923–1970), after Paul had signed a military alliance with Nazi Germany in Vienna two days earlier.

In fall 1940, Adolf Hitler directed the German High Command to develop plans

for the invasion of the Soviet Union. On December 5, Hitler approved the invasion plans and, on December 18, signed the war directive that authorized the invasion, code-named Operation Barbarossa, to begin on May 15, 1941. Hitler then began negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria to secure the southern flank of the proposed offensive against a possible attack by the British from the south and to protect the vital Romanian oilfields. Romania formally joined the Axis on November 23, 1940, with German promises to return the provinces of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, which Hitler had forced Romania to cede to the Soviet Union in August 1939. On March 1, 1941, Bulgaria joined the Axis in exchange for promises to receive the Macedonian provinces of Yugoslavia and Greece.

Italy's invasion of Greece from Albania that began on October 28, 1940, complicated the situation in the Balkans. Although the Italian army initially performed well and drove through the Greek defenses, the Italian advance stalled in muddy and mountainous terrain after two weeks of fighting. The Greek army went on the offensive and drove the Italians back to the Albanian border by the end of January 1941. Hitler now felt that he had to prevent the complete defeat of the Italians and the humiliation of his Axis partner, Benito Mussolini.

In the meantime, Hitler pressured Prince Paul, who hoped to keep Yugoslavia out of the war, into signing the Tripartite Treaty in Vienna on March 25, 1941. News of the official signing of the treaty produced anti-Nazi demonstrations in Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital. When Paul returned to Belgrade two days later, senior military officers led by the air force's Brigadier General Borivoje Mirković (1884–1969), opposed to the treaty and encouraged by anti-Nazi opposition parties and promises from

Britain, arrested the three members of the regency—Prince Paul, Dr. Radenko Stan-ković (1880–1956), and Dr. Ivo Perović (1882–1958); the premier, Dragiša Cvetković (1893–1969); and the vice prime minister, Vlatko Maček (1879–1964). The conspirators exiled Paul and installed Peter II as king with full powers; General Dušan Simović (1882–1962), the commander of the air force, as the prime minister; and Slobodan Jovanović (1869–1958) as the deputy prime minister.

Upon hearing the news of the coup in Belgrade, Hitler took it as a personal insult, went into a rage, and ordered the High Command to develop a plan to invade Yugoslavia. The invasion began on April 6, 1941, with a devastating aerial attack on Belgrade. The Yugoslav army collapsed on April 17. Also on April 6, the Germans invaded Greece and completely occupied that country by June 1, 1941. Some historians contend that these actions delayed the invasion of the Soviet Union until June 22, which meant that Hitler's armies bogged down in approaching winter weather in October, about 100 miles west of Moscow.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Germany in the Balkans during World War II; Greece, Invasion of, 1941; Yugoslavia, Invasion of, 1941

Further Reading

- Costa, Nicholas J. *Shattered Illusions: Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1998.
- Hopner, Jacob B. *Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934–1941*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962.
- Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Pawlowitch, Stevan K. *The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and Its Problems*,

1918–1988. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1988.

Yugoslav Overflight Incidents, 1946

The Yugoslav overflight incidents were a series of confrontations over Yugoslav air space during the early Cold War. In 1946, the new Yugoslav Communist government headed by Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) interdicted several American flights that had crossed into Yugoslav territory. The Yugoslavs forced down one British aircraft and shot down two American planes. Having assumed control by military victory in 1945, Tito wanted to demonstrate to the Soviets his commitment to Communism. This led him to engage in a dispute over the disposition of the Italian Adriatic port of Trieste. This also caused the Yugoslavs to assume an aggressive posture toward the Americans and their allies. In 1946, a Yugoslav Air Force Yak-3 had forced down a Royal Air Force Dakota transport plane near Niš (Serbia). No one was injured in this incident. On August 9, 1946, the Yugoslav Air Force operating from Ljubljana shot at an American C-47 flying over northern Yugoslav (Slovenia) air space land and made it land. One passenger was severely wounded in the incident. Ten days later, on August 19, a Yugoslav Air Force Yak-3 fighter plane, also from Ljubljana, shot down another American C-47 over northern Yugoslavia (Slovenia), killing the entire five-man crew. The American flights were apparently unauthorized efforts by the individual crews to save time in flying from Vienna to Venice and Rome. The Yugoslavs evidently perceived these intrusions as a part of a hostile American effort directed against the Yugoslav Communist govern-

ment. They probably thought the transport planes were bombers. Neither side chose to escalate the conflict. The Yugoslavs released the airmen from the first plane and paid compensation to the families of the airmen in the second plane. Tensions between the Americans and Yugoslavs eased in 1948 as Tito split with his Soviet allies.

This did not entirely end such overflight incidents, however. On October 27, 1948, an Italian Air Force P-38 Lightning was shot down over Yugoslavia. Then on October 13, 1951, another Italian Air Force P-38L Lightning was shot down over Yugoslavia. Only with the final resolution of the Trieste issue in 1954 did Yugoslavia's aggressive defense of their air space against intrusion from the West come to an end.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Cold War in the Balkans; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Trieste Dispute; Yugoslav-Soviet Split

Further Reading

"Intrusions, Overflights, Shootdowns and Defections during the Cold War and Thereafter." <http://myplace.frontier.com/~anneled/ColdWar.html>.

Lampe, John. *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Yugoslav-Soviet Split

This 1948 rupture between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union stemmed, in large measure, from personal and geopolitical conflict between Stalin and Tito. Following World War II, Yugoslavia, under the leadership of Partisan resistance hero Josip Broz Tito, was the Soviet Union's most ardent ally in Eastern Europe. The Yugoslavs even became embroiled in disputes with the

Americans over the disposition of Trieste and Yugoslav attacks on American aircraft. Both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union held similar attitudes toward Albanian developments. The Yugoslavs initially decided to subordinate their foreign policy objectives to Moscow by seeking Soviet approval and support for Belgrade's expansionist objectives toward Albania. Stalin indicated that Yugoslavia might "swallow" Albania. Moscow's interests, though, transcended bilateral Soviet-Yugoslav relations and stressed combating what they saw as a permanent U.S. commitment to Western Europe demonstrated by the Marshall Plan.

Stalin sought to reinforce Soviet dominance of the Communist bloc by demanding subservience of all Eastern Europe Communist regimes. He became suspicious of Tito's efforts to establish a Balkan Federation including Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs, however, resented Soviet efforts to dominate their economy and military. In particular they, having won their war against Nazi Germany, disliked receiving the same treatment from the Soviets accorded to former Nazi allies Bulgaria and Romania. Tito and the Yugoslavs refused to submit to the Soviet definition of Socialist Internationalism.

On June 28, 1948, the date recalling the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand (1863–1914) in 1914, the Yugoslav Communist Party was expelled from Cominform, the international Communist organization. As a result, Albania, a Yugoslav satellite since 1945, broke away from Belgrade's control and sought support from Moscow. Also, the Yugoslavs discontinued their support for the Greek Communist rebels. The Greek Civil War ended the next year. Finally Tito's government adopted a policy of nonalignment in international relations. Yugoslavia joined

neither NATO and the European Common Market, nor COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. It did briefly enter into a Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey in 1954, but this agreement proved to be ephemeral. It also formulated an economic model that included worker's self-management, permitted the emigration of labor to Western European countries, and encouraged foreign tourism.

After Stalin's death, bilateral relations were restored between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the Yugoslavs maintained their distance. This ideological split to some degree precluded further Communist advancement in Eastern Europe. Even though Stalin had threatened that he would lift his little finger and destroy Tito, Yugoslav national interests were able to survive until its national disintegration in the early 1990s. This was in part because Stalin did not wish to expend the military effort to subdue Tito and his successors when he had other global interests to attend to.

Bert Chapman

See also: Balkan Pact, 1954; Hoxha, Enver (1908–1985); NATO in the Balkans; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Truman Doctrine; Yugoslav Overflight Incidents, 1946

Further Reading

- Djilas, Milovan. *Tito: The Story from Inside*. London: Phoenix Press, 2000.
- Majstorović, Vojin. "The Rise and Fall of the Yugoslav-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1948." *Past Imperfect* 16 (2010): 132–64.
- Pons, Silvio. "Stalin and the European Communists after World War Two (1943–1948)." *Past & Present* (January 2011, supplement 6): 121–38.
- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. National Foreign Assessment Center. *Key Soviet-Yugoslav Documents: A Reference Aid*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1980. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015054429413>.

Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995

The Yugoslav Wars were conflicts resulting from years of increasing ethnic antagonism in the former nation of Yugoslavia. The outbreak of hostilities was precipitated by the death of Communist leader Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) in 1980 and the subsequent collapse of the Cold War and communism.

Under Tito's regime, small-scale ethnic clashes and religious rivalries were quickly and forcefully suppressed. Following Tito's death, a nationalistic movement supplanted the League of Communists in Yugoslavia, and Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006) gained power. On May 8, 1989, Milošević was elected president of Serbia. He soon established control over the autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Together with control of Montenegro, this gave him effective domination of the eight-member Yugoslav executive council established as an executive body after Tito's death in 1980. As it became clear that Milošević was intent on Serbian authority over the entire region, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991. Consequently, the Bosnian Serbs, led by Milošević and Radovan Karadžić (1945–), launched a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Muslim and Croat population.

On June 27, 1991, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) failed to quell the insurgent Slovenian forces with tank and infantry assaults. About the same time, fighting began between Croats and local Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia. Slovenia's war for independence lasted only a month, with fewer than 70 deaths reported; Milošević decided to cut his losses in Slovenia. In any event, Slovenia did not contain a significant Serbian population. Croatia,

however, was different. Around 12 percent of the population of Croatia was Serbian. Croatian secessionist forces pitted against Serb rebels (supported by the JNA) continued fighting for another six months with roughly 10,000 reported deaths. On December 19, 1991, rebel Serbs declared independence in the Krajina region, which constituted almost a third of Croatia. On November 17, 1991, the besieged town of Vukovar in eastern Croatia fell to Croatian Serb and JNA forces. In the aftermath the victors massacred civilians and wounded Croat soldiers.

On January 3, 1992, the United Nations successfully brokered a cease-fire agreement between the Croatian government and rebel Serbs. After many subsequent breaches, the UN Protection Force installed 14,000 peacekeeping troops in Croatia. That installation was eventually expanded to include help in the delivery of humanitarian aid for those affected by the ongoing hostilities.

The fighting then shifted to Bosnia. On December 21, local Serb leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina declared a new republic independent from Bosnia. On March 3, the Bosnian Muslim and Croat population voted for independence in a referendum denounced by Bosnian Serbs.

On April 6, 1992, Bosnian Serbs attempted to seize possession of Bosnia's capital city of Sarajevo. War broke out between Bosnian government forces and the rebel Serbs, and war ensued. The Bosnian Serb attack on Sarajevo failed due to the resistance of the mainly Muslim (Bosniak) Bosnian government forces. The Bosnian Serbs then imposed a siege from the hills around Sarajevo. In May, UN sanctions were implemented against Serbia for support of rebel Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. As heavy fighting continued throughout



Bosnian government forces point guns at the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, on April 6, 1992, after a crowd of tens of thousands of peace protesters came under sniper fire from the hotel windows in Sarajevo. Five people were killed, and police reportedly arrested six Serb gunmen. (AP Photo/Tanjug)

January 1993, the Serbian rebel siege of Sarajevo continued. The United Nations and European Union peace negotiations failed while war broke out in Bosnia once more—this time between Muslims and Croats, who fought over the remaining 30 percent of Bosnia not already claimed by the Bosnian Serbs. On April 13, 1993, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began air patrols over Bosnia to enforce a UN ban on flights in the region.

On February 6, 1994, Serbian rebels shelled Sarajevo's central marketplace, killing 68 people. In retaliation, NATO jets shot down four Serbian aircraft as hostilities continued to escalate in the region. This marked the first time that NATO had used force since its inception in 1949. On March 18, 1994, Bosnian Muslims and Croats signed a U.S.-brokered peace

agreement. On April 10, NATO launched its first air strikes against the Serbs in Banja Luka.

Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government signed a truce facilitated by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter on January 1, 1995. However, when the agreement expired four months later, the Muslim-led government refused to renew the terms, and fighting escalated once more. Serbs continued to assail Sarajevo, while on May 26, 1995, NATO air strikes created a crisis situation in which 350 UN peacekeepers were taken hostage by Bosnian Serbs. The Serbian government (in a bid to improve relations with the West) helped to arrange the hostages' release. The massacre of 8,000 Bosniak men and boys after Bosnian Serb forces led by Ratko Mladić (1942–) overran Srebrenica on July 11, 1995,

provided added incentive for the resolution of the fighting. In Operation Storm, launched on August 4, 1995, U.S.-trained Croat forces undertook the offensive against the Croatian Serb army in the Krajina. The Croats rapidly overran the Serbian positions. In the aftermath of this operation, most of the Serbian population left or was expelled from the Krajina, where it had lived since the beginning of the eighteenth century. Then on August 28, NATO launched a massive bombing campaign on Bosnian Serb positions. This enabled Croat and Bosniak forces to proceed against the Bosnian Serbs. By September 21, 1995, the Croats and Bosniaks had taken about half of Bosnia. Both sides were exhausted and ready to talk.

Hosted by the United States, peace talks began on November 1, 1995, near the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, at the Begrim Conference Center. While Serbian president Milošević claimed support for the peace talks, Serbian general Mladić proclaimed that he would fight the terms of the forthcoming peace accord. As the talks continued, the first NATO peace-keeping troops arrived in Sarajevo.

On December 14, the Dayton Agreement (1995) was signed in Paris, France. The terms of the agreement granted 51 percent of Bosnia to the Bosnian-Croat federation and 49 percent to the Serbs. While this agreement officially ended the war, as Serbs withdrew occupation forces in the region granted to the Bosnian-Croat federation, they destroyed what little was left intact in the aftermath of the conflict, and sporadic fighting continued. Fighting then erupted in Kosovo in 1998. A collapse of Albanian government authority in 1997 led to the looting of stores of Albanian army weapons and munitions. The next year, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) made use

of these weapons against Serbian authorities in Kosovo. The Serbs responded with brutality. NATO undertook a bombing campaign against the Serbs in February 1999. In response, in Operation Horseshoe, the Serbs attempted to force much of the Albanian population out of Kosovo. Finally, on June 10, 1999, the Serbs agreed to withdraw from Kosovo. NATO forces assumed responsibility for the country.

Following a U.S. bombing of Kosovo in 1999 and the winding down of the war, Milošević remained in power despite being declared a war criminal. Finally brought to justice in the year 2000, Milošević's trial began at The Hague on September 26, 2002. He died of an apparent heart attack on March 11, 2006, before a verdict could be rendered. As of this writing, two other war criminals awaited justice in The Hague: Radovan Karadžić, captured on July 26, 2008; and Ratko Mladic, apprehended by Serbian authorities on May 26, 2011. On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. While most European states and the United States recognized this, Serbia and Russia have not. A NATO force remains in the country.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bosnian War, 1992–1995; Dayton Peace Accords, 1995; Kosovo War, 1998–1999; NATO in the Balkans; Srebrenica Massacre, 1995; Vance-Owen Plan, 1993; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Magas, Branka. *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Breakup 1980–1992*. New York: Verso, 1993.

Rogel, Carole. *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998.

Silber, Laura, and Allen Little. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. New York: Penguin, 1998.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. *Balkan Battlefields: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict 1990–1995*. Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002.

Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes

The causes of the Yugoslav Wars began in the formation of the first Yugoslav state in 1918. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes that emerged at the end of World War I had a plurality of Serbs scattered throughout much of its territory. These included the population of the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro as well as the Serbian populations of Bosnia and Croatia.

Many of these Serbs regarded the new state as theirs by right of their sacrifices made during the war against the Central Powers. The assertion of Serbian authority and rights often came at the expense of the non-Serbian population. Many Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Croats, and Slovenes had served in the Austro-Hungarian army during the war, and thus were regarded as former enemies by the Serbs. Serbian domination belied the ideal of Yugoslavism, which regarded all South Slavs as being essentially the same people. Serbs held leading positions in the government, military, and police. The monarch was from the Serbian Karageorgević dynasty. To emphasize the dominant position of the Serbs, the constitution of the new state, essentially an updated version of the Serbian Constitution of 1903, was enacted on *Vidovdan* (St. Vitus Day), June 28, 1921, the Serbian national holiday and the seventh anniversary

of the Sarajevo assassination. The predominance of the Serbs in the government alienated much of the non-Serbian populations. The Croats, who constituted the second-largest element in the population, were especially disaffected. King Alexander (1888–1934) attempted to denationalize the country in 1929 by redrawing the borders of administrative districts to vary the population and adopted the name Yugoslavia for the country. This had little effect. Nor did the 1939 *Sporzum*, which granted the Croatian parts of the country some autonomy, alleviate the problem.

The German and Italian attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941 demonstrated how deep the divisions among the Yugoslav nationalities had become. Most Serbian units in the Yugoslav armed forces resisted the invaders; many Croatian units did not. Yugoslavia dissolved into a German-sponsored Croatian state (NDH) and a German-sponsored Serbian state. Bulgarian, German, Hungarian, and Italian forces occupied the rest of the country. The atrocities of the ruling party in the NDH, the Ustaša, directed against the Serbian populations of Bosnia and Croatia, soon led to Serbian resistance. At the same time, mainly Serbian units of the Royal Yugoslav Army bypassed during the invasion coalesced with local Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia into a force known as the Četniks. A nonnationalist resistance force led by Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) and the Yugoslav Communist Party known as the Partisans became active after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. A multisided civil war ensued among the Četniks, Partisans, and Ustaša. Adding another dimension to the fighting were occupation forces. Smaller units of various origins—including Montenegrin nationalists (Greens), Slovene Home Guards, Kosovo Albanian units, and even a

Russian Cossack unit—participated in the general chaos. While fighting occurred throughout the country, the epicenter of the conflict was Bosnia, which was nominally a part of the NDH. There, all sides committed horrific atrocities, and all sides suffered considerable military and civilian casualties.

The surrender of the Italians in September 1943 and the withdrawal of the Germans in the fall of 1944 left the Partisans to dominate Yugoslavia. The NDH held on until May 9, becoming the last of the German European allies in World War II to fall. Vengeful Partisans pursued the remnants of the Četniks, Ustaša, and others, massacring around 70,000 of them near Bleiburg in southern Austria. A legacy of nationalist hatred remained.

After the war, the new Communist regime sought to erase the nationalist legacy. This meant the imposition of communist ideology in place of nationalism. This also meant the establishment of a federal government, with six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. The Tito regime also carved out two autonomous regions—Kosovo, with a predominately Albanian population, and Vojvodina, with a mixed population—out of Serbian territory. They were intended to some degree to dilute Serbian influence and prevent Serbian domination of the new Yugoslavia. Overt expressions of nationalism were forbidden in this second Yugoslavia. The Tito regime succeeded to some degree in developing and maintaining the idea of Yugoslavia as an independent Communist state. Only in 1971 did Croatian intellectuals attempt to emphasize their particularism. The regime soon suppressed this Croatian Spring. This incident demonstrated that nationalist sensibilities, although muted, remained exeunt in Tito's Yugoslavia.

Tito's death in May 1980 began the revival of nationalism and, with it, the slow unraveling of the second Yugoslavia. Several problems beset the post-Tito government. In place of the dictatorial leadership of Tito was a council consisting of the presidents of the six republics and two autonomous regions. Chairmanship of this council rotated on a yearly basis. This arrangement precluded the rapid and decisive exercise of executive power. During the 1980s, the Yugoslav economy foundered. The cost of imported gas and oil soared. Yugoslav production faltered. One well-known failure was the Yugo, a cheap car exported to the United States. Without the adequate repair and supply infrastructure to maintain it, exports plummeted. Another problem for the country was the 1989 failure of communism throughout Eastern Europe. This brought the validity of the ruling ideology in Yugoslavia into question.

As the post-Tito Yugoslavia faced economic and political crises, nationalism reemerged. Soon after Tito's death, the majority Albanian population of Kosovo began to raise demands for the elevation of their autonomous region to the status of republic. Under Tito, the Kosovo Albanians had achieved important economic and political gains in Kosovo. Serbs, however, had long regarded Kosovo as the heartland of their nationalist mythology. Even though by 1980 they were in the distinct minority, they considered Kosovo to be an important part of their identity. They perceived the demands of the Kosovo Albanians for a republic as a threat to Serbian identity. Although federal authorities quashed the demands for a Kosovo republic in 1981, many Serbs remained concerned that their domination of that region was in peril. In 1986, a group from the Serbian Academy of Sciences published a memorandum that

claimed that the Serbian population of Kosovo and Croatia was under threat of extermination. The rhetoric grew even more extreme the next year, when a Communist Party official from Serbia, Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006), told a Serbian crowd in Kosovo that “no one [meaning the Kosovo Albanian police] should dare to beat you.” He implied that the Yugoslav government was then replacing the Tito-era consideration for the Kosovo Albanians with the restoration of Serbian privilege in Kosovo. This performance elevated Milošević to the leadership of the Serbian nationalists. For him, Serbian nationalism became a vehicle to Yugoslav political power.

By 1989, Milošević had taken over control of the Serbian Communist Party. That same year, he ousted the leaders of the Communist Parties of Kosovo and Vojvodina and installed his allies in their places. This gave him control of three seats in the rotating presidency, together with the ready acquiescence of Montenegro. With four presidential seats under Milošević’s power, the specter of a Serbian-ruled Yugoslavia appeared again. This was unacceptable to the Croats and Slovenes. These two republics also resented that their greater economic prosperity helped to fund Serbian political power through the federal system. They both declared their independence on June 25, 1991. After a short war, the Slovenes achieved recognition from Belgrade. The independent Croatian state under the strong nationalist Franjo Tudjman (1922–1999) soon revived symbols associated with the NDH and the Ustaša, such as the checkerboard shield (*sahovnica*), and fired Serbs from government positions in Croatia. These actions greatly increased the nationalist anxieties of Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia. They remembered the horrible

events of World War II. These Serbian communities responded by reviving self-defense organizations based on Četnik models.

The situation exploded in Croatia in 1991 as the Zagreb government sought to enforce its authority in Serbian-inhabited areas. War ensued in the Serbian-inhabited areas of central and eastern Croatia. It blew up in Bosnia in the spring of 1992 after the Bosniak and Croat populations voted to establish an independent Bosnian state, rather than remain in a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. These wars persisted until 1995. In 1999, conflict also came to Kosovo.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bosnian War, 1992–1995; Milošević, Slobodan (1941–2006); Sarajevo, Siege of, 1992–1995; Srebrenica Massacre, 1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

Further Reading

Magas, Branka. *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Breakup 1980–1992*. New York: Verso, 1993.

Rogel, Carole. *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998.

Silber, Laura, and Allen Little. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. New York: Penguin, 1998.

Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences

The Yugoslav Wars were a series of horrific disasters for the people living there. These conflicts tore apart what had been a stable and even at times prosperous country. Pre-war Yugoslavia had even achieved sufficient international acclaim to successfully host the 1984 Winter Olympics. The cost in lives for the wars remains unclear. At least 200,000 people died. Hundreds of thousands

more were displaced from their homes. In addition, uncounted numbers of people suffered from deprivation, psychological problems, and rape. Much of Bosnia especially sustained great material damage. Finally, the concept of Yugoslavism, which emphasized the essential cultural and political unity of the South Slavic peoples of south-eastern Europe, suffered a blow from which it is unlikely to soon recover.

The death, devastation, and displacement caused by the fighting did not affect the lands of Yugoslavia evenly. The most grievously distressed region was Bosnia-Herzegovina. Before 1991, this republic was the most ethnically diverse of all the Yugoslav republics, with about 44 percent Bosniaks (Muslim Slavs), 31 percent Serbs, and 17 percent Croats. It also had the highest percentage of self-professed “Yugoslavs” of any republic. Before the war, this population was distributed fairly evenly throughout Bosnia. Around 150,000 Bosnians died in the war, although any casualty figures lack precision. The majority of these victims were Bosniaks.

One of the most horrific instances of loss of life occurred during the first two weeks of July 1995 at Srebrenica. There, Serbian forces under the command of Ratko Mladić (1942–) massacred around 8,000 Bosniak men and boys. Much infrastructure was also destroyed in the fighting, including many mosques and Catholic and Orthodox churches. The famous Old Bridge (*Stari Most*) in Mostar was also ruined, although it has since been rebuilt. Among the casualties was the concept of a multinational Bosnia. The ethnic cleansing carried out by all sides, especially the Serbs, has concentrated the Bosniak, Croat, and Serbian populations in their own ethnic enclaves. It has also increased the Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox identities of these groups. The

division of Bosnia into a Bosniak-Croat federation and a Serbian Republic by the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 is unlikely to overcome these differences anytime soon. As a result, the federal Bosnian state with its two components is unlikely to gain economic and political stability. Any inclusion in wider European organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU) remains only a remote possibility. An EU military force remains in Bosnia to enforce the peace.

Another area that endured significant death and destruction from the Yugoslav Wars was Croatia. Here, the losses were confined to three distinct areas. In the southwest, the medieval city of Dubrovnik suffered considerable material damage while blockaded by Serbian and Montenegrin forces in the fall of 1991. In eastern Croatia (Slavonia) during the same time, the city of Vukovar endured many civilian and military casualties while under siege by the Serbs. Many of its buildings were destroyed in the fighting. The Serbs massacred many survivors when they took the city on November 18, 1991. Most of the consequences for Croatia occurred in the traditional Serbian areas known as the Krajina. Serbs had settled this area as a part of the Habsburg Military Frontier in the early eighteenth century. They constituted around 12 percent of the population of the Croatian republic. During Operation Storm in August 1995, most of the Serbian civilian population fled from their homes or were driven out by the Croatian army into the Serbian-held areas of Bosnia and Serbia itself. The 200-year-old presence of Serbs in south-central Croatia was ended in a week. The independent Croatian state became much less ethnically diverse. For some time after 1995, Croatia remained something of an international pariah because of the ethnic cleansing. Only after the

death of wartime leader Franjo Tudjman in 1999 did Croatia begin to seek to restrain its nationalist self-righteousness. It began to detain internationally indicted war criminals and sought inclusion in European organizations. Croatia joined NATO in 2009 and entered the EU in 2013.

The outbreak of fighting in Yugoslavia in 1991 raised hopes in Kosovo that Serbian rule might come to an end. An underground Kosovo assembly proclaimed independence in the fall of 1991, but the presence of Serbian security forces prevented any action. Resentment over the failure of the Dayton Peace Accords to address the Kosovo issue helped to revive the Albanian cause. At the same time, the Serbian government, under the pressure of the losses in Bosnia and Croatia, became more determined than ever to retain Kosovo. The repetition of the same tactics of brutality toward the civilian population and ethnic cleansing the Serbs had employed in Bosnia helped to focus the sympathies of the outside world on the Kosovo Albanians. As a result, NATO intervened and carried out a bombing campaign against Serbia. This caused considerable destruction and some loss of life. After the Serbs withdrew from Kosovo, NATO assumed control there. Kosovo remained under UN control from 1999 until its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008.

The efforts that Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006) took in 1999 to ensure Serbian control of Kosovo and Yugoslavia ended in the loss of Serbian control of both. The actions and atrocities committed by some Serbian groups during the fighting in Bosnia and Croatia cast a shadow of international opprobrium. The behavior of Serbian forces in Kosovo did little to alleviate these impressions. After the separation of Kosovo in 2008, Serbia was reduced to little more than

the pre-1912 state plus Vojvodina, which remains nominally autonomous. With the election of a pro-European government in 2008, the Serbs finally began to seek out internationally indicted war criminals as a preliminary step to an application to the EU.

For Macedonia, the consequences of the Yugoslav Wars were mixed. Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia on September 8, 1991. While no Yugoslav component challenged this, two problems did confront the new state. The Greeks objected to the name of the state and its use of certain symbols. They considered the name Macedonia as a provocation indicating designs on the northern Greek province of the same name. As a result, the Greeks obstructed Macedonian admission to international bodies such as NATO. The other problem concerned the status of the Albanian minority within the new state. The Albanians, who constitute around a quarter of the population, were emboldened by the Albanian success in Kosovo to seek greater access to economic and political power in Macedonia. A brief war ensued in 2001. NATO peacekeepers enforced a ceasefire. As of this writing, EU peacekeepers remained there. Because of Greek embargoes, economic development still lags in Macedonia. Macedonia achieved a precarious independence but neither international acceptance nor internal stability.

Montenegro and Slovenia actually benefited from the collapse of Yugoslavia. At first Montenegro, the smallest of the Yugoslav republics, sided with Serbia in the wars. In April 1992, Montenegro and Serbia declared themselves the components of a new Yugoslav federation. Montenegrin enthusiasm for the war and the new Yugoslavia waned, however, as the fighting dragged on and as EU investment money became available. Montenegro's Adriatic

Coast attracted much foreign interest. NATO's bombing campaign in 1999 hit some Montenegrin targets and further eroded the ties between Montenegro and Serbia. In 2003, a looser union between Serbia and Montenegro replaced Yugoslavia. In 2006, Montenegrins voted for independence. With the declaration of independence on June 3, 2006, for the first time since 1918, an independent Montenegrin government ruled the country. The coastline of the country has sustained extensive development. The country seeks admission to the EU and NATO. The smallest Yugoslav republic has gained some prosperity along with its restored independence.

The biggest winner in the Yugoslav Wars was Slovenia. The most developed republic of Tito's Yugoslavia fought a brief war in August 1991 against the Yugoslav army. At a low cost in lives and material, the Slovenes preserved the independence they had declared on June 25, 1991. After the withdrawal of federal forces, Slovenia maintained a distance from events in the rest of Yugoslavia. Slovenia established good commercial and political relations with the rest of Europe. In 2004, Slovenia became the first of the former Yugoslav republics to join both NATO and the EU.

The Yugoslav Wars were a horrible tragedy for most of the former state of Yugoslavia. The exact number of dead and displaced will probably never be clear, but perhaps 200,000 citizens of the state

perished as it fell apart. At least 2.5 million people were internal or external refugees. The trauma inflicted on the survivors in Bosnia and Croatia will endure for a long time. For Serbia, these wars meant physical destruction, territorial retreat, and international humiliation. Everywhere, the concept of Yugoslavism was also a casualty. Cultural, economic, and political unity in southeastern Europe will now likely only occur in the context of a greater European union. Ironically, for Montenegro, the wars meant the restoration of independence lost in 1918. For Kosovo and Macedonia, the collapse of Yugoslavia led to political independence for the first time in their histories. For Slovenia, they opened a new era of political independence and economic development.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Bosnian War, 1992–1995; Milošević, Slobodan (1941–2006); Sarajevo, Siege of, 1992–1995; Srebrenica Massacre, 1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995; Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes

Further Reading

Benson, Leslie. *Yugoslavia: A Concise History*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

Philips, John. *Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004.

Sell, Louis. *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002.

Z

Zhekov, Nikola (1864–1949)

Bulgarian army general, later commander in chief of the army, Nikola Todorov Zhekov was born on December 25, 1864, at Silven in eastern Bulgaria. Zhekov graduated from the military academy in Sofia and fought in Bulgaria's 1885 war against Serbia. Zhekov received advanced training in Italy and then commanded first a regiment and then a division. During the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars, he was chief of staff of the Second Army and participated in the siege of Adrianople. During August–October 1915, he was minister of war under Premier Vasil Radoslavov (1854–1929), working to prepare his country for entry into World War I on the side of the Central Powers. He became commander of the Bulgarian army in October 1915.

Zhekov directed Bulgarian forces that took part in the defeat and occupation of Serbia in 1915 under overall German command. Repeatedly the Germans ignored Zhekov's proposals for action. In particular they refused support for the Bulgarians to pursue the defeated British and French across the Greek frontier in the fall of 1915. In September 1916, the Bulgarians seized control of the Aegean port of Kavala. The Germans, overcommitted militarily, requested the use of Zhekov's troops in an offensive against Romania led by Field Marshal August von Mackensen (1849–1945). The Bulgarians then had to defend most of the long Macedonian border, with only scant German assistance, to protect Bulgaria against Allied attack from Greece and Salonika.

In 1917, Zhekov became involved in a plot to oust Bulgarian Premier Vasil Radoslavov (1854–1929). The Bulgarian military was then experiencing serious military shortages, and it was clear the Central Powers were losing the war. During the battle of Dobro Pole in September 1918, Zhekov was in Vienna seeking treatment for a medical condition. He was thus not on hand to direct his forces when they suffered the defeat that knocked Bulgaria out of the war.

With a Bulgarian military defeat imminent, Zhekov fled to Germany. In 1923, he returned to Bulgaria to defend his actions during the war, but he was promptly imprisoned. Granted amnesty after serving three years in prison, Zhekov later espoused fascist ideals and led a pro-German group in Bulgaria. Although he was granted a German pension, Adolf Hitler refused to install him in power. Zhekov left Bulgaria at the end World War II and died at Füssen, Germany, on October 6, 1949.

Brian C. Trueblood

See also: Bulgaria in World War I; Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918; Radoslavov, Vasil

Further Reading

Bell, John D. *Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian National Union, 1899–1923*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Hall, Richard C. *Balkan Breakthrough: The Battle of Dobro Pole 1918*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

Zhekov, Nikola T. *Bŭlgarskoto voistvo 1878–1928 g.* Sofia: Bratya mladynovi, 1928.

Zog, King of the Albanians (1895–1961)

Ahmed Bey Zogu/Zogolli was born on October 8, 1895, in the village of Burgayet, to Xhemal Pasha Zogolli (1860–1911), the leader of the Muslim Mati tribe in Ottoman-controlled central Albania. The family of his mother, Sadijë, the Toptanis, claimed descent from the fifteenth-century Albanian national hero Skanderbeg (1405–1468). Zog received some formal education in Constantinople. He fought for Albanian autonomy against the Young Turks in 1911, and against the invading Serbs in 1912, who sought Albanian territory. In the same year, he was one of the signers of Albanian independence. During the First World War, Zog served in an Austro-Hungarian-sponsored unit. Austro-Hungarian authorities later detained him in Vienna. He returned to Albania in 1919.

In 1920, he served as a delegate to the Congress of Lushnjë, which met to deal with internal crisis and possible partition. He then served as an interior minister and commander of the military. After stabilizing the country, Zog became prime minister in 1922. He left the government in 1924, after popular sentiment turned against him and an assassination attempt, but he continued to run the country. A liberal rebellion in June 1924 forced him to flee to Yugoslavia. In December 1924, with Yugoslav backing and accompanied by White Russian troops, Zog returned to Albania and overthrew the government of American-educated Orthodox bishop Fan S. Noli (1882–1965). A month later, he had the parliament name him president. Parliament then approved a new constitution granting him dictatorial powers, and finally, in September 1928, proclaimed him as king.

Zog succeeded in centralizing his control by using oppressive measures that led to a series of revolts and attempts on his life. Yet, he introduced a number of Western reforms and unsuccessfully tried to modernize the poverty-stricken country. In 1929, he abolished Islamic law and introduced a civil code similar to that of Kemalist Turkey. Zog increasingly turned to Italy for economic and military help. By the late 1920s, however, Italy's growing influence alarmed Zog, and several times in the 1930s, he unsuccessfully tried to lessen Italian control by turning to other countries.

In April 1938, Zog married Geraldine Apponyi de Nagy-Apponyi (1915–2002), a half-Hungarian, half-American aristocrat. On April 5, 1939, she gave birth to Albanian Crown Prince Leka (1939–2011). Two days later, Italy invaded after Zog refused to turn his country into an Italian protectorate. Zog and his family fled to Greece and spent most of World War II in Britain. The Communist government of Enver Hoxha abolished the monarchy in 1945. After the war Zog and his family lived in Egypt, and later France. He died in Suresnes, Hauts-de-Seine, France, on April 9, 1961. Despite his devious methods and uneven rule, Zog remained an Albanian patriot throughout his life.

Gregory C. Ference

See also: Albanian Uprisings, 1910–1911; Albania, Italian Occupation of, 1939; Young Turks

Further Reading

Fischer, Bernd J. *King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1984.

Tomes, Jason. *King Zog of Albania: Europe's Self-Made Muslim King*. New York: New York University Press, 2004.

Vickers, Miranda. *The Albanians: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1995.

This page intentionally left blank

Chronology

National Wars

1804	Serbian Revolt against Ottoman Empire	1897	April 14: Greco-Ottoman War begins May 18: Armistice in Greco-Ottoman War
1813	Serbian Revolt suppressed		
1818	Serbian Revolt renewed	1903	Ilinden Revolt in Macedonia
1821	Greek Revolt against Ottoman Empire begins	1908	Young Turk Revolt Bosnian Crisis
1827	October 20: Battle of Navarino	World War I	
1829	May–September: Russo-Ottoman War September 14: Treaty of Adrianople	1912–1913	First Balkan War
1859	Wallachia and Moldavia unite under Prince Alexander Curza	1912	October 17: Ottoman Empire declares war on Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia October 24: Battle of Kumanovo November 9: Salonika surrenders to Greeks November 17: Battle of Chataldzha
1876	April 20: Bulgarian Revolt against Ottomans begins Serbo-Ottoman War	1913	March 6: Fall of Janina to Greeks March 25: Fall of Adrianople to Bulgarians April 24: Fall of Scutari to Montenegrins May 30: Preliminary Peace of London
1877–1878	Russo-Ottoman War		
1877	August 7–11: Battle of Shipka Pass		
1878	March 3: Treaty of San Stefano July 1: Treaty of Berlin	1913	Second Balkan War June 30: Bulgarian Forces attack Greeks and Serbs
1885	November 2–16: Bulgarian-Serbian War		

	July 18: Battle of Kalimantsi August 10: Treaty of Bucharest September 30: Treaty of Constantinople		August: Battle of Mărășești, Romania
1914	June 28: Sarajevo Assassination July 28: Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia August 15: Battle of Cer Mountain December 15: Austro-Hungarians evacuate Belgrade	1918	May 7: Treaty of Bucharest, Romania leaves war September 14: Battle of Dobro Pole begins September 16: Battle of Doiran begins September 29: Bulgaria signs armistice, leaves war October 30: Ottoman Empire leaves war
1915	October 5: British and French troops begin to arrive in Salonika October 14: Bulgaria declares war on Serbia October: Serbia overrun by Central Powers December 20: Bulgarians deploy along Greek frontier, Macedonian Front established	1919	November 9: Romania reenters war on side of Entente December 4: Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) proclaimed September 10: Treaty of Saint-Germain, Austria dismembered November 27: Treaty of Neuilly, Bulgaria punished
1916	January: Austro-Hungarian forces overrun Montenegro January 25: Montenegro surrenders August 17: Bulgarian offensive on Macedonian Front begins August 27: Romania enters war on side of Entente, invades Austria-Hungary September 2: Central Powers invade Romania October 23: Central Powers take Constanța November 19: Serbs take Bitola December 7: Central Powers occupy Bucharest	1920	June 4: Treaty of Trianon, Hungary dismembered August 10: Treaty of Sèvres, Ottoman Empire dissolved
		Interwar	
		1919–1922	Greco-Turkish War
		1921	Little Entente established
		1923	October 29: Turkish Republic proclaimed
		1934	February 9: Balkan Pact signed
		1939	April 7: Albania invaded by Italy
		World War II	
1917	July 2: Greece enters war on side of Entente	1940	June 28: Soviet Russian army occupies Romanian Bessarabia

	October 28: Italian forces invade Greece from Albania		October 1: Red Army enters Yugoslavia
	November 7: German forces enter Romania		October 14: British troops enter Athens
	November 23: Romania joins German alliance		October 20: Red Army and Partisan forces liberate Belgrade
1941	March 4: Yugoslavia joins German alliance		December 3: Battle of Athens begins
	March 27: Anti-German government seizes power in Yugoslavia	1945	Partisan victories in Yugoslavia and Albania
	April 6: Yugoslavia and Greece invaded by Germany, Hungary, and Italy	Cold War	
	April 17: Yugoslavia surrenders	1945–1949	Greek Civil War
	April 27: Greece surrenders	1948	June 28: Yugoslav-Soviet Split
	May: Chetnik resistance in Yugoslavia begins	1954	August 9: Balkan Pact
	May 20: German paratroops land in Crete	1955	Warsaw Pact established
	June 22: German and Romanian forces invade Soviet Russia; Partisan resistance begins in Yugoslavia	Yugoslav Wars	
	October 16: Romanian forces occupy Odessa	1980	May 4: Death of Tito
1942	July 1: Fall of Sevastopol to German and Romanian forces	1991	February: Serbs in Krajina resist Croatian government, beginning of Croat War
	November 19: Soviet Russian counterattack at Stalingrad begins		June 25: Declarations of Croat and Slovene independence
1943	February 2: German and Romanian forces surrender at Stalingrad	1992	June–July: Slovene war
	August 28: Death of Czar Boris III	1995	July 7: Slovene War ends
1944	August 23: Romania defects from Axis, joins Soviet Russia; Marshall Antonescu arrested		November 17: Fall of Vukovar
	September 9: Bulgaria defects from Axis	1992	April: Bosnian War begins
		1995	July 12: Srebrinica Massacre
			September 11: Operation Storm begins
			November 11: Dayton Peace Accords end Bosnian War
		1998	Kosovo Revolt begins
		1998–1999	Operation Horseshoe
		1999	March: NATO air assault on Yugoslavia begins

2001	June 12: NATO troops enter Kosovo	2006	March 11: Death of Slobodan Milošević
	January: Macedonian conflict begins		June 3: Montenegro declares independence
	August 13: Ohrid agreement ends fighting in Macedonia	2008	February 17: Kosovo formally declares independence

Bibliography

- Adams, John Clinton. *Flight in Winter*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1942.
- Ahmad, Feroz. *The Young Turks*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
- Autry, Phyllis. *Tito, a Political Biography*. New York: Penguin, 1974.
- Axworthy, Mark, Cornel Scafes, and Christian Craciunoiu. *Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1939–1945*. London: Arms and Armour, 1995.
- Banac, Ivo. *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.
- Barnett, Michael B. *Prelude to Blitzkrieg: The 1916 Austro-German Campaign in Romania*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.
- Bell, John D. *Peasants in Power, Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian Union, 1899–1923*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Benson, Leslie. *Yugoslavia: A Concise History*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- Biondich, Mark. *The Balkans: Revolution, War, and Political Violence since 1878*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Blau, George E. *Invasion Balkans! The German Campaign in the Balkans, Spring 1941*. Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press, 1997.
- Tarnstrom, Ronald. *Balkan Battles*. Lindsborg, KS: Trogen, 1998.
- Burgwyn, H. James. *The Legend of the Mutilated Victory: Italy, the Great War, and the Paris Peace Conference*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993.
- Burgwyn, H. James. *Mussolini Warlord: Failed Dreams of Empire, 1940–1943*. New York: Enigma Books, 2012.
- Campus, Eliza. *The Little Entente and the Balkan Entente*. Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1978.
- Cervi, Mario. *The Hollow Legions: Mussolini's Blunder in Greece, 1940–1941*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971.
- Chary, Frederick B. *The History of Bulgaria*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011.
- Clogg, Richard. *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Crampton, R. J. *Bulgaria 1878–1918: A History*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1983.
- Cohen, Philip J. *Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996.
- Dawidowicz, Lucy S. *The War against the Jews, 1933–1945*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975.
- Djilas, Milován. *Tito: The Story from Inside*. London: Phoenix Press, 2000.
- Djilas, Milován. *Wartime*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.
- Dragnich, Alex N. *Serbia, Nikola Pašić, and Yugoslavia*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974.

- Durham, M. Edith. *The Struggle for Scutari (Turk, Slav, Albanian)*. London: Edward Arnold, 1914.
- Erickson, Edward J. *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.
- Erickson, Edward J. *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001.
- Falls, Cyril. *Military Operations, Macedonia*. 2 vols. Nashville, TN: Battery Press, 1996.
- Fischer, Bernd. *Albania at War, 1939–1945*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1999.
- Fischer, Bernd. *King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1984.
- Fryer, C. E. J. *The Destruction of Serbia in 1915*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1997.
- Gerolymatos, André. *The Balkan Wars: Conquest, Revolution, and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond*. New York: Basic Books, 2002.
- Glenny, Misha. *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804–1999*. New York: Viking, 2000.
- Glenny, Misha. *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*. 3rd ed. New York: Penguin, 1996.
- Groueff, Stephane. *Crown of Thorns: The Reign of King Boris III of Bulgaria 1918–1943*. Latham, MD: Madison Books, 1987.
- Hall, Richard C. *Balkan Breakthrough: The Battle of Dobro Pole 1918*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
- Hall, Richard C. *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Hall, Richard C. *The Modern Balkans: A History*. London: Reaktion, 2011.
- Haynes, Rebecca, and Martyn Rady. *In the Shadow of Hitler: Personalities on the Right and Center in Eastern Europe*. London: I. B. Taurus, 2011.
- Hellenic Army General Staff. *A Concise History of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Athens: Army History Directorate, 1998.
- Helmreich, E. C. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938.
- Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania, 1866–1947*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
- Hoare, Marko. *Genocide and Resistance in Hitler's Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks, 1941–1943*. London and New York: Oxford University Press (for the British Academy), 2006.
- Honig, Jan Willem, and Norbert Both. *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime*. New York: Penguin, 1996.
- Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans*. 2 vols. Vol. 1, *Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*; Vol. 2, *Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Jelavich, Barbara. *Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806–1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Judah, Tim. *Kosovo: War and Revenge*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.
- Judah, Tim. *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.
- Kerner, Robert Joseph, and Harry Nicholas Howard. *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente 1930–1935*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1970.
- Király, Béla K., and Dimitrije Djordjevic, eds. *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.
- Lampe, John R. *Yugoslavia as History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Langer, William L. *European Alliances and Alignments 1871–1890*. 2nd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950.

- Leon, George. *Greece and the Great Powers*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1978.
- MacKenzie, David. *The "Black Hand" on Trial: Salonika 1917*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1995.
- MacKenzie, David. *The Lion of Tashkent: The Career of General M. G. Cherniaev*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974.
- MacKenzie, David. *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875–1878*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976.
- Magas, Branka. *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Breakup 1980–1992*. New York: Verso, 1993.
- Mazower, Mark. *Inside Hitler's Greece*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993.
- Mazower, Mark. *Salonika: City of Ghosts*. New York: Vintage, 2006.
- Miller, Marshall Lee. *Bulgaria during the Second World War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975.
- Milton, Giles. *Paradise Lost, Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of a Christian City in the Islamic World*. New York: Basic Books, 2008.
- Mitrović, Andrej. *Serbia's Great War, 1914–1918*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007.
- Mojzes, Paul. *Balkan Genocides*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011.
- Oren, Nissan. *Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power 1934–1944*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
- Palmer, Alan. *The Gardeners of Salonika*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.
- Papacosma, S. Victor. *The Military in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup d'État*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1977.
- Pavlowitch, Stavan K. *Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
- Perry, Duncan. *The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Revolutionary Movements, 1893–1903*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988.
- Petrovich, Michael Boro. *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804–1918*. 2 vols. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.
- Petsalis-Diomidis, N. *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference (1919)*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1979.
- Philips, John. *Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004.
- Roba, J. Louis. *Seaplanes over the Black Sea: German Romanian Operations, 1941–1944*. Bucharest: Editura Modelism International Ltd., 1998.
- Remak, Joachim. *Sarajevo: The Story of a Political Murder*. New York: Criterion, 1959.
- Roberts, Allen. *The Turning Point: The Assassination of Louis Barthou and King Alexander I of Yugoslavia*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970.
- Roberts, Elizabeth. *Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.
- Rogel, Carole. *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998.
- Rossos, Andrew. *Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2008.
- Schmitt, Bernadotte E. *The Annexation of Bosnia 1908–1909*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937.
- Sell, Louis. *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002.
- Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezul Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 2, *Reform, Reaction and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

- Shepherd, Ben. *Terror in the Balkans: German Armies and Partisan Warfare*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.
- Silber, Laura, and Allen Little. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. New York: Penguin, 1998.
- Stavrianos, L. S. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958.
- Stickney, Edith Pierpont. *Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in European International Affairs, 1912–1923*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1926.
- Tarnstrom, Ronald. *Balkan Battles*. Lindsbrog, KS: Trogen, 1998.
- Thadden, Edward C. *Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965.
- Thomas, N., and K. Mikulan. *Axis Forces in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945*. Oxford: Osprey, 1995.
- Thomas, N., and K. Mikulan. *The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992–2001*, Botely, Oxford: Osprey, 2006.
- Tomasevich, Jozo. *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.
- Tomasevich, Jozo. *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The Chetniks*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975.
- Tomes, Jason. *King Zog of Albania: Europe's Self-Made Muslim King*. New York: New York University Press, 2004.
- Torrey, Glenn. *Romania and World War I*. Iași: Center for Romanian Studies, 1998.
- Torrey, Glenn. *The Romanian Battlefront in World War I*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011.
- Treadway, John D. *The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908–1914*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1983.
- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. *Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995*. 2 vols. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002–2003.
- Vachkov, Alexander. *The Balkan War 1912–1913*. Sofia: Anzhela, 2005.
- Vickers, Miranda. *The Albanians: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1995.

Editor and Contributors

Editor

Richard C. Hall
Department of History and Political Science
Georgia Southwestern State University

Contributors

Jon C. Anderson Jr.
Virginia Military Institute

Walter F. Bell
Independent Scholar

Bestami S. Bilgic
Canakkale Onsekiz Mart University &
Turkish Historical Society (Turkey)

Anna Boros
Independent Scholar

Dino E. Buenviaje
Lecturer
Riverside Community College

Antoine Capet, FRHS
Head of British Studies
University of Rouen

Bert Chapman
Government Information, Political
Science, & Economics Librarian
Purdue University Libraries

Bernard Cook
Provost Distinguished Professor
of History
Loyola University, New Orleans

Maeve Cowan
Independent Scholar

Brig. Gen. Uzal W. Ent (Ret.)
Military Historian

Gregory C. Ference
Professor of History
Salisbury University

Timothy L. Francis
Historian
Naval Historical Center (NO9B)
Department of the Navy

James W. Frusetta
Assistant Professor
Hampden Sydney College

Richard C. Hall
Chair
Department of History and Political Science
Georgia Southwestern State University

Neil A. Hamilton
Professor of History
Spring Hill College

Laura J. Hilton
Associate Professor and Chair
Department of History
Muskingum University.

Gordon E. Hogg
Special Collections and Archives
University of Kentucky Libraries

John J. Horton
Deputy Librarian
University of Bradford

Michael D. Johnson
Independent Scholar

Robert B. Kane
Director of History
Air University
Maxwell Air Force Base

Gary Kerley
Independent Scholar

Lucian N. Leustean
Senior Lecturer
Aston University

Bonnie K. Levine-Berggren
Adjunct Professor
Georgia Southwestern State University

Alessandro Massignani
Independent Scholar

Lisa McCallum
Independent Scholar

Joseph McCarthy
Independent Scholar

James Brian McNabb
Professor
Department of Social Science
American University of Iraq, Sulaimani

Karen Mead
Independent Scholar

Marko Milivojevic
Independent Scholar

Alexander Mikaberidze
Assistant Professor
Department of History and Social Sciences
Louisiana State University, Shreveport

Josip Mocnik
Director of Libraries
Georgia College

Irina Mukhina
Assistant Professor of History
Assumption College

Michael S. Neiberg
Professor of History
Co-Director of the Center for the Study
of War and Society
University of Southern Mississippi

Jason Newman
Professor of History
Consumnes River College

Christian Nuenlist
Professor
University of Zurich

Eric W. Osborne
Adjunct Professor of History
Virginia Military Institute

Ahmet Özcan
Faculty Member
Çankırı Karatekin University

Neville Panthaki
Independent Scholar

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.
Fellow
Military History, ABC-CLIO, Inc.

John David Rausch Jr.
Teel Bivins Professor of Political
Science
West Texas A&M University

Annette Richardson
University of Alberta

Karl Roider
Alumni Professor of History
Louisiana State University

Margaret Sankey
Professor of History
Minnesota State University, Moorhead

Mary Kate Schneider
University of Maryland

Charles R. Shrader
Independent Scholar

Brian G. Smith
Associate Professor of Political Science
Georgia Southwestern State University

Eva-Maria Stolberg
Lecturer
Institute of Russian History

Gerald D. Swick
Senior Editor for Digital Media
Weider History Group, Inc.

David Tal
Professor
Tel Aviv University

James Tallon
Assistant Professor
Lewis University

Brian C. Trueblood
Virginia Military Institute

Spencer C. Tucker
Senior Fellow
Military History, ABC-CLIO, Inc.

Brandon H. Turner
Virginia Military Institute

Mesut Uyar
Associate Professor
University of New South Wales

Dierk Walter
Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung
Hamburg, Germany

A. J. L. Waskey
Professor of Social Science
Dalton State College

Tim J. Watts
Content Development Librarian
Kansas State University

James H. Willbanks
Director, Department of Military
History
U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College

Hedley P. Willmott
Honorary Research Associate
Greenwich Maritime Institute

Anna M. Wittmann
University of Alberta

Fatih Yeşil
Faculty Member
Hacettepe University

Gültekin Yıldız
Faculty Member
University of Istanbul

Topical Index

Entry

Adrianople, Siege of, 1912–1913
Albania in the Balkan Wars
Balkan League
Balkan War, First, 1912–1913
Balkan War, Second, 1913
Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes
Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Consequences
Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Naval Campaigns
Bucharest, Treaty of, 1913
Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars
Chataldzha, Battle of, 1912
Constantinople, Treaty of, 1913
Contested Zone (Macedonia), 1912
Greece in the Balkan Wars
Greek Military Coup, 1909
Janina, Siege of, 1912–1913
Kalimantsi, Battle of, 1913
Kumanovo, Battle of, 1912
London, Treaty of, 1913
Lyule Burgas-Buni Hisar, Battle of, 1912
Mahmud Muhtar Pasha
Montenegro in the Balkan Wars
Novi Pazar, Sanjak of
Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars
Romania in the Balkan Wars
Sarkoy and Baloyir, Battles of
Savoy, Mihail
Scutari, Siege of, 1912–1913
Serbia and the Balkan Wars

Category

Event Overview
Event Overview
Organization Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Place Overview
Event Overview
Movement Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Individual Overview
Event Overview
Place Overview
Organization Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview
Individual Overview
Event Overview
Event Overview

Conflict

Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars
Balkan Wars

Stamboliski, Aleksandŭr	Individual Overview	Balkan Wars, Interwar Years
Alexander I, King of Yugoslavia	Individual Overview	Balkan Wars, World War I
Dimitriev, Radko	Individual Overview	Balkan Wars, World War I
Enver Pasha	Individual Overview	Balkan Wars, World War I
Epirus	Place Overview	Balkan Wars, World War I
Ferdinand I, Czar of Bulgaria	Individual Overview	Balkan Wars, World War I
Salonika	Place Overview	Balkan Wars, World War I
Stepanović, Stepa	Individual Overview	Balkan Wars, World War I
Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria	Individual Overview	Bulgarian-Serb War
Bulgarian-Serb War, 1885	Event Overview	Bulgarian-Serb War
Slivnitsa, Battle of, 1885	Event Overview	Bulgarian-Serb War
Balkan Pact, 1954	Organization Overview	Cold War
Ceausescu, Nicolae	Individual Overview	Cold War
Cold War in the Balkans	Event Overview	Cold War
Corfu Channel Incident, 1946	Event Overview	Cold War
Cyprus War, 1974	Event Overview	Cold War
Djilas, Milován	Individual Overview	Cold War
Greek Civil War	Event Overview	Cold War
Hoxha, Enver	Individual Overview	Cold War
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Organization Overview	Cold War
Papandreou, George	Individual Overview	Cold War
Transnistrian War	Event Overview	Cold War
Trieste Dispute	Place Overview	Cold War
Truman Doctrine	Event Overview	Cold War
Vaphiadis, Markos	Individual Overview	Cold War
Warsaw Pact	Event Overview	Cold War
Yugoslav Overflight Incidents, 1946	Event Overview	Cold War
Yugoslav-Soviet Split	Event Overview	Cold War
Carol II, King of Romania	Individual Overview	Interwar Years
Corfu Incident, 1923	Event Overview	Interwar Years
Fiume/Rijeka, 1919–1924	Place Overview	Interwar Years
Greco-Italian War, 1940–1941	Event Overview	Interwar Years

Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922	Event Overview	Interwar Years
Greens (Montenegro)	Movement Overview	Interwar Years
Iron Guard	Organization Overview	Interwar Years
Lausanne, Treaty of, 1923	Event Overview	Interwar Years
Little Entente	Organization Overview	Interwar Years
Metaxas, Ioannis	Individual Overview	Interwar Years
Mihailov, Ivan	Individual Overview	Interwar Years
Military League (Bulgaria)	Organization Overview	Interwar Years
Neuilly, Treaty of, 1920	Thing Overview	Interwar Years
Romanian Campaign in Hungary, 1919	Event Overview	Interwar Years
Saint-Germain, Treaty of, 1919	Thing Overview	Interwar Years
Sakarya River, Battle of, 1921	Event Overview	Interwar Years
Sévres, Treaty of, 1920	Thing Overview	Interwar Years
Smyrna, Destruction of, 1922	Event Overview	Interwar Years
Trianon, Treaty of, 1920	Thing Overview	Interwar Years
Zog, King of the Albanians	Individual Overview	Interwar Years
Abdulhamid II	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Adrianople, Treaty of, 1829	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Albanian Uprisings, 1910–1911	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Alexander Obrenović, King of Serbia	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Ali Pasha	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Berlin, Treaty of, 1878	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Bosnia, Austrian Occupation, 1878	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Bosnian Crisis, 1908–1909	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Bosnian Revolt, 1876	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Bulgarian Horrors, 1876	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Carol I, King of Romania	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Cherniaev, M. G.	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Cretan Crisis, 1896	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Crimean War, Balkan Operations	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts

Greco-Ottoman War, 1897	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Herzegovina Revolt, 1875	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Ilinden Uprising, 1903	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Karageorge (George Petrović)	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Levski, Vasil	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Mahmud II, Ottoman Sultan	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Mehmet Ali	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Montenegro in Balkan Events, 1876–1878	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Navarino, Battle of, 1827	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Obrenović, Milan	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Obrenović, Miloš	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations in the Balkans and Crete	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Ottoman Empire	Organization Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Pleven, Siege of, 1877	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Romanian Peasant Uprising	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Russo-Ottoman War, 1806–1812	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Russo-Ottoman War, 1828–1829	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Selim III	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Serbian War of Independence, 1804–1817	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts

Serbo-Ottoman War, 1876	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Shipka Pass, Battles of, 1877–1878	Event Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Süleyman Hüsni Pasha	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Tepelene, Ali Pasha	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Vladimirescu, Tudor	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
VMRO	Organization Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Ypsilantis, Alexander	Individual Overview	Ottoman Conflicts
Albania in World War I	Event Overview	World War I
Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I	Event Overview	World War I
Averescu, Alexandru	Individual Overview	World War I
Black Hand	Organization Overview	World War I
Bucharest, Treaty of, 1918	Event Overview	World War I
Bulgaria in World War I	Event Overview	World War I
Cer Mountain, Battle of, 1914	Event Overview	World War I
Constantine I, King of Greece	Individual Overview	World War I
Corfu Declaration, 1917	Event Overview	World War I
Dimitrijević, Dragutin	Individual Overview	World War I
Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918	Event Overview	World War I
Doiran Battles, 1915–1918	Event Overview	World War I
Gallipoli, 1915	Event Overview	World War I
Germany in the Balkans during World War I	Event Overview	World War I
Greece in World War I	Event Overview	World War I
Italy in the Balkans during World War I	Event Overview	World War I
Kosovo, Battle of, 1915	Event Overview	World War I
Lake Prespa, Battle of, 1917	Event Overview	World War I
Macedonian Front, 1915–1918	Event Overview	World War I
Mărășești, Battle of, 1917	Event Overview	World War I
Montenegro in World War I	Event Overview	World War I
National Schism (Greece), 1916–1917	Event Overview	World War I
Nikola I, King of Montenegro	Individual Overview	World War I
Odessa, Siege of, 1941	Event Overview	World War I
Ottoman Empire in World War I	Organization Overview	World War I
Princip, Gavrilo	Individual Overview	World War I
Putnik, Radomir	Individual Overview	World War I
Radomir Rebellion, 1918	Event Overview	World War I
Romania in World War I	Event Overview	World War I

Romania, Invasion of, 1916	Event Overview	World War I
Sarajevo Assassination, 1914	Event Overview	World War I
Serbia, Invasions of, 1914	Event Overview	World War I
Serbia, Invasions of, 1915	Event Overview	World War I
Serbia in World War I	Event Overview	World War I
Serbian Retreat, 1915	Event Overview	World War I
Venizélos, Eluthérios	Individual Overview	World War I
Young Turks	Organization Overview	World War I
Yugoslav Military Coup	Event Overview	World War I
Zhekov, Nikola	Individual Overview	World War I
Kemal, Mustafa	Individual Overview	World War I, Interwar Years
Albania, Italian Occupation of	Event Overview	World War II
Albania in World War II	Event Overview	World War II
Antonescu, Ion	Individual Overview	World War II
Balkan Entente, 1934	Organization Overview	World War II
Balli Kombetar	Organization Overview	World War II
Bessarabia	Place Overview	World War II
Black Sea Campaign, 1941–1944	Event Overview	World War II
Boris III, Czar of Bulgaria	Individual Overview	World War II
Bukovina	Place Overview	World War II
Bulgaria in World War II	Event Overview	World War II
Bulgarian “Fatherland War,” 1944–1945	Event Overview	World War II
Četniks	Organization Overview	World War II
Crete, Battle of, 1941	Event Overview	World War II
Dobrudja	Place Overview	World War II
Dodecanese Campaign, 1944	Event Overview	World War II
EAM/ELAS	Organization Overview	World War II
EDES	Organization Overview	World War II
Germany in the Balkans during World War II	Event Overview	World War II
Greece, Invasion of, 1941	Event Overview	World War II
Greece in World War II	Event Overview	World War II
Handschar SS Division	Organization Overview	World War II
The Holocaust in the Balkans	Event Overview	World War II
Italy in the Balkans during World War II	Event Overview	World War II
Michael I, King of Romania	Individual Overview	World War II
Mihajlović, Dragoljub “Draža”	Individual Overview	World War II
Nedić, Milan	Individual Overview	World War II
Partisans, Albania	Organization Overview	World War II
Partisans, Bulgaria	Organization Overview	World War II
Partisans, Yugoslavia	Organization Overview	World War II
Pavelić, Ante	Individual Overview	World War II

Ploesti, Bombing of, 1943–1944	Event Overview	World War II
Romania, Invasion of, 1944	Event Overview	World War II
Romania in World War II	Event Overview	World War II
Romanian Campaign in Hungary, 1944–1945	Event Overview	World War II
Romanian Coup, August 1944	Event Overview	World War II
Skanderbeg SS Division	Organization Overview	World War II
Stalingrad, Battle of, 1942–1943	Event Overview	World War II
Tsolakoglou, Georgios	Individual Overview	World War II
Ustaše	Organization Overview	World War II
Vienna Award, Second	Event Overview	World War II
World War II Peace Settlement in the Balkans	Event Overview	World War II
Yugoslavia, Axis Occupation Forces in World War II	Organization Overview	World War II
Yugoslavia, Collaborationist Forces in World War II	Movement Overview	World War II
Yugoslavia, Invasion of, 1941	Event Overview	World War II
Yugoslavia in World War II	Event Overview	World War II
Tito, Josip Broz	Individual Overview	World War II, Cold War
Yugoslavia	Place Overview	World War II, Cold War, Yugoslav Wars
Bihać	Place Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Bosnian Forces, 1992	Organization Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Bosnian War, 1992–1995	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Brioni Agreement	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Croat Forces, 1991–1995	Organization Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Croat War, 1991–1995	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Dayton Peace Accords, 1995	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Horseshoe, Operation, 1998	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Izetbegović, Alia	Individual Overview	Yugoslav Wars
JNA (Yugoslav People's Army)	Organization Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Karadžić, Radovan	Individual Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Kosovo Liberation Army	Organization Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Kosovo War, 1998–1999	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Macedonia	Place Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Macedonian War, 2001	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Milošević, Slobodan	Individual Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Mladić, Ratko	Individual Overview	Yugoslav Wars
NATO in the Balkans	Organization Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Sarajevo, Siege of, 1992–1995	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Slovene War, 1991	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Srebrenica Massacre, 1995	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars

Storm, Operation, 1995	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Tudjman, Franjo	Individual Overview	Yugoslav Wars
UNPROFOR	Organization Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Vance Owen Plan, 1993	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Vukovar, Siege of, 1991	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars
Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences	Event Overview	Yugoslav Wars

Categorical Index

Events

- Adrianople, Siege of, 1912–1913
- Adrianople, Treaty of, 1829
- Albania, Italian Occupation of
- Albania in the Balkan Wars
- Albania in World War I
- Albania in World War II
- Albanian Uprisings, 1910–1911
- Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I
- Balkan War, First, 1912–1913
- Balkan War, Second, 1913
- Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes
- Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Consequences
- Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Naval Campaigns
- Berlin, Treaty of, 1878
- Black Sea Campaign, 1941–1944
- Bosnia, Austrian Occupation, 1878
- Bosnian Crisis, 1908–1909
- Bosnian Revolt, 1876
- Bosnian War, 1992–1995
- Brioni Agreement
- Bucharest, Treaty of, 1913
- Bucharest, Treaty of, 1918
- Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars
- Bulgaria in World War I
- Bulgaria in World War II
- Bulgarian “Fatherland War,” 1944–1945
- Bulgarian Horrors, 1876
- Bulgarian-Serb War, 1885
- Cer Mountain, Battle of, 1914

Category

[illegible]

Chataldzha, Battle of, 1912	Event Overview
Cold War in the Balkans	Event Overview
Constantinople, Treaty of, 1913	Event Overview
Corfu Declaration, 1917	Event Overview
Corfu Channel Incident, 1946	Event Overview
Corfu Incident, 1923	Event Overview
Cretan Crisis, 1896	Event Overview
Crete, Battle of, 1941	Event Overview
Crimean War, Balkan Operations	Event Overview
Croat War, 1991–1995	Event Overview
Cyprus War, 1974	Event Overview
Dayton Peace Accords, 1995	Event Overview
Dobro Pole, Battle of, 1918	Event Overview
Dodecanese Campaign, 1944	Event Overview
Doiran, Battles of, 1915–1918	Event Overview
Gallipoli, 1915	Event Overview
Germany in the Balkans during World War I	Event Overview
Germany in the Balkans during World War II	Event Overview
Greco-Italian War, 1940–1941	Event Overview
Greco-Ottoman War, 1897	Event Overview
Greco-Turkish War, 1919–1922	Event Overview
Greece, Invasion of, 1941	Event Overview
Greece in the Balkan Wars	Event Overview
Greece in World War I	Event Overview
Greece in World War II	Event Overview
Greek Civil War	Event Overview
Greek Military Coup, 1909	Event Overview
Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832	Event Overview
Herzegovina Revolt, 1875	Event Overview
The Holocaust in the Balkans	Event Overview
Horseshoe, Operation, 1998	Event Overview
Ilinden Uprising, 1903	Event Overview
Italy in the Balkans during World War I	Event Overview
Italy in the Balkans during World War II	Event Overview
Janina, Siege of, 1912–1913	Event Overview
Kalimantsi, Battle of, 1913	Event Overview
Kosovo, Battle of, 1915	Event Overview
Kosovo War, 1998–1999	Event Overview
Kumanovo, Battle of, 1912	Event Overview
Lake Prespa, Battle of, 1917	Event Overview
Lausanne, Treaty of, 1923	Event Overview
London, Treaty of 1913	Event Overview
Lyule Burgas-Buni Hisar, Battle of, 1912	Event Overview

Macedonian Front, 1915–1918	Event Overview
Macedonian War, 2001	Event Overview
Mărășești, Battle of, 1917	Event Overview
Montenegro in Balkan Events, 1876–1878	Event Overview
Montenegro in the Balkan Wars	Event Overview
Montenegro in World War I	Event Overview
National Schism (Greece), 1916–1917	Event Overview
Navarino, Battle of, 1827	Event Overview
Odessa, Siege of, 1941	Event Overview
Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations in the Balkans and Crete	Event Overview
Pleven, Siege of, 1877	Event Overview
Ploesti, Bombing of, 1943–1944	Event Overview
Radomir Rebellion, 1918	Event Overview
Romania, Invasion of, 1916	Event Overview
Romania, Invasion of, 1944	Event Overview
Romania in the Balkan Wars	Event Overview
Romania in World War I	Event Overview
Romania in World War II	Event Overview
Romanian Campaign in Hungary, 1919	Event Overview
Romanian Campaign in Hungary, 1944–1945	Event Overview
Romanian Coup, August 1944	Event Overview
Romanian Peasant Uprising	Event Overview
Russo-Ottoman War, 1806–1812	Event Overview
Russo-Ottoman War, 1828–1829	Event Overview
Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878	Event Overview
Sakarya River, Battle of, 1921	Event Overview
San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878	Event Overview
Sarajevo, Siege of, 1992–1995	Event Overview
Sarajevo Assassination, 1914	Event Overview
Sarkoy and Baloyir, Battles of, 1913	Event Overview
Scutari, Siege of, 1912–1913	Event Overview
Serbia, Invasions of, 1914	Event Overview
Serbia, Invasions of, 1915	Event Overview
Serbia and the Balkan Wars	Event Overview
Serbia in World War I	Event Overview
Serbian Retreat, 1915	Event Overview
Serbian War of Independence, 1804–1817	Event Overview
Serbo-Ottoman War, 1876	Event Overview
Shipka Pass, Battles of, 1877–1878	Event Overview
Slivnitsa, Battle of, 1885	Event Overview
Slovene War, 1991	Event Overview
Smyrna, Destruction of, 1922	Event Overview

Srebrenica Massacre, 1995	Event Overview
Stalingrad, Battle of, 1942–1943	Event Overview
Storm, Operation, 1995	Event Overview
Transnistrian War	Event Overview
Truman Doctrine	Event Overview
Vance-Owen Plan, 1993	Event Overview
Vienna Award, Second	Event Overview
Vukovar, Siege of, 1991	Event Overview
Warsaw Pact	Event Overview
World War II Peace Settlement in the Balkans	Event Overview
Yugoslavia, Invasion of, 1941	Event Overview
Yugoslavia in World War II	Event Overview
Yugoslav Military Coup	Event Overview
Yugoslav Overflight Incidents, 1946	Event Overview
Yugoslav-Soviet Split	Event Overview
Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995	Event Overview
Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Causes	Event Overview
Yugoslav Wars, 1991–1995, Consequences	Event Overview

Individuals

Abdulhamid II	Individual Overview
Alexander I, King of Yugoslavia	Individual Overview
Alexander Obrenović, King of Serbia	Individual Overview
Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria	Individual Overview
Ali Pasha	Individual Overview
Antonescu, Ion	Individual Overview
Averescu, Alexandru	Individual Overview
Boris III, Czar of Bulgaria	Individual Overview
Carol I, King of Romania	Individual Overview
Carol II, King of Romania	Individual Overview
Ceausescu, Nicolae	Individual Overview
Cherniaev, M. G.	Individual Overview
Constantine I, King of Greece	Individual Overview
Dimitriev, Radko	Individual Overview
Dimitrijević, Dragutin	Individual Overview
Djilas, Milován	Individual Overview
Enver Pasha	Individual Overview
Ferdinand I, Czar of Bulgaria	Individual Overview
Hoxha, Enver	Individual Overview
Izetbegović, Alia	Individual Overview
Karadžić, Radovan	Individual Overview
Karageorge (George Petrović)	Individual Overview
Kemal, Mustafa	Individual Overview

Levski, Vasil	Individual Overview
Mahmud II, Ottoman Sultan	Individual Overview
Mahmud Muhtar Pasha	Individual Overview
Mehmet Ali	Individual Overview
Metaxas, Ioannis	Individual Overview
Michael I, King of Romania	Individual Overview
Mihailov, Ivan	Individual Overview
Mihajlović, Dragoljub “Draža”	Individual Overview
Milošević, Slobodan	Individual Overview
Mladić, Ratko	Individual Overview
Nedić, Milan	Individual Overview
Nikola I, King of Montenegro	Individual Overview
Obrenović, Milan	individual Overview
Obrenović, Miloš	Individual Overview
Papandreou, George	Individual Overview
Pavelić, Ante	Individual Overview
Princip, Gavrilo	Individual Overview
Putnik, Radomir	Individual Overview
Savov, Mihail	Individual Overview
Selim III	Individual Overview
Stamboliski, Aleksandŭr	Individual Overview
Stepanović, Stepa	Individual Overview
Süleyman Hüsni Pasha	Individual Overview
Tepelene, Ali Pasha	Individual Overview
Tito, Josip Broz	Individual Overview
Tsolakoglou, Georgios	Individual Overview
Tudjman, Franjo	Individual Overview
Vaphiadis, Markos	Individual Overview
Venizélos, Eluthérios	Individual Overview
Vladimirescu, Tudor	Individual Overview
Ypsilantis, Alexander	Individual Overview
Zhekov, Nikola	Individual Overview
Zog, King of the Albanians	Individual Overview

Organizations

Balkan Entente, 1934	Organization Overview
Balkan League	Organization Overview
Balkan Pact, 1954	Organization Overview
Balli Kombetar	Organization Overview
Black Hand	Organization Overview
Bosnian Forces	Organization Overview
Četniks	Organization Overview
Croat Forces, 1991–1995	Organization Overview

EAM/ELAS	Organization Overview
EDES	Organization Overview
Greens (Montenegro)	Organization Overview
Handschar SS Division	Organization Overview
Iron Guard	Organization Overview
JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army)	Organization Overview
Kosovo Liberation Army	Organization Overview
Little Entente	Organization Overview
Military League (Bulgaria)	Organization Overview
NATO in the Balkans	Organization Overview
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Organization Overview
Ottoman Empire	Organization Overview
Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars	Organization Overview
Ottoman Empire in World War I	Organization Overview
Partisans, Albania	Organization Overview
Partisans, Bulgaria	Organization Overview
Partisans, Yugoslavia	Organization Overview
Skanderbeg SS Division	Organization Overview
UNPROFOR	Organization Overview
Ustaša	Organization Overview
VMRO	Organization Overview
Young Turks	Organization Overview
Yugoslavia, Axis Occupation Forces in during World War II	Organization Overview
Yugoslavia, Collaborationist Forces in World War II	Organization Overview

Places

Bessarabia	Place Overview
Bihać	Place Overview
Bukovina	Place Overview
Contested Zone (Macedonia), 1912	Place Overview
Dobrudja	Place Overview
Epirus	Place Overview
Fiume/Rijeka, 1919–1924	Place Overview
Macedonia	Place Overview
Novi Pazar, Sanjak of	Place Overview
Salonika	Place Overview
Trieste Dispute	Place Overview
Yugoslavia	Place Overview

Treaties

Neuilly, Treaty of, 1920	Thing Overview
Saint-Germain, Treaty of, 1919	Thing Overview
Sévres, Treaty of, 1920	Thing Overview
Trianon, Treaty of, 1920	Thing Overview

General Index

Note: Page numbers in **bold** font indicate main entries.

- A., Harry, 229
Abdic, Fikret, 36
Abdülaziz, Ottoman Sultan, 300, 301
Abdulhamid I, Ottoman Sultan, 180, 212, 303
Abdulhamid II, **1–2**
 and Albanian uprisings, 10
 dethronement of, 183
 and Kemal, 160
 true agreement with Serbia, 44
 and Young Turks, 334–36
Accolade, Operation, 97
Acheson, Dean, 88, 313
Adrianople, Siege of, **2–3**
Adrianople, Treaty of, **3**, 182, 256
Agamemnon, 222
Ahtisaari, Martii, 166
Albania
 in Balkan Wars, **5–7**
 in World War I, **7–8**
 in World War II, **8–10**
 Italian occupation of, **3–4**
 Jewish protection, 138
Albanian Fascist Party, 4, 142
Albanian National Liberation Army
 (ANLA), 224
Albanian uprisings, **10–11**
Aleksandrov, Todor, 187
Alexander, Czar of Russia, 282
Alexander, King of Greece, 124
Alexander I, Czar of Russia, 253
Alexander I, King of Yugoslavia, **11–12**,
 148, 338, 348
Alexander II, Czar of Bulgaria, 13, 60
Alexander II, Czar of Russia, 204, 257
Alexander III, Czar of Bulgaria, 14, 60
Alexander Obrenović, King of Serbia,
 11–13, 93
Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of
 Bulgaria, **13–14**, 60–61, 106
Alexander the Great, 174–75
Alexandrov, Todor, 326
Ali, Mehmet, 185–86, 199
Alia, Ramiz, 143
Ali Pasha, **14–15**
Allenby, Edmund H., 161
Allied Force air campaign, 142
Allied Supreme War Council, 309
Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation
 of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), 154, 350
Antipater, 174
Antonescu, Ion, **15–16**
 arrest of, 250
 and Iron Guards leaders, 145–46
 and Jewish population in Romania, 140
 and Michael I, 16, 187
 and Odessa, Siege of, 211
 and Romanian Coup, 250–51
 as Romania prime minister, 324
 and Tripartite Pact, 238, 250
 and World War II, 245–47

- Apis. *See* Dimitrijević, Dragutin
 Arab Revolt, 221
 Arafat, Yasser, 65
 ARBiH (Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), 43–44
 Armenian Genocide, 215
 Armistice of Moudros, 119
 Army Group Scholtz, 113, 177
 Army of Epirus, 24, 105, 122
 Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH), 43–44
 Army of Thessaly, 24, 122
Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediyye (Victorious Troops of Muhammad), 181
 Asia Minor Campaign, 313
 Asia Minor Catastrophe, 261
 See also Greco-Turkish War; National Struggle
 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal. *See* Kemal, Mustafa
 Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during World War I, **16–18**
 Austro-Hungarian First Army, 237
 Austro-Turkish War, 15
 Averescu, Alexandru, **18–19**, 243
 AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia), 154, 350

 Balfour Declaration of 1917, 285
 Balkan Entente, **20**
 Balkan League, **20–21**
 attack on Albania, 5
 and disposition of Macedonia, 26
 and First Balkan War, 31
 formation of, xviii, 132
 Balkan Pact, **21–22**
 Balkan War, First, **22–26**
 Balkan League in, xviii
 Bulgaria in, 106
 causes of, 28–30
 commencement of, 5, 122
 and Italy, 21
 naval campaigns, 32–33
 siege of Adrianople, 2
 and Treaty of London, 75, 172
 Balkan War, Second, **26–28**, 175
 and Alexander I, King of Yugoslavia, 11
 and Antonescu, 15
 Bulgaria in, 106, 157, 172
 causes of, 30
 naval campaigns, 32–33
 and Treaty of Bucharest, 47–48, 54
 and Treaty of Constantinople, 75
 Balkan Wars, causes, **28–30**
 Balkan Wars, consequences, **31–32**
 Balkan Wars, Naval Campaigns, **32–33**
 Balli Kombetar (BK), 18–19, **33–34**, 224
 Banditry, 303
 BANU (Bulgarian National Agrarian Union), 236, 297
 Barbarossa, Operation, xix, 38, 117, 120–21, 352
 Battles. *See specific battles*
 Belgrade Convention, 309
 Benkovski, George, 60
 Berlin, Treaty of, **34–35**
 Austria-Hungary invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina provinces, 40–41, 45, 137
 and Balkan states, xvii
 and Bulgaria, 60
 and Dobrudja, 96
 infraction of, 42
 and Montenegro, 193–94
 Berlin Peace Treaty, 212
Besa, 138
 Bessarabia, **35**
 Bey, Enver, 218
 Bey, Hasan Riza, 270
 Bihać, **36**
 Birdwood, William, 110
 Black George. *See* Karageorge (George Petrović)
 Black Hand, **36–37**, 93, 232, 266–67
 Black Sea Campaign, **37–38**
 Boletini, Isa, 5
 Bolshevik Revolution, 259
 Bolshevism, 246

- Bonacini, Luigi, 78
 Boris III, Czar of Bulgaria, **39–40**, 106, 203, 236
 Bosnia, Austrian Occupation, **40–41**
 Bosnian Crisis, 29, **41–42**
 Bosnian forces, **43–44**
 Bosnian Revolt, **44–45**
 Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), 292
 Bosnian War, **45–46**
 Brătianu, Gheorghe, 250
 Brereton, Lewis H., 230
 Brioni Agreement, **47**
 British Expeditionary Force (BEF)
 and Bulgarian Second Army, 98
 evacuation from Dunkerque, 111
 evacuation from Greece, 80–81
 and Germany's invasion of Greece, 121
 Brătianu, Ionel, 19, 242
 Brusilov, A. A., 113
 Bucharest, Treaty of, 1886, 61
 Bucharest, Treaty of, 1913, **47–48**
 and Albania, 6
 and Bessarabia annexation, 35
 and Dobrudja, 53, 96
 and Serbia independence, 159
 Bucharest, Treaty of, 1918, **48–49**
 and Dobrudzha, 56
 signing of, 243–44
 Bucharest pogrom, 140, 146
 Bukovina, **49–50**
 Bulgaria
 anti-Jewish laws in, 138–39
 in the Balkan Wars, **50–53**
 Macedonia invasion, 341
 in World War I, **53–57**
 in World War II, **57–58**
 Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), 225
 Bulgarian "Fatherland War," **58–59**
 Bulgarian First Army
 Battles of Doiran, 99
 led by Kutinchev, 23–24
 Macedonia invasion, 341
 and Serbian army, 162
 Bulgarian Fourth Army, 36, 157
 Bulgarian Horrors, **59–60**
 Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (BANU), 236, 297
 Bulgarian Second Army
 and Greek army, 27, 98, 123
 and Serbian Second Army, 2, 25, 52
 Bulgarian-Serbian Treaty, 27
 Bulgarian-Serb War, **60–61**, 288
 Bulgarian Third Army
 defeated by Serbian army, 52
 and Ottoman Fortress of Lozengrad, 173
 in Thrace, 92
 Byron, Lord, 304
 Cabrinović, Nedjelko, 232
 Campioni, Inigo, 97–98
 Carden, Sackville, 108
 Carol I, King of Romania, **62–63**, 242
 Carol II, King of Romania, **63–64**, 145, 211, 245, 324
 Cassander, 174
 Castenfelt, Peter, 166
 Catholicism, 349
 Cavallero, Ugo, 116
 Ceausescu, Nicolae, **64–66**
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 310
 Cer Mountain, Battle of, **66–67**
 Čermak, Ivan, 300
 Červenko, Zvonimir, 299
 Četniks, **67–68**, 338–39. *See also* Mihajlović, Dragoljub "Draža"
 Charles I, Karl Eitel Friedrich. *See* Carol I, King of Romania
 Chataldzha, Battle of, **68–69**
 Cherniaev, M. G., **70**, 283–84
 Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 166
 Chernyayev, Mikhail Grigorievich, **70**, 283–84
 Chervenkov, Vulko, 96
 Chetas, 325
 Childe Harold, 304
 Chotek, Sophie, 266
 Christea, Miron, 64
 Christianity, 242, 349

- Christians
 - Balkan Orthodox, 337
 - and Great Smyrna Fire, 291
 - Greek- and Turkish-speaking, 262
 - Orthodox, 258, 318
 - and Young Turks, 335
- Christmas Rebellion, 134
- Chuikov, Vasily, 294
- Churchill, Winston
 - and Dodecanese, 97–98
 - and Gallipoli campaign, 108
 - and Greek Civil War, 130
 - and Stalin, 71
- CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 310
- Ciano, Galeazzo, 323
- Clinton, Bill, 91
- Codrington, Sir Edward, 200
- Cold War in the Balkans, **70–72**
- Committee of Union and Progress
 - (CUP), 216, 267, 334–35. *See also*
 - Young Turks
- Communist Partisans, 202
- Congress of Berlin, 207, 229
- Constantine I, King of Greece, **73–74**
 - abdication, 124, 322
 - neutrality declaration, 119
 - Venizélos resignation demand, 74
- Constantine II, King of Greece, 223
- Constantinople, Treaty of, 28, 53, **75**, 172, 219
- Contested Zone (Macedonia), **75–76**
- Convention of Akkirman, 256
- Conversations with Stalin* (Djilas), 94
- Corfu Channel Incident, **76–77**
- Corfu Declaration, **77–78**
- Corfu Incident, **78–79**
- Corti, Luigi, 78
- Craiova, Treaty of, 57, 96, 241, 332
- Cretan Crisis, **79–80**
- Crete, Battle of, **80–82**
- Crimean War, **82–83**, 256
- Crna Ruka*. *See* Black Hand
- Croat Forces, **83–84**
- Croatia, 342–43
- Croatian Defense Council, 84
- Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), 314
- Croatian Spring movement, 314
- Croat War, **84–87**. *See also* Yugoslav Wars
- Crown Prince Alexander, 24, 37
- Crown Prince Constantine, 24, 122, 153
- Crown Prince Danilo, 24, 269
- Csáky, István, 323
- Cuban Missile Crisis, 329
- Culcer, Ioan, 241
- Culture
 - Greek, 304
 - Muslim, 265
 - Ottoman, 214
- Cunningham, Andrew, 81
- Cuza, Alexandru, 62
- Cvetković, Dragiša, 352
- Cypriot Civil War, **87–88**
- Cyprus War, **88–90**
- Danckelmann, Heinrich, 202
- Danev, Stoyan, 27, 52
- D’Annunzio, Gabriele, 107
- Dartmouth*, 201
- Daskalov, Raiko, 236
- Davies, Mostyn, 225
- Dayton Agreement, 152, 158, 265, 315, 340, 357
- Dayton Peace Agreement, 45, 83, **91**
- Dedaković, Mile, 327
- Deed of Agreement (*Sened-i Ittifak*), 180
- de Gaulle, Charles, 206
- Delchev, Gotse, 325
- Delfino*, 116
- Delphin*, 33
- Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), 101, 320
- de Nagy-Apponyi, Geraldine Apponyi, 365
- de Rigny, Henry Gauthier, 200
- de Robeck, John, 108
- d’Espéray, Louis Franchet, 168, 309
- Determined Falcon, Operation, 164
- Deva, Xhafer, 287

- Dimitriev, Radko, **92**
 attack on Ottomans, 69, 173
 and Bulgarian Third Army, 23–24
 resignation from post of Bulgarian minister, 54
- Dimitrijević, Dragutin, 11, 37, **93**, 266
- Disarmament Conference, 206
- Djilas, Milovan, **94**, 307
- Djuic, Momcilo, 68
- Djukanović, Milo, 134
- Dobro Pole, Battle of, 11, **95**
- Dobrudja, **96**
- Dodecanese Campaign, **97–98**
- Doiran, Battles of, **98–99**
- Dordevic, Vladan, 12
- DSE (Democratic Army of Greece), 101, 320
- Dual Monarchy, 41, 112–13
- Dubček, Alexander, 330
- Duca, Ion, 145
- Dumlupinar, Battle of, 120
- Durham Light Infantry, 98
- EAM (Greek National Liberation Front), **100–101**
 and German occupation, 129
 Greek Civil War, 129–31
 National Popular Liberation Army as armed component of, 127–28
 and National Republican Greek League, 128
See also ELAS (Greek People's Liberation Army)
- Eastern Orthodox Christianity, 242
- ECMM (European Community Monitor Mission), 47
- EDES (National Republican Greek League), **101–102**, 128–29
Einsatzgruppen, 137
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 97, 205
- ELAS (Greek People's Liberation Army), **100–101**
 and Greek Civil War, 129–31
 as Greek National Liberation Front armed component, 127–28
 and National and Social Liberation, 129
 and National Republican Greek League, 102
See also EAM (Greek National Liberation Front)
- Elena, queen of Italy, 134
- Elli*, 116
- Emmanuel III, Victor, 4, 8, 148
- Ent, Uzal G., 230
- Enver Pasha, **102–4**, 160, 183, 221, 267
- Epirus, **104–5**
- Etairia, Filiki, 133
- European Community, 265, 290–91
- European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM), 47
- European Union (EU)
 sanctions against Yugoslavia, 340
 Vance-Owen peace plan and, 319
 Yugoslav Wars and, 356, 361
- “Fatherland Front,” 225
- Fatherland War, 58–59
- Ferdinand, Czar of Bulgaria, 203, 236, 269, 297
- Ferdinand, Franz
 assassination of, 93, 112, 231–32, 234, 266–67, 278, 338
 and Black Hand organization, 266
- Ferdinand, Sophie, 231
- Ferdinand I, Czar of Bulgaria, **106**
 abdication of, 56
 joining Central Powers, 54
 ordered attacks on Serbs and Greeks, 52
 and Savov, 27, 30
 and victory over Ottomans, 51
- Ferdinand I, King of Romania, 242
- Ferdinand of Saxe-Gotha-Coburg, Prince of Bulgaria, 61
- Filiki Etairia* (Society of Friends), 337
- The Final Solution, 137. *See also* Hitler, Adolf; Holocaust in the Balkans

- First Jassy-Kishinev Operation, 239
- Fiume/Rijeka, **106–7**
- Foreign Affairs*, 307
- Four Power Pact. *See* Balkan Entente
- Fraseri, Mehdi, 9
- Fretter-Pico, Maximilian, 239
- Freyberg, Bernard, 81

- Gallipoli campaign, **108–11**
- Garda de Fier*. *See* Iron Guard
- Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 153
- Garibaldi, Ricciotti, 24, 153
- George, David Lloyd, 285
- George II, King of Greece
 - crowning as king, 74
 - government-in-exile, 127, 129
 - Zervas on, 101
- George Papandreou Party, 223
- Georgios Averof*, 22, 32, 122
- German Eleventh Army
 - attack on Serbia, 112
 - Bulgarian troops in, 95, 113, 177
- German Ninth Army, 237
- German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 35, 64, 245
- German Twelfth Army, 114–15, 121
- Germany
 - in the Balkans during World War I, **111–13**
 - in the Balkans during World War II, **113–15**
 - in Yugoslav territory, 341–42
- Gerstenberg, Alfred, 231, 251
- Geshov, Ivan E., 51–52
- Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 64–65
- Gligorov, Kiro, 176
- Goering, Hermann, 295
- Gonatas, Stylianos, 102
- Gorbachev, Mikhail, 330–31
- Gorchakov, Alexander, 83
- Gorchakov, Mikhail, 82
- Gotovina, Ante, 84, 300
- Goudi Coup. *See* Greek Military Coup
- Grande Armée*, 282

- Great Serbian Retreat, 162
- Great Smyrna Fire, 291–92. *See also* Smyrna, Destruction of
- Greco-Italian War, **116–17**
- Greco-Ottoman War, **118–19**
- Greco-Turkish War, **119–20**, 261, 286, 322
- Greece
 - in the Balkan Wars, **122–23**
 - invasion of, **120–21**
 - Jewish population during World War II, 139–40
 - in World War I, **123–25**
 - in World War II, **125–29**
- Greek Army of Epirus, 105, 153
- Greek Civil War, **129–32**, 223, 263, 306
- Greek Communist Party (KKE), 100–101, 129–31
- Greek culture, 304
- Greek First Army, 121
- Greek military coup, **132**
- Greek Revolt, 254
- Greek Second Army, 121
- Greek War of Independence, **133–34**, 199
- Greens (*zelenashi*), **134**
- Grigorescu, Eremea, 184
- Guillaumat, Louis, 177
- Gurko, Iosif, 286

- Halder, Franz, 294
- Hamidiye*, 23, 33
- Hamilton, Ian, 109
- Hampel, Desiderius, 135
- Handschar SS Division, **135–36**, 345
- Haradinaj, Ramush, 164
- Helen of Greece, 63, 187
- Helle*, 125, 148
- Herzegovina Revolt, **136–37**
- Herzl, Theodor, 1
- Highlander's Rebellion, 10–11
- Himmler, Heinrich, 135, 287
- Hitler, Adolf
 - attack on Soviet Union, 38, 114, 351–52
 - attack on Yugoslavia, 114, 121, 126, 338

- and attack on Yugoslavia, 345–46
- invasion of Greece, 117, 120–21
- and Operation Blau (Blue), 293
- Soviet Union, invasion of, 211
- and Stalingrad, Battle of, 293–96
- and Ustaša regime, 228
- and World War II, 245–46, 338, 348–49
- and Yugoslav Military Coup, 351–52
- HMS *Leander*, 76
- HMS *Mauritius*, 76
- HMS *Orion*, 76
- HMS *Saumarez*, 76
- HMS *Superb*, 76
- HMS *Volage*, 76
- Hohenzollern, Carol, 237
- Holocaust in the Balkans, **137–41**. *See also* Hitler, Adolf
- Horseshoe, Operation, **141–42**, 357
- Horthy, Miklós, 309
- Hoth, Hermann, 294
- Hoxha, Enver, **142–43**, 224, 288
 - and Albania, 10
 - and Albania's premiership, 143
 - death of, 143
 - meeting with Mao Zedong, 72
- Hrvatska vojska* (HV). *See* Croat Forces
- Hrvatsko vijeće obrane* (HVO). *See* Croatian Defense Council
- Hungary
 - Romanian campaign of 1919 in, 248
 - Romanian campaign of 1944–1945 in, 249
 - and Yugoslavia, 342
- Hunter-Weston, Aylmer, 110
- Ilinden-Preobrazhenski Uprising. *See* Ilinden Uprising
- Ilinden Uprising, **144**, 174, 214, 325
- Imperial School of Military Engineering, 271
- IMRO/VMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), 144, 174, 187–88, 325–26
- Independent State of Croatia (NDH—Nezavisna Država Hrvatska), 226
- Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO, or VMRO), 144, 174, 187–88, 325–26
- International Boundary Commission, 78
- International Court of Justice, 46, 77
- International Criminal Tribunal, 315
- International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
 - formation of, 45
 - and Haradinaj, 164
 - indictment under, 91
 - and Milošević, 191
 - and Mladić, 193
- International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 199
- Intra-Allied War. *See* Balkan War, Second
- Iron Guard, **145–46**
 - and Carol II, 63–64
 - and killing of Jews, 145–46
 - leaders and Antonescu, 15
- Islam, 214–15, 336–37
- Islam between East and West* (Izetbegović), 150
- Italian Air Force P-38 Lightning, 353
- Italo-Ottoman War, 29
- Italo-Turkish War, 51, 97, 160
- Italy
 - in the Balkans during World War I, **146–47**
 - in the Balkans during World War II, **148–50**
 - occupation of Yugoslavia, 342
- Ivanov, Nikola, 2, 24
- Izetbegović, Alija, **150–51**
 - and Bosnian forces, 43
 - signing Dayton Agreement, 152
- Janina, Siege of, **153**
- Jankovich, Bozhidar, 25
- Janša, Janez, 290
- Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 330
- Jellicoe, George, 97

- Jeschonnek, Hans, 295
- Jews
- in Albania, 138
 - in Bulgaria, 138–39
 - in Greece, 139–40
 - in Romania, 140
 - in Yugoslavia, 140–41
- JNA (Yugoslav People's Army), **154–56**
- and Bosnian forces, 43
 - in Croatia, 83
 - in Croat War, 84–86
 - establishment of, 43
- Joseph, Franz, 37, 93, 144, 266
- Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija*. *See* JNA (Yugoslav People's Army)
- Kadyr-Bey, Abdul, 3
- Kalimantsi, Battle of, **157**
- Kamensky, Mikhail, 253
- Karadžić, Radovan, **157–58**, 319, 355, 357
- Karageorge (George Petrović), **158–60**, 210
- Karageorgević, Alexander, 68, 210
- Karageorgević, Peter, 338
- Karamanlis, Constantine, 88
- Karl Anton, Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 62
- Károlyi, Mihály, 308–9
- Karteria*, 200
- Kemal, Mustafa, **160–61**
- accomplishments, 161
 - establishment of rival government, 169
 - and Greco-Turkish War, 119–20
 - nationalist movement in Anatolia, 104
 - and Young Turks, 335
- Kharkov*, 38
- Khrushchev, Nikita S.
- de-Stalinization campaign, 143
 - focus on relationship with Tito, 72
 - visit to Belgrade, 22
 - and Warsaw Pact, 328–30
- King's Own, 98
- King Unifier. *See* Boris III, Czar of Bulgaria
- Kitchener, Marshal Horatio, 108, 110–11
- KKE (Greek Communist Party), 100–101, 129–31
- Knezes*, 281–82
- Konev, Ivan G., 328
- Koryzes, Alexander, 127
- Kosovo, Battle of, **162**, 337
- Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), **163–64**
- and Kosovo insurgency, 141
 - and Serbian authorities, 357
- Kosovo Verification Mission, 164
- Kosovo War, **164–66**
- Kostunica, Vojislav, 340
- Kragujevac massacre, 202
- Krajsnik, Momcilo, 158
- Kremlin, 71–72
- Kučan, Milan, 289
- Küçük, Fazıl, 87–88
- Kumanovo, Battle of, **166–67**
- Kun, Béla, 244, 248
- Kunchev, Vasil Ivanov. *See* Levski, Vasil
- Kupi, Abas, 8–10
- Kutinchev, Nikola, 173
- Kutinchev, Vasil, 24
- Kutuzov, Mikhail, 253
- Kvaternik, Slavko, 343
- Lake Prespa, Battle of, **168**
- Lambrino, “Zizi,” 63
- Lausanne, Treaty of, 120, **169–70**, 284
- League of National Christian Defense, 145
- League of Nations, 8, 34, 204, 261, 284
- League of Private Initiative and Decentralization, 335
- Lebed, Alexander, 308
- Levski, Vasil, **170–71**
- Liberator Tsar. *See* Boris III, Czar of Bulgaria
- List, Wilhelm Siegmund, 121, 293, 346
- Little Entente, **171–72**
- Logothetopoulos, Konstantinos, 127
- Löhr, Alexander, 341
- Loisinger, Johanna, 14
- Lojotić, Dimitrije, 344

- London, Treaty of, **172**
 and Albania's independence, 6, 146
 and First Balkan War, 75, 78
 and Ottoman Empire, 31, 219, 256
 and Sanjak division, 207
 London Conference of Ambassadors, 78–79
 London Protocol of 1830, 79, 133–34
 Long Range Desert Group, 98
 Ludendorff, Erich, 49
 Lupescu, Elena “Magda,” 187, 245
 Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, Battle of, **173**
- Macedonia, **174–76**
 Macedonian Front, **176–78**
 Macedonian War, **178–80**
 Maček, Vlatko, 352
 Mahmud II, Ottoman Sultan, 133, **180–82**,
 185, 254, 304
 Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, **182–84**
 Makarios III, 87–89
Makedonia, 33
 Malinovsky, Rodion, 239
 Malobabić, Rade, 37
 Manastir (Bitola), Battle of, 6
 Maniu, Iuliu, 250
 Manoilescu, Mihail, 323
 Mao Zedong, 72, 143
 Mărășești, Battle of, **184**
Marasti, 38
 Marita, Operation, xix, 117, 121, 126, 149
 Markač, Mladen, 300
 Martić, Milan, 299–300
 Martinović, Anastasia, 204
 Martinovich, Mitar, 24, 270
 Mašin, Draga, 12, 209
 Maurer, Ion, 64–65
 McLean, Neil, 18–19
 Mecid I, Abdul, 136, 185
Mecidiye, 23, 33
 Mehmet II, 214
 Mehmet Ali, **185–86**, 199
Mekteb-i Harbiyye. *See* Ottoman Military
 Academy
 Metaxas, Ioannis, **186**
 death, 117, 120
 and Italian invasion of Greece, 125
 and Nazi Germany, 116
 outlaw of KKE, 100
 Metaxas Line, 121, 126
 Michael I, King of Romania, **187**, 239, 247,
 249, 250
 Michelson, Ivan I., 253
 Mihailov, Ivan, **187–88**, 326
 Mihajlović, Dragoljub “Draža,” **188–89**
 emergence of cetniks, 67
 execution of, 68, 351
 leading Cetniks, 349
 Serbian massacre, 226
 and Tito's Partisans, 305
 Military League (Bulgaria), 132, **189**
 Milne, George, 168, 285
 Milošević, Slobodan, **190–92**
 as Balkan peacemaker, 191
 death of, 192
 economic sanctions on, 319
 and Kosovo Liberation Army, 163
 nationalist policies of, 134
 Operation Horseshoe, 141–42
 and Serbia, 339–40, 355, 360
 and Slovene War, 289
 and Vance-Owen peace plan, 319
 and Yeltsin, 164
 and Yugoslav Wars, 355, 360, 362
 Mirković, Borivoje, 352
 Mladić, Ratko, **192–93**
 apprehended by Serbian
 authorities, 357
 Srebrenica invasion, 292
 and Srebrenica invasion, 45
 war crimes attributed to, 192–93
 Monro, Charles, 111
 Montenegrin National Assembly, 205
 Montenegro
 in Balkan events, 1876–1878, **193–94**
 in the Balkan wars, **194–95**
 in World War I, **195–96**
Moskva, 38
 Mărășești, Battle of, 184

- Muhammad Ali of Egypt, 133, 181
- Munich Agreement, 172
- Mürzteg agreement, 144
- Muslims
 - Balkan Wars and, 219
 - Bosnian, 292–93
 - Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and, 334
 - culture, 265
 - Great Smyrna Fire and, 292
 - Serbian War of Independence and, 281–82
 - Yugoslav Wars and, 355–56, 358, 361
- Muslim SS, 135
- Mussolini, Benito
 - and annexation of Albania, 8
 - invasion of Albania, 148
 - invasion of Corfu, 79
 - plans to invade Greece, xix, 105, 114–17
 - and Yugoslav state, 148
- Mustafa III, 270
- Mustafa IV, 271
- Nadezhda*, 33
- Napoleonic Wars, 159, 282, 304, 336
- Narodna Odbrana* (National Defense), 37
- Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 306
- National Guard Corps. *See* Croat Forces
- Nationalism
 - Albanian, 304
 - Croatian, 314
 - Croat radical, 317
 - Romanian, 324
 - Serbian, 232, 360
 - Slavic, 258
 - Turkish, 300, 334, 336
 - western European, 216
- Nationalist Army of Montenegro and Herzegovina, 345
- National Liberation Army (NLA), 154–55, 179–80
- National Liberation Movement. *See* Partisans, Albania
- National Peasants, 63
- National Radical Union, 223
- National Republican Greek League (EDES), 100–102, 128–29
- National Schism, 124, **197–98**, 263, 321
- National Struggle, 261. *See also* Asia Minor Catastrophe; Greco-Turkish War
- NATO in the Balkans, **198–99**. *See also* North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
- Naval campaigns, Balkan Wars, 32–33
- Navarino, Battle of, 133, **199–201**
- Nazi-Soviet Pact, 225, 226
- Nedić, Milan, 127, **201–3**, 314, 343, 349
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, 307
- Neuilly, Treaty of, **203–4**
 - and Bulgaria, 39, 57
 - and Romania, 49
- The New Class* (Djilas), 94, 307
- Nicholas, Grand Duke, 229
- Nicholas I, Czar of Russia, 82, 254, 337
- Nikola I, King of Montenegro, **204–5**
 - and Central Powers, 196
 - and Herzegovina unrest, 193
 - Montenegrin forces commander, 24
 - and Ottoman territory in Albania, 194
 - personal regime, 32
- Nixon, Richard M., 65
- NLA (National Liberation Army), 154–55, 179–80
- Noli, Fan S., 365
- Non-Aligned Movement, 198, 306
- North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 206
- North Atlantic Council (NAC), 206
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), **205–7**
 - air patrols over Bosnia, 356
 - air strikes against Yugoslavia, 163, 191
 - in the Balkans, 198–99
 - bombing campaign on Bosnian Serb, 356–57
 - and Bosnian War, 45
 - commencement of, 91
 - Croatia and, 362
 - International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 199
 - and Kosovo War, 165–66

- Military-Technical Agreement, 163
- and North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 206
- and North Atlantic Council (NAC), 206
- Operation Determined Falcon, 164
- and Slovenia, 291
- Slovenia and, 363
- staff of, 207
- and Warsaw Pact, 328–30
- Yugoslav Wars and, 356–57
- Northern Epirus, 8
- Novi Pazar, Sanjak of, **207–8**

- Obrenović, Milan, 12, 44, 60, **209–10**, 288
- Obrenović, Miloš, **210**, 282
- Obrenovic, Alexander, 11–13, 93
- Obrenovic, Natalija, 12
- Odessa, Siege of, 1941, **210–12**
- Ohrid Framework Agreement, 180
- Operation Accolade. *See* Accolade, Operation
- Operation Barbarossa. *See* Barbarossa, Operation
- Operation Determined Falcon. *See* Determined Falcon, Operation
- Operation Horseshoe. *See* Horseshoe, Operation
- Operation Iraqi Freedom, 199
- Operation Mandibles, 97
- Operation Marita. *See* Marita, Operation
- Operation Maslenica, 84
- Operation Storm, 299–300
- Operation Storm (*Oluja*), 87
- Operation Uranus, 295
- Orlov, Aleksey, 3
- Orthodox Christianity, 349
- Osman I, 214
- Ottoman Alasonya Army, 118
- Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations in the Balkans and Crete, **212–14**
- Ottoman culture, 214
- Ottoman Empire, **214–15**
 - and Armenian Genocide, 215
 - in the Balkan Wars, **215–20**
 - and Bosnian Crisis, 41
 - and Bulgarian-Serb War, 60–61
 - and Greco-Turkish War, 119
 - and Greek War of Independence, 133
 - and Karageorge, 158–60
 - and Russo Turkish War, 28
 - and Treaty of Berlin, xviii
 - and Treaty of Constantinople, 219
 - and Treaty of London, 26, 172
 - in World War I, **220–22**
 - World War I and the destruction of, 215
- Ottoman Military Academy, 181–82
- Ottoman Peace, xvii
- Ouchy, Treaty of, 216
- Owen, David, 319–20

- Pact of Corfu, 279
- Pact of Halepa, 79
- Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 65
- Pandurs*, 324
- Panić, Života, 327
- Papagos, Alexander, 116, 121, 131
- Papandreou, Andreas, 223
- Papandreou, Damaskinos, 140
- Papandreou, George, **223**
 - government of national unity, 100, 102
 - as Greece prime minister, 129
 - resignation as Greece prime minister, 130
- Paris Peace Conference
 - and Neuilly, Treaty of, 203
 - and Romania, 244
 - and Saint-Germain, Treaty of, 259–60
 - and Trianon, Treaty of, 308
 - and Venizélos, 322
- Paris Peace Treaty, 50, 96, 107
- Partisans
 - Albania, **224–25**
 - Bulgaria, **225–26**
 - Yugoslavia, **226–27**
- Partisans, Yugoslav, 310
- Partnership for Peace Program, 198
- Pasha, İsmail, 212
- Pasha, Abdülkerim Nadir, 283, 286

- Pasha, Abdullah, 23, 173
 Pasha, Agha Huseyin, 254
 Pasha, Alemdar Mustafa, 180–81, 271
 Pasha, Ali, 14–15
 Pasha, Djemal, 335
 Pasha, Enver, 102–4, 160, 183, 221, 267
 Pasha, Esat, 153
 Pasha, Ferik Abdullah, 217
 Pasha, Ferik Mehmed Sukru, 2
 Pasha, Hasan Riza, 5–6
 Pasha, Hassan Tahsin, 24
 Pasha, Hüseyin Avni, 301
 Pasha, Husvre, 181
 Pasha, Ibrahim, 200
 Pasha, Mahmud Şevket, 267–68
 Pasha, Mahmud Muhtar, 182–84
 Pasha, Mehmed Ali, 301
 Pasha, Muhammad Ali, 181
 Pasha, Mustafa Naili, 212
 Pasha, Nazim, 217, 218
 Pasha, Ömer Lütfü, 82
 Pasha, Osman, 229
 Pasha, Rauf, 301
 Pasha, Reshid Mehmed, 255
 Pasha, Selim, 181
 Pasha, Shevket Turgut, 10
 Pasha, Süleyman Hüsnü, 286–87
 Pasha, Talaat, 335
 Pasha, Tepedelenli Ali, 180–81
 Pasha, Zeki, 218
 Pašić, Nicola, 77, 93
 Pašić, Nikola, 37
 Paskevich, Ivan F., 254
 Paskievitch, Ivan, 82
 Paulus, Friedrich, 293
 Pavelić, Ante, 135, **227–28**, 317–18, 343
 Pavichenko, Vera, 211
Pax ottomanica, xvii, xx
 PCC (Political Consultative Committee), 328
 PCR (Romanian Communist Party), 64–65
 Peasant Revolt, 15
 PEEA (Political Committee of National Liberation), 100, 129
 People's League Party, 19
 Perović, Ivo, 352
 Pétain, Henri, 314
 Pétain, Henry, 127
 Peter I, King of Serbia, 205, 234, 280
 Peter II, King, 227, 306
 Peter II, King of Yugoslavia, 227, 346, 348, 351
 Peter II Karageorgević, 115, 188
 Peter I Karageorgević, 11, 13, 93, 195–96
 Petrescu, Constantin Titel, 250
 Petrović, George, 282
 Petrović-Njegoš, Danilo, 204
 Petrović-Njegoš, Mirko, 204
 Petrović-Njegoš, Nikola Mirkov. *See* Nikola I, King of Montenegro
 Philip II, 174
 Plastiras, Nikolaos, 101, 130, 223
 Plavsić, Biljana, 158
 Pleven, Siege of, **228–29**
 PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), 65
 Ploeshti, Bombing of, **229–31**
 PMR (Romanian Workers' Party), 64–65
 Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA), 100, 129
 Political Consultative Committee (PCC), 328
 Potiorek, Oskar, 66, 93, 271
 Prasca, Sebastiano Visconti, 116
 Prince Paul of Yugoslavia, 114, 338, 348, 351–52
 Princip, Gavrilo, **231–32**, 266
 Pătrăşcanu, Lucretiu, 250
 Putnik, Radomir, **232–35**
 attack on Ottomans, 24, 167
 and Austrian invasion, 66
 battle of Cer Mountain, 278
 health of, 233–34
 Queen Natalija, 209
 Radetzky, Josef, 13
 Radomir Rebellion, **236–37**

- Radoslavov, Vasil
 as Bulgarian prime minister, 52
 as commander of Bulgarian army, 364
 joining Triple Alliance, 203
 neutrality proclamation, 54
 resignation from prime ministerial position, 56
 and Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, 48
- Raguz, Martin, 152
- Raiding Forces' Levant Schooner Flotilla, 98
- Rambouillet Accords, 165
- Rapallo, Treaty of, 107, 147
- Red Army
 formations, 341–42
 invasion of Bulgaria, xx, 58
 in southeastern Europe, 72
- Regina Maria*, 38
- Reinhardt, Georg-Hans, 346
- Religion, Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and, 336
- Revolution of April 21, 1967, 223
- Rhallis, Ioannis, 127
- Roman Catholicism, 318
- Romania
 in the Balkan Wars, **240–42**
 invasion of 1916, **237–38**
 invasion of 1944, **238–39**
 and siege of Odessa, 210–11
 in World War I, **242–45**
 in World War II, **245–48**
- Romanian Boy Scouts, 63
- Romanian Campaign in Hungary
 of 1919, **248–49**
- Romanian Campaign in Hungary of 1944–1945, **249–50**
- Romanian Communist Party (PCR), 64–65
- Romanian coup, **250–51**
- Romanianization, 140
- Romanian Peasant Uprising, **251–52**
- Romanian Workers' Party (PMR), 64–65
- Roosevelt, Franklin D.
 bombing of Ploesti, 230
 death of, 70
 and Dodecanese, 97
 and Stalin, 71
- Royal Air Force (RAF)
 bases in Greece, 120–21, 126
 and Dodecanese campaign, 98
 and Greco-Italian War, 117
- Royal Irish Fusiliers, 98
- Rugova, Ibrahim, 164
- Rupnik, Leon, 344
- Russian Civil War, 226, 305, 313
- Russian Revolution, 211, 221, 243
- Russian Southern Group, 286
- Russo-Japanese War, 274
- Russo-Ottoman War
 of 1806–1812, **252–53**
 of 1828–1829, **254–56**
 of 1877–1878, **256–58**
- Russo-Ottoman War, 1768–1774, 49
- Russo-Ottoman War, 1806–1812,
 180, 252–53
- Russo-Ottoman War, 1828–1829,
 181–82, 254–56
- Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878
 Dimitriev in, 92
 initiation of, xvii, 44
 Treaty of Adrianople, 3
- Russo Turkish War, 28
- Sadat, Anwar, 65
- Saint-Germain, Treaty of, 50,
259–61, 309
- Sakarya River, Battle of, **261–62**
- Salonika, **262–64**
- Sampson, Nick, 88
- Sanatescu, Constantin, 250
- San Stefano, Treaty of, **264**
 Bulgarian state, 28, 50
 and Greater Bulgaria, 257
 and Ottoman Empire, 40, 45, 60
 revision of, 34
 Serbia and Montenegro
 independence, 338
- Sapountzakes, Constantine, 24, 153
- Sarajevo, Siege of, **265–66**

- Sarajevo Assassination, **266–67**. *See also*
 Ferdinand, Franz
- Sarkoy and Bolayir, Battles
 of, **267–68**
- Sarkozy, Nicolas, 207
- Sarrail, Maurice, 168, 177, 243
- Sauberzweig, Karl-Gustav, 135
- Savino, Francesco Jacomoni di San, 4
- Savov, Mihail, **268–69**
 attack on Greek and Serbian
 positions, 27, 51
 battle of Kalimantsi, 157
 and Czar Ferdinand, 27, 30
 as leader of Bulgarian armies, 23
- Sazonov, Sergei, 240
- Schleiffen Plan, 112
- Schmidhuber, August, 287–88
- Scobie, Ronald, 129–30
- Scutari, Siege of, **269–70**
- SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije), 151
- Second Jassy-Kishinev Operation, 239
- Second Vienna Award, 245
- Selim, Mehmed, 254
- Selim II, Sultan of Ottoman, 215
- Selim III, Sultan of Ottoman, **270–71**
 and Alemdar, 180–81
 and Karageorge, 159
 reoccupation of Egypt, 185
- Serbia
 and the Balkan Wars, **274–77**
 collaboration with Germany, 343–44
 invasions of 1914, **271–72**
 invasions of 1915, **272–73**
 in World War I, **277–80**
- Serbian First Army, 11, 26
- Serbian Radical Party (SRS), 68
- Serbian Retreat, 1915, **280–81**
- Serbian Second Army
 and Bulgarian Second Army, 2, 25, 52
 invasion of Montenegro, 196
- Serbian War of Independence,
281–83
- Serbo-Ottoman War, 233, **283–84**
- Seselj, Vojislav, 68
- Sevastopol*, 38
- Sèvres, Treaty of, 119, 169–70, **284–86**
- Shehu, Mehmet, 143, 224
- Shipka Pass, Battles of, **286–87**
- Siantos, Georgios, 100
- Siege of Scutari (Shkodër), 5–6
- Sima, Horia, 145–46
- Simeon II, 40, 58
- Simović, Dušan, 346, 349, 352
- Šinik-oglu, Hadji Mustapha, 281
- Skanderbeg, George Kastrioti, 287
- Skanderbeg SS Division, **287–88**
- Slivnitsa, Battle of, **288–89**
- Slovene War of 1991, **289–91**
- Slovenia, 344
- Smiley, David, 9
- Smyrna, Destruction of, **291–92**
- Social Liberation movement (EKKA),
 100, 129
- Soddu, Ubaldo, 116
- Solidarity crisis, 330
- Special Boat Squadron, 98
- Špegelj, Martin, 83
- Srebrenica Massacre, **292–93**
- SRS (Serbian Radical Party), 68
- SS Reichsführer*, 287
- SS-Standartenführer*, 287
- Stalin, Joseph
 and Churchill, 71
 death of, 72
 and Djilas, 94
 and Romania, 247
 and Roosevelt, 71
 and Stalingrad Battle, 294–95
- Stalingrad, Battle of, **293–97**
- Stamboliski, Aleksandër, 52, 189, 203, 236,
297–98, 326
- Stambolov, Stefan, 14
- Stanković, Radenko, 352
- Star of David, 141
- Stepanović, Stepa, 25, 66, **298**
- Stepinac, Aloysius, 306
- Storm, Operation, **299–300**, 357
- Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA), 151

- Strategic Defense Initiative, 206
- Student, Kurt, 81
- Sturdza, Dimitrie, 252
- Sturm, Pavle Jurisich, 66
- Suleiman I, Ottoman Sultan, 214
- Süleyman Hüsnü Pasha, **300–302**
- Sultane*, 201
- Supremists, 325
- Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, 285
- Tankosi, Vojislav, 232
- Teleki, Pál, 323, 349
- Tellini, Enrico, 78
- Ten Days War. *See* Slovene War of 1991
- Tepelene, Ali Pasha, **303–4**
- Thaci, Hashim, 163–64
- 13 SS Frei.Gebirgs Division (*kroatien*), 135
- 13 Waffen-Gebirgs-Division der SS*
‘*Handschar*’ (*kroatische Nr. 1*). *See* 13
SS Frei.Gebirgs Division (*kroatien*)
- Thirty Years’ War, 260
- Thompson, Frank, 225
- Tito, Josip Broz, **305–7**
and Albanian Communists, 224
and Balkan Federation, 354
and Belgrade, 115
and Communist Partisan resistance
movement, 305–6
and Communist Party of Greece, 131
death of, xx, 156, 175, 306–7, 339, 359
and Djilas, 94
federal republic regime, 84
interdiction of American flights, 353
leading Partisans, 349–50
and Macedonians, 175
and Mihajlovic, 188
National Front, formation of, 306
and Soviet Union, xx
and Treaty of Friendship, 22
and Ustaša, 318
during World War II, 154
and Yugoslav Communist Party, 305
and Yugoslav Partisans, 226–27,
310, 349–51
and Yugoslav-Soviet split, 320, 353–54
and Yugoslav Wars, 355, 359–60
- Tittoni-Venizalos agreement, 105, 147
- Tolbukhin, Fyodor, 239
- Topanti, Essad Pasha, 5–6
- Toptani, Esat Pasha, 270
- Total National Defense, 155
- Townshend, Charles, 221
- Trajkovski, Boris, 176
- Trajkovski, Branko, 176
- Transnistrian War, **307–8**
- Treaties. *See specific treaties*
- Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation,
and Mutual Assistance, 22
- Trianon, Treaty of, 49, 171, 244, **308–10**, 322
- Trieste Dispute, **310–11**
- Tripartite Pact, 121, 154, 345, 349
- Truce of Foscari, 243
- Truman, Harry S., 71–72, 131
- Truman Doctrine, **311–13**
- Trumbic, Ante, 77
- Tsolakoglou, Georgios, **313–14**
as prime minister of Greece, 127, 313–14
surrender to German invaders, 121, 126
surrender to Italians, 127
- Tudjman, Franjo, 83–84, **314–15**
- Turkmenchay, Treaty of, 3
- 21st Waffen Mountain Division SS
Skanderbeg, 345
- UCY (Union of Communist Youth), 64
- Ujedinjenje ili Smrt*. *See* Black Hand
- Ujedinjenje ili Smrt* (Unification
or Death), 37
- Union of Communist Youth (UCY), 64
- United Nations
Operation Storm and, 299
sanctions against Yugoslavia, 339
Security Council, 316
Slovenia and, 291
Srebrenica Massacre and, 292–93
United Nations Protection Force, 292, 316–17
Vance-Owen peace plan and, 319
Yugoslav Wars and, 355–56, 362

- United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 86, **316–17**
- United Nations Security Council, 316
- Unity or Death. *See* Black Hand
- UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force), 86, 316–17
- Ustaša, **317–18**
- Vance, Cyrus, 86, 88, 319–20
- Vance-Owen Plan, **319–20**
- Vancho. *See* Mihailov, Ivan
- Vandenberg, Arthur, 313
- Vaphiadis, Markos, **320**
- Vardar Army, 6, 167, 218
- Varkiza Agreement, 101, 130
- Velestinlis, Rhigas, 133
- Velvet Revolution of 1989–1990, 311
- Venizélos, Eleuthérios, **321–22**
 - abdication of Constantine I, 119, 322
 - death of, 322
 - differences with Constantine I, 74, 322
 - National Schism, 197
 - national schism, 124
 - and Papandreou, 223
 - at Paris Peace Conference, 322
 - as premier of Greece, 73
 - resignation as Greece’s premier, 74, 123–24, 321
 - resignation of, 263
- Versailles, Treaty of, 259
- Vienna Award, Second, **322–24**
- Vladimirescu, Tudor, **324**, 337
- VMRO/IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), 144, 174, 187–88, **325–26**
- von Battenberg, Alexander, 288
- von Below, Otto, 168
- von Bismarck, Otto, 112, 137, 264
- von Bock, Fedor, 293
- von Bülow, Bernhard, 42
- von der Goltz, Colmar, 153
- von Diebitsch, Hans Karl, 255
- von Falkenhayn, Erich, 48, 162, 237
- von Hindenburg, Paul, 49, 56
- von Hoetzendorf, Franz Conrad, 162
- von Kleist, Paul Ludwig Ewald, 294, 346
- von Kuhlmann, Richard, 49
- von Mackensen, August, 19, 112, 237–38, 279
- von Manstein, Erich, 294
- von Obwurzer, Herbert, 135
- von Ribbentrop, Joachim, 323
- Von Richtofen, Wolfram F., 296
- von Sanders, Otto Liman, 110, 161, 221
- von Weichs, Maximilian, 293, 341, 346
- Vukmanović, Svetozar, 224
- Vukotic, Milena, 204
- Vukotich, Janko, 24
- Vukovar, Siege of, **327**
- Vulović, Ljubomir, 37
- Waffen SS, 135
- Warsaw Pact, **328–30**
 - and Albania, 72, 329
 - creation of, 328
 - crisis, 330
 - and Gorbachev, 331
 - invasion of Czechoslovakia, 155
 - and Khrushchev, 328–30
- Warsaw Treaty Organization, 205
- White Guards, 344
- Wiesel, Elie, 140
- Wilhelm II, German Emperor, 73, 112, 197, 242
- William of Wied, 273
- Wilson, Henry Maitland “Jumbo,” 121
- Wilson, Woodrow
 - and Armenian borders, 284
 - Fourteen Points, 309
 - and independent Albania, 78
 - and Paris Peace conference, 148
 - and World War I, 57
- World War I
 - Albania in, 7–8
 - Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, 16–18
 - Battle of Mt. Cer and, 272
 - Bulgaria in, 53–57
 - Germany in the Balkans, 111–13
 - Greece in, 123–25
 - Italy in the Balkans, 146–47

- Ottoman Empire in, 215, 219, 220–22
- Romania, invasion of, 237–38
- Romania in, 242–44
- Salonika and, 262–63
- Serbia in, 277–80
- siege of Odessa and, 211
- Treaty of Trianon and, 308
- Tsolakoglou, Georgios and, 313
- VMRO and, 325–26
- Young Turks and, 335
- World War II
 - Albania in, 8–10
 - Battle of Stalingrad, 293
 - Bulgaria in, 57–58
 - Germany in the Balkans, 113–15
 - Greece in, 125–29
 - Italy in the Balkans, 148–50
 - National Liberation Movement (Partisans) and, 224
 - peace settlement in the Balkans, **331–33**
 - Romania in, 245–47
 - siege of Odessa and, 210–11
 - Tsolakoglou, Georgios and, 313
 - Tudjman, Franjo and, 314
 - Ustaša and, 317
 - Yugoslav Partisans and, 226
- XLIV Panzer Corps, 114
- XLIX Mountain Corps, 347
- XL Panzer Corps, 346–47
- XLVI Panzer Corps, 347
- Yanya Corps, 118
- Yeltsin, Boris, 308
- Young Turk Coup, xviii, 132
- Young Turks, **334–36**
- Ypsilantis, Alexander, 133, 324, **336–37**
- Yugoslav Committee, 279
- Yugoslav Communist Party (YPJ), 305
- Yugoslavia, **337–40**
 - and Axis occupation forces in World War II, **340–42**
 - and collaborationist forces in World War II, **342–45**
 - invasion of, **345–47**
 - in World War II, **347–51**
 - military coup, **351–52**
 - Yugoslav overflight incidents, **353**
 - Yugoslav People's Army. *See* JNA (Yugoslav People's Army)
 - Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), 289–91, 299
 - Yugoslav Royal Army, 202
 - Yugoslav-Soviet Split, **353–54**
 - Yugoslav Wars, **355–57**
 - and Bihać, 36
 - and Bosnian forces, 43
 - causes, **358–60**
 - consequences, **360–63**
 - and Croat War, 84
- Zabtiye* organization, 212
- Zachariadis, Nikolaos, 100
- Zanella, Riccardo, 107
- Zbor*, 344
- Zbor narodne garde* (ZNG). *See* Croat Forces
- Zeki Pasha, Halepli, 167
- Zelea Codreanu, Corneliu, 63, 145
- Zervas, Napoleon, 101, 128
- Zhekov, Nikola, **364**
 - and Macedonian Front, 176
 - medical treatment of, 95
- Zhukov, Georgii, 294
- Zog, King of the Albanians, **365**
 - escape from Albania, 8
 - grants by Facists, 4
- Zogu/Zogolli, Ahmed Bey. *See* Zog, King of the Albanians
- zu Wied, Wilhelm, 7
- Zveno, 188–89

This page intentionally left blank

About the Editor

Richard C. Hall, PhD, is a professor of history at Georgia Southwestern State University. His research focuses primarily on early twentieth-century diplomatic and military conflicts in the Balkans. Hall is the author

of *Consumed by War: European Conflict in the 20th Century* (2009); *Balkan Breakthrough: The Battle of Dobro Pole 1918* (2010); and *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War* (1996).